IR 05000155/1979006

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IE Insp Rept 50-155/79-06 on 790403-06.No Noncompliance Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Preparation for Refueling process;pre-fuel Handling Activities,Fuel Handling Activities & Mod of Containment Supply Ventilation Valve
ML19259C346
Person / Time
Site: Big Rock Point File:Consumers Energy icon.png
Issue date: 04/13/1979
From: Reyes L, Streeter J
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML19259C342 List:
References
50-155-79-06, 50-155-79-6, NUDOCS 7906140616
Download: ML19259C346 (5)


Text

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT

REGION III

Report No. 50-155/79-06 Docket No. 50-155 License No. DPR-6 Licensee:

Consumers Power Company 212 k'est Michigan Avenue Jackson, MI 49201 Facility Name:

Big Rock Point Nuclear Plant Inspection At:

Big Rock Point Nuclear Plant, Charlevoix, MI Inspection Con ted:

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Approved By:

re Chief IWN Nuclear Support Section 1 Inspection Summary Inspection on April 3 - 6, 1979 (Report No. 50-155/79-06)

Areas Inspected:

Routine, unannounced inspection of preparation for refueling; pre-fuel handling activities; fuel handling activi-ties; modification of containment supply ventilation valve.

The inspection involved 28 inspector-hours en site by one NRC inspector and included inspectica effort during offshift hours.

Results: No items of noncompliance or deviations were ideatified.

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DETAILS 1.

Persons Contacted

  • C.

Hartman, Plant Superintendent

  • J. S. Rang, Operations and Maintenance Superintendent
  • D. P. Blanchard, Reactor Engineer
  • A.

C. Sevener, Operations Supervisor

  • L.

Monshor, General Engineer

  • T.

C. Bordine, QA Superintendent

  • D.

E. DeMoor, Technical Engineer

  • G.

D. Gilbody, QA Engineer

  • K.

M. Brun, Senior Secretary The inspector also contacted several other licensee employees, including members of the technical and engineering staffs, reactor and juniliary operators ar.d clerical personnel.

  • Denotes those attending the exit interview.

2.

Pre-Fuel Handling Activities The inspector verified that surveillance testing had been com-pleted on Technical Specification requirements, refueling machine operation, ventilation requirement in fuel storage areas, re-fueling interlocks, crane testing, refueling deck radiation monitors, and communication systems.

The inspector also verified that approved procedures are available for new fuel receipt and inspection and for fuel transfer and core verification.

In addition, the inspector verified that new fuel was received and inspected in accordance with the licensee's procedures.

The inspector reviewed the following procedures relative to fuel handling.

" Exxon - G4 Fuel Receiving Inspection" (RI - 10251)

a.

b.

" Fission Counting Instrumentation Calibration and Neutron Response Check" (TR-20, Rev 3)

c.

" Rod Withdrawal Permissive Interlock Test" (TR-02)

d.

" Fuel Bundle Removal Procedures" (0-FFI-1, Rev 0)

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e.

" Emergency Diesel Generator Auto Star c Test" (T7-01, Rev '_2)

f.

" Master Check-Off Sheet" (0-TCS-1, Rev 22)

g.

" Fuel Handling Equipment Saf ety Check" (TR-07, Rev 6)

h.

" Transfer Cask - Preparation for Refueling" (MFHS-1 Rev 7)

1.

" Fuel Bundle Core Loading Procedure" (TR-46, Rev 7)

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

3.

Fuel Handling Activities

'

The inspector verified by direct, observations that core moni-toring during refueling operations was in accordance with Technical Specifications, that containment integrity during refueling operations was in accordance with the Technical Specifications, that fuel bundle insertion and removal were in accordance with established procedures, that fuel account-ability methods were in accordance with established procedures, that core internals were stored to protect against damage, that housekeeping was proper, that vessel level was in accor-dance with the Technical Specifications, that the reactor mode switch position was as requiied by the Technical Specifi-cations, and that control blade checks were performed.

The inspector also observed that the individual directing fuel handling activities held a senior operating license and was present directly supervising activities, and that a licensed reactor operator was present in the control room and in constant direct communication with a member of the fuel handling crew when work was being performed that could affect the reactivity of the core.

The inspector also verified that operations personnel stationed on the refueling bridge had received prior fuel handling training.

The observations were performed from the control room and the refueling deck during regular and offshift hours.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

4.

Control Blade Boron Carbide Tubes Examination During the Eddy Current examination of the boron carbide rods from Control Blade 49, the highest exposure blade, cracking was observed. The crack that was visually verified was an axial crack about 0.5 inches long and about two mils wide.

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The license performed a safety evaluation based on information supplied by General Electric Company.

The licensee concluded that core loading will proceed and that subcriticality checks will be performed after inserting each bundle.

As part of the refueling observations, the inspector verified that subcriticality checks were performed after the insertion of each bundle during the time of the inspection.

The inspector verified that NRR had been informed of the cracking problem. Meetings have been scheduled between the licensee and NRR on this subject.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

5.

Supply Ventilation Valve Disc Modification The inspector reviewed the modification package used to improve the seal arrangement of supply ventilation valve CV/4097 (Allis-Chalmers Streamseal Model 50 FR).

The modification consisted of machining the valve disc to receive a new type rubber seat and retaining ring.

The licensee stated that the new disc seating capture mecha-nism does not depend upon bolt penetration but on a larger rubber width. Leakage paths through the bolts on the original design were the cause for excessive leakage and failure of several routine local leak rate tests.

The new design will also provide for uniform compression on the rubber seat which will reduce the need for frequent seal adjustments. The modification is expected to provide more reliable containment integrity since the causes for the local leak rate test failures have been eliminated.

A vendor representative was onsite during the implementa-tion of the valve modification.

The inspector verified that the procedure for Specification Field Change 79-003 (Supply Ventilation Valve Disc Modification) contained administrative approvals for removing the system from service and returning it to service, hold points for inspection and signoff by quality assurance personnel, provisions for testing following maintenance, provisions for assuring that a system is aligned for normal service following maintenance.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

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6.

Plant Tour The inspector conducted a tour of various areas of the plant to observe operations and activities in progress, general housekeeping and cleanliness, and equipment caution or lockout tags.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

7.

Exit Interview The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1) at the conclusion of the inspection on April 6, 1979. The inspectors summarized the purpose and the scope of the inspection and the findings.

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