IR 05000155/1977012
| ML20002E425 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Big Rock Point File:Consumers Energy icon.png |
| Issue date: | 09/28/1977 |
| From: | Hunter D, Kohler J, Warnick R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20002E424 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-155-77-12, NUDOCS 8101270942 | |
| Download: ML20002E425 (9) | |
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e U.S. NUCLEAR RECULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND EHFORCDIENT
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REGION III
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Report No. 50-155/77-12 Docket No. 50-155 License No. DPR-6 Licensee: Consumers Power Company 212 West Michigan Avenue Jackson, MI 49201 Facility Name:
Big Rock Point Nuclear Plant Inspection'at:. Big Rock Point Site, Charlevoix, MI
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Inspection Conducted: August 17-19 and September 6-9, 1977 l
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Inspectors:
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. Hunter J. E. Kohler
$fh Approved by:
R. F. Warnick, Chief 9-28-2'7 Reactor Projects Section 2 l'
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Inspection Summary Inspection on August 17-19 and September 6-9, 1977 (Report No. 50-155/77-12)
Areas Inspected: Routine, announced inspection of plant operations, records, reportable occurrences, maintenance, outstanding inspection items, and pro-cedures and preparation of the containment integrated leak rate test.
The inspection involved 41 inspector-hours onsite by two URC inspectors.
Results: No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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DETAILS
~ Section I
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Persons Contacted
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- C. J. Hartman, Plant Superintendent
- D.
E. DeMoor, Technical Engineer
- T. W. Elward, Technical Superintendent F. J. Valade, Shif t Supervisor W. F. Blissett,' Shift Supervi cr R. E. Schrader, Senior Technologist
- A. C. Sevener, Operations Supervisor
- G. Gilbody, Quality Assurance Engineer
- K. M. Brun, Plant Review Committee Secretary The inspector contacted several other licensee employees, including members of the technical, engineering, administrative staffs, and reactor and auxiliary operators.
- donotes those attending the management exit on September 9, 1977.
2.
Plant Operations The inspector reviewed general plant operations including selected logs, procedures, enntrols, control room manning, equipment tagout status, plant system status, selected plant annunciators, and plant deviation reports.
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The inspector noted that the licensee had identified and taken the
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appropriate corrective actions concerning two items; the failure to follow a procedure during a plant special surveillance test (SST-02, RDS Valve Test, step 3.3), and the failure of the Plant Review Com-mittee to review a safety related procedure (Plant Manual, Volume 13)
due to inadequate procedural controls.
The licensee.also identified setpoint drifts during the refueling calibration of certain reactor pressure instrumentation (PS-RE-07A, 07B, 07C, 07D). The instrument setpoints had drifted in the con-servative direction and were reset to be within the desired tolerances.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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Records The inspector reviewed selected plant records to ascertain that con-trol, storage, retention, and retrieval of records and documents b
.were in accordance with the requirements. The inspector noted that-the licensee is continuing to pursue complete implementation of the records storage system at the plant.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
4.
Reportable Occurrences The inspector reviewed the licensee actions completed concerning the following nonroutine event reports to verify that the events were reviewed and evaluated as required, that the corrective actions were taken, and that selected plant limits were not exceeded. The reviev included selected records, meeting minutes, and intervieus of selec-
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ted plant personnel.
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- Reactor Depressurization System Battery "B" I.ow a.
RO 77-21 Specific Gravity.
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RO 77-22 - No. 7, 46 KV Trancformer Removed from Service for Repair Due to a Defective Bushing Insulator.
c.
RO 77-23 - Reactor Depressurization System Steam Drum Actuation Sensor Drift.
d.
RO 77-24 - Visual Indication on the 6 Inch Coolant Inlet Pipe
to the Emergency Condenser Not Within Code Requirements.
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The licensee has cut the weld out for repair. Other. welds inspected in the emergency condenser system revealed no prob-lems.
No further questions are required of this matter at this time.
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RO 77-26 - Reactor Protection System Vacuum Trip Interlock Setpoint Drift.
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RO 77-27 - Failure of t he Automatic Transfer of Power to the Emergency Bus (2B) During Routine Scheduled Surveillance Testing.
The occurrence was apparently caused by an inadequate functional testing program following a modification. The licensee has reviewed the inadequacy and recent modification procedure upgrad-ing should help to preclude such occurrences. During the past
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1/ RO 50-155/77-08.
_ 2/ IE Inspection Rpt No. 50-155/77-02.
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y operating cycle (1975-1977) the emergency power system was operable and the bus tie breaker (2A-2B) which caused the event was maintained in the racked-in position.
No further questions are required of this matte.r at this time.-
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'R0 77-29 - Control Rod Drive Pumps Internal Poppets and External Check Valves Leaked Excessively.
The CRD pump discharge check valves could not be repaired due to internal degradation, therefore, the licensee installed a 2 inch check valve in the common suction line to the CRD pumps
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to provide the redundant containment isolation functions for each pump.
- No further questions are required of this matter at this t,ime.
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RO 77-30 - Control Rod Drive Pump Piston Shaft Cooling /Lubricat-ing Line Design Deficiency (No Check Valves Installed for Con-tainment Isolation).
The recent improvements in the design control procedures should prevent a reoccurrence of this type in the future.
No further questions are required of this matter at this time.
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RO 77-31 - Containment Isolation Check Valve in the Demineralized Water Supply Line Leaked Excessively.
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RO 77-33 - Backup Cooling Supply Hose to the Post-Incident Heat Exchanger Contained a Leaking Section, k.
RO.77-34 - Weld Indications on the 2 Inch Bypass Line Around the Cleanup Demineralizer in the Cleanup System.
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RO 77-35 - Containment Spray Flow Transmitter FT-2164 and FT-2161 Inaccurate.
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tbintenance The inspector reviewed selected maintenance activities during the outage and verified that the maintenance was being performed in accordance with the requirements.
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.The rsview revealed the apparent nezd to strengthen the manage--
ment requirements for implementing quality control and independent verification hold points. This item was discussed at the manage-ment exit.
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No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
6.
Outstanding Inspection Items The Inspector reviewed the following selected outstanding items to assure adequate licensee response and action:
Emergency Diesel Generator Full Lcad Test (TR-42)3/
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.The inspector reviewed the procedure (TR-42, Rev. 1, 4/77, and Rev. 2, 9/9/77). Due to apparent load bank problems, the test was dolcyed for a short period and the inspector discussed the test with the
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licensee representative on September 14, 1977. No problems were-apparently encountered.
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No further questions are required of this matter at this time and this item is considered closed.
Station Battery Service Test (TR-65S, 8/3/77, Rev. 0)4/
The inspector reviewed the procedure and discussed the results with the licensee representative. The test loaded the battery with the simulated emergency loads for a period of 61 minutes. The.est results indicated a total load of 193.9 ampere-hours with a minimum battery voltage of 105.2 volts DC during minute 31 at 401 amperes
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discharge rate. The final battery volaage at the end of minute 61
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was 109.6 volts DC and the voltage recossred to 118.3 volts at zero load at the end of the test.
No further questions are required of this matter at this time and this item is considered closed.
Station Battery Discharge Test (TV-16S, 8/17/77, Rev. 0)b The inspector reviewed the procedure and discussed the results with the licensee representative. The test loaded the battery at greater than 72 amperes for 7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br /> at which time the overall battery voltage dropped below 105 volts DC.
The calculated battery capacity indicated 3/ IE Inspection Rpt No. 50-155/76-12.
4/ ' Ibid.
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86.3 p:rcent as compared to the required 80 percent. The test was considered acceptable. During the test, certain battery cell voltages had decreased'to below 1.75 volts DC (10 celle), certain
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' battery cells specific gravit.v had decreased below 1.090, and one cell voltage had dropped to approximately 0.72 volts DC.
The licensee was reviewing the apparent discrepancies to, determine the corrective actions necessary.
This item was discussed with the licensee representative and will remain open pending the completion and review of the item.
Reactor Depressurizatf 7n System UpS Battery Discharge Test (TV-16 A-D, 8/12/77, Rev. 0)E
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The test loaded the batteries at greater than 26 amperes for approximately I hour when the overall battery voltage decreased to 105 volts DC.
The test revealed battery capacities in excess
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of 100 percent as compared to the requirement of 80 percent. The tests were considered acceptabic. During the tests on the UpS
"B" and "D" batteries, batteries No. 9 and No. 18, res-pectively, indicated low voltage readings. The licensee plans to replace the battery cells. The inspector discussed this item with the licensee representative and this item will remain open pending
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the completion and review of the licensee evaluations.
Emergency Core Cooling System Online Testing 7/8/
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The procedures for online testing of the ECCS were not available for review by the inspector and this item will remain open.
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Primary Ring Core Spray Valves
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The inspector noted that the licensee had elevated the ring core ordergyalves to approximately the 591 foot EL as indicated in the spray from the Commission.
No further questions are required of this matter at this time and the item is considered closed.
Loss of Coolant Qualified pressure Tranrmitter- /
The licensee completed the installation of the LOCA qualified pressure transmitter to provide primary system pressure indication to the reactor operator in the control room for monitoring of the system pressure following an incident.
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7/ Hemorandum and Order dated 5/26/77.
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8/ IE Inspection Rpt No. 50-155/76-10.
9/ Hemorandum and Order dated 5/26/76.
10/ Ltr, Cp to NRR, dtd 6/2/76.
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No further quantions are required of this matter at this time and this item is considered closed.
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No items of noncompliance or deviationa were identified.
Management Exit The inspector conducted a management interview with licensee representa-tives (denoted in paragraph 1) at the conclusion of the inspection at the plant site on September 9, 1977. The inspector summarized the scope and findings of the inspection. The licensee made the following remarks in response to the items discussed by the inspector.
The licensee acknowledged the inspector's statements concerning the instrument drift on the reactor pressure instrumentation.
By telecon on September 14, 1977, the licensee was informed that the out-of-tolerance instrument readings were not reportable due to the drift being in the
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conservative direction; therefore, the actions taken by the licensea -
appeared acceptable (paragraph 21 The licensee acknowledged the inspector's statement that two violations of Technical Specifications had been identified and corrected concerning failure to follow procedures and inadequate procedures (paragraph 2).
The licensee acknowledged the inspector's statement concerning the modi-fication test program as related to the failure to adequately test the emergency bus tie breaker 2A-2B (paragraph 4).
The licensee' acknowledged the inspector's comment concerning the apparent
lack of hold pointn in the procedures aed activities reviewed during the inspection (paragraph 5).
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The licensee acknowledged the inspector's comment and concern that the procedures for online testing of the ECCS instrumentation had not been written and indicated that the. area would be reviewed during a subse-quent inspection (paragraph 6).
By telecon on September 21, 1977, the licensee acknowledged the inspec-tor's statement that a violation of the Technical Specifications and a violation of Criterion XI of Appendix B to 10 CFR 50 had been identified and corrected concerning the failure to maintain containment integrity and inadequate modification testing, respectively (paragraph 4).
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DETAILS
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Section II
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I Prepared by:
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~J. EDRohler
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Reviewed by: //
N W. S'/ Littic, Chief
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Nuc1caf Support Section 1.
Persons Contacted
- J. P. Flynn, Operations Superintendent
- T. W. E1 ward, Techaical Superintendent
- D.
Blanchard, Reactor Engineer
- T. L. Bordine, QA Superintendent
- D. DeMoor, Technical Engineer
- K. M. Brun, Technical Clerk
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- denotes those attending the management exit on August 19, 1977.
2.
Valve Lineup Audit
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The inspector reviewed the proposed valve lineup for the 1977 CILRT.
Ten penetrations were sel uted at random for inspection.
In all cases, the lineup was correct or the proper exemption pertaining to 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, had been applied for.
3.
10 CFR 50, Appendix J, Exemption Request
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The inspector reviewed the exemption request which the licensee had
prepared detailing the specific areas where the licensee's testing program did not meet the provisions of 10 CFR 50, Appendix J.
During the review, it was determined that the licensee did not apply for exemptions in the following areas:
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Primary containment singic bellows.
b.
Formula in Technical Specifications describing acceptance criteria for CILRT.
The licensee stated that modifications to the exemption request would be prepared to include the above areas.
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CILRT Instrumentation and Calibration The inspector reviewed the procedures which describe the steps the licensee takes to calibrate the CILRT instrumentation.
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was determined that'the licensee had no aeceptance criteria to perform the calibration. The licensee stated that the proper acceptance criteria would be developed.
5.
MSIV Testing i
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.The licensee stated.that a hydrostatic test of the main steam isolation valve was the only current Icak test being performed'
on this valve and that the acceptance criteria, as stated in Technical Specification 3.7.B. was in drops /second. Ilowever, the inspector reviewed a Icak test procedure, TV-10, and found no such acceptance criteria. The licensec will add the acceptance criteria.
6.
Exit Interview
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An exit interview was conducted by Mr. Kohler at the conclusion of.this inspection in which the inspector described his finding's'.
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