IR 05000029/1989020
| ML20006C262 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Yankee Rowe |
| Issue date: | 01/26/1990 |
| From: | Blough A NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20006C259 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-029-89-20, 50-29-89-20, NUDOCS 9002070217 | |
| Download: ML20006C262 (19) | |
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t U.S.-NUCLEAR' REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION I
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Report No:
50-29/89-20
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Docket No:-
50-29-
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Licensee'No':
OPR-3)
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' Yankee Atomic Electric Company d
LLicensee:
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580 Main Street-Bolton, Massachusetts 01740-1398
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- Facility Name:. Yankee Nuclear Power Station
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w yInspection at: ~Rowe,-Massachusetts
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Inspection. Conducted:
, November 7, 1989 - Janua'ry'2, 1990
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'-Inspectors:'
-H.~ Eichenholz, Senior Resident Inspector L Markley, Resident Inspector
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! Approved'By:-
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. A. Randy Bigpgh, Chief, Reactor: Projects Section 3A Date
Inspection Summary: Inspection on November 7, 1989 January 2,'1990 (Report
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No. 50-29/89-20)
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A, inspectors of:-operational safety;. security; plant operations; maintenance and:
- Areas Inspected
- : Routine inspection on' daytime'and backshifts by two. resident
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surveillance;fengineering. support; radiological controls; actions on previous
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< inspection findings; licensee event reports; licensee response'to NRC initi -
atives;Eand,-periodic reports.
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General Conclusions on Adeo'uacy, Strength or Weakness :in -Licensee -Programs
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Theilicensee _ demonstrated a high level of commitment in' improving opera-
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tions staffing and procedures.
Several' individuals of.the current operat-i.S Jing. staff?were' advanced'to increased license responsibility. Also, the'
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i 1 licensee hired'several new auxiliary operators.
~During this inspection period, the licensee began an operations procedure
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upgrade program.2 This was,.in part, due to -previous NRC identified weak-
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nesses. The inspector routinely observed operators performing procedure walkdowns=and technical reviews.
Several staff members were activated to support this effort as an operations support group.
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9002070217 900126
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TABLE OF CONTENTS j
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Persons Contacted....................................................
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2.
Summary of Facility Activities.....................
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OperationalSafetyl Verification ~(IP 71707,71710,71714).............
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m 3.1 Plant 0perations Rev1ew.........................................
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3.2 Safety System Review.............................................
3.3: Review of Temporary Changes, Switching and Tagging..............
- 3. 4 - ' Ope ra ti onal Sa f ety Fi ndi n g s.....................................
4 3.5 Cold Weather Preparations.......................................
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3.6 Facility Housekeeping and Fire Protection.......................
1 4.
Engineered Safety Feature System Wal kdown (71710)....................
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Security (IP71707)..................................................
n 5.1 Observations of Physical Securi ty............................
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5.2 Security A11egation.............................................
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Plant Operations'(IP /1707)...........................................
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6.1 Emergency' Load Reduction Due to Generator Hydrogen Leak.........
6.2 Operations Staffing and Program Upgrades........................
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6.3 Reactor-Protection System Instrumentation Dri f t.................
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Maintenance / Surveillance (IP 71710,61726,62703)....................
7 7.1 Charging Pump Strainer Maintenance..............................
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7.2 Safe Shutdown System Surveillance Test..........................-
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7.3 Emergeacy Feedwater Valve Indication............................
8.
' Radiological Controls (IP 71707).....................................
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8.1 Di spo sal of Septi c Tan k S1 udge..................................
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9.
Licensee Event Reporting (LER) (IP 90712)............................
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10. - Review of Licensee Response to NRC Initiatives (IP 92703)............
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10.1 Defsetive Overl oad Rel ay Heaters................................
10.2 ASCO Solenoid Valve Concerns....................................
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i-311. Status: of Previous Find'ing s (IP 92701)...............................
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11.1 (Cl osed) ' Unresolved Item (50-29/89-11-02)....................... : 15 11.2 (Closed) Unresolved Item (50-29/89-11-01).......................
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- 12. Review of Periodic Reports (IP 90713)................................
U 13.-ManagementMeetings(IP30703).......................................
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-?The NRC~ Inspection Manual-inspection procedure (IP.) or temporary. instruction-3Vv '
(TI) or the Region I temporary instruction (RI TI) that was used as inspection
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guidance is listed-for each applicable report section.
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L DETAILS
' 1.
-Persons Contacted-
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Yankee Nuclear Power Station T. Henderson, Plant Superiatendent I
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R. Mellor, Technical' Director
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Yankee Atomic Electric Company (YAEC)
N. St. Laurent, Manager of Operations r
The ins'pector also interviewed other licensee employees during the inspec-tion, including members of the operations, radiation protection, chemis-try,' instrument and control, maintenance, reactor engineering, security, training, technical services and general office staffs.
2.
Summary of Facility Activities Yankee Nuclear Power Station (YNPS, Yankee or the plant) has maintained continuous power operation since August-30, 1989. During the inspection i
period, the plant operated at 100% rated oower until De: ember 14, 1989, when the licensee initiated an emergency soad reduction due_to a loss of generator hydrogen pressure. The leak was quickly secured and full power operation continued-through the end of the inspection period.
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EffectiveiDecember 31, 1989, NRC Senior Resident Inspector (SRI)
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Mr.; Harold Eichenholz completed his assignment at YNPS. The NRC has
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selected Mr.1 Thomas Koshy, currently a Senior Reactor Engineer in the NRC Region'I Division of Reactor Safety, to be the new SRI.
In the interim
" prior to Mr. Koshy's arrival, the current Resident Inspector, v
' Mr. Michael Markley will be the SRI at Yankee.
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During the period of November. 6-9, 1989, a NRC Region I (NRC:RI) special-ist inspector conducted a routine radiation protection program inspection x
(50-29/89-19).
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During the period of November 6-14, 1989, a team inspection was conducted by NRC:RI' personnel, NRC headquarters personnel, one contractor, and the resident inspector to examine the Emergency Operating Procedures (EOP)
program (50-29/89-80).
During the period of November 27 - December 1, 1989, a NRC:RI operator license examiner conducted SR0 requalification reexaminations for three candidates and SR0 license upgrade examinaticos for two candidates
.(50-29/89-22).
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On November 28, 1989, NRC:RI specialist inspectors and the resident in-spector conducted an inspection of the annual emergency preparedness exer-
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'cise (50-29/8,9-21).
3.
Operational Safety Verification-3.1 Plant Operations Review The inspector observed plant operations during regular and backshift tours-of the following areas:
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Control Room Safe Shutdown System Building i
Primary Auxiliary Building Fence Line (Protected Area)
Diesel Generator Rooms Intake Structure Vital Switchgear Room Turbine Building Cable Tray House Spent Fuel Pit (SFP) Building Safety Injection Building The following items were checked during daily-routine facility tours:
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shift staffing, access control, adherence to procedures and limiting
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conditions of operation (LCOs), instrumentation, recorder traces,.
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protective systems, control room annunciators, area radiation ar.d j
process monitors, emergency power source operability, operability of
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the. Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS), control room lop,' shift
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supervisor logs, and operating orders. On a weekly basis, selected Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) trains were verified to be operable, i
The condition of plant equipment, radiological controls, security and zl safety were assessed. On a biweekly frequency, the inspector re-
viewed safety-related tagouts, chemistry sample results, shift turn--
overs, portions of the containment isolation valve lineup and the posting of notices to workers.
Plant housekeeping and fire protec-
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- tion were also evaluated.
Inspections of the control room were performed on weekends an? ow. '
shifts as follows: November 9, 13' 19, 30 and December 2, 11, 12,
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m 20. Operators and shift supervisors were alert, attentive and re-spanded appropriately to annunciators and plant conditions.
~3.2 Safety System Review The emergency diesel generators, EDG fuel oil, residual heat removal, and safety inje:: tion systems were reviewed to verify proper alignment and operational status.
The review included verification that (1) accessible major flow path valves were correctly positioned,
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(ii): power supplies were energized, (iii) lubrication and component cooling was proper, and (iv) components were operable based on a E
' visual inspection of equipment for leakage and general conditions.
System walkdowns to assess the material conditica of the ECCS HPSI
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l and LPSI and the low pressure safety injection accumulator were per-l
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formed.. Selected accessible valves were verified to be in the cor-rect position and locked when required by plant procedures.
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.The condition of those system components inspected was good.
Leakage from system piping and flanged joints was not observed..No unaccept-able _ conditions were identified regarding ECCS pump lubrication.
The inspector'verifie:. that local instrumentation.was operable by
ob' serving channel checks with remote indication. The inspector iden-
.tified'no conditions adverse to safety during inspection of ECCS equipment.
3.3 Review of Temporary Changes Switching and Tagging
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Temporary change requests (TCRs), which were approved in. support of implementing-lifted' leads and jumper requests and mechanical by-passo, were reviewed to verify that: controls established by AP-
-0018,l" Temporary Change Control," were met; no conflicts with the Technical Specifications were created; the requests were properly.
approved prior ~to installation; and a safety evaluation in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59 was prepared if required.
Implementation of the
. requests was reviewed on a sampling basis,
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The switching and tagging log was reviewed cnd tagging activities were inspected to verif./ plant 'equipmer,t was controlied in accordance
'with the requirements ef AP 0017,
" Switching and Tagging of Plant Equipment."
Licensee administrative control of off-normal system configurations s
'by the use of TCR and switching and tagging procedures as reviewed above, was in compliance with procedural instructions and was con-sistent with plant safety. No unacceptable conditions were identi -
fied.
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3.4.0perational Safety Findings Operations shift personnel demonstrated noteworthy command and con-trol during significant activities impacting the control room.
Specifically, the operating shift crews maintained a high level of safety and decorum while effectively supporting the' NRC einergency operating procedures (EOP) inspection, the annual emergency prepared-ness exercise, SR0 operator licensing requalification reexamination and.SR0 license examination upgrades. The inspector observed no de-gradation in the quality of operating shif t personnel performance.
Control room professionalism and decorum for routine plant activities were exemplary. The inspector routinely observed plant personnel obtain proper access prior to entering the operating shift work area.
Senior operations management oversight was good.
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3.5 Cold Weather Preparations lJ The inspector reviewed licensee preparations for extreme cold weather l
relative to station procedures, controls detailed in the' response to
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IE Bulletin 79-24, and good engineering practices. The condition of~
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those systems and. components inspected was good.
Systems susceptible.
to freezing were. adequately protected with heat tracing, insulation,
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or space heating units.
Inspector observation of control circuitry indicated the systems were properly energized.
Routine examination
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of thermostat indications evidenced adequa+.c temperature settings.
The inspector noted no anomalous freezing -incidents during sub-zero i
' environmental temperatures. No unacceptable conditions were identi-
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fied.
3.6. Facility Housekeeping and Fire Protection
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During.this inspection period, the licensee continued to implement structural upgrades to the primary auxiliary building (PAB) that in-
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volved the installation-of a new roof and painting of the floors.
The activity was being controlled in accordaace with Engineering De-sign Change Request (EDCR)86-308. On November 8 and 9,1989, during
adverse weather conditions (heavy rain), the 1icensee discovered that
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protective measures for roof construction / modification hari not-pre-
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venMd water penetration into areas of the. upper PAB.
Specifically,
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large quantities of rain water were observed coming through the PAB roof'near the sample sink area, the component cooling heat exchan-gers, and the high pressure safety injection (HPSI) flow control
valve SI-MOV-46.
A prior NRC observation-involving the intrusion of.
rain water-into a plant building during the. implementation of EDCR-86-308 roof modification related activities is documented in NRC In-
,spection Report 50-29/89-17, Section 4.4.
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The licensee initiated immediate corrective actions to stop the rain water intrusion into the upper PAB.
The shift supervisor (SS) ex-amined the leakage and determined no conditions existed.which affected equipment operability.
However, the inspector observed -
water running down the front of a wall where a non watertight elec-
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.trical-junction box associated with valve SI-MOV-46 was mounted. The
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inspector identified this condition to the'SS who similarly examined
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the condition and concluded that the junction box was safe and that
.no further action was necessary. The inspector expressed concern
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that this conclusion was reached without examining the interior of the junction box.
The licensee opened the junction box and found a small a nount of water in the bottom.
However, nu water was found on electrical circuitry. The water was removed and the cover was re-
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installed.
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- S On November 16, 1989, local weather bureaus issued > *evere weather warning.- The licensee implemented OP-3019, Rev.1, " Severe Weather Guidelines," to secure loose equipment and materials. : Emergency diesel generators were load tested. Although the storm did,not nega-tively impact.the. plant, licensee preparations were effective.
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No-subsequent incidents of rain intrusion occurred. Although the
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licensee demonstrated good initiative in upgrading the condition of the' plant, as' discussed above, cognizant, personnel occasionally Llacked'the proper. sensitivity to maintaining optimum equipment con-
.ditions-and housekeeping.
Therefore, lapses in the quality of-per-
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formance did occur.
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4.
Engineered Safey' Feature' System Walkdown-
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The inspector independently verified the operability of the emergency feedwater system (EFW) by performing a complete walkdown of the accessible portions of the system to:
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confirm that the licensee'sLsystem lineup procedures-match plant
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drawings and the as-built configurations;
. identify equipment conditions-and items that might degrade perform-
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ance; ensure that no prohibited ignition. sources or flammable materials
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were present in-the vicinity of the' system without proper authoriza-tion; verify appropriate levels of cleanliness were being maintained;
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verify technical specification requirements were adhered to;
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. verify proper breaker position at local electrical boards and switch
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positions at control boards; confirm-that support systems essential to equipment actuation and
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performance were operational; and, c
verify valves were properly positioned and locked as appropriate.
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Inspector' review noted good agreement of procedure No. OP-2259, Rev. 3,
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'" Emergency Feedwater System At-Power Alignment Check," with the station safety systems manual and as-built drawings.
Proper system alignment was verified. Component-labeling was generally good.
However, the inspector noted two valves without tags. The licensee properly initiated measures V
to have labels made.
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Power supply and breaker alignment was verified.
Instrumentation calibra-tion data was up'to date and indicated proper calibration periodicities.
L Required flowpath heat tracing was verified energized. Hangers were in good physical. condition.
-The= overall condition of the EFW system is good. - Appropriate corrective measures were previously initiated for degraded-equipment observed by.the inspector.
Specifically, the following maintenance request tags were
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attached t'o the following components:
.t MR 89-312, Valve AS-V-719 (VC Isolation Boundary), Body-to-Bonnet
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flange leak, initiated January 18, 1989.
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MR 89-1049, Valve AS-PCV-451, Does not Regulate, initiated April 28
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1989.
MR 89-2256, Valve HIS-V-698, Flange Leak, initiated November 29,
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The inspector discussed the above MRs with the licensee.
Valves AS-V-719
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and HIS-bo98' cannot be fully repaired during plant operation. Although mainter,ance has been performed to seal the leaks, ultimate repairs are planned for the June'1990 refueling outage.
Valve-AS-PCV-451 is placed in the open position (at power lineup for system operation) pending replace-ment of the= regulating device.
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Licensee corrective measures and planned maintenance is adequate to ensure system operability and containment pent tration boundary integrity. No
- unacceptable conditions were identified.
5.
Security
5.1 Observations of Physical Security
Selected aspects of plant physical security were reviewed during i
regular and backshift hours to verify that controls were in accord-
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ance with the security planLand approved procedures. This review
=l included the following security measures: guard staffing, vital and-j protected area barriEP integrity, maintenance of isolation zones, and i
implementation of access controls including authorization, badging,
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escorting, and searches, No inadequacies were identified.
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5.2 Security Allegation (RI-89-A-0140)
On December 2, 1989, the inspector received an allegation from an l
individual who raised the following concerns:
-At approximately 3:15 p.m. on December 1, 1989, an unidentified
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individual approached the plant and walked along the protected area fence for approximately 150 yards undetected by plant
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security. Plant personn'el observed the individual touch-the J
fence-several times while traversing the distance.
No intrusion al m s occurred.
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'ip alleger contends that cognizant security oerunnel were in-
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- attentive due to excessive overtime, work-related reading, and a:
lack of dedicated staffing at surveillance positions.
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The inspector reviewed this event and found that,-immediately follow-j
'ing the incident, security personnel tested plant intrusion detection-devices.'- No unacceptable conditions were-identified. The inspector
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verified the. accuracy and validity of the licensee findings.-
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The-inspector reviewed security personnel overtime' for the months-immediately preceding the incident and for the 1989 calendar year.
Security overtime mas. consistent with.the overtime worked by other
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j" station departments and-was not excessive. The avert.ae annual. over-time for -individual security' personnel in 1989 was approximately.250 hours0.00289 days <br />0.0694 hours <br />4.133598e-4 weeks <br />9.5125e-5 months <br />.
The work-related' reading and staffing-dedication contentions were-i rev'ewed by NRC Region I security personnel.
The licensee practice to allow selecteiwork-related. reading was acceptable. Current staffing dedication levels are consistent with the Security Plan and
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regulatory requirements.
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NoLunacceptable conditions were identified.
~6.
Plant Operations
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6.I' Emergency Load Reduction' Due to Generator Hydrogen Leak At 11:13 p.m. on December 14, 1989, the licensee initiated an emer-
.gency controlled plant load red.ction due to a loss of generator hydrogen pressure. The licensee. identified the pressure loss as a leak by the generator hydrogen supply valve GG-SV-59. Personnel-secured-the leak of 11:18 p.m. and terminated-the' load reduction.
~0perators returned the plant to full rated power without any prob-lems. The total load reduction was approximately 2 MWe. Maintenance
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' Request No. 89-2381 was submitted to effect.long term repairs.
Inspector review noted strong operator performance. -Personnel ac-tions were conservative in initiating the load reduction. The hydro-s gen leak was-secured in a timely manner consistent with plant safety.
6.2 Operations Staffing and Prograrc Upgrades
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During this inspection period, the licensee demonstrated a high level of commitment to improving operations. staffing and procedures.- One senior reactor operator (SRO) licensed reactor operator (RO) was-
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advanced to shif* control room operator (SCRO) responsibility. Four
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R0-licensed auxiliary operators (A0s) were advanced-to routine con :
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trol room R0 duty..Six new A0s were hired. Also, one R0 was dedi-cated to support plant-initiatives to improve plant labeling.
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During this inspection period, the licensee began an operations pro-
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cedure upgrade program. This was, in part, due to previously NRC-
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identified weaknesses.
The licensee established a central work.
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facility to support this effort, The inspector routinely observed l
operators performing procedure walkdowns and technical reviews..
Several staff members were activated to form the initial core of an operations support group.. The licensee is now being responsive to-
NRC identified concerns in this area.
6.3 Reactor Protection System Instrumentation Drift During OP-4601', Rev. 23, " Nuclear Instrumentation Channel Functional Test," on November 22, 1989, the licensee determined that the No.'3 intermediate range-(IR) nuclear instrument reactor trip startup rate (SUR) setpoint had drifted in a non-conservative manner. Specific-ally, the observed setpoint was 5.5 decades per minute (DPM) whereas Technical Specifications (TS) require the safety limit setting to be less than or equal to 5.2 DPM.
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The licensee initiated an event reportability evaluation which deter-
mined it not reportable for the current condition of the plant (Mode i
1-PowerOperation). The licensee corrected the setpoint value to 5.0'
l DPM;and returned the instrument to service.
The inspector questioned the licensee what the SUR setpoint had been during:the August 1989 startup. The licensee provided the inspector with instrumentation setpoint trending for IR No. 3 for the 1989 n
calendar year.
No unacceptable setpoints were previously identified.
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The inspector.had no further questions. The licensee is continuing L
to monitor IR No. 3_SUR setpoint performance. The licensee hopes to alleviate many nuclear instrumentation problems when installation and c
L testing of the new indication system is complete. This is planned
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for the 1990 refueling outage.
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Maintenance / Surveillance L"
The inspector observed and reviewed maintenance and surveillance problem b
investigation activities to verify compliance with regulations, admini-
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strative.and maintenance and surveillance procedures, codes and standards,
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proper QA/QC involvement, safety tag use, equipment alignment, jumper use, personnel qualification, radiological controls for worker protection, fire E
protection, retest requirements, LC05, evaluation of test results, removal L,
and restoration of equipment, deficiency review, resolution and report-ability per Technical Specifications.
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7.1 Charging pump Strainer Maintenance
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Durihg a tour on November 30, 1989, the inspector ob' served "QC Hold
= Tags" on No. 2 and No. 3 charging pump suction lines. At the time,.
the No. 3 charging pump was the operating pump providing charging flow to_the main coolant system (MCS).
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The inspector questioned the operations shift supervisor (SS) why the
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charging: pump was operating with a hold tag. -The SS was not aware of-l the hold tags and had no documentation relative to their issuance.
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The SS dispatched an operator to examine.the' tags.
It was determined
that the hold tags had been installed.during charging pump strainer cleaning and fastener replacement per Maintenance. Request (MR) No.
89-2106, " Charging Pumps No. 1,'2, and 3 Strainers.".The charging
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pumps and strainers are a Safety Class 2'(SC-2) system. The fast-l
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'eners replaced on the No. 2 and No. 3 charging pump strainers were
commercial. grade, non-nuclear safety (NNS) class A194-2H hexagonal nuts. -The subject fasteners were purchased for another job and had
~been maintained in the stockroom " hold area" pending testin'g and-documentation to upgrade the material from NNS.to SC-1.. On November
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7, maintenance' supervision obtained authorization from the Plant Superintendent to remove the fasteners from the storeroom and install
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them prior to possessing upgrade qualification documentary evidence by securing his signature on the QC hold tags.
Maintenance personnel completed the work and the Nos. 2 and 3 charging pumps were returned to service on November 8 and 9,.respectively.
The licensee received the fastener qualification documentary evidence satisfying SC-1 re-quirements on November 20. The hold tags were removed following identification by the NRC.
The.-inspector reviewed the above described activities with licensee management relative to station procedures, industry standards,. and regulatory requirements.
The licensee initiated a quality assurance (QA) assessment which resulted in the issuance of Nonconformance Re-
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port No. 89-21.
The licensee determined that the fasteners had been authorized for use contrary to step A.11 of station procedure AP-0206, Rev. '10,
"Nonconformance Report." Specifically, after an NCR is approved, the materials or services in question may be placed in service by the Plant Superintendent or alternate,.on a permanent or temporary basis, even though, further actions maybe required by the disposition of the NCR.
Contrary to the above, no NCR was approved prior to authoriza-tion for use and installation-of the fasteners.
~ Licensee corrective actions detailed in the NCR 89-21 disposition included refamiliarizing personnel with the requirements of AP-0206, reminding personnel that adequate information and/or documentation must be:obtained in order to install equipment being upgraded for
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safety class applications, evaluating procedures to better delineate
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Lthe' method for controlling " Tagged" material, and evaluating the
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Quality Services Group (QSG) observations and recommendations.- The
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licensee'also accepted the installed fasteners based on the documen-tary evidence supporting upgrading the material to SC-1.
r The inspector noted significant weakness in personnel performance and
program implementation.
Poor communications were evident in that the cognizant Maintenance: Services Department (MSD) engineer who pur-
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' chased ~ the fasteners for-another job was not consulted regarding the matarial qualification and use.
Subsequent operations shift crews
were' not informed regarding the hold tags - No onsite engineering-i evaluation of1the material integrity was performed.
10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterien XV specifies measures shall be
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established to. control materials, parts, or components which do not
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conform to requirements in; order-to prevent their inadvertent use or
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-installation.
It further_ specifies that nonconforming items shall be-reviewed and accepted, rejected, repaired or reworked in accordance with documented procedures.
Licensee pe~rsonnel, including senior management, demonstrated in-
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adequate knowledge of program guidance for'the disposition and use of nonforming' material s.
Procedure AP-0207, Rev. 8 " Equipment Control,"
. specifies in step II. A.7.c., that cases were required documentary evidence is-not available, the associated equipment or materials-shall be considered nonconforming.
Procedure AP-0212, Rev. 16, " Con-l trol of Purchased Material, Equipment and Services,"' requires in step
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II.A.4...that documentary evidence that items conform to procurement requirements shall be available prior to installation or use of such; items where required by code, regulation or contract requirements.
Contrary to the above, the licensee installed nonconforming materials without-the' required documentary evidence.
Procedure AP-0206, Rev. 10M, "Nonconformance Report," requires in discussion step No. 4 nonconforming raterials, parts or components which depart from'specified requirements that render the quality of o
an item unacceptable shall be reported under an NCR. Step A.11 of
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the same-procedure specifies that the Plant Superintendent may authorize the materials or services in question to be placed in ser-p vice after an NCR is approved.
Contrary to the above, no NCR was
issued and the fasteners were authorized for use contrary to station procedures, m-The installation of nonconforming materials on the Nos. 2 and 3 charging pumps constitutes a violation of station procedures and 10 l-CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XV (50-29/89-20-01).
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7.2 Safe Shutdown' System (SSS)L Surveillance Test
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On' November 29,11989, the inspector observed the: licensee perform surveillance test OP-4253, Rev. 6, Att. B, "SSS Quarterly Operability Test." Cognizant ' personnel obtained the proper authorization prior-to commencing the surveillance. The. licensee performed valve and
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breaker alignment, switching and tagging in accordance with the pro-cedure.
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During the test, a leak was identified on the primary pump P-82. dis-
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charge valve SS-V-355.
It _resulted in a steam plume in-the pump room-and water on the floor.
The licensee evaluated the deficiency and-determined that the surveillance test could be continued. No addi-
.tional-anomalies occurred. ~The surveillance test was completed with all. acceptance criteria satisfied.. Maintenance Request No. 89-2260
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Inspector review noted licensee performance for the test was gene-
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rally good.
Personnel were conservative in assessing tne leak.
l Electrical' and operating equipment were not challenged by the 1eak.
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Good communication with the control room was maintained. The' system l
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was properly. restored to the original configuration.
No unacceptable
conditions were identified.
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j 7.3 Emergency Feedwater Valve Position Indication.
On November 9, 1989, the operations department was performing sur-ve111ance testing on the Emergency Feedwater (EFW) System and noted a
potential position indication problem-on the EBF-MOV-555 valve.
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Specifically, the valve was observed to move only 90% of the full open position while driven by the valve!s motor operator. The re-i mainingL10% of travel occurred from mechanical coasting to the back-
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seat position.
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Maintenance Request (MR) _
wastinitiated.to investigate this
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89-2145 apparent equipment discrepancy. Following release of the equipment to the maintenance department on-November 9, 1989, testing of the valve.
l was performed.
No deficiencies were identified.
Stroke times were -
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compared to previous history and found to be acceptable. Maintenance personnel confirmed that standard procedure.is to adjust the open i
limit switch to deenergize the motor operator at 90% of full open
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travel to preclude the possibility of backseating the valve while the
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valve operator is energized. The inspector identified no concerns in
the-manner with which maintenance and surveillance activities wore conducted on the EFW System and the way-potential deficiencies were
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Even though the final resolution of this item indicates j
there was no actual deficiency, operators displayed good attention to i
deta11'and a proper questioning attitude.
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Radiological controls were reviewed on a routine basis relative to indus-try radiological ~ standards, administrative and radiological control pro-'
cedures, and regulatory requirements. Selected work evolutions were ob-
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. served to determine the adequacy of program implementation commensurate
- with the radiological hazards and importance to safety.
Independent sur-
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veys were performed by the inspector to verify the adequacy of radiologi-cal controls and instructions to workers.
Inplant. radiation pretection program implementation was consistently good.
~The inspector identified no unacceptable conditions - Personnel demon-
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strated a proper questioning attitude in both planning and impicmenting
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radiological work controls.
8.1. Disposal of Septic Tank Sludge In October, 1989, the licensee determined the presence of trace levels of radioactivity in the plant's septic tank sludge. As a're-sult, the Yankee Nuclear Services Division (YNSD) performed an eva19-ation of=several potential options for the disposal of the sludge.
This evaluation was documented in YNSD memorandum REG 215/89, dated October 20, 1989, to the Plant Superintendent.
The evaluation recommended that the contents of the onsite septic tank (7000 gallons with approximately 2 microcuries of total radio-activity) be-disposed of at a municipal sanitary. sewerage treatment facility in accordance with 10 CFR 20.303.
Furthermore, the evalu-ation indicated that the sanitary waste process employed at the facility (septic tank with leach field) does not constitute a com-plete sewage treatment system. Thus, the existing guidance is NRC Information Notice'(IN) 88-22, Disposal of Sludge from Onsite Sewage
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Treatment-Facilities at Nuclear Power Stations, is not applicable.
Subsequent to the issuance of the above noted evaluation, the plant Technical Director (TD) provided the document to the inspector. The inspector transmitted the licensee evaluation to the.NRC Region I Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards cognizant specialist in-spector.. Following specialist inspector review of the licensee docu-ment, the licensee was informed that the NRC did not concur with licansee plans'to< dispose of the septage in accordance with 10 CFR 20.303.
It was the NRC Region I position that the guidance in IN 88-22 was applicable to on-site septic systems because a septic sys-tem is a form of treatment facility. Therefore, transfer to an off-site facility would be acceptable only if NRC approval is first ob-tained per 10 CFR 20.302.
The.NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regula-s tion (NRR) was consulted and agreed that a 10 CFR 20.302 request is required, since questions of solubility and dispersibility of the material exist.
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'As of the end of the inspection period, the licensee was in the pro-cess'of developing a 10 CFR 20.302 application for the proposed dis-
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posal of the septage.
9..
Licensee Event Reporting (LER)
The inspector reviewed the below listed licensee event reports (LER) to determine that with respect to the general aspects of the event: (1) the report was submitted in a timely manner; (2) description of the events was accurate; (3) root cause analysis was performed; (4) safety implications were> considered; and (5) corrective actions implemented or planned were:
. sufficient,to preclude recurrence of a similar event.
9.1 LER 89-12-The LER 89-12, " Degradation of a Main Coolant System Boundary Results
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in Steam Leak,". addresses the August 24,.1989, identified main coolantisystem (MCS) leak from the socket weld of the loop No. 2 by -
pass line hich point vent valve.
Repairs required taking the plant
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to cold shutdown conditions. An Unusual Event (UE) was declared based on MCS leakage:within the capacity of charging pump flow. The
- preliminary cause of the weld failure was fatigue. A thorough fail-=
ure analysis is.being conducted.
The licensee pl.ans to supplement the LER if significant new information results from the analysis.
The LER provided a concise description of the sequence of events'and noted a similar event reported in LER 83-25.
The inspector had no further questions.
No deficiencies were identified.
10. - Review of Licensee Response to NRC ' Initiatives 10,1 Defective Overload Relay Heaters Pursuant to 10 CFR Part 21, Telemecanique Inc. advised the NRC Region
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-I Regional Administrator on October 17, 1989, that a potential for
defective relay heaters with the catalogue numbers G30T9 thru G30T16 existed. The' concern involves weak resistance welded electrical con-nections. Visual inspection can be used to identify heaters which have suspect welded connections. -Yankee was listed as potential re-cipient'of defective components. A separate advisory was issued to the licensee on this subject by Telemecanique Inc. on October 18, 1989. The inspector noted that the specified catalogue numbers are used in safety related motor operated valve circuits at YNPS.
Independent of the above notification, the on-site technical services department (TS0) was in receipt of an October 11, 1989 Yankee Quality Assurance Department memorandum (QAD 89-586/4-5), that documented a Yankee QA surveillance activity conducted at Telemecanique facility in which overload heaters procured for another plant were found to be improperly welded. The onsite TSD conducted an inspection of
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one style of overload heater and determined that-six of eleven in-
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spected units were defective. The licensee issued Nonconformance Re-
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N port (NCR) No. 89-15 on October -17,1989. The Plant Operations Re-
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view Committee (PORC) reviewed the NCR at the October 31,.1989 meet-
ing (No.89-107).- The NCR indicated 1) that the receipt inspection, testing, and post maintenance testing operations checks were effec-
1 tive for the devices installed in the plant; 2) that the remaining stock would be placed in a condition that would restrict the-issuance j
m without maintenance supervision approval; and 3) that Yankee Nuclear Services Department was to evaluate the condition and provide a re-ceipt inspection technique to detect the bad welds. The PORC deter-
. mined that it:was not necessary to test all heaters at this time.
The cognizant MSD engineer informed the inspector that the installed units (a total of nine) would-be inspected in the June 1990 refueling outage. On. December 8., 1989, the inspector provided the Quality Ser-vices Group (QSG) a copy of the Telemecanique Inc. letter to the NRC dated October 17,-1989.
In response, a QA evaluation was initiated.
This evaluation reviewed all existing documentation on the subject, inspected all units existing in stock ~.and determined how many units were issued. Out of 139 units inspected, six additional defects were found. Nine units had been issued to the field for installation in
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The results of the QSG evaluation are contained in
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Quality Assurance. Surveillance Report No. 89-77. dated December 14,
1989.
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The inspector requested that the licensee review their material issue-process and maintenance records to provide the assurance that com-ponents in the field have not.been subject to the identified defect.
The cognizant MSD engineer informed the inspector that post mainten-
'ance testing provides a proper basis that the replaced component is
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not defective.
This testing includes multi-amp trip testing of the.
thermal overload relay heater following replacement followed by valve cycling. On December 11, 1989, the cognizant MSD engineer documented that none of the replaced heaters had been the result of the weld separation defects; that all replaced units in the field had been
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overload trip tested in accordance with plant procedures OP-5758 or OP-5755; and that Telemecanique Inc, concurred with the licensee
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position that deferral of visual inspection of. installed relay
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L heaters until the 1990 refueling outage is appropriate based upon the-post-maintenance testing employed by the licensee and the continued i;
satisfactory operation of the installed equipment.
L The licensee was responsive to NRC concerns on this subject and the l _
inspector had no further questions on this item.
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10.2 ASCO Solenoid Valve Concerns On December 1,1989, two of eight main steam isolation valves (MSIVs)
at the River Bend Station (an NRC Region IV plant) reopened after being slow closed following plant cooldown.
This event was attribut-able to sticky solenoids on ASCO dual coil solenoid valves, Model No.
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8323. To aid the NRC events assessment and draft generic communica-tions on this subject, the NRC Region I Director, Division of Reactor
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Projects' requested on December 8, 1989,'that the inspector'obtain i
answers to questions related to the use and testing of the subject-
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valves at the Yankee Nuclear Power Station, Following discussion of the concerns with licensee personnel and the review of procurement t
records, the inspector determined that'the subject' solenoids were not
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in use at this facility.
l The licensee also provided the inspector with a March 13, 1989, t
evaluation of operating experience for NRC Information Notice No.
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88-43, Solenoid Valve Problems, which described a number of oper-ability problems associated with the. dual-coil solenoid valve Model
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NP8323 manufactured by ASCO, determined that the subject valves are not in use at this facility.
The inspector had no further questions on this matter.
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11. -Status of Previous Inspection Findings 11.1 (Closed) Unresolved Item (50-29/89-11-02), Review of Licensee
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Actions to Address Uncontrolled Plant Modification.
i This item is related to the uncontrolled modification to the safety injection accumulator drain valve SI-V-50 (Safety Class 2) configura-r tion.
Licensee corrective actions detailed in Nonconformance Report
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No. 89-10 were adequate in ensuring that no unreviewed safety ques-tions existed for the as-found conditions.
Inspector review noted-the engineering evaluation was technically sound and conservative.
Resolution of corrective actions to preclude recurrence was adequate.
This item is closed.
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11.2 (Closed) Unresolved Item (89-11-01) Review of PORC Actions to Address Task Force Results from July 25 Loss of Emergency Bus
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b This item is related to the plant operations review committee (PORC)
review of the task force analysis of the July 25, 1989 inadvertent
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loss of the No. I'480V emergency bus. The licensee effectively ex-
-amined the root causes and contributory factors.
Ine PORC reviewed the task force analysis which included a detailed engineering evaluation (MSD Memo. 109/89, RE Memo. 89/49) and an emergency response evaluation of Emergency Plan Implementation (TS Memo. 89/164). The task force findings and corrective actions to preclude recurrence were approved by the PORC in Meeting No. 89-81 on August 22, 1989.
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Additionally, the licensee conducted a thorough human performance evaluation which identified additional opportunities for improvement.
Inspector review noted the licensee assessment and review demon-
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strated a strong safety perspective. The Task Force adequately t
addressed operations and maintenance department activities relative i
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to'this event. Corrective action recommendations detailed in the engineering evaluation were effectively evaluated and appropriately
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included in Licensee Event Report No. 89-11.
This item is closed.
12.
Review of Periodic Reports Upon receipt, the inspector reviewed periodic reports submitted pursuant to Technical Specifications. This review verified, as applicable:
(1) that the reported information was valid and included the NRC-reqcited data; (2) that test results and supporting information were consistent with_ design predictions and performance specification; and (3) that planned corrective actions were adequate for resolution of the problem.
The inspector also ascertained whether any reported information should be
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classified as an abnormal occurrence.
The following reports were re-l viewed:
Monthly Statistical Reports for plant operations for the months of
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November and December, 1989, 13. Management Meetings At periodic intervals during this inspection, meetings were held with senior plant management to discuss the findings. - A summary of findings q
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for the report period was also discussed at the conclusion of the inspec-
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tion and prior to report issuance. No proprietary information was identi-I fied as being included in the report.
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