IR 05000003/1977018
| ML20042B091 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Indian Point  |
| Issue date: | 01/19/1978 |
| From: | Davis A, Raymond W, Streeter J, Thonus L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20042B083 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-003-77-18, 50-247-77-28, 50-247-77-38, 50-286-77-39, 50-3-77-18, NUDOCS 8203240553 | |
| Download: ML20042B091 (30) | |
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J.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMI.. ION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
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50-03/77-18 Region I ct hn$M N 50-247/77-38 g
Report No. 50-286/77-39 geto ?
50-03, N
oma*#
ame Occket No. 50-247, 50-286 ca#" '
DPR-5, License No. OPR-26, DPR-64 Priority Category D:C:C
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Licensee:
Consolidated Edison Comoany of New York, Inc.
4 Irving Place New York, New York 10003 Facility Name:
Indian Point Nuclear Generating Units 1, 2, and 3 Inspection at:
Buchanan, New York Inspection con uc ed:' November 21-23, N r 28 - December 2, Dece ber 5-7, 1977
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Inspectors:
I At
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/ /7 f
J. F Streete fleacfor Inspe d, te si ned r
lW.J.f,,6R& fh/60
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'79 aymo}d, Giact r '[nspector date 'signlid
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o -ch e 1-W 79 L. h. Thonu, Radiation 5FecQdst date signed Approved by:
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///f/7f A. B. Davis, Chief, Reactor Projects date' signed Section No.1, RO&NS Branch Insoection Summary:
Insoection on November 21-23, November 28 - December 2, December 5-7, 1977 (Combined Reoort Nos. 50-03/77-18, 50-247/77-38, and 50-286/77-39)
Areas Inspected:
Routine, announced inspection of previous unresolved items and items of noncompliance; plant operations (Unit 2 only); reported events (Unit 2 only); drawing control (Unit 2 only); action on IE Circular 77-13 l
(Units 2 and 3 only); plant modifications (Unit 2 only); radiation protection and exposure controls including plant tours; management audits of plant operations (Unit 2 only).
The inspection involved 104 inspector-hours (Unit 1 -
1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />; Unit 2 - 63.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />; Unit 3 - 39.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />) on site by three NRC inspectors.
Results:
No items of noncompliance were identified at Units 1 and 3.
Of the i
eight areas inspected at Unit 2, no items of noncompliance were identified in six areas; two items of noncompliance were identified in two areas (Deficiency -
failure to follow drawing control procedure, Paragraph 3; Infraction - failure to follow instrument calibration procedure, Paragraph 2).
Region I Form 12 (Rev. April 77)
8203240553 780119 PDR ADOCK 05000003 G
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' DETAILS
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Persons Contacted
- Mr. J. Bayne, Resident Manager, Unit 3 (PASNY)
Mr. J. Cullen, General Health Physics Supervisor Mr. S. Dodge, Assistant to R and ESS, Unit 3 (PASNY)
Mr. W. Ferreira, QA Engineer Mr. P. Grobelny, QA Examiner
- Mr. J. Higgins, General Chemistry Supervisor
- Mr. J. Kelly, Radiological and Environmental Services Supervisor, Unit 3 (PASNY)
Mr. W. Kessler, Watch Supervisor, Unit 2
- Mr. J. Kilduff, Assistant to Resident Manager, Unit 3 (PASNY)
- Mr. T. Law, Plant Manager Mr. G. Liebler, Radiological Engineer Mr. C. Limoges, Reactor Engineer Mr. R. Long, Maintenance Engineer
- Mr. J. Makepeace, Technical ~ Engineering Director
- Mr. E. McGrath, Manager, Nuc' lear Power Generation Department Mr. J. Mooney, Instrument and Control Engineer Mr. B. Moroney, Nuclear Training Director
- Mr. A. Nespoli, Operations Engineer, Unit 2
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Mr. R. Orzo, Watch Supervisor, Unit 2 Mr. J. Perrotta, Health Physics Supervisor, Unit 3 (PASNY)
- Mr. M. Shatkouski, Chief Operations Engineer Mr. E. Tagliamante, Operations Engineer, Unit 3 Mr. M. Tagliamonte, Assistant Plant Engineer, Unit 3 (PASNY)
Mr. T. Teague, Health Physics Supervisor Mr. R. Warren, Security Supervisor
- Mr. S. Wisla, Chemistry and Radiation Safety Director l
- Mr. S. Zulla, Technical Services Superintendent, Unit 3 (PASNY)
The inspectors also interviewed other licensee employees including
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members of the operations, maintenance, testing, instrument and l
controls, health physics, and training staffs.
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- denotes those present only at the December 2,1977, meeting at
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Indian Point Station.
- denotes those present only at the December 7,1977, meeting at Indian Point Station.
- denotes those present at both the December 2 and 7,1977, meetings.
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2.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Unresolved Item (247/77-23-01):
Location of missing ma-
terial certifications for spent fuel racks and completion of licensee review of QA documentation.
The lice'nsee provided the inspector with copies of the previously missing material certifi-cations and had completed his review of the QA documentation package to assure that all components were properly documented.
Discrepancies discovered during the licensee's review had been corrected.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (247/77-25-03):
Procedure changes to reflect Technical Specification amendments.
The licensee revised procedures POP-2.1, SOP-1.8, and SA0-131 on September 1,1977, to remove inconsistencies between the procedures and recent Technical Specification amendment; In addition, the revision of SAO-131 included provisions *
assuring in the future that applicable pro-cedures are appropriateiy modified to accurately reflect Technical Specification changes.
(Closed) Noncompliance (247/77-25-02; 286/77-25-02):
Index of procedures identifying latest revisions and temporary changes.
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The licensee completed on August 1,1977, an index of procedures which identified latest revisions.
Procedure OAD-7 was revised on October 1,1977, to remove-the requirement for identifying the
' latest temporary change in the procedure index. The inspector determined that an index of temporary changes and copies of Temporary Procedure Change Forms were being maintained in the control rooms.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (247/77-26-01):
Action to be taken when flux traces are not recorded.
The licensee approved new procedure TE-2, " Power Distribution and Hot Channel Factor Determination,"
on October 26, 1977, which provides guidance as to measures to be taken to assure that all possible flux traces are taken.
The licensee incorporated these provisions into TE-2 rather than incor.-
porating them into procedure 50P-14.1.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (247/77-26-04): Missing nuclear instru-mentation calibration sheets.
The licensee provided the inspector
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The sheets did not contain any discrepancies.
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(0 pen) Unresolved Item (247/77-26-03):
Calibration records for thermometer SN 68122.
The licensee contacted the thermometer man-ufacturer and detemined that all thermometers made by that vendor are routinely checked at one point against a themometer certified by NBS.
The licensee has issued a purchase request for calibrated thermometers to be used on safety related equipment.
These therm-ameters will be calibrated at several points against NBS certified thermometers and certification papers will be provided to the licensee.
The calibrated thermometers are expected to be received by January 1,1978.
This item remains an Unresolved Item pending the licensee's receipt of the calibrated thermometers and a review of the calibration documentation by an NRC inspector.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (247/77-26-05):
Target axial flux procedure.
The licensee approved procedure TE-1, " Target Flux Difference Deter-mination," on September 20, 1977, which provides detailed instructions for and documentation of target axial flux determinations.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (247/77-24-04):
Determine if reactor was operated in excess of the license limit.
The licensee had revised the Central Control Room Log Sheets to require logging of the NI rack indicators.
The i'nspiector concluded his review of this matter
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which was partially resolved in Inspection 50-247/77-29, Paragraph 3.
(Closed) Unresolved Item ('247/77-21-04):
Temporary changes to procedure 2/3 CM 3.20.
The licensee revised procedure 2/3 CM 3.20 on November 17, 1977, to reflect the correct model of charging pump.
The inspector concluded his review of this matter which was partially resolved in Inspection 50-247/77-29, Paragraph 3.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (03/77-02-01; 247/77-06-01; 286/77-07-02):
Possible plateout of cesium after liquid sampling.
The possibility of plateout of Cs-137 and Cs-134 in an NRC liquid sample was noted during a previous inspection when the licensee's measurement of
,those isotopes in a liquid sample was higher than the NRC results.
A spiked Cs-137 and Cs-134 sample was provided to the licensee for analysis and the results of that analysis were presented in J
Combined Inspection Report 50-03/77-12, 50-247/77-28, and 50-286/
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77-27.
The results indicate the licensee's analyses of cesium are acceptable.
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(Closed) Unresolved Item (247/77-2911):
Weld gouges on Auxiliary Boiler Feed Line to Steam Generator 24.
The licensee detennined the weld gouges on Auxiliary Boiler Feed Line to Steam Generator
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24 to be unacceptable in that the gouges reduced the pipe wall thickness at one spot to 0.045 inches less than the allowable minimum.
The licensee completed corrective action to restore the wall thickness by weldMg on October 14, 1977.
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(Closed) Noncompliance (Combined Inspection Report 50-247/76-20
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and 50-286/76-22, Paragraph 7):
Position descriptions.
The licensee approved procedure OAD-9, " Position Guides and Job Descriptions,"
on November 15, 1977, to delineate the major duties and responsi-bilities of personnel assigned to the Operations Subsection.
The inspector concluded his review of this matter which had been pre-viously addressed in Combined Inspection Reports 50-247/77-08 and 50-286/77-09, Paragraph 7, and 50-03/77-15, 50-247/77-29, and 50-286/77-28, Paragraph 3.
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(Closed) Unresolved Item (286/77-09-04):
Deluge system testing.
The-licensee completed surveillance test 3PT-Al2 during the interval November 2 - December 2,1977, which checked the performance of the water deluge system for ma.in, un,it, and station transformers.
A Maintenance Work Request was issued to correct one minor discrepancy (repair of a heat actuating device).
(0 pen) Unresolved Item (286/77-11-01):
Review of logging require-ments.
The licensee had made efforts to improve the quality of log entries and reviews. The licensee had instituted a review of outstanding jumpers each month and had reminded operating personnel of the need to insert actual values on log sheets instead of check
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marks.
The licensee had also reminded supervisory personnel of their responsibilities to conduct meaningful reviews to detect degradation of the quality of log entries. Although the licensee had taken these corrective actions, the inspector observed when reviewing the Nuclear NPO Log Sheets that consistent out-of-tolerance readings on the radiciodine monitor sample flows were being recorded and there were no remarks to indicate why the readings were out-of-tolerance.
There was no indication from documentation reviewed by the inspector that supervisory review of these log sheets had re-sulted in action on these out-of-tolerance readings.
The inspector stated that this matter would remain an Unresolved Item pending the licensee taking steps to assure that all out-of-tolerance readings are highlighted and explanatory cements are placed on the log sheets.
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(Closed) Unresolved Item (Combined Inspection Report 50-247/76-20 and 50-286/76-22, Paragraph 9.c):
Drawing control ~in maintenance area.
The inspector reviewed engineering drawing control in the maintenance area to determine if the licensee was acceptably imple-menting established controls over Class A drawings.
The inspector noted that the licensee had been unable to retrieve a controlled copy of drawing 8205983 and had classified the drawing as lost.
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The inspector determined from discussions with personnel in the Maintenance Subsection and with the Central Files Controller that drawing controls were currently being properly implemented in the maintenance area.
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(Closed) Unresolved Item (Inspection Report 50-L86/76-02, Paragraph 15):
Replacement of Penetration W.
The licensee had completed the replacement and testing of containment sample line Penetration W to eliminate potential overstressing of sample lines in the penetration due to thermal expansion.
The inspector visually examined the.
penetration, reviewed Modification Procedure MMS-76-3-01, reviewed Safety Evaluation NS-23-76-004, reviewed the hydrostatic testing records of the sample lines, and reviewed the soap bubble and containment isolation valve closure time test results. All items
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reviewed by the inspector wire satisfactory.
The soap bubble test was conducted to satisfy the local leak rate testing provisions of Appendix J to 10 CFR Part 50.
The test results indicated zero leakage; however, since the minimum sensi-tivity for the soap bubble test has been established by the licensee to be 0.59 cubic centimeters per minute, a leak rate of 0.59 cc/ min will be assigned to that penetration in the Type B and.C running total.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (247/77-24-02; 286/77-24-02):
Minimize fire hazards.
The inspector determined from visual observations within the Primary Auxiliary Buildings that the licensee had in-stalled flame-proof lockers and'had stored unattended flammable material in those lockers.
Nuclear Plant Operators were aware of their responsibilities for assuring all unattended flammable materials are stored in the flame-proof lockers.
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(Closed) Unresolved Item (247/77-21-01):
Installation of new RWST low level alarm.
The licensee completed the installation and testing of the new RWST low level alarm which gives operators advance warning l
of low level conditions before the Technical Specification limit is l
reached.
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The inspector also detemined that the licensee had adjusted the setpoints of the existing RWST lo and 10-10 level alarms to provide redundant alarms as required by Amendment No. 34 to the operating license.
(0 pen) Unresolved Item (247/77-24-03):
RCS leakage rate calcula-tions based on containment radiation detector information.
The licensee stated that a procedure would be implemented by December 16, 1977, to provide guidance on calculating RCS leakage rates based on containment radiation detector (Rll/R12) information.
This remains an Unresolved Item pending the licensee's implementation of that procedure.
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(0 pen) Unresolved Item (247/77-24-05):
Determine cause of RCP seal failure. The licensee had not yet disassembled the reactor coolant pump seal which failed July 2,1977, to determine the cause of failure.
High' radiation areas 'and a crane clearance problem have contributed to the delay in pump disassembly.
The licensee plans to have the seal disassembled by January 1,1978.
This remains an Unresolved Item pending completion of the licensee's investigative efforts.
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(0 pen) Unresolved Item (286/77-24-03):
Sealing of cable penetrations.
Due to the manpower demands 'of the current turbine maintenance outage, the licensee had madi little progress in reviewing the unsealed cable penetrations between the Unit 3 cable tunnels and the Auxiliary Boiler Feed pump Room.
The licensee indicated an increased effort would be made to resolve the item and this remains an Unresolved Item pending completion of the licensee's review and completion of any sealing deemed necessary by the licensee's review.
(0 pen) Unresolved Item (286/76-19-01):
Establish criteria for heat tracing circuit operability.
Due to the manpower demands of the current turbine maintenance outage, the licensee had made little progress in recording and evaluating temperature data on lines required by Technical Specifications to be heat traced.
This data
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is to be used by the licensee to establish acceptable ranges of temperatures for operable lines.
A recorder which is being per-manently installed will be used to verify operability of alamed heat tracing circuits.
The licensee indicated an increased effort would be made to resolve this item and this remains an Unresolved Item pending completion of the licensee effort.
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i (0 pen) Unresolved Item (286/77-28-07):
Schedule for first periodic containment integrated leak rate test.
The licensee currently plans to conduct the first periodic containment integrated leak rate test during the second refueling outage which is now expected to begin in June 1979.
This would be about 53 months from the preoperational test date and 34 months from the commercial operation date.
The licensee's test schedule is under review by the NRC.
This remains an Unresolved Item pending completion of the NRC
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review.
(Closed) Noncompliance (247/77-29-02; 286/77-28-02):
Station Nuclear Safety Comittee review of security plan implementing procedures.
The SNSC reviewed and approved all sections of the
" Indian Point Station Securit plan implementing procedures)y Guard and Watchman Manual" (security during Meeting No.106 on November 16, 1977.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (286/77-33-01):
Supervisory circuit modifications.
The inspector reviewed records of the only modifi-cation made to the supervisory relay circuit at the Buchanan Sub-station since the operating license was issued for Unit 3.
That modification made in late 1976, caused continuous energization of
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timer relay 62 TRl which prevented the relay from properly operating (deenergizing) when the generator output breakers opened on July 13, 1977.
This prevented the automatic transfer of the 6900 volt power to Busses 1 through 4 from the unit to offsite sources.
The licensee corrected the faulty supervisory relay circuit modifi-cation in November 1977, and perfomed post-modification trip checks.
The circuit modification was implemented in accordance with a October 27, 1977, memorandum from the licensee's electrical engineering department.
The licensee plans additional long-term actions to improve supervisory circuit reliability.
The dead fast transfer scheme for 6900 volt Busses 1 through 4 is generally described on FSAR Page 8.2-3 where it is stated that the i
fast transfer will occur after a turbine thrust bearing trip or an
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electrical trip.
The 1976 supervisory circuit modification, which was made without a safety evaluation being perfomed, defeated the fast transfer scheme for some but not all of the unit electrical
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trips.
(The fast transfer scheme was defeated only for those electrical trips which sense an interruption of electrical load.)
The inspector stated that since the specific electrical trips which initiate the fast transfer scheme were not described in the FSAR, it was acceptable to modify the specific electrical trips without i
conducting a safety evaluation under the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59.
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(Closed) Noncompliance (247/76-26-04):
Va!ves in instrument air
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system open but unlocked.
The inspector visually verified valves IA-11 and IA-11-1 were locked in the open position as is required by the Instrument Air System Check-Off List (COL-39).
The licensee revised COL-39 and COL-51 to clearly indicate the locked open requirement and to require quarterly verification of the locked open condition.
(Closed)' Unresolved Item (247/76-26-07; 286/76-28-06):
Installation of narrow range pressure recorder.
The licensee had completed the installation of a narrow range pressure recorder on each unit which have a' unique sounding adjustable alarm.
The recorders and alarms will be used to provide advance overpressure warning while the reactor coolant system is in a low temperature / low pressure s
condition.
The licensee's efforts are documented in MWRs 6157 (Unit 2) and 1412 (Unit 3) and test procedure P-MT-25 (Unit 2)
dated May 7, 1977.
The licensee inves'igated but was unable to determine the cause t
of the spurious closure of the Unit 3 RHR inlet valve which initiated the overpressurization event of September 30, 1976.
This anomaly has not recurred.
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(Closed) Unresolved Item (247/77-10-03; 286/77-21-04):
Jumper control review..The licenses determined that the missing tags for Unit 2 Jumper J-2-82 were caused by maintenance personnel who cor-rected the deficient condition requiring the jumper but who failed to clear the non-safety related jumper.
The licensee conducted a review of his jumper controls and revised procedure SAC-126,
" Jumper Log," on November 15, 1977, to improve jump ~er. control.
(Closed) Noncompliance (03/77-15-01; 286/77-28-06):
Physical security.
The inspector determined that corrective actions in regard to these matters'had been completed.
(Closed) Noncompliance (247/77-29-03):
Accumulator discharge valve circuit breakers not locked.
The inspector visually verified the circuit breakers to be lock;d in deenergized position during the inspection.
The licensee revised check-off lists COL-12, COL-46, COL-1, and COL-51 to assure the circuit breakers are locked in the deenergized position.
The revision to COL-51 provides for quarterly verification of correct circuit breaker locking.
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(Closed) Noncompliance (247/77-29-04): Weld Channel and Contain-ment Penetration Pressurization System valves open but unlocked.
The inspector visually verified valves PCV-ll10-1, -1110-5, -1110-9, and -1110-21 to be locked in the open position' as is required by check-off list COL-15.
The licenses fabricated and installed a locking bar to assure these valves remain locked open.
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procedure OAD-7 was revised on October 1,1977, to require check-off list deviations be explained.
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(0 pen) Unresolved Item (247/76-18-05; 286/76-35-01):
Radiation monitoring air pump replacement.
The licensee has experienced many failures of the containment radiation monitor air sample pump.
The engineering department initially decided to change pump designs but subsequently decided to install improved bearings instead.
The first and only improved bearing in use at Indian Point was installed September 23, 1977, at Unit 2.
Additional improved bearings are on order and will be installed in spare pumps.
The performance of the improved bearings and past performance of pump belts will be eval-uated to determine the need and scope of a preventive maintenance program.
The licensee currently takes local flow readings every four hours to insure timely detection of pump failures.
In addition, the licensee plans to include the pump high/ low flow conditions in the process radiation monitor citegory alarm.
This remains an Unresolved Item pending the licensee's determination of the need for a preventive maintenance program and the implementa-tion of any program deemed necessary.
(Closed) Noncompliance (286/77-10-06):
Milch animal census.
On August 1 and November 1, 1977, the licensee submitted to NRR the results of the milch animal census for Indian Point Station for 1976 and 1977.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (03/77-03-07; 247/77-09-07):
Calculation of maximum heat rejection rate.
The revised Environmental Technical'
Specification Requirements issued by NRR on November 16, 1977, clarifies and resolves this matter by making the Unit 1 and 2 ETSRs the same as the Unit 3 ETSRs.
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(Closed) Unresolved Item (03/77-03-08; 247/77-09-08):
Reporting
i requirements for I-131 co'ncentrations in air.
The revised Environ-
j mental Technical Specification Requirements issued by NRR on November 16, 1977, removed the nonroutine reporting requirement for I-131 in air which was previously in Section 5.6.2.2.b.
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(0 pen) Unresolved Item (247/77-21-02):
Charging pump vibration.
The licensee had received a report from So'uthwest Research which recomended the installation of pulsation dampeners to reduce the i
vibration problem.
The licensee is reviewing an engineering modi-fication which provides for the installation of pulsation dampeners.
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This remains an Unresolved Item pending (1) installation of the
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pulsation dampeners, and (2) completion of the licensee's resolution of NPG-QA findings concerning charging cubicle weld integrity as
documented in a May 18, 1977, memorandum from the QA Engineer to '
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the Manager NPG.
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(0 pen) Unresolved Item (247/77-10-05):
Primary Auxiliary Building sump piping.
The engineering modification for the PAB sump tank s
drainage system has been finalized and the earliest date for com-pletion of the modification is February 1,1978 (start of second refueling outage).
(Closed) Unresolved Item (247/76-35-04): Voluntary entry into an LCO action statement..The-NRC has reviewed the matter of licensee's voluntarily entering for ease of plant operation into the action
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statements of limiting conditions for operations.
The NRC has
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concluded that licensees could take such action providing a Reportable
Occurrence was reported and providing the action statements were not frequently entered.
Therefore, the licensee's actions on
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September 22 and 26, 1976, in reducing the level of the Condensate
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Storage Tank to expedite the flushing of chlorides from the secondary I
system is considered acceptable.
(0 pen) Unresolved Item (247/76-18-04):
Operauility requirements for ECCS components.
The licensee has reviewed this matter and
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I does not intend to propose a change to Technical Specification 3.3 to make the Unit 2 TS as conservative as the equivalent Unit 3 TS.
The licensee expects the Unit 2 TS to be revised sometime in the future as a result of NRR's efforts to encourage licensee's with i
older TSs to revise the older TSs to confonn to the Standard Tech-nical Specifications.
This remains an Unresolved Item pending further review by the inspector.
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(Closed) Unresolved Itsn (286/77-01-08):
Review of waste system requirements in FSAR, SAO-107, and ETSR.
The licensee completed a review of the various waste system requirements and associated safety evaluations on June 23, 1977.
There were no unreviewed safety questions related to the inconsistencies identified.
All differences between the FSAR, SA0-107, and ETSR have been resolved.
(Closed) Noncompliance (286/76-28-01):
Periodic instrument cali-bration program.
The licensee had implemented a calibration program and had calibrated approximately 51% of the instruments in less than one year of the two year cycle which ends December 31, 1978.
(0 pen) Unresolved Item (286/77-13-02):
Operational directives for three channel fixed gas and particulate monitors.
The licensee had made little progress in establishing operational controls to govern maximum alarm setpoints and alarm response actions.
The licensee indicated increased efforts would be made to resolve this item in a timely manner.
(0 pen) Unresolved Item (247/77-12-01; 286/77-13-03):
Sampling line losses and heat tracing evaluation.
The licensee had begun but not yet completed the engineering evaluation of the need to heat trace the portion of the plant vent sampling line exposed to the environment.
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The licensee had completed the line loss testing for R-13 on Units 2 and 3 and the test results indicated there is no signifi-cant line loss.
A line loss test was conducted for R-ll on Unit 3 but the results were inconclusive due to the low activity in contain-ment.
The line loss test for R-11 on Unit 2 will be conducted during the seccnd refueling outage.
The Unit 2 results on R-ll will be evaluated for applicability to Unit 3.
If the Unit 2 results are not applicable to Unit 3, a retest will be conducted for R-ll at Unit 3.
This remains an Unresolved Item pending the licensee (1) evaluating the line loss for R-ll, and (2) completing the heat tracing evaluation and installing heat tracing if deemed necessary.
(0 pen) Unresolved Item (286/77-01-10):
Status of startup test program.
The licensee has completed the initial startup program testing and accepted the results with the exception of the following tests:
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INT-TP-4.12.11. "Feedwater Pumps Functional"-
INT-TP-4.12.21, " Steam Dump Control" INT-TP-4.12.12. " Secondary Sampling System Function Test"
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INT-TP-4.11.4, " Flash Evaporator" INT-TP-4.6.4
" Solid Processing" INT-TP-4.1.4, " Power Relief Valve Operability" INT-TP-4.12.11 and INT-TP-4.12.21 are scheduled to be conducted during the plant recovery from the turbine outage.
INT-TP-4.12.12 and INT-TP-4.ll.4 have been conducted and the results are under i
review.
INT-TP-4.6.4 has been-conducted and the test results did
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not meet the acceptance criteria.
INT-TP-4.1.4 will probably be omitted since the new valves have been installed and tested as part of the overpressure protection system installation.
None of the incomplete tests relate to specific testing commitments made in the FSAR.
The incomplete tests do not prevent the plant from operating safely at full licensed power.
This remains an Unresolved Item pending the licensee's completion or dispositioning of,the above listed tests.
(0 pen) Unresolved Item (247/76-31-02):
SNSC and NFSC recomendations
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J to prevent dilutions.
The licensee changed procedure 50P-1.2,
" Draining the Reactor Coola6t System," to require the secondary side of the steam generator be drained before the reactor coolant system whenever a steam gen'erator is known to have leaking tubes.
Controls have also been implemented which prevent using nitrogen to expedite secondary draining on generators having leaking tubes.
In addition, a policy within the Chemistry Subsection has been instituted
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to require boron sampling of the RCS twice per watch instead of once per day.
The licensee concluded that the baron dilution event of November 9,
1976, did not involve an unreviewed safety question.
However, efforts continue in addition to the above mentioned procedure changes to prevent an undetected baron dilution event.
These efforts include the installation of an improved RCS level indicator
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during the upcoming refueling outage,and evaluation of continuous boron analyzers.
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This remains an Unresolved Item pending the licensee (1) installing the improved RCS level indicator, and (2) detennining if a continuous boron analyzer with' acceptable response characteristics is available
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for installation.
These efforts will complete the implementation of SNSC and NFSC recomendations to prevent dilutions.
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(Closed) Noncompliance (286/77-13-01):
Continuous recording of flow rates of liquid effluents.
The inspector verified that the licensee is using his Regulatory Status Report to assure timely resolution of matters related to regulatory requirements.
(0 pen) Unresolved Item (286/77-01-01):
Installation of ARM Co60 check sources.
The licensee has had difficulty obtaining acceptable check sources and this has delayed resolution of this item.
Recently received sources were being installed during the inspection.
This remains an Un' resolved Item pending installation of the check sources.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (286/77-01-02):
Verification of monitor calibration factors and establishment of a mechanism for periodi-cally verifying the factors.
As of June 20, 1977, calibration
factors for R-ll, R-12, R-13, R-14, and R-18 had been established.
As of June 27, 1977, a quarterly program had been implemented to reverify those factors.
Paragraph 5.c of Combined Inspection Report 50-247/77-12 and 50-286/77-13 indicated the licensee's rationale for setting the alarm point of R-18 would be reviewed with this Unrgsolved Item.
- In the past the licensee used the maximum range (100 cpm) on the liquid radwaste monitor (R-18) meter face as the setpoint for the automatic isolation valve in the discharge line to the environment.
An analysis documented in an October 5, 1973, memorandum indicates the R-18 monitor responds to dissolved gases and that setting the
trip point at 10 cpm would not result in discharge limits being exceeded.
The licensee has discontinued that practice and now sets the trip point at 150,000 cpm based on the maximum discharge rate of the waste pump, minimum circulatin and a conservative value (1 x 10-3 uci/cc)g water flow for dilution, for waste.
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Paragraph 10 of Combined Inspection Report 50-247/77-12 and 50-286/77-13 indicaten the licensee's voluntary actions to remedy
problems with the radiciodine monitoring system would be reviewed with this Unresolved Item.
As of June 27, 1977, all of the corrective actions listed in Paragraph 10 had been completed by the licensee.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (286/77-01-05):
Setpoint checks of R-ll, R-12, R-13, and R-14 during releases.
A review of September 1977, gaseous release permits indicated that operating personnel were implementing the recommendations of the General Chemistry Supervisor outlined in a May 11, 1977, memorandum to the Chief Operations Engineer.
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(Closed) Unresolved Item (286/77-01-03):
Routine method for main-
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taining R-18 decontaminated.
The licensee has implemented a program to maintain the trip point of R-18 at 150,000 cpm.
In the event the monitor becomes contaminated to the extent that the trip point will not allow releases to be made, the monitor will be removed and decontaminated.
(0 pen) Unresolved Item (286/77-21-03):
As-found connections differ from print.
The licensee determined that Engineerin2 Change Notices 70050 and 70058 did not relate to the as-found field connections which were different' from the print.
The licensee determined that the as-found connections were correct and resulted from the sub-
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merged valve modifications made prior to issuance of the operating
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i license.
The print (ll3E700) was never' updated to reflect the modi-fication.
A licensee review revealed that there are no other prints which have not been revised. As of November 23, 1977, Sheets 36 and 37 of Print 113E700 had been revised.
Sheet 18 also needs
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revising and this is in process.
This remains an Unresolved Itsm pending the revision of Sheet 18 of Print 113E700.
(0 pen) Unresolved Item (Inspection Reports 50-286/76-04, Paragraph
7, and 50-286/76-06, Paragraph 7):
Completion of ventilation -
system testing.
The status of the ventilation system testing is as follows:
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a.
Enclosures 3.2,.3.6, 3.10, and 3.11' of Preoperational Test
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4.11.1 are complete.
This resolves the concern in Paragraph
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7.c of Inspection Report 50-286/76-04.
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b.
Technical Specification 4.5.A.6.c(2) requires a freon test of.the Fuel Storage Building charcoal filters at + 20% of the accident design flow rate prior to handling irradiated fuel.
This resolves the concern identified in Paragraph 7.a of Inspection Report 50-286/76-04.
c.
Technical Specification 4.5.A.6.c(3) requires a 00P test of the Fuel Storage Building HEPA filters at + 20% of the accident design flow rate prior to handling irradiated fuel.
This re-s.olves the concern identified in Paragraph 7.d of Inspection Report 50-286/76-04.
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d.
Enclosure 3.4 of Preoperational Test 4.11.1 is complete and, with one exception, the test appeared to demonstrate the Fuel Storage Building ventilation system will perform as described in the licensee's response to FSAR Question 9.1.
The test did not appear to demonstrate that the carbon filter dampers fail safe (emergency mode of operation) on loss of air.
The licensee stated that installed accumulators preclude the dampers from not failing safe on loss of air.
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This remains an Unresolved Item (76-04-01) pending thq inspector reviewing the accumulator installation in the Fuel Storage Building carbon filter damper air supply which as:ure the dampers fail safe on loss of air.
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(Closed) Unresolved Item (Combined Inspection Report 50-03/76-05 and 50-247/76-08, Paragraph 4):
Delegation of authority to issue work permits.
The inspector determined that a memorandum issued on March 29, 1976, was intended to authorize certain personnel other than Watch Foremen to sign and issue Radiation Work Permits as well as Work Permits.
This delegation of authority was consistent with the intent of procedure SAO-105.
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(Closed) Unresolved Item (247/76-26-02):
Traceability of test equipment to NC3 standards.
This item has been elevated to an Item of Noncompliance (77-38-02) of the Infraction level as follows:
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Technical Specification 6.8.1 requires in part that procedures be implemented that meet or exceed the provisions of Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33.
In May 1976, procedure.PE-AD-8,
" Calibration and Control of Measuring and Test Equipment,"
implemented the provisions of Paragraph A.1 of Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33 and required in Section 5.4 that measuring and test equipment used on Class A systems be calibrated against reference standards whose calibration has a known valid rela-tionship to nationally recognized standards.
Contrary to the abcVe, en May 22, 1976, procedure 2PC-R5b,
"6.9 KV Underfrequency Relay Calibration," was conducted on Class A components using a frequency generator which had not been calibrated against a known nationally recognized standard.
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tio response to this item is necessary since corrective action has been taken by the licensee to achieve comoliance and to prevent recurrence. The instrument in' question (ROC Generator #3768) was recalled and verified to be in calibration with an tiBS traceable standard as of June 28, 1977.
Procedure 2PC-R5b was revised to use a scaler-counter (traceable to f4BS) to measure frequency gen-erated by the ROC instrument which is used as a high power, variable frequency signal source.
The Instrument and Control Engineer also discussed this matter with his staff and issued a memorandum on flovember 28, 1977, to remind personnel that only properly tagged measuring and test equipment be used for calibrating equipment on Class A systems.
(0 pen) Unresolved Item (Inspec. tion Report 247/75-07, Paragraph 9):
Modification of waste drumming facility.
Modifications are nearing completion and are expected to be in operation about February 1978.
(0 pen) Unmsolved Item (Inspection Report 247/75-07, Paragraph 10):
Clean / contaminated interfaces.
This remains an Unresolved Item pending installation of a continuous monitor on the auxiliary boiler.
(Closed) Deviation and Unresolved Item (Inspection Report 247/75-07,
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Paragraphs 3.c and 3.d): -Calibration of instruments and monitors.
The licensee's calibration methods have been evaluated and found to be acceptable.
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(Closed) floncompliance (Combined Inspection Report 03/76-03 and 247/76-05, Paragraph 6):
Failure to post notice of violation.
This item was corrected at the time of the inspection.
Permanent corrective action was accomplished by a change to Station Adminis-trative Order 110 which clarified the requirement for posting notices of violation.
(Closed) fioncompliance (Inspection Report 286/76-14-02, Paragraph 7):
Failure to post a radiation area.
The inspector found posting of radiation areas satisfactory on two plant tours.
Personnel had been reinstructed and retrained.
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(Closed) fiancompliance (Inspection Report 247/76-14, Paragraphs 5 and 7):
Failure to follow procedures.
Personnel had been rein-structed and disciplinary actions instituted for personnel failing to follow procedures.
The inspector examined records of air samples
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taken after the reinstruction and verified that technicians were counting for alpha activity when beta gamma activity was greater than 1 x 109 uC1/ml.
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(Closed) Deviation (Inspection Report 286/76-14, Paragraph 8):
Alternate entrance and exit point contrary to FSAR Section 11.
The licensee completed a safety analysis of the use of the new Controlled Area entry and exit point and concluded that such use does not constitute an unreviewed safety question.
(Closed) Noncompliance (03/76-12-02, 247/76-25-02, 286/76-27-01):
Failure to perform surveys.
The procedure governing steam generator primary water' box entries was revised to include requirements for surveys and personnel were instructed.
The requirement for airborne iodine sampling during waste drumming has been incorporated on Radiation Work Permits governing waste drumming.
The inspector examined records of the surveys to verify that they were taken.
Health Physics procedure HP 4.1 and Health Physics instruction HPI 4.19 incorporate requirements for evaluation of dosimetry when discrepancies occur between film and pocket dosimeters.
(Closed) Noncompliance (03/76-12-03, 247/76-25-03, 286/76-27-02):
Failure to follow procedures.; The inspector examined the licensee's
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three corrective actions and verified that they were implemented by reviewing the Steam Generator p'rocedure for sign-offs and air sample results for alpha evaluation.
During plant tours, the in-spector observed that RWPs werd being adhered to and procedures followed.
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(0 pen) Unresolved Item (286/77-01-09):
Discrepancies between film and GM vs TLD and ion chamber.
The licensee is currently evaluating energy dependence of film and GM detectors.
This remains an Unre-solved Item pending ccmpletion of the licensee's evaluation.
(Closed) Noncompliance (03/77-04-03, 247/77-11-02, 286/77-12-02):
Failure to follow procedure.
The inspector examined control points, dosimeters, step-off pads, use of anti-contamination clothing, and access control to the Radiation Control Area to verify the licensee's corrective actions and found them to be acceptable.
(Closed) Noncompliance (03/77-07-02, 247/77-19-04, 286/77-19-02):
Failure to follow procedure.
The inspector reviewea the licensee's new method of scheduling instruments for calibration and examined access control to the Radiation Control Area to verify the licensee's corrective action.
No inadequacies were identified.
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(Closed) Inspector Followup (247/77-02-03; 286/77-03-03):
Records of audit response.
The inspector reviewed records of corrective actions taken in response to audits performed by the Nuclear Fa-cilities Safety Committee.
The inspector had no further questions in this area.
(Closed) Inspector Followup (03/77-01-08; 247/77-02-11; 286/77-03-11):
Qualifications of health physics personnel.
The inspector reviewed the qualifications of Health Physics supervisors and technicians against the criteria of ANSI N18.1 (1972).
The inspector inad no further questions in this area.
(Closed) Inspector Followup (03/77-01-09; 247/77-02-12; 286/77-03-12):
Evaluation of continuous air monitors.
The licensee has evaluated continuous air monitors and will use them only as trend indicators when they are used with hoses.
(0 pen) Inspector Followup (03/77-01-11; 247/77-02-14; 286/77-03-14):
Evaluation of dosimetry.
The licensee's evaluation of dosimetry is ongoing and reaching the implementation stage.
This item will be reviewed at a subsequent inspection to verify the effectiveness of the licensee's action.
3.
Drawing Control
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The inspcctor reviewed the licensee's efforts to control drawings
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associated with Modification Procedure ESG-76-2-07, " Modify ECCS Valve Circuitry."
Procedure-QA-GAD-8, " Control Policy on Drawing Distribution," requires in Section 3.1.d that personnel possessing controlled drawings will maintain security for the drawings and return them promptly to the Central Files Controller (CFC) when notified the 4b is completed.
Controlled copies of drawings associated with ESG-76-2-07 issued to the Construction Department -
in June 1976, were recalled by the CFC in a memorandum to the Construction Department dated August 16, 1976; however, the Con-struction Department failed to respond to the memorandum.
As of December 2,1977, the Construction Department was attempting to locate the drawings for return to the CFC.
Failure to control drawings in accordance with procedure QA-GAD-8 is contrary to Criterion V of Appendix B, 10 CFR Part 50.
This is an Item of Noncompliance (77-38-01) of the Deficiency level.
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4.
Surveillance Intervals - Unit 2 The Unit 2 Technical Specifications require monthly, quarterly, and annual periodic testing of emergency power system components.
The TSs do not define the intervals as do the Standard Technical Specifications (STSs) in numbers of days or months.
For example, the STSs define monthly as 31 days and quarterly as 92 days.
The inspector informed the licensee that the STS interval definitions should be used for the emergency power system periodic tests speci-fied in TS 4.6.
In addition, the inspector said it was permissible to apply the STS interval extension to these tests so that the maximum allowable extension does not exceed 25% of the test interval and the maximum combined interval for any 3 consecutive tests does not exceed 3.25 times a specified test interval.
The inspector suggested that the licensee reque~t a TS change if additional clarification is needed in the area of surveillance intervals.
The licensee indicated he would pursue that course of action.
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5.
IE Circular 77-13 - Units 2 and 3 The inspector reviewed IE Circular 77-13, " Reactor Safety Signals Negated During Testing," with the licensee to verify that the licensee had reviewed all items in the circular, to discuss con-clusions reached by the licensee, and to determine if the licensee
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proposes to take any corrective actions.
The licensee reviewed the circular during SNSC Meeting No. 97 on October 12, 1977, and determined that existing administrative controls preclude the type of event described in the circular from occurring at Indian Point Station.
The inspector reyiewed the following surveillance / calibration pro-cedures to determine the licensee's method for controlling sur-veillance and calibration of safety related equipment:
Unit 2
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PT-M1, " Nuclear Power Range Channels" PT-M3, " Reactor Coolant Flow Analog Test" PT-M4, " Pressurizer Level Analog Channel Test" PT-M16, " Cable Tunnel Ventilation Fans Test" PT-Ml7, " Safety Injection Pump Functional Test" PT-M21, " Emergency Diesel Generators Functional Test" PT-Q7, " Boric Acid Electrical Heat Tracing" PC-R17A, " Accumulator Level Transmitter Calibration"
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PC-R17B, " Accumulator Pressure Transmitter Calibration" PT-M23, " Motor Driven ABFP Functional Test" PT-A8. " Charging Pumps Operational Test" Unit 3 3PT-MS, " Pressurizer Pressure Analog Channel Functional Test" 3PT-M17, " Containment Spray Pump Functional Test" 3PT-M9, " Containment Pressure" 3PT-M8, " Steam Generator Level" 3PT-M2, "0 TAT and OPAT" 3PT-M12, " Turbine Electrical 0/S Analog" 3PT-M14A, " Safety Injection System Channel I" 3PT-M148, " Safety Injection System Channel II" 3PT-M19, " Auxiliary Component Cooling Pump" 3PT-M10. " Steam Line Pressure" The inspector determined that the above listed procedures contained sufficient precautionary statements to prevent negating safety signals and to prevent exceeding Technical Specification limits on operable equipment.
For example, the procedures contained necessary limits on the number of components that could be tested at any one time and limits on the plant operational conditions.
All of the licensee's surveillance and calibration procedures require Watch Supervisor permission be obtained before activities can comm.ence.
The procedures also require Watch Supervisor notifi-cation and signature after the activities have been completed.
These requirements assure that the first-line supervisor (licensed as senior reactor operator) responsible for ' safe operation of the unit controls all calibration and surveillance activities in progress.
Therefore, an individual thoroughly trained in system functions, system interactions, and Technical Specification requirements controls calibration and surveillance activities to avoid such unsafe operations as simultaneous calibration and surveillance of multiple redundant components.
The licensee did not consider it necessary to conduct special training of plant personnel on this particular circular.- However, the LER review program for licensed and non-licensed personnel which was instituted as a result of IE Circular 76-07 will include the LER which was the basis for IE Circular 77-13.
In addition, a new training course for non-licensed personnel was recently ini-tiated which covers system functions, system interactions, and some Technical Specification requirement.
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The licensee determined that his management controls did not need to be strengthened to avoid events as described in IE Circular 77-13.
6.
Plant Modifications - Unit 2 The inspector reviewed Maintenance Work Requests 6151 and 6152, Modification Procedure ESG 77-2-02, and procedure P-MT-25, which were related to the installation and testing of (1) key lock switches used to defeat the automatic safety injection signal during cold shutdown conditions and associated annunciators, and (2) second pressure transmitter to provide independent pressure interlocks for RHR isolation valves 730 and 731.
These actions complete the licensee comitments made in licensee letters to NRR dated November 29, 1976, and February 28, 1977.
7.
Radiation Protection and Exoosure Controls - Unit 3 Several mechanics working at Unit 3 approached the inspector with concerns related to radiation exposure controls and records.
These concerns only related to Unit 3 and. included the following matters:
a.
Current quarterly exposures were not available at the Unit 3 checkpoint for mechanics as they were at the Unit 2 checkpoint.
b.
Exposure infomation given to a mechanic at the Unit 3 check-point by a supervisor was different (lcwer) than the exposure given to the mechanic by the health physics supervisor in
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charge of official exposures.
e c.
Maintenance foremen were shortcutting radiation protection measures in order to expedite jobs.
d.
Supervisory personnel were not adhering to the provisions of Radiation Work Permits.
e.
Radiation exposures of mechanics were not being equalized.
As a result of the concerns of the mechanics, the inspector con-ducted a backshift inspection on November 31, 1977, within the Unit 3 containment to detennine if radiation protection controls were being adhered to.
Work areas around the steam generators and reactor coolant pumps were examined to detemine if the areas were being properly controlled and if workers were adhering to the
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controlling Radiation Work Permits.
The only discrepancy identified was also identified and corrected on-the-spot by the work foreman.
The discrepancy related to one worker not removing enough outer protective clothing (coveralls) and one worker removing too much outer protective clothing (gloves) at an intermediate control point around a reactor coolant remp.
To prevent recurrence of this item
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the licensee issued a memorandum on December 1,1977, which empha-sized the necessity for all personnel to follow radiation protection requirements.
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The licensee issued another memorandum to Unit 3 health physics supervisors on December 2,1977,.which instructed the supervisors to assure health physics technicians direct workers to comply with RWP provisions.
In addition, the memorandum stated that any person wishing radiation exposure information should be directed to an individual having access to the official exposure record.
The inspector verified that the mechanics who voiced concerns to him were knowledgeable of the two licensee memoranda.
The inspector also informed the mechanics that the NRC did not have any require-ments for the equalization of exposures or 'the availability of
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exposurg records at specific checkpoints.
The mechanics were also aware of the results of the inspector's backshift inspection efforts.
A spokesman for the mechanics informed the inspector that the mechanics were satisfied that their concerns had been addressed and that acceptable corrective measures appeared to be in progress by the licensee.
8.
Management Audits of Plant Ooerations The inspector interviewed the member of the operations staff who has been assigned the responsibility of performing periodic audits of plant operation.
The audit program as described to the inspector was consistent with the licensee's commitment documented in a letter from the licensee to Region I dated November 22, 1977.
The licensee's audit program results will be examined during a subsequent inspection.
9.
Review of Plant Operations - Unit 2 a.
Shift Loas and Ooerating Records (1)
The inspector reviewed the following logs and records
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for the periods indicated.
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(a)
Senior Reactor Operator Log, September 1 - October 31 -
(b) Watch Supervisor Log, September 1 - October 31 (c)
Conventional Nuclear Plant Operator Log, September 1
- October 31 (d)
Nuclear Plant Operator Log, September 1 - October 31 (e)
Night Order Book, August 30 - November 21 (f)
Jumper Log, all 12 outstanding jumpers (g) Temporary Procedure Change Forms, September 1 -
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November 15
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(h)
Significant Occurrence Reports, July 13 (77-2-100)
- November 15 (77-2-17T)
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(i)
Daily Containment Leakage Calculation Sheets, September 1 - October 31
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(j)
Flux Difference Log Sheets, September 1 - October 31 (k)
Reactor Coolant System Leakage Surveillance Data Sheets, September 1 - October 31 (1)
Rod Position Indication Logs, September 1 - October 31 (m)
Thermal Power Calculation Data Sheets, September 1 -
October 31 (n)
Control Room Log Sheets, September 1 - October 31 (o)
Conventional Area Log Sheets, September 1 - October 31 (p)
Locked Gate List, September 1 - October 31 (q)
Nuclear Area Log Sheets, September 1 - October 31 (r)
Quadrant Power Tilt Calculations, September 1 -
October 31
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(2)
The logs and records were reviewed to verify:
(a)
log book reviews are being conducted by the staff; (b)
instructions in Night Order Books do not conflict with Technical Specifications; (c) jumper log entries do not conflict with Technical Specifications; (d)
Significant Occurrence Reports confirm compliance with Technical Specification reporting and LCO re-requirements; (e)
log book entries involving abnormal conditions are sufficiently detailed; (f)
log sheet entries are filled out and initialed; (g)
log sheet reviews are beir.y conducted by the staff; and, (h)
off-normal readings are treated as required.
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(3)
The inspector used the following acceptance criteria for the above reviews.
(a) Technical Specifications (b)
Licensee Procedures 0AD-3, " Plant Surveillance and Logkeeping Policy," SA0-126, " Jumper Log," and SAO-124, " Reporting of Anomalous Conditions"
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(c)
Inspector Judgment (4)
Findings:
No Items of Noncompliance or Unresolved Items were iden-tified during the review of logs and recordL_.
b.
Plant Tour (1)
The inspector toured accessible plant areas at various times during the inspection including the following areas.
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(a')
Emergency Diesel Room (b)
Primary Auxiliary Building
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(c) Turbine Building (d) Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Room
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(e)
Safeguard Pump Area (f)
Witchgear Areas
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(g)
Relay Rooms (h)
Control Room (2) The following determinations were made.
(a)
Radiation controls:
step-off pads, storage / disposal of radiation protection clothing, and control of high radiation areas (including locked gates and posting) were observed in all areas toured.
(b)
Fluid leaks:
All areas toured by the inspector were observed for any evidence of fluid leaks.
(c)
Monitoring instrumentation:
recorders were observed to be properly operating for containment radiation monf tors (Ril/R12), rod position indication system, nuclear instrumentation channels, and steam generator pressure.
(d)
Piping vibration:
piping in all areas toured was
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observed for evidence of excessive vibration.
(e)
Control room and nuclear operator station manning:
the. inspector observed control room manning to be in conformance with regulatory requirements.
(f)
Equipment tag information:
selected tags related to radiation monitor R-20 (20069), steam generator blowdown flow transmitter (20073), main steam trip valve #3 bypass root stop valve (20074), No. 22
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diesel auxiliaries:
MCC-29 (20071) and boric acid evaporator (20031) were examined and reviewed to verify that tags were positioned as required.
(g)
Selected start positions / valve positions:
Proper switch positions were verified on the diesel generator and safety injection pumps.
Proper positioning for the following valves was also verified:
894A, 894B, 894C, 8940, 983, 638, 885A, 8858,1810, 882,1805, 1831, 1821, 1822, 337, 364, 360, 336, 334, 749A, 7498, 749C, 749D, 749E, 749F, 787, 865A, 8658, 869A, 8698, 878A, 8788, and 1806.
No inadequacies were observed.
(h)
Control room overhead annunciators were observed for alarms that should not be in effect for the existing-plant conditions.
None were identified.
Control room operators were knowledgeable of the reasons for all lighted annunciators.
(i)
Seismic restraints: hydraulic restraints and hangers were observed for proper levels and settings in all areas toured.
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(j)
Licensee policies and practices regarding plant tours conducted by the Plant Manager an! Watch Supervisor.
No changes to the licensee's policies were noted in this area.
(3) The inspector used the following acceptance criteria for the above items.
(a)
Technical Specifications (b)
10 CFR 50.54(k).
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(c)
10 CFR 20.203 (d)
Tags 20031, 20069, 20071, 20073, and 20074 i
(e)
System flow diagram mounted in control room (f)
Inspector judgment (g)
COL-51, Locked Valves i
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(4)
Findings:
The inspector had no further questions on the items ex-amined.
10.
In Office Review of Licensee Reoorted Events The inspector reviewed licensee reports received in the NRC:I office to verify that details of the events were clearly reported including the accuracy of the cause description and adequacy of corrective action, and the inspector determined whether further information was required from the licensee, whether generic impli-cations were involved, and whether the event warranted onsite followup.
The following licensee event reports (LERs) and technical engineering information reports (TEIRs) were reviewed.
LER 77-2-17(B), No. 21 Boric Acid Storage Tank baron concen-
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tration low.
LER 77-2-18(B), No. 23 Emergency Diesel inoperable due to a
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defective pre-lube oil pump pressure switch.
LER 77-2-19(B), No. 23 Emergency Diesel Generator inoperable
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due to jacket water cooler tube leaks.
LER 77-2-20(B), No. 22 Emergency Diesel Generator inoperable ~
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due to a defective exhaust hood blower motor.
- LER 77-2-21(B), Process Radiation Monitors R-11 and R-12
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inoperable due to a seized sample pump.
- LER 77-2-22(A), Axial Flux Difference outside of target band
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for more than one hour cumulative in preceding 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> period,
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contrary to the requirements of TS 3.10.2.
- LER 77-2-24(A), Air Efecto-Diversion Line containment isolation
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valve control circuitry does not meet single failure criteria for a postulated short circuit or imposed foreign voltage, contrary to the requirements of Appendix A,10 CFR 50.
TEIR 77-2-5, No. 22 Charging Pump inoperable due to fluid
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drive coupling failure.
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TEIR 77-2 6, No. 23 Bleed Holdup Tank collapsed during transfer
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operations.
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TEIR 77-2-7, Feedwater System Seismic Restraint excessive
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fluid leak.
TEIR 77-2-8, No. 26 Service Water Pump packing gland leak.
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TEIR 77-2-9, No. 22 Boric Acid Transfer Pump shaft seal leak.
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TEIR 77-2-10', Main Steam System Seismic Restraint fluid leak.
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- TEIR 77-2-11, Position Indication for control rod N-5 greater
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than 13 steps from associated bank demand position.
TEIR 77-2-12, No. 22 Cable Tunnel Ventilation Fan support
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bolts broke.
TEIR 77-2-13, No. 26 Service Water Pump packing gland leak.
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- TEIR 77-2-14, Independent Overspeed Logic Train B protection
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system relays tripped.
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Except as noted in Paragraph 11 below, the inspector had no further comments on this item.
11.
Onsite Licensee Report Followuo
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For those reports selected for onsite followup, the inspector verified that reporting requirements of Technical Specification and Regulatory Guide 1.16 had been met, that appropriate corrective action had been taken, that the event was reviewed by the licensee in accordance with his administrative procedures, and that continued operation of the facility was in accordance with the Technical Specification limits.
The reports selected for onsite review are denoted by an asterisk (*) in Paragraph 10 above.
No inadecuacies were identified.
The inspector noted that the RPI calibration problem addressed in TEIR 77-2-11 is being followed as Unresolved.
Item 77-29-05.
12.
Radiation Controlled Area Tour The inspactor toured the Radiation Control Area of Units 1, 2, and 3 o.. 'ecember 5 and Unit 3 on December 6 to observe radiation safety practices and procedures.
Posting of radiation areas and
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high radiation areas was examined and found to be in compliance
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with 10 CFR 20.203. Work sites were visited to verify compliance I
with Radiation Work Permits and radiation protection procedures j
and instructions.
Radiation, contamination, and airborne surveys
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and survey records were examined for compliance with 10 CFR 20.201.
Access control and contamination control were examined for compliance with procedures HPP 2.2, HPP 2.3, HPP 2.4, HPI 2.22, HPI 2.24, and HPI 2.25.
High Radiation Areas were found to be locked in accordance with 10 CFR 20.203.
Independent measurements were made to verify licensee surveys and posting.
No items of noncompliance or Unresolved Items were ioentified.
13.
Exit Interview The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in Para-graph 1) at the conclusion of the first phase of the inspection on December 2,1977, and at the conclusion of the second phase on December 7,1977.
The inspectors summarized the purpose and the scope of the inspection and the inspection findings.
A subsequent discussion of the inspection findings occurred on January 6,1978, in a telephone call from Mr. J. Streeter to Mr. J. Makepeace.
The licensee representatives acknowledged the inspection findings including the two Unit 2 Items of Noncompliance (247/77-38-01, Paragraph 3, and 247/77-38-02, Paragraph 2).
The inspector informed the licensee representatives. that a response would only be required for item 247/77-38-01.
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