ENS 47967
ENS Event | |
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17:22 May 25, 2012 | |
Title | De-Energization of Both Divisions of Rhr Suction Line Primary Containment Isolations Valves During Testing |
Event Description | On Friday, May 25th 2012 at 1322 EDT, Nine Mile Point Unit 2 experienced a loss of power to 600V 2EJS*US1 emergency load center while performing scheduled surveillance testing of the Division 1 Remote Shutdown System disconnect switches. Disconnect switch SW 1-2CESA20 was taken to the actuate position which isolated main control room control, bypassed the housing limit switches and aligned the trip test switch for local breaker control of 2EJS*US1 supply breaker 1-3B. Contacts in the trip test switch for 2EJS*US1 supply breaker 1-3B were found to be closed which energized its trip coil. This resulted in a loss of motive power to Division 1 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system primary containment isolation valve 2RHS*MOV113 on the shutdown cooling suction line from the reactor vessel. At the time of the event, the Division 1 RHR shutdown cooling system was in-service with the Division 2 shutdown cooling suction line primary containment isolation valve 2RHS*MOV112 de-energized open to prevent inadvertent or spurious closure, which would interrupt the shutdown cooling decay heat removal function.
The result of the event was that both the Division 1 and Division 2 isolation valves on the common RHR shutdown cooling suction line (2RHS*MOV112 and 2RHS*MOV113) were open with no motive power. Thus, neither valve was capable of automatically closing in the event of a reactor level low (level 3) signal due to a leak in the RHR shutdown cooling system. The loss of this isolation function is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) as an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function of a system that is needed to (D) mitigate the consequences of an accident. Technical Specification 3.6.1.3 Condition G was entered and actions to restore the valves to operable status were immediately initiated in accordance with Required Action G.2. Power to 2RHS*MOV113 was restored at 1824 hrs, re-enabling its automatic isolation capability. The licenses has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
Where | |
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Nine Mile Point New York (NRC Region 1) | |
Reporting | |
10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident | |
Time - Person (Reporting Time:+3.92 h0.163 days <br />0.0233 weeks <br />0.00537 months <br />) | |
Opened: | Andrew Michaud 21:17 May 25, 2012 |
NRC Officer: | Bill Huffman |
Last Updated: | May 25, 2012 |
47967 - NRC Website
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Unit 2 | |
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Reactor critical | Not Critical |
Scram | No |
Before | Cold Shutdown (0 %) |
After | Cold Shutdown (0 %) |
Nine Mile Point with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident | |
WEEKMONTHYEARENS 546922020-05-03T21:50:0003 May 2020 21:50:00
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