ENS 40920
ENS Event | |
|---|---|
14:46 Aug 3, 2004 | |
| Title | High Pressure Core Spray Rendered Inoperable Due to Faulty Test Equipment |
| Event Description | Maintenance technicians were performing surveillance testing on the Division 3 Battery. The as-found bus voltage was approximately 139 VDC and the technicians adjusted the battery charger output voltage to 134 VDC.
At 1046, the control room received an alarm with bus voltage at 125 VDC. The High Pressure Core Spray System was declared inoperable per Technical Specification 3.8.4 with Division 3 DC Bus voltage < 130 VDC. The maintenance technicians determined that the voltmeter used to measure the voltage was defective and actual bus voltage was adjusted to 125 VDC. At 1105, Division 3 bus voltage was restored above 130 VDC (136 VDC) and the High Pressure Core Spray System was declared operable. The High Pressure Core Spray System was inoperable for approximately 19 minutes from when the alarm was received until the maintenance technicians restored voltage to 136 VDC. The High Pressure Core Spray System is a single train system. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
This Notification is to retract EN# 40920, Unplanned High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) inoperability. On 8/4/04 at 0414 Nine Mile Point Unit 2 notified the NRC under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) of the inoperability of a single train safety system (HPCS) due to low battery voltage caused by use of defective test equipment. Engineering performed an analysis of this event and concluded that the HPCS system was operable during the event and would have performed its required function. Since, the battery charger was connected to the panel and maintaining bus voltage at or above 125 VDC, it was capable of supplying the steady state dc loads connected to the panel. Also, the battery charger was capable of maintaining the battery in a fully charged condition for the duration of the degraded condition. Based on the above, it is concluded that the CSH system was operable during this event and the div. 3 battery was capable of performing its intended design functions if required. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Doerflein). |
| Where | |
|---|---|
Nine Mile Point  New York (NRC Region 1) | |
| Reporting | |
| 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident | |
| Time - Person (Reporting Time:+13.47 h0.561 days <br />0.0802 weeks <br />0.0185 months <br />) | |
| Opened: | Chris Skinner 04:14 Aug 4, 2004 |
| NRC Officer: | Steve Sandin |
| Last Updated: | Sep 16, 2004 |
| 40920 - NRC Website
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Unit 2 | |
|---|---|
| Reactor critical | Critical |
| Scram | No |
| Before | Power Operation (100 %) |
| After | Power Operation (100 %) |
Nine Mile Point with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident | |
WEEKMONTHYEARENS 546922020-05-03T21:50:0003 May 2020 21:50:00
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