ELV-02241, Application for Amends to Licenses NPF-68 & NPF-81,revising Tech Spec 3.4.6.1 Re Leakage Detection Sys

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Application for Amends to Licenses NPF-68 & NPF-81,revising Tech Spec 3.4.6.1 Re Leakage Detection Sys
ML20065K840
Person / Time
Site: Vogtle  Southern Nuclear icon.png
Issue date: 11/28/1990
From: Hairston W
GEORGIA POWER CO.
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
Shared Package
ML20065K841 List:
References
ELV-02241, ELV-2241, NUDOCS 9012050003
Download: ML20065K840 (4)


Text

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Georg a Ftmet Company 333 Piedmont Actue

/can'a Ge:rg a 30308 <

Telephone 404 $20 3195 l

Mabg tesess Po t i Elox 5 Bnningham. Alabama 35201 Telephone 205 868 5501 1

November 28, 1990 " " """ " " " "

ESNPN.n, ELV-02241 Nxlear Opemom 0691 Docket Nos. 50-424 50-425 i l

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  !

ATTN: Document Control Desk l Washington, D. C. 20555 l Gentlemen:

V0GTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT RE0 VEST TO REVISE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.4.6.1 In accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR 50.90 and 10 CFR 50.59, Georgia -

Power Company (GPC) hereby proposes to amend the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (VEGP) Unit I and Unit 2 Technical Specifications, Appendix A to Operating Licenses NPF-68 and NPF-81. The proposed amendment would add an additional action statement to Technical Spec *-1 cation (TS) 3.4.6.1, " Leakage Detection Systems," to address the case where less than two of the required leakage detection systems are operable. The proposed change and its basis are described in Enclosure.1. Our evaluation pursuant to 10 CFR 50.92 showing that the proposed change does not involve a significant hazards consideration is provided as Enclosure 2. Instructions'for incorporation of the proposed change into the Technical Specifications and marked-up pages are provided as Enclosure 3. In accordance with 10 CFR 50.91, the designated staff official will be sent a copy ,

of this letter and' all enclosures. -

Mr. W. G. Hairston,-III states that he is a Senior Vice President of Georgia '

Power Company and is authorized to execute this oath on behalf of Georgia Power Company and that, to the best of his knowledge and belief, the facts set forth in this letter and enclosures are true.

GEORGIA POWER COMPANY By: Id . ./ E W .G. Hairston, Ill SworntoandsubscribedbeforemethisNdayof'lble,abw , 1990, itAtmkt,?$hEL Notary Public m cc,am tmns DEC.15.It02 WGH,III/NJS/gm jvf

  • l 9012050003 901168 o

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POR ADOCK 05000424 F

PDC

Georgia Power A U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ELV-02241 Page 2

Enclosures:

1. Basis for Proposed Change
2. 10 CFR 50.92 Evaluation
3. Instructions for Incorporation and Revised Pages c(w): Georoia Power Company Mr. C. K. McCoy 1 Mr. W. B. Shi> man j Mr. P. D. Rus1 ton '

1 Mr. R. M. Odom NORMS U. S. Nuclear Recule+9ry Commission Mr. S. D. Ebneter, Ligional Administrator Mr. D. S. Hood, Licensing Project Manager, NRR Mr. B. R. Bonser, Senior Resident Inspector, Vogtle State of Georoia -

Mr. L. C. Barrett, Commissioner, Department of Natural Resources I

l

.  !' l I

l ENCLOSURE 1 V0GTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT ,

REQUEST TO REVISE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.4.6.1 l BASIS FOR PROPOSED CHANGE Proposed Chanae i

The Vogtle Unit 1 and Unit 2 Techt.ical Specifications for the Reactor Coolant System Leakage Detection Systems (TS 3.4.6.1) do not address the condition where l 1ess than two of the required leakage detection systems are operable. The I proposed change would add an additional action statement to TS 3.4.6.1 which  !

would require a plant shutdown (Hot Standby in 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and Cold Shutdown wit'iin l the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />) in the event that less than two of the required lea'. age 1 detection systems are operable, in addition to the existing requirements.

BJL111 1

The leakage detection systems required by TS 3.4.6.1 are provided to moritor and detect leakage from the reactor coolant pressure boundary. The action statement of TS 3.4.6.1 is as follows:

With only two of the above required Leakage Detection Systems OPERABLE, operation may continue for u) to 30 days provided grab samples of the containment atmosphere are oatained and analyzed at least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> when the required Gaseous or Particulate Radioactive Monitoring System is inoperable; otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the ,

r. ext 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

Recently, an event occurred at VEGP which resulted in less than two of the required leakage detection systems being operable. (Reference Licensee Event Report 50-425/1990-006, dated May 29,1990,ELV-01707.) Given that the above action statement does not explicitly address the condition where less than two i of the required leakage detection systems are operable, it was not clear whether the shutdown requirement'("otherwise, be in at least Hot Standby"...., etc.) or TS 3.0.3 was applicable. The net effect on plant operation would have been i

essentially the same under either TS requirement. The shutdown requirement of.

TS 3.4.6.1 calls for the plant to be in at least Hot Standby in six hours and Cold Shutdown within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />, whereas TS 3.0.3 requires that within.one hour action should be taken to place-the plant in Hot Standby within six hours, Hot Shutdown within-the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, and Cold Shutdown within the subsequent 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. However, from a regulatory standpoint the judgement was-made to enter TS 3.0.3. To prevent future confusion cnd eliminate the need for a TS interpretation, GPC proposes to add an action statement to TS 3.4.6.1 which' would address the condition where less than two of the required leakage detection Systems are operable.

I El-1

ENCLOSURE 2 V0GTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT REQUEST TO REVISE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.4.6.1 10 CFR 50.92 EVALVATION Pui uant to 10 CFR 50.92, GPC has evaluated the proposed amendment and has determined that operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not involve a significant hazards consideration. The basis for this determination is as follows:

1. The proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previour.ly evaluated. If less than two leakage detection systems are operable,1..e proposed amendment would require placing the plant in Hot Standby within six hours and Cold Shutdown within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />. The provisions of TS 3.0.3 would require action within one hour '.o place the plant in Hot Standby within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, Hot Shutdown within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, and Cold shutdown within the subsequent 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. The net effect on plant operation is the same under either requirement. Therefore, there is no effect on the probability or consequences of any accident previously evaluated.
2. The proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or dif ferent kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated. As stated above, the net effect on plant operation is the same under the proposed amendment or under TS 3.0.3. They both require a shutdown in essentially the same time frame. Therefore, there is no potential for a new or different kind of accident.
3. The proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of

-safety. The existing margin of safety is maintained in that a plant shutdown will continue to be required in the event that less than two leakage detection systems-are operable.

Based on the preceding analysis, GPC has determined that the proposed change to l the Technical Specifications will not significantly increase the probability or - l consequences of any accident previously evaluated, create the possibility of a  ;

new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated, or l involve ~a significant reduction in a margin of safety. GPC therefore concludes I that'the proposed change meets the requirements of 10 CFR 50.92 (c) and does not l involve a significant hazards consideration. l E2-1 l

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