DCL-85-333, Applicant Exhibit A-1,consisting of Forwarding Application for Amend to Licenses DPR-80 & DPR-82,changing Tech Specs to Limit Movement of Spent Fuel Shipping Cask in Fuel Handling Areas of Auxiliary Bldg
| ML20237J047 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Diablo Canyon  |
| Issue date: | 06/17/1987 |
| From: | Brand D PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC CO. |
| To: | Harold Denton Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| DCL-85-333, OLA-A-001, OLA-A-1, NUDOCS 8709030471 | |
| Download: ML20237J047 (19) | |
Text
_ -
cro- 2 75/3 2 3 - N A d[/ 7/F7 2 PGandEExhibli%5o. 1
'87 Am 26 P1 :59 P.A.C I F I C GAS AND E LE C T RI C C C M PANY
~.-
. ~:-
n scatt sutti . saw <me sc:. ca 'c" A u::t m 5nsi.m . m s::r.en-i
, October 30, 1985 g
- l. "ll. ". '
PGandE Letter No.: DCL-85-333 Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Weactor Regulation U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Re: Docket No. 50 275, OL-DPR-80 Docket No. 50-323, OL-DPR-82 Diablo Canyon Units 1 and 2 License Amendment Request 85-13 Reracking of Spent Fuel Pools
Dear Mr. Denton:
Enclosed are three (3) signed and forty 140) copies of an application for asundment to Facility Operatir.g License Nos. DPR-80 and DPR-82.
This License Amendment Request (LAP) proposes to change the DCpP Technical
~
- Specifications to (1) limit movement of a spent fuel shipping cask in the fuel handling areas of the auxiliary building and (2) reflect the installation of the new spent fuel storage racks. The new racks will accommodate an increase in spent fuel assemblies beyond the existing storage capacity of the spent fuel pools as described in the reracking report sent to the NRC Staff on September 19,1985 (PGandE Letter DCL-85-306).
PGandE is requesting approval of the LAR by March 31, 1986 to permit dry installation of the new spent fuel storage racks for both units. NRC approval by that date will allow installation of the new spent fuel storage racks prior to the first Unit 1 refueling outage, which could occur as early as July 1986. To assist the NRC Staff in its review, PGandE is prepared to meet with the Staff reviewers at their convenience to provide an overview of the reracking report and Answer any questions.
Pursuant to 10 CFR 170.12(c), an application fee of $150.00 is enclosed.
Kindly acknowledge receipt of this material on the enclosed copy of this letter and return it in the enclosed addressed envelope.
8709030471 070617 PDR ADOCK 05000275 Sincerely, ,
s G PDR 1 Enclosure m cc: L. J. Chandler H. E. Schierling R. T. Dodds J. O. Ward G. W. Knighton CPUC J. 8. Ma rti n Diablo Distribution
- 8. 2 rton 04225/0037K/DWo/1901
MCLEAR REGULATH1 COuwsss0N Docket hn.1 O $ - O LO Offeist Lah. k (7Y la the mutter of _ b7 4 b 04W P4 NQ '
I Ltaf' _.-
1DENTiflID O
attttytp APpikant atjttt[p intemm Cant'g Ofre Contractor
. cArg b~ k1"/I) om. un..
gepygy kiMM H si e 6 j
i s
O O
PGandE Letter No.: DCL-85.333 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ,
) Docket No. CD-275 In the Matter of ) Facility Operating License
) No. DPR-80 PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY )
. ) Docket No. 50-323 Diablo Canyon Power Plant ) Facility Operating License Units 1 and 2 ) No. DPP-82
)
License Amendment Request No. 85-13 Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.90, Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PGandE) hereby applies to amend its Diablo Canyon Power Plant (DCPP) Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-80 and DPR-82.
The proposed changes amend the Units 1 and 2 Technical Specifications (Appendix A of the Licenses) to nvise the limit on movement of a spent fuel shipping cask in the fuel handling areas of the auxiliary building and provide new specifications to reflect the installation of the new spent fusi storage
,, racks.
- Information on the' proposed changes is provided in Attachments A and 8.
These changes have been reviewed and are considered not to involve a significant hazards consideration an defined in 10 CFR 50.92 or an unreviewed environmental question. Further, there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by the proposed changes.
Subscribed to in Sen Francisco, California, this 30th day of October 1985.
Respectfully submitted, Pacific Gas and Electric Cospany By . /
WA.we Robert Ohlbach Vice President Philip A. Crane, Jr. Engineering Richard F. Locke Atto s for Pacific Subscribed and sworn to before me Ga a Electri this 30th day of October 1985 B)
- o'W /= _gg
' Phili A. Crane t Jr. IMOGy J. i.etnasteMotary Public in and for the City and County of
. San Francisco, State of California
~~
-~
- ^ ^ ^ ^
"
- 1986 Attachments hiA"NCY~ -5.YMAET55 '
04225/0037K I,, , Tr7[so u
uY/rooyA
,$4N FRANCt$CD f
ATTACHMENT A TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGES .
RERACKING OF SPENT FUEL POOLS i
A. DESCRIPTION OF AMENDMENT REQUEST This License Amandment Request (LAR) propose
- to limit movement of a spent fuel shipping cask in the fuel handling areas of the auxiliary building by amending Technical Specification 3/4.9.13 and its related Bases. This LAR adds a new Technical Specification 3/4.9.14 and related Bases to: (1) limit the storage of spent fuel assemblies in Region 2 of the spent fuel storace racks based on initial enrichment and cumulative exposure, and (2) ensure a minimum boron concentration in the spent fuel pools. This LAR also amends Technical Specification 5.6.1.1 to specify a conservative allowance for uncertainties in keff and to allow a nominal 10.93 inch center-to-center spacing between fuel assemblies placed in the storage pools. This LAR also amends Technical Specification 5.6.3 to increase the storage capacity of the spent fuel storage pools from 270 to 1324 fuel assemblies. Additional infor1 nation is provided in the PGandE report on reracking of the spent fuel pools for Diablo Canyon Power plant Units 'I and 2 (hereinafter referred to as the reracking report). The reracking report was submitted for Staff review on September 19,1985 (PGandE letter DCL-85-306).
~
Changes to the Technical Specifications of Operating License Nos. DPR-80 and DPR-82 are noted in the matted-up copy of the applicable Technical Specifications (Attachment B).
B. JUSTIFICATION Discosal of spent fuel from Diablo Canyon Units 1 and 2 is scheduled to be carried out by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) in or after 1998 in accordance with Public Law 97-425, the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982.
However, ciue to their commercial operation dates. Diablo Canyon Units 1 and 2 may not be accorded a high priority under the DOE program. Furthermore, no other contractual arrangements exist for the interim storage of spent fuel from the Diablo Canyon Power Plant. Accordingly, as indicated in Section 9.0
, of the reracking report, increased storage capacity in the Diablo Canyon fuel pools is the only viable option currently available to PGandE.
Installation of the new spent fuel storage racks provides spent fuel storage capacity for approximately 20 years of nomal operation of both uaits. As shown by the fuel discharge schedules provided in the reracking report (Tables 1.la and 1.1b), with the increased storage capacity full core discharge capability will be maintained through approximately September 2007 and March 2008 for Units 1 and 2, respectively. g 04225/0037K C. SAFETY EVALUATION Reracking of the existing spent fuel pools to increase the storage capacity involves removal of the existing storage racks and installation of the new racks. In consideration of the potential hazards that may accompany reracking, approval of the reracking amendment will not increase the amount of spent fuel less than one year old that is stored in the fuel pools of Diablo Canyon Units 1_ and 2; approval will only increase the amount of aged spent fuel that can .be stored at the plant site. This is because the quantity of radioactivity and the decay heat output of the spent fuel decreases rapidly after reactor shutdown. For example, after a year of storage in the pool, the radioactivity and decay heat are less than 2% of the values at the time of plant shutdown. As a result, the potential change in hazards resulting from reracking of the fuel pools is primarily associated with the handling and storage of aged spent fuel.
Pacific Gas and Electric Company has evaluated the hazard considerations involved with the proposed amendment, focusing on the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c) as quoted below:
The Commission may make a final determination, pursuant to the procedures in 50.91, that a proposed amendment to an operating license for a facility licensed under 50.21(b) er 50.22 or for a testing facility involves no significant hazards considerations, if operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not:
l (7 1 \ ') (1) Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or (2) Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3) Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
The PGandE reracking report on the spent fuel pools for Diablo Canyon Units 1 and 2 provides an evaluation of the proposed changes, including a description of the types of accidents postulated as a result of the new spent fuel storage racks.
The following evaluation is provided for the significant hazards consideration standards.
- 1. Does the change involve a significant increase in the probability or l consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
As part of its evaluation, PGandE identified the following potential abnormal / accident conditions:
1
[]
i 04225/0037K l t _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ -
1 i
- a. A spent fuel assembly drop in the spent fuel pool
- b. Loss of spent fuel pool cooling
- c. Seismic events
- e. A spent fuel shipping cask drop
- f. Criticality accidents
- g. An installation accident The first five abnormal / accident conditions are initiated either by external ,
events or by failure of an engineered system; e.g., dropping a fuel assembly )
or a shipping cask, as well as failure of a cooling pump. The probabilities of externally initiated events would not be increased by expanding the capacity of the Diablo Canyon spent fuel pools. The same conclusion can be drawn for cooling system failures because they are also " external," in the sense that they are not initiated as a direct result of reracking.
- a. Spent Fuel Assembly Drop Reracking does not affect the probability of this event. The consequences of a spent fuel assembly drop in the spent fuel pool are discussed in the reracking report. For this accident condition, the n'aximum effective neutron multiplication factor, keff, is less than 0.95. The conclusions of the DCPP FSAR Update Chapter 15 on the radiological consequences of a spent fuel assembly are still valid, and offsite radiological dose consequences are well within 10 CFR 100 limits. Thus, the consequences of this type of accident will not be
' C')
l significantly increased from the previous DCPP FSAR Update evaluation.
- b. Loss of Spent Fuel Pool Cooling Reracking does not affect the probability of this event. The consequences of loss of spent fuel pool cooling have been evaluated and are described in Section 5.0 of the reracking report. If loss of pool cooling occurred, there is sufficient time to restore the cooling system or establish makeup water flow.
A conservative analysis was perfor.ned to determine offsite radiological doses associated with a postulated spent fuel pool boiling event. The assumptions used to calculate the heat generation / evaporation rates and ;
the offsite doses for loss of cooling to the spent fuel pool are 1 discussed in Section 7.7 of the reracking report. The offsite dose consequences of a pool boiling event are well within 10 CFR 100 limits.
Therefore, the consequences of this type of accident will not be i significantly increased from those previously evaluated in the DCPP FSAR Update for loss of spent fuel pool cooling.
1 1 0
04225/0037K
- c. Seismic Events Reracking does not affect the probability of this event. The {
consequences of seismic events have been evaluated and are described in !
Section 6.0 of reracking report. The racks were evaluated agai'nst the l appropriate codes and standards described in Section 3.0 of the reracking report. The racks were designed to seismic Category I requirements. The analysis methodology / techniques and acceptance criteria are the same as those used in reracking applications by other licensees which have been approved by the NRC Staff. The results of the analysis show that the proposed racks and fuel pool structure meet the structural acceptance criteria applicable to Diablo Canyon. Thus, the consequences of seismic events will not significantly Screase from those previously evaluated in the DCPP FSAR Update. i i
- d. Tornado-Generated Missiles Reracking does not affect the probability of this evert. The consequences of tornado missile impacts have been analyzed and are described in Section 9.1.2.3.2 of the FSAR Update. Section 9.1.2.3.2 concludes that the spent fuel storage pools and associated racks have ,
adequate protection against tornado forces and tornado-generated missiles. The rack design does not affect the evaluation provided in the FSAR Update. Therefore, the consequences of tornado raissiles will not significantly increase from those previously evaluated. f V e. Spent Fuel Shipping Cask Drop Reracking does not affect the probability of this event. To determine the consequences of a shipping cask drop, PGandE has evaluated which spent fuel storage racks could be impacted in the event of a cask drop.
This was done to determine an adequate space where storage of spent fuel would not be allowed during shipping cask movement near the spent fuel pool. Based on an analysis of the worst case spent fuel shipping cask tipping accident, PGandE has proposed amended Technical Specifications which will preclude spent fuel shipping cask movement near the spent fuel pool (i.e., any movement of a cask located north of column line 72.9 for Unit 1 or south of column line 23.1 for Unit 2) with spent fuel in Racks C, 01, E, F, G, J, and L (see Figures 2.la and 2.lb of the reracking report). This provides an exclusion zone to protect the spent fuel.
Thus, the consequences of dropping a spent fuel shipping cask will not increase from those previously evaluated in Section 9.1.2.3.1 of the DCPP FSAR Update.
- f. Criticality Accidents A discussion of the potential for criticality accidents is discussed in Sections 4.2 and 4.7 of the reracking report. Postulated events that could potentially involve accidental criticality were examined and it was concluded that the limiting value for criticality (keff of 0.95) would O
l 04225/0037K l
not be exceeded. With the inclusion of administrative controls as required in the amended Technical Specifications to (1) maintain the boron concentration in the fuel pools at a minimum of 2000 ppm, and (2) to limit storage of spent fuel assemblies in Region 2 of th,e spent fuel storage racks based on initial enrichment and cumulative exposure, none of the postulated events would result in a criticality accident.
Therefore, the probability and consequences of a criticality accident are not significantly increased from those previously evaluated in the DCPP FSAR Update,
- g. Installation Accident Timely approval of the license amendment will permit reracking in a dry, empty pool which would preclude the consideration of events which would have radiological consequences. Worker radiation exposure would be less than that which would be received if reracking is delayed beyond the first refueling outage when spent fuel assemblies would be present in the pool during reracking.
With respect to wet rock installation with spent fuel in the pool, the Technical Specifications prohibit handling loads in excess of 2500 pounds over fuel stcred in the fuel pools, and strict administrative ccatrols are in place w11ch preclude the movement of racks or other heavy loads 4 over stored sp ent fuel. The consequences of damage from a rack drop to )
. the pool floor m liner would be similar to the previously analyzed cask g y drop accident.
Both the old and the new racks fall into the category of heavy loads as i defined in NUREG-0612, " Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants." l Installation will be perfonned consistent with PGandE's previous responses to the NUREG guidelines. In SSER 27 and SSER 31, dated July l
1984 and April 1985, respectively, the NRC concluded that the Diablo Canyon program for control of heavy loads was in compliance with the requirements of NUREG-0612.
Based on the foregoing discussion, it is concluded that the proposed amandment to rerack the spent fuel pools for Units 1 and 2 will not involve a significant increase in the prot' ability and consequence of accidents previously evaluated.
- 2. Does the change create the possibility of a new or different kind of !
accident from any accident previously evaluated?
1 PGandE has evaluated potential accidents associated with the proposed reracking in accordance with the design bases specified in the FSAR Update, l
~
the guidance contained in NRC position paper "0T Position for Review and Acceptance of Spent Fuel Storage and Handling Applications," applicable NRC '
Regulatory Guides and Standard Review Plans, and the appropriate industry codes and standards listed in the reracking report. j O
04225/0037K L_______-___-____-__________________ _. _ .-_
q No unproven technology will be utilized either in the construction process or in the analytical techniques necessary to justify the planned fuel storage expansion. In fact, the basic reracking technology in this instance has been developed and demonstrated in over 80 applications for a fuel pool capacity increase which have already received NRC Staff approval.
The change to a two-region spent fuel pool require's the performance of additional evaluations to ensure that the criticality criterion is maintained. These include the evaluation of the limiting criticality condition f.e., misplacement of an unirradiated fuel assembly of 4.5%
enrichment into a Region 2 storage cell or outside and adjacent to a Region 2 rack module. The evaluation for this case shows that when the boron concentration meets the proposed Technical Specifications requirement, the criticality criterion is satisfied. Although this change does create the requirement to address additional aspects of a previously analyzed accident, it does not create the possibility of a previously unanalyzed accident.
PGandE concludes that the proposed reracking does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated for the Diablo Canyon spent fuel storage facilities.
- 3. Does the change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?
The NRC Staff safety evaluation review process has established that the issue q of margin of safety, when applied to a reracking modification, should be .
.Q evaluated for the following considerations:
o Nuclear criticality o Thermal-hydraulics o Mechanical / structural design and materials The margin of safety that has been established for nuclear criticality considerations is that the effective neutron multiplication factor (keff) in the spent fuel pool is to be less than or equal to 0.95, including all i reasonable uncertainties, under all postulated conditions. After an extensive i study, the NRC Staff determined in 1976 that as long as the maximum value of l the effective neutron multiplication factor, keff, was equal to or less than 0.95, then any change in pool reactivity would not significantly reduce a margin of safety, regardless of the storage capacity of the pool.
The methods used in the criticality analysis for Diablo Canyon Units 1 and 2 !
reracking confonn to the applicable portions of the codes, standards, and specifications listed in Section 4.0 of the reracking report. The computer i programs, data libraries, and benchmarking data used in the evaluation have {
been used in previous spent fuel reracking applications by other licensees and have been reviewed and approved by the NRC Staff. Criticality analyses were conducted for the Diablo Canyon Units 1 and 2 reracking assuming operation of the spent fuel storage facilities consistent with the proposed Technical Specifications (Attachment B). The results of these analyses indicate that i keff is less than 0.95 at a 95/95 probability / confidence level under all '
eq postulated conditions, including a margin for uncertainties in reactivity V
0422S/0037K - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _
calculations and mechanical tolerances. Thus, in meeting the acceptance
(')T
( criteria for criticality, the proposed reracking does not involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety for nuclear criticality.
From a themal-hydraulic consideration, the areas of concern when evaluating whether there is a significant reduction in margin of safety are: (1) maximum fuel cladding temperature, and (2) the increase in spent fuel pool water temperature. The themal-hydraulic evaluation is described in Section 5.0 of the reracking report. The new storage configuration will result in an increase in the naximum heat load in the spent fuel pool. The maximum spent fuel pool temperature will not exceed 150*F for a partial core discharge or 175'F for a full core discharge. Nonetheless, the fuel cladding temperatures s under all conditions are sufficiently low to preclude structural failure.
Thus, it is concluded that there is no significant reduction in the margin of safety for thermal-hydraulic or spent fuel cooling concerns.
The mCin function of the spent fuel pool and the racks is to maintain the spent fuel assemblies in a stable configuration through all noma 1, abnomal/ accident, and earthquake loadings. Nuclear criticality, thermal-hydraulic, material, and structural considerations of the proposed new l racks are described in the reracking report. The neutron poison ana rack materials are compatible with materials used for the spent fuel pool liner and the spent fuel assemblies. The rack structural considerations address adequate margins of safety of critical items during aismic motion and the racks are seismically qualified. Thus, the margins of safety are not significantly reduced by the proposed expansion of pool storage capacity.
() D. NO SIGNIFICANT-HAZARDS CONSIDERATION DETERMINATION The Commission har provided guidance concerning the application of these standards by providing examples of amendments considered likely, and not likely, to involve a significant hazards consideration. These examples were published in the Federal Register on April 6,1983 (48 FR 14870). Spent fuel pool reracking was specifically excluded from the list of examples considered likely to involve a significant hazards consideratic . Pending further study of this matter, the Commission is making a finding on the question of no significant hazards consideration on a case-by-case basis, giving full >
consideration to the technical circumstance of the case using the standards of 10 CFR 50.92 (48 FR 14869).
, Based on the safety evaluation, PGandE concludes that the activities
$ associated with this license amendment request do not involve a significant e hazards consideration and, accordingly, a no significant hazards finding is justified.
E. ENVIRONMENTAL EVALUATION The proposed changes will not affect the environmental analyses in the FSAR Update, Environmental Report, or the Final Environmental Impact Statement.
Sections 7.0 and 9.0 of the reracking report describe the potential environmental impacts of this change and conclude that these impacts will be negligible. Therefore, there are no unreviewed environmental questions OLj invol ved.
0422S/0037K O ATTACHMENT B REVISED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PAGES- .
Specification 3/4.9.13, page 3/4 9-15 Figure 3.9-1, page 3/4. 9-16 Bases 3/4.9.13, page B3/4 9-3 l Specification 3/4.9.14.1, page 3/4 9-17
, Figure 3.9-2, page 3/4 9-18 Specification. 3/4.9.14.2, page 3/4 9-19 l Bases 3/4.9.14, page B 3/4 9-3 Design Features 5.6, page 5-6 l
O ,
O ,
0422S/0037K l l
l 1
- REFUELING OPERATIONS 3/4.9.13 SPENT FUEL SHIPPING CAS MOVEMENT LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION B
3.9.13 No spent fuel shipping cask handling operation near the spent fuel pool (i.e., any movement of a cask located north of column line 12.9 for Unit I or south of column line 23.1 for Unit 2) shall be performed ;M::: ;;; n f.e1 in eli lec;ti;n; in Re;ke 5 nd 0 he; de;ejed for et lee;t 1000 h;- ; ein;<
- htd:u . w.m b' m the sort hi tax eeiv:acn tone idenhhed in figse 3 9-l.
APPLICABILITY: During all cask handling operations.
ACTION:
' With the requirements of the above specification not satisfied, move the cask out of the specified area (s), or move spent fuel eM:.' 5:: d:::y:d 1;;; in.er C;0 he.r; f rom all locations in, Racks n 5 ;ad 0.w.ir..n m eausn tens ide Ad ic ;>ge: 3 ' 1.
O .
~
l SURVE!LLAEE REQUIREMENTS Rack:> wen +he eelsen u,ne ;danM ed in F.ptc 3?!-1 4.9.13 Th; de;;, ti;; ef the f.e . in R.;L ; sne-fr shall be verified t; tc et it::t 1000 h;;
to tonein n: Lcl
- prior to the movement of the cask into the specified area, l
O V
l-- i C:AELO CAtiYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 9-15 f l 1
i
N
- k V ,
UNIT 1 :
u .
H i 8
"s e K Region 1 Hs il II g As l
a e Region 1 11 F
11 ll A1 J Di Region 1 SPENT FUEL CASK '~'~l-- :
Il EXCLUSION ZONE g Cask Pit O;
V' as E ll M its L
\ ,__;
p j g Region 1 Ag G b 8 "
C A2 H \
Plus 10 D3 K Region 1 MM -
a u
N O unir 2 FIGURE 3.9-1 UNITS 1 AND 2 SPENT FUEL POOL LAYOUT O!T ' .S '.C'.r;N '.h % [ t 2 3pi q.it
i REFUELING OPERATIONS ,
( BASES 3/4.9.12 FUEL HANDLING BUILDING VENTILATION SYSTEM The limitations on the Fue) Handling Building Ventilation System ensure that all radioactive material released from an irradiated fuel assembly will be filtered through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber prior to discharge to the atmosohere. The OPERA *ILITY of this system and the resulting iocine.
i
' removal capacity are consistent.with the assumptions of.the safety analyses.
Transfer of system operation into the lodine removal mode (exhaust through HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers) is initiated automatically by either. the new fuel storage or spent fuel pool area radiation monitors required ~by Specification 3.3.3.
ANSI N510-1980 will be used as a procedural guide for surveillance testing.
3/4.9.13 SPENT FUEL SHIPPING CASK MOVEMENT Tre restriction on spent fuel shipping cask movement ensures that Me-n .txt:
- f no
- :r; thr 20 fuel assemblies witt ;; in ;t 2000-hn r 2n:,
++me will be ruptured in the event of a spent fuel shipping cask accident.
The dose consequences of this accident are within the dose guideline values of
' , , 10 CFR Part 100. 't; 'n;;in ;f OnL; ; nd i i; ;h;r ' 'ig,r; 0.1-: ;f tne fdJ@.
O i.
C:AE.O CANYOh - UNITS 1 & ; E 3/4 9-3
- blew PAGE REFUELING OPERATIONS 3/4.9.14 SPENT FUEL ASSEMBLY STORAGE 1
LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.9.14.1 The combination of initial enrichment and cumulative burnup.for spent fuel assemblies stored in Region 2 shall be within the acceptable area.of Figure f 3.9-2. )
APPLICABILITY: Whenever fuel assemblies are in the spent fuel pool.
ACTION:
- a. With the requirements of the above specification not satisfied..
suspend all movement of fuel assemblies and crane operations (with loads in the fuel' storage area) and move the non-complying fuel assemblies to Region 1. Until the requirements of the above specification are satisfied, boron concentration of the spent fuel pool shall be verified to be greater than or equal to 2000 ppm at least once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />.
- b. The provisions of Specifications 3.0.3 and 3.0.4 are not applicable.
SURVE!LLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.9.14.1 The cumulative burnup of each spent fuel assembly stored in Region 2 shall be determined by analysis of its burnup history, prior to storage in Region 2. A complete record of such analysis shall be maintained for the time period that the spent fuel assembly remains in Region 2 of the spent fuel pool.
4 l
l O l (lld'h (PNM" LNli.b I ' l l
NEW ifGE 40,000
( .- -
35,000 \>
/
p /'
s / i 30,000 j 5 /
2 Acce statie /
g a / i E 25,000 s )
[ '
$ /
/
$ /
20,000 .,
f
,a / I o /
O ,..
15,000 f
n
-' a / Unacce ptable E /
- /
10,000 j
/
/
/
5,000 #
E' j
/
/
. (
0 , , ,
2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0' 4.5 initial Enrichment. Wt% U-235 FIGURE 3.9-2 MINIMUM REQUIRED ASSEMBLY DISCHARGE BURNUP O( As A FUNCTION OF INITIAL ENRICHMENT TO PERMIT STORAGE IN REGION 2
> /sl ') !$
hil4M (kN UM-kldll5 l'.
_________________-______D
l 1
NES [66 O REFUELING OPERATIONS 3/4.9.14 SPENT FUEL POOL BORON CONCENTRATION LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.9.14.2 The boron concentration of the spent fuel pool shall be greater than or equal to 2000 ppm. )
APPLICABILITY: Whenever fuel assemblies are in the spent fuel pool.
ACTION: a) With the requirements of the above specification not satisfied, intnediately suspend all movement of fuel assemblies in the spent fuel pool and initiate corrective actions to restore the boron concentration.
b) The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 and 3.0.4 are not applicable.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.9.14.2 The boron concentration of the spent fuel pool shall be determined by chemical analysis at least once per.31 days.
O .
i O l DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 9-19 l
- _ _ _ _ _ - _a
O REFUELING OPERATIONS BASES 3/4.9.14 SPENT FUEL ASSEMBLY STORAGE The restrictions placed on spent fuel assemblies stored in Region 2 of the spent fuel pool and the requirement for 2000 ppm boron concentration ensure that keff will not be greater than 0.95. The spent fuel storage has been designed and analyzed for a maximum enrichment _of_4.5 weight percent U-235.
1 l
0 t .
l O ;
1 a 3/4 9 -3 L _ _ _ _ _: - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ,
DESIGN FEATURES 5.5 METEOROLOGICAL TOWER LOCATION 5.5.1 The meteorological tower shall be located as shown en Figu'fe 5.1-1.
5.6 FUEL STORAGE CRITICALITY l 5.6.1.1 The spent fuel storage racks are designed and shall be maintained I
with:
- a. A k,ff equivalent to less than or equal to 0.95 when flooded with emborated water, which includes a conservative allowance ef-f:45 1kkWe for unewtainties as described in Sectica g.1 of the FSAR.
- b. A nominalgen-inch center-to-center distance between fuel assemblies placed in the storage racks.
5.6.1.2 The k,ff for.new fuel for the first core loading stored dry in the spent fuel storage racks shall not exceed 0.90* when flooded with unborated water. ,
W ,
DRAINAGE ,)
. 5.6.2 The spent fuel storage pool is designed an( shall be maintained to prevent inadvertent draining of the pool below elevation 133. .
J CAPACITY 5.5.3 storageThe spent fuel capacity storage lietted to nopool more is than de % signed fuel and shall be maintained with a assemblies. .
l W .
5.7 COMPONENT CYCLIC OR TRANSIENT LIMIT 5.7.1 The components identified in Table 5.7-1 are designed and shall be maintained within the cyclic or transient limits of Table 5.7-1.
S
, + . \
- b n
l DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 5-6
__- - - ____-