Text

Response Update to Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.3 Seismic
	ML14129A001
Person / Time
Site:	Diablo Canyon
Issue date:	05/08/2014
From:	Allen B; Pacific Gas & Electric Co
To:	; Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
	DCL-14-041
	Download: ML14129A001 (121)
	v • d • e

Pacific Gas and Electric Company May 8, 2014 PG&E Letter DCL-14-041 Barry S. Allen Site Vice President Diablo Canyon Power Plant Mail Code 104/6 P. 0. Box 56 Avila Beach, CA 93424 805.545.4888 Internal: 691.4888 Fax: 805.545.6445 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk 11555 Rockville Pike 10 CFR 50.54(f)

Rockville, MD 20852 Docket No. 50-275, OL-DPR-80 Diablo Canyon Power Plant Unit 1 Response Update to Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f)

Regarding Recommendation 2.3 Seismic Unit 1

References:

1. NRC Letter, "Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3, and 9.3 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident," dated March 12, 2012

2. PG&E Letter DCL-12-118, "Response to Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.3 Seismic Unit 1,"dated November 27, 2012

Dear Commissioners and Staff:

On March 12, 2012, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued Reference 1 to Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E), which contains the requested information and required responses associated with Recommendation 2.3 Seismic.

Reference 2 provided PG&E's response to Recommendation 2.3 Seismic for Diablo Canyon Power Plant Unit 1 accessible components and a commitment to provide an update on inspections of inaccessible components within 60 days following the completion of the Unit 1 eighteenth refueling outage (1 R18). 1 R18 was completed on March 13, 2014. of this letter identifies the updates to Reference 2 and the basis for the updates. Enclosure 2 of this letter provides the amended Reference 2 pages with updates shown as electronic markups with a revision bar in the margin (deletions crossed out and insertions italicized). Enclosure 2 Attachments I and J include only the new seismic walkdown checklists and area walk-by checklists and do not include the previously submitted checklists.

A member of the STARS (Strategic Teaming and Resource Sharing)

Alliance Callaway

Comanche Peak

Diablo Canyon

Palo Verde

Wolf Creek

Document Control Desk May 8, 2014 Page 2 PG&E Letter DCL-14-041 PG&E makes no regulatory commitments (as defined by NEI 99-04) in this letter.

This letter includes no revisions to existing regulatory commitments.

If you have any questions, or require additional information, please contact Mr. Patrick Nugent at (805) 781-9786.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on May 8, 2014.

Sincerely, s1~1e:- A/4--

Site Vice President dmfn/SAPN 50465913-69 Enclosures cc:

Diablo Distribution cc/enc:

Peter J. Bamford, NRC Project Manager Marc L. Dapas, NRC Region IV Administrator Thomas R. Hipschman, NRC, Senior Resident Inspector Eric J. Leeds, NRC/NRR Director A

member of the STARS (Strategic Teaming and Resource Sharing)

Alliance Callaway

Comanche Peak

Diablo Canyon

Palo Verde

Wolf Creek PG&E Letter DCL-14-041 Diablo Canyon Power Plant, Unit 1, 2.3 Seismic Submittal Updates Affected PG&E Letter DCL-12-118, Enclosure 1 Section Page 1, Purpose Pages 12 and 13, NRC Requestd Page 14: References Page 15: Attachment List Attachment A Attachment C Attachment G Attachment H Attachment I Attachment J Attachment K Reason for Update Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E) completed inspections of components that were previously inaccessible.

Updated number of walkdown packages completed and the number of potentially adverse seismic conditions identified. Removed references to inaccessible items.

There are no remaining inaccessible items. Updated with information in relation to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) request for additional information (RAI).

Added references to PG&E Letters DCL-12-118 and DCL-13-114; the November 1, 2013, NRC RAI; and made format changes.

Corrected attachment reference for the Unit 1: Area Walk-By Checklists.

Updated walkdown team member information.

Bus G was inspected instead of the equivalent Bus F for deferred components DC-1-63-E-XF-SHF and DC-1-64-E-XF-THF10, which was not available during the Unit 1 eighteenth refueling outage (1 R18).

References to Bus F were changed to Bus G.

Added seven potentially adverse seismic conditions, which were entered into the corrective action program, resulting from the inaccessible component inspections and RAI response. Updated status of corrective actions.

Deleted list of inaccessible Unit 1 components and added that PG&E completed walkdowns of all previously-identified Unit 1 inaccessible components during 1 R 18. Added changes to inspected Area Walk-By Checklists (AWCs).

Added 19 seismic walkdown checklists resulting from walkdowns of inaccessible components. Only the added seismic walkdown checklists and associated licensing basis evaluations (LBEs) are included.

Added nine AWCs resulting from walkdowns of inaccessible components. Only the added AWCs and associated LBEs are included.

Added six peer review comments to the seismic walkdown checklist review, and two peer review comments to the LBE review.

PG&E Letter DCL-14-041 Page 1 of 16 Updated Response to Recommendation 2.3 Seismic Diablo Canyon Power Plant Unit 2 Acronyms used in this response are defined in Attachment L to this enclosure.

==

Introduction:==

On March 12, 2012, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued letter, "Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f)

Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3, and 9.3 of the Near-Term Task Force Review Of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident" (Reference 1 ). Enclosure 3 of Reference 1 contains a request for information related to the results of the seismic design basis walkdowns performed in accordance with NRC Letter, "Endorsement of Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) Draft Report 1025286, 'Seismic Walkdown Guidance,"' dated May 31, 2012, (Reference 2).

Purpose:

Reference 1 requests that within 180 days of NRC's endorsement of the walkdown procedure, each addressee will submit its final response for the requested information and that the response should include a list of any areas that are unable to be inspected due to inaccessibility and a schedule for when the walkdowns will be completed. This Enclosure contains Pacific Gas and Electric Company's (fG&E~J response for the requested information for Unit 1, which includes the results of the walkdowns performed and any further actions required. This response also includes a list of any components that PG&E V..'as unable to inspect due to inaccessibility. and a schedule for '..vhen PG&E

.-..ill complete those '..valkdovvns.

PG&E Letter DCL-12-118, dated November 27, 2012 (Reference 6) 11 provided PG&E's response for the requested information, which includes the inspection results of accessible components. This enclosure provides the results of items identified in PG&E Letter DCL-12-118 as inaccessible.

NRC Request:

a.

Describe the plant-specific hazard licensing bases and a description of the protection and mitigation features considered in the licensing basis evaluation PG&E Res.Ponse:

The seismic inputs applicable to the design of DCPP are described in the DCPP UFSAR, Sections 2.5 and 3.7. Since the development of the seismic inputs for DCPP predates the issuance of 10 CFR 100, Appendix A, "Seismic and Geologic Siting Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants," the following DCPP-specific earthquakes are defined:

Design Earthquake PG&E Letter DCL-14-041 Page 2 of 16 The design earthquake (0.2g) is defined as the maximum size earthquake that can be expected to occur at DCPP during the life of the reactor. The design earthquake is the equivalent of the operating basis earthquake, as described in 10 CFR 100, Appendix A.

Double Design Earthquake The double design earthquake (0.4g) is defined as the hypothetical earthquake that would produce accelerations twice those of the design earthquake. The double design earthquake is the equivalent of the safe shutdown earthquake, as described in 1 0 CFR 100, Appendix A.

Hosgri Earthquake The Hosgri earthquake (0. 75g) is defined as the predicted ground motion at DCPP due to a Richter magnitude 7.5 earthquake on the offshore Hosgri fault. The Hosgri earthquake does not correspond to an operating basis earthquake or safe shutdown earthquake.

Long Term Seismic Program In addition to the above three earthquakes, PG&E implemented a program to reevaluate DCPP's seismic design, as described below. As part of the operating license issuance for DCPP Unit 1, the NRC imposed a license condition that required in part: "PG&E shall develop and implement a program to reevaluate the seismic design bases used for the DCPP."

PG&E's reevaluation effort in response to the license condition was titled the "Long Term Seismic Program." In June 1991, the NRC issued SSER 34, in which the NRC concluded that PG&E had satisfied the license condition described above. In SSER 34, the NRC requested certain confirmatory analyses from PG&E, and PG&E subsequently submitted the requested analyses. The NRC's final acceptance of the L TSP is documented in a letter to PG&E dated April17, 1992.

Although the L TSP contains extensive databases and analyses that update the basic geologic and seismic information in the UFSAR, the L TSP material does not alter the design bases for DCPP. In SSER 34, the NRC states: "The Staff notes that the seismic qualification basis for Diablo Canyon will continue to be the original design basis plus the Hosgri evaluation basis, along with associated analytical methods, initial conditions, etc."

Classification of SSCs PG&E Letter DCL-14-041 Page 3 of 16 The classification system applicable to SSCs at DCPP is described in UFSAR, Section 3.2. Since the development of the classification system for DCPP predates Regulatory Guide 1.29, "Seismic Design Classification," DCPP does not use SC I terminology. Instead, DCPP uses the following classifications:

Design Class 1: SSCs necessary to ensure: (a) the integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary, (b) the capability to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition, or (c) the capability to prevent or mitigate the consequences of accidents that could result in potential offsite exposures comparable to the guideline exposures of 10 CFR 100 are classified as Design Class I. Design Class I SSCs are designed for the design earthquake, double design earthquake, and Hosgri earthquake.

Design Class I SSCs correspond to SC I SSCs, as defined in Regulatory Guide 1.29.

Design Class II: SSCs important to reactor operation but not essential to safe shutdown and isolation of the reactor, and failure of which would not result in the release of substantial amounts of radioactivity, are classified as Design Class II. In general, Design Class II SSCs correspond to non-SC I SSCs, as defined in Regulatory Guide 1.29. Some Design Class II SSCs are required for the operation of certain Design Class I features and are designed for the double design earthquake or the Hosgri earthquake.

Therefore, as discussed above, all Design Class I and selected Design Class II components that are designed for the double design earthquake or the Hosgri earthquake are scoped in as equivalent to SC I for the purpose of this evaluation.

Codes. Standards, and Methodology Given the above considerations regarding Design Class I and II equipment, some of the major codes and standards used include:

(1)

ANSI B31.1, "Power Piping" (1967 Edition up to and including 1973 Addenda)

(2)

ANSI B31.7, "Nuclear Power Piping" (1969 Edition with 1970 Addenda)

(3)

ACI-318-63, "Building Code Requirements for Reinforced Concrete (4)

AISC, "Specification for the Design, Fabrication, and Erection of Structural Steel for Buildings" (1969)

(5)

IEEE 344-1971, "IEEE Recommended Practices for Seismic Qualification of Class I Electric Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations." Specific cases have been supplemented by seismic qualification criteria per IEEE 344-1975.

Additional codes and standards are identified in the UFSAR.

PG&E Letter DCL-14-041 Page 4 of 16

~RC-approved methodologies were used for design, construction and any modification of seismic-related SSCs at DCPP Unit 1. The various methodologies used for the SSCs are identified in the UFSAR.

NRC Request:

b.

Present information related to the implementation of the walkdown process PG&E Response:

Personnel Qualifications:

The development of the various teams of personnel for the DCPP seismic walkdown effort was consistent with EPRI 1025286, Section 2.

The equipment selection personnel were responsible for identifying the sample of SSCs to be walked down in accordance with the guidance of EPRI 1025286, Section 4. The equipment selection personnel were selected based on their knowledge of the following areas:

( 1) plant operations (2) plant documentation (3) associated SSCs (4) the IPEEE program The SWEs were responsible for the required walkdown inspections per the approved plant procedures and/or practices. The SWEs were required to have the following qualifications:

(1) a degree in mechanical or civil/structural engineering or equivalent (2) experience in seismic engineering as it applies to nuclear power plants (3) successful completion of either the NTTF 2.3 seismic walkdown training course or the SQUG walkdown training *Course The licensing basis reviewers were responsible for the performance of evaluations of potentially adverse seismic conditions identified during the walkdowns against the licensing basis for the SSCs. They were selected based on having knowledge and experience in the following areas:

(1) the seismic licensing bases of DCPP (2) seismic qualification methods and documentation used at DCPP (3) the DCPP requirements and procedures for entering documentation into the plant records system and the CAP PG&E Letter DCL-14-041 Page 5 of 16 The peer review personnel were responsible for collectively reviewing the following:

( 1) the SWEL for scope (2) a sample of completed SWCs and AWCs to validate the process and to identify and communicate any lessons learned for the remaining walkdown efforts (3)

LBEs and the decisions on entering potentially adverse seismic conditions into CAP (4) this response being submitted to the NRC to determine that the objectives and requirements of the NRC and the endorsed EPRI guidance were met The peer reviewers included members of the teams above and other plant personnel that have expertise in related plant processes.

Attachment A to this enclosure provides a summary of the qualifications of each of the team members and a table of activities that they performed.

SWEL Development The process for selecting the DCPP SSCs for the SWEL included appropriate variety of classes of equipment, environments, primary and secondary systems, new and replacement equipment, and other elements consistent with EPRI 1025286, Section 3.

The DCPP SWELs were developed for the following two groups of SSCs:

(1) a sample of SSCs required to safely shutdown the reactor and maintain containment integrity (SWEL-1)

(2) a sample of SSCs required to support SFP-related processes including components that could potentially allow rapid drain-down of the SFP in the event of an earthquake (SWEL-2)

Development of SWEL-1 The development of the SWEL-1 followed a process defined in EPRI 1 025286 through the application of the following four screens:

(1)

Screen No.1 -Seismic Category I (2)

Screen No. 2 - Equipment or System (3)

Screen No. 3 - Support for Five Safety Functions (4)

Screen No.4-Sample Considerations Screen No. 1 - Seismic Category I Screen No. 1 narrowed the scope of SSCs included in SWEL-1 from the total population of SSCs to those that are classified as SC I, where SC I is defined in Regulatory Guide 1.29. However, as discussed in the UFSAR Section 3.2.1, the licensing basis for PG&E Letter DCL-14-041 Page 6 of 16 the seismic classification system for DCPP does not include Regulatory Guide 1.29, so SSCs are not explicitly classified as SC I. However, as discussed in the UFSAR Section 3.2.1, the licensing basis for the seismic classification system for SSCs meets the intent of Safety Guide 29, which uses the term "Category I" for "all structures, systems, and components important to safety" that must remain functional in the event of a safe shutdown earthquake.

The application of Screen No. 1 was based on the equivalency between DCPP's classification system and SC I as discussed previously in this enclosure. Design Class I SSCs and those Design Class II SSCs that have been seismically qualified for double design earthquake or Hosgri earthquake screened-in under Screen No. 1.

Screen No. 2 - Equipment or Systems Screen No. 2 narrowed the scope of SSCs in SWEL-1 by selecting only those SSCs that do not regularly undergo inspections to confirm that their configuration continues to be consistent with the DCPP licensing basis. The following types of SSCs screened-out of SWEL-1 under Screen No. 2:

(1)

SC I - equivalent structures (2)

Containment penetrations (SWEL-1 includes certain CIVs)

(3)

SC I - equivalent piping systems Screen No. 3 - Support for the Five Safety Functions Screen No. 3 narrowed the scope of SSCs in the SWEL-1 to those that are associated with maintaining the following five safety functions:

( 1)

Reactor reactivity control (2)

Reactor coolant pressure control (3)

Reactor coolant inventory control

( 4)

Decay heat removal (5)

Containment function Screen No. 3 was applied in two steps: (1) application to the output of Screen No. 2 and (2) application to the "previous equipment list." These steps are described in the following subsections.

(1)

Application to the Output of Screen No. 2 The application of Screen No. 3 to the output from Screen No. 2 was completed and the list of SSCs that screen-in through the application of Screen No.3 served as input to Screen No. 4

(2)

Application to the Previous Equipment List PG&E Letter DCL-14-041 Page 7 of 16 In accordance with EPRI 1025286, Section 3, DCPP used "previous equipment lists" as part of the application of Screen No. 3. DCPP used a combination of all SSCs from the following previous equipment lists that are SC !-equivalent:

(a)

DCPP IPEEE, completed in 1994, and documented in the "Individual Plant Examination for External Events Report for Diablo Canyon Power Plant Units 1 and 2 in Response to Generic Letter 88-20 Supplement 4" (b)

UFSAR, Appendix 9.5G, "Equipment Required for Safe Shutdown,"

includes a tabulation of the minimum equipment required to bring the plant to a cold shutdown condition Screen No. 4 - Sample Considerations Screen No.4 modifies the scope of the SWEL-1 from that selected in Screen No.3 to sufficiently represent a broad population of SC !-equivalent SSCs in order to meet the overall objective of the seismic walkdowns. The following five sample selection attributes were applied under Screen No. 4:

( 1) a variety of types of systems (2) major new and replacement equipment (3) a variety of types of equipment (4) a variety of environments (5) equipment enhancements associated with the IPEEE program (note that no vulnerabilities were identified during the implementation of the IPEEE program for DCPP).

Finalization of the SWEL-1 The SWEL-1 was finalized to include representative item(s) from each of the above five attributes. In addition, the risk significance of specific SSCs was considered in the final selection process. See Attachment C of this enclosure for the final SWEL-1 list.

Development of SWEL-2 The development of the DCPP SWEL-2 followed a process defined by EPRI 1025286 through the application of the following four screens:

(1)

Screen No. 1 -Seismic Category I (2)

Screen No. 2 - Equipment or System (3)

Screen No. 3 - Sample Considerations (4)

Screen No. 4-Rapid Drain-Down

Screen No. 1 - Seismic Category I PG&E Letter DCL-14-041 Page 8 of 16 Screen No. 1 narrowed the scope of SFP-related SSCs included in the SWEL-2 from the total population of SFP-related SSCs at DCPP to those that are classified as SCI, where SC I is defined in Regulatory Guide 1.29. Since Regulatory Guide 1.29 is not directly applicable to DCPP, the screening was based on the equivalency between DCPP's classification system and SC I.

Screen No. 2 - Equipment or Systems Screen No. 2 narrowed the scope of SSCs in the DCPP SWEL-2 by selecting only those that do not regularly undergo inspections to confirm that their configuration continues to be consistent with the DCPP licensing basis. The following types of SSCs were screened-out of the SWEL-2 under Screen No. 2:

(1)

SCI-equivalent structures (2)

SC I - equivalent piping systems Screen No. 3 - Sample Considerations Screen No. 3 modified the scope of the SWEL-2 from that selected in Screen No. 2 to sufficiently represent a broad population of SC !-equivalent SSCs in order to meet the overall objective of the seismic walkdowns. The following sample selection attributes were applied under Screen No. 3:

( 1) a variety of types of systems (2) major new and replacement equipment (3) a variety of types of equipment (4) a variety of environments Screen No. 4 - Rapid Drain-down Screen No. 4 identified items that could allow the SFP to drain rapidly. The scope of these items was typically limited to hydraulic lines connected to the SFP and the equipment connected to those lines.

All piping entering the SFP was added to the SWEL-2 to verify that siphoning of water from the SFP was not possible.

SFP Penetrations EPRI 1025286 requires for Screen No. 4 that penetrations below about 10 feet above the top of the fuel assemblies be evaluated for rapid drain-down. At DCPP there are no such penetrations.

PG&E Letter DCL-14-041 Page 9 of 16 SFP Configurations Associated with Refueling Outages Drain-down flow paths that could exist as a result of the various SFP configurations associated with refueling outages at DCPP were investigated. SSCs associated with these flow paths were added to the SWEL-2.

Finalization of the SWEL-2 The SWEL-2 was finalized to include representative item(s) having each of the attributes associated with Screen No. 3 and all items associated with potential rapid drain-down.

The Unit 1 components excluded from the SWEL-2 are listed in Table 1 below:

Table 1: Unit 1 Components Excluded from the SWEL-2 Listing Component Basis for Exclusion Refueling water purification pump Not required for SFP inventory control or cooling Refueling water purification filter Not required for SFP inventory control or cooling SFP demineralizers and resin traps Not required for SFP inventory control or cooling, inaccessible due to high radiation levels FHB crane No functional relationship to SFP inventory control or cooling Spent fuel storage racks Racks are free-standing (no anchorage to SFP),

are passive (no moving parts), and are not classified as targets in the SIS I P Cask pit platform Used for anchorage of spent fuel transfer cask during cask loading operations. No functional relationship to SFP cooling or inventory control New fuel storage rack Not located in SFP SFP bridge crane No functional relationship to SFP inventory control or cooling New fuel elevator No functional relationship to SFP inventory control or cooling 480-V electric power Provides power to the SFP cooling system pumps, but components from this system have already been included in the SWEL-1 120-V electric power Provides power for SFP-related instrumentation, but components from this system have already been included in the SWEL-1 SFP cooling system pressure No functional relationship to SFP inventory control instrumentation or cooling FHBVS fire dampers Associated with fires, not seismic events FHBVS fan air monitors Not required for operation of FHBVS FHBVS emergency exhaust section Post-accident mitigation components; not required for normal operation of FH BVS FHBVS normal roughing and HEPA filters Post-accident mitigation components; not required for normal operation of FH BVS

Combination of the SWEL-1 and the SWEL-2 PG&E Letter DCL-14-041 Page 10 of 16 Based on the guidance in EPRI 1025286, Figure 1-3, "Seismic Walkdowns, Area Walk-Bys, and Licensing Evaluations," the final DCPP SWEL is the combination of SWEL-1 and SWEL-2.

Requested Summary Lists (1)

Attachment B to this enclosure provides the Unit 1 SWEL-1 Base List 1, which is the equipment coming out of Screen No. 3 and entering Screen No. 4 of the SWEL-1.

(2)

Attachment C to this enclosure provides the Unit 1 SWEL-1 list which is the equipment coming out of Screen No. 4 selected for seismic walkdown.

(3)

Attachment D to this enclosure provides the Unit 1 SWEL-2 Base List 2 of the equipment coming out of Screen No. 2 and entering Screen No. 3 SWEL-2.

(4)

Attachment E to this enclosure provides the Unit 1 SWEL-2 Rapid Drain-Down list of equipment coming out of Screen No. 4 determined to potentially cause SFP to rapidly drain-down.

(5)

Attachment F to this enclosure provides the Unit 1 SWEL-2 list, which is a combination of the equipment coming out of Screens No. 3 and No. 4.

The system diversity of these lists is shown below in Table 2 and the equipment class diversity is shown in Table 3:

Table 2: Unit 1 Diablo Canyon Power Plant System Diversity Listing (SWEL-1)

System No.

System Description

Selected Equipment Count 03 Feedwater 6

04 Turbine Steam Supply 9

08 Chemical and Volume Control 7

09 Safety Injection 5

10 Residual Heat Removal 5

14 Component Cooling Water 6

17 SaltWater 3

18 Fire Protection 1

21 Diesel Engine Generator 14 23 Ventilation and Air Conditioning 20 25 Compressed Air 1

36 Eagle 21 2

38 Solid State Protection 4

41 Reactor Control Rods 1

43 Plant Annunciators 1

63 4.16 kV Electrical 3

64 480 V Electrical 3

System No.

System Description

65 120 V Instrument AC 67 125 V and 250 Vdc 96 Multiple System Panels PG&E Letter DCL-14-041 Page 11 of 16 Selected Equipment Count 3

4 9

Total 107 Table 3: Unit 1 Diablo Canyon Power Plant Equipment Class Diversity Listing (SWEL-1)

Equipment Class Class Title Selected Equipment Count 0

Miscellaneous 8

1 Motor Control Centers 2

2 Low Voltage Switchgear 3

3 Medium Voltage Switchgear 1

4 Transformers 3

5 Horizontal Pumps 8

6 Vertical Pumps 2

7 Fluid Operated Valves 15 8

Motor Operated Valves, Solenoid Operated Valves 15 9

Fans 4

10 Air Handlers 5

11 Chillers 01 12 Air Compressors 1

13 Motor Generators 02 14 Distribution Panels 2

15 Batteries on Racks 1

16 Battery Chargers and Inverters 2

17 Engine Generators 1

18 Instruments on Racks 4

19 Temperature Sensors 2

20 Instrumentation and Control Panels and Racks 21 21 Tanks and Heat Exchangers 7

Total 107 Notes:

1. DCPP does not have any chillers, since there is not a chilled-water system. Seismically qualified air conditioning systems at DCPP use Freon-based cooling coils, condensers, and compressors.

2. The only motor generators at DCPP are those for the control rod drive system, which are not seismically qualified (excluded at Screen No. 1), so they cannot be included in the seismic walkdowns.

Summary of Walkdown Process An SWC or an AWC package was prepared for each item on the SWEL. The actual walkdowns and walk-bys were performed by a minimum of two qualified SWEs.

Each walkdown or walk-by package contains, as a minimum, the following:

(1)

SWC or AWC, as appropriate (2) relevant drawings (components, locations, etc.)

(3) location (unit, area, etc.)

PG&E Letter DCL-14-041 Page 12 of 16 (4) relevant anchorage details (for components subject to configuration verification)

(5) relevant technical information Each component walkdown and area walk-by was completed by a team of at least two qualified SWEs. Any potentially adverse seismic conditions identified by the team were noted in the SWCs and AWCs. For each of the potentially adverse seismic related conditions and observations a LBE was performed to determine the component's ability to perform its required function. If this evaluation resulted in no potentially adverse seismic conditions, no further action was necessary and the results were documented in the walkdown checklists. For seismic conditions or observations that were determined to be adverse, the condition or observation was documented in the walkdown checklist and entered into the CAP. Other non-seismic related items identified during the team walkdowns were documented on the checklists and entered into the CAP.

The LBEs were performed by DCPP cognizant engineers and subject to a peer review.

Potentially adverse seismic conditions that could not readily be resolved were entered into the CAP. The peer review team consisted of a minimum of two individuals and any comments were addressed.

NRC Request:

c.

Present a list of plant-specific vulnerabilities (including any seismic anomalies, outliers, or other findings) identified by the IPEEE and a description of the actions taken to eliminate or reduce them (including their completion dates)

PG&E Response:

As provided in PG&E Letter DCL 94-133, "Response to Generic Letter 88-20 Supplement 4, (Individual Plant Examination of External Events for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities,"' dated June 27, 1994, (Reference 3), based on the results presented in the IPEEE study, no vulnerabilities with regard to seismic induced core damage exist at DCPP. There were other completed plant improvements that have a beneficial impact on the PRA that were included in the SWEL development.

NRC Request:

d.

Results of the walkdown including key findings and identified degraded, non-conforming, or unanalyzed conditions. Include a detailed description of the actions taken or planned to address these conditions using the guidance in Regulatory Issues Summary 2005-20, Rev 1, Revision to NRC Inspection Manual Parl9900 Technical Guidance, "Operating Conditions Adverse to Quality or Safety," including entering the condition in the corrective action program.

PG&E Response:

PG&E Letter DCL-14-041 Page 13 of 16 The completed walkdowns (SWEL-1 and SWEL-2 combined) for Unit 1 was-comprised of -tOO 125 SWCs and a9-68 AWCs. T\\venty three Thirty potentially adverse seismic conditions were identified, placed in CAP, and evaluated. The engineering evaluations were completed and the conditions did not adversely affect the performance of any required safety function. The CAP status of these items is identified in Attachment G of this enclosure.

The NRC issued ({Request for Additional Information Associated with Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3, Seismic Walkdowns," on November 1, 2013 (Reference 4).

PG&E provided its response in PG&E Letter DCL-13-114, ({Response to November 1, 2013, Request for Additional Information Regarding Recommendation 2.3 Seismic,"

dated December 2, 2013 (Reference 5). In response to RAI-1 alternative (b), PG&E confirmed that a new CAP entry was made to verify if appropriate actions were taken when reporting and dispositioning identified potential adverse seismic conditions (PASCs).

PG&E's review concluded that the PASC associated with AWC 1-CP-35 had not been included in Reference 6, Enclosure 1, Attachment G. The identified PASC had been entered into CAP during the original walkdowns for Reference 6 and appropriate actions had been taken when dispositioning this PASC. The PASC associated with AWC 1-CP-35 is included in Attachment G of this enclosure.

Attachment H of this enclosure, originally listed components that were inaccessible in accordance with EPRI 1025286 and could not be inspected prior to submitting PG&E Letter DCL-12-118. All inaccessible components identified in PG&E Letter DCL-12-118 were walked down. There are no further inaccessible components to be walked down in the scope of Recommendation 2.3 Seismic for Unit 1. Notes have been added to Attachment H of this enclosure accordingly.

6,ttachment H of this enclosure provides a listing of components that 'Nere inaccessible in accordance '*'lith EPRI 1 025286 and could not be inspected prior to submitting this response. These inaccessible items 'Nill be inspected prior to the end of the next refueling outage for Unit 1 (1 R18). 1 R18 is currently scheduled to be completed in March 2014. )1\\n update from those inspections \\Viii be submitted 'Nithin 60 days foiiCYNing the completion of 1 R18.

Attachment I of this enclosure contains the SWCs including any associated LBEs that were not included in Reference 6 due to inaccessibility.

I Attachment J of this enclosure contains AWCs including any associated LBEs that were *I not included in Reference 6 due to inaccessibility.

)

PG&E Letter DCL-14-041 Page 14 of 16 In summary, there were no deficiencies entered into CAP for Unit 1 that resulted in any safety-related SSCs being inoperable or non-functional.

NRC Request:

e.

Discuss any planned or newly installed protection and mitigation features PG&E Response:

There are currently no planned or newly-installed changes to the plant as a result of implementing this seismic walkdown guidance.

NRC Request:

f Results and any subsequent actions taken in response to the peer review PG&E Response:

Various members of the peer review team reviewed the entire process of the DCPP seismic walkdown guidance, as well as each element. Peer reviewers did not review their own work. The peer review process included a review of the following:

( 1) the selection of the SSCs in the SWEL (2) a sample of the SWCs and the AWCs (3) the LBEs and decisions for entering the potentially adverse conditions into CAP (4) the submittal response Attachment K of this enclosure provides a table that corresponds to each of these activities and includes the results of the reviews and any actions taken to address those results.

References:

1.

NRC Letter, dated March 12, 2012, "Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3, and 9.3 of the Near Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident," March 12, 2012

2.

NRC Letter, "Endorsement of Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) Draft Report 1025286, 'Seismic Walkdown Guidance,"' dated May 31, 2012

3.

PG&E Letter DCL 94-133, dated June 27, 1994, "Response to Generic Letter 88-

20. Supplement 4, 1ndividual Plant Examination of External Events for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities," June 27, 1994 PG&E Letter DCL-14-041 Page 15 of 16

4.

NRC Letter, "Request for Additional Information Associated with Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3, Seismic Walkdowns," November 1, 2013.

4.-5.

PG&E Letter DCL-13-114, UResponse to November 1,) 2013, Reqi!.Jest for Additional Information Regarding Recommendation 2.3 Seismic f) "

December 2, 2013

6.

PG&E Letter DCL-12-118, "Response to Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50. 54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2. 3 Seismic Unit 1, ! JJ November 27, 2012

Attachment A

B c D

E F

G H

I hJ K

L Attachment List Title PG&E Letter DCL-14-041

Page 16 of 16 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List Team Personnel Qualifications Unit 1: Seismic Walkdown Equipment List-1 Base List 1 Unit 1: Seismic Walkdown Equipment List-1 List Unit 1: Seismic Walkdown Equipment List-2 Base List 2 Unit 1: Seismic Walkdown Equipment List-2 Rapid Drain-Down List Unit 1: Seismic Walkdown Equipment List-2 List Unit 1: Potentially Adverse Seismic Conditions Entered into the Corrective Action Program Unit 1: Inaccessible Component List Unit 1: Seismic Walkdown Checklists Unit 1: Area Walk-By Checklists Unit 1: Summary Findings of the Peer Reviews List of Acronyms

Attachment A PG&E Letter DCL-14-041 Attachment A Page 1 of 3 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List Team Personnel Qualifications The following contains a brief summary of the industry and educational qualification of the personnel that were directly involved with the equipment selection, seismic walkdowns, licensing basis reviews, individual plant examination of external events reviews, and peer reviews.

Team Members Nozar Jahangir, PE is DCPP's manager of project engineering and the seismic project team lead. Mr. Jahangir is a degreed civil engineer and has over 30 years in the nuclear power industry at DCPP involved in plant seismic design and qualifications.

William Horstman, PE is a DCPP senior civil engineer on the Fukushima Response Project. Mr. Horstman is a degreed civil engineer specializing in structural engineering. Mr. Horstman has 32 years of experience in the commercial nuclear power industry, including over 22 years at DCPP, where he has provided services in civil engineering, seismic design, seismic analysis, license amendments, design criteria development, and licensing basis impact evaluations.

David Mik/ush is a degreed mechanical engineer with 34 years of experience in the nuclear industry at DCPP. Mr. Miklush was licensed as an operator for both units at DCPP for 7 years. Mr. Miklush has also served as operations director, maintenance director, and engineering director.

Patrick Huang, PE is a degreed civil engineer and has over 30 years of experience in the nuclear industry. Mr. Huang has worked for DCPP performing seismic equipment qualification for 23 years.

Matthew Sage is a degreed mechanical engineer and provided engineering support for this project.

Scott Maze, PE is a degreed civil engineer and has*over 23 years of structural engineering experience including experience in seismic design, most of that in support of DCPP.

David Cryer is a degreed mechanical engineer, and has over 34 years in the nuclear power industry. Most of Mr. Cryer's work has been for DCPP in seismic qualification of equipment and pipe support.

PG&E Letter DCL-14-041 Attachment A Page 2 of 3 Thomas Kipp is a degreed aeronautical engineer and has 42 years of experience in the nuclear power industry in fields including PRA, fragility analysis and the L TSP at DCPP.

Kevin Moore is a degreed structural engineer with over a year of experience in the nuclear power industry, including work at several nuclear generating stations.

Mr. Moore also participated in seismic walkdowns for San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station.

Fred Grant is a degreed engineer specializing in mechanics of structures and has 7 years of experience in mechanical and structural engineering. Four of Mr.

Grant's years in the industry have been dedicated to seismic walkdowns and seismic fragility analysis.

Krishna Amirineni, PE is a degreed civil engineer with 4 years of seismic structural engineering experience in the nuclear power industry.

John Gantner, PE is a degreed civil engineer with 5 years of structural engineering experience in the power industry.

David Nakaki, Ph.D, PE is a degreed engineer with 25 years in the nuclear power industry. Mr. Nakaki has been involved with DCPP L TSP program in developing equipment fragility evaluations since the 1980s.

Nathan Barber is a degreed nuclear engineer with 10 years of experience in PRA at DCPP.

Murrell Evans provided operations support for this project. Mr. Evans has 36 years of experience in the nuclear industry, over 31 of which have been in support of DCPP, including holding positions as an operations shift manager and maintenance operation support manager.

Philippe Soenen is a degreed mechanical engineer and has 1 0 years of licensing experience in the nuclear industry, most of that in support of DCPP.

Mr. Soenen is a licensing supervisor.

Thomas Baldwin, PE is a degreed mechanical engineer with 26 years of experience with DCPP, holding positions such as a design engineer, senior reactor operator; engineering supervisor, procedure services manager, and licensing manager.

Personnel SWE Training Personnel Functions and Qualifications Ops I Licensing EPRI/

SWE ESP Ops Systems IPEEE Basis Individuals SQUG Reviewer Nazar Jahangir EPRI X

X William Horstman EPRI X

X X

Scott Maze EPRI X

X David Cryer EPRI X

X David Miklush N/A X

X X

Murrell Evans N/A X

David Nakaki SQUG X

Thomas Kipp SQUG X

Kevin Moore SetAEPRI X

Fred Grant EPRI X

Krishna Amirineni EPRI X

X John Gantner EPRI X

Nathan Barber N/A X

Matthew Sage N/A Patrick Huang N/A X

Philippe Soenen N/A Thomas Baldwin N/A System Engineers N/A X

Note: There are four peer review activities listed below. The numbers correspond to the review performed

1.

Peer review of the selection of the SSCs in the SWEL

2. Peer review of a sample of the SWCs and the AWCs

3.

Peer review of the LBEs and the decisions for entering the potentially adverse conditions into CAP

4.

Review of the submittal report PG&E Letter DCL-14-041 Attachment A Page 3 of 3 I

Peer Support Reviewer Personnel (see note) 1,2,3 2,3 3

3 4

1 1, 2, 3 X

1 X

3 4

4 X

Attachment B PG&E Letter DCL-14-041 Page 1 of 5 Unit 1: Seismic Walkdown Equipment List-1 Base List 1 EPRI 1 025286 Screen No. 3 (Five SF or CF)

RRC RCPC RCIC DHR CF IPEEE SSEL Structure, System, or Component (Y/N)

(Y/N)

Remarks Volume control tank outlet to CCP y

y y

N y

y y

Flow path pressure boundary and CIVs suction valves (LCV-1128, LCV-112C)

Emergency borate valve to charging y

y y

N y

Added from SSEL.

pump flow path (8104)

Valves in flow path to RCS through y

y y

N y

Added from SSEL.

regenerative Hx (8107, 8108, 8145, 8146, 8147, 8148)

Charging pump discharge FCV-128 y

y y

N y

Added from SSEL.

RCP seal water RV-8121 y

y y

N y

Added from SSEL.

RWST to charging pump suction valves N

N N

N y

y y

Valves in the recirculation between RHR Sl and (8805A, 88058)

CCP are not safe shutdown equipment; only valves that are CIVs are included.

RWST to Sl pump suction valves (8976)

N N

y y

N Valves in the recirculation between RHR Sl and CCP are not safe shutdown equipment; only valves that are CIVs are included.

RHR discharge to charging pump suction N

N N

N y

y N

Valves in the recirculation between RHR Sl and valves (8804A, 88048)

CCP are not safe shutdown equipment; only valves that are CIVs are included.

Charging pump injection valves (8801A, N

N N

N y

y y

Valves in the recirculation between RHR Sl and 88018, 8803A, 88038)

CCP are not safe shutdown equipment; only valves that are CIVs are included.

Containment recirculation suction valves N

N N

N y

y N

Valves in the recirculation between RHR Sl and (8982A, 89828)

CCP are not safe shutdown equipment; only valves that are CIVs are included.

Accumulator outlet valves to cold leg N

N N

N y

Added from SSEL.

valve CCW pumps N

N y

y y

Safe shutdown equipment

EPRI 1 025286 Screen No. 3 (Five SF or CF)

RRC RCPC RCIC DHR CF Structure, System, or Component (Y/N)

(Y/N)

CCWHx N

N y

y y

CCW surge tank N

N y

y y

CCW header A and B FCV-430 and N

N N

N y

FCV-431 SG blowdown isolation valves (FCV-151, N

N N

N y

157,160,244,246,248,250,760,761, 762, 763)

CCW pump auxiliary lube oil pumps N

N y

y y

(CCWAP1, CCWAP2, CCWAP3)

DG fuel off shutoff valves (LCV-85 to y

y y

LCV-90)

DG engines and generator y

y y

DG main lead terminal/box y

y y

DFO storage tanks (0-1, 0-2) y y

y y

y DFO filters y

y y

DFO pumps y

y y

DG air start receiver y

y y

DG inlet air filter y

y y

DG inlet silencer y

y y

DG exhaust silencer y

y y

DFODT y

y y

DG radiator/water pump y

y y

4160 V Switchgear (Bus F, G, H) y y

y y

y ASW pump overcurrent relays y

y y

ASW pump undervoltage relays y

y y

IPEEE SSEL (Y/N)

(Y/N) y y

y y

N y

y y

y N

y y

y N

y y

y N

y y

PG&E Letter DCL-14-041 Attachment B Page 2 of 5 Remarks Safe shutdown equipment Safe shutdown equipment CIVs only Added from SSEL.

Added from SSEL.

Safe shutdown equipment Safe shutdown equipment Safe shutdown equipment Safe shutdown equipment. Buried tank, permanently accessible for inspection.

Safe shutdown equipment Safe shutdown equipment Safe shutdown equipment Safe shutdown equipment Safe shutdown equipment Safe shutdown equipment Safe shutdown equipment Safe shutdown equipment Safe shutdown equipment Safe shutdown equipment Safe shutdown equipment

EPRI 1 025286 Screen No. 3 (Five SF or CF)

RRC RCPC RCIC DHR CF Structure, System, or Component (Y/N)

(Y/N)

CCW pump undervoltage relay y

y y

CCW pump overcurrent relays y

y y

4160 V load center transformer y

y y

overcurrent relays (51HF10 to 51HH10)

CCP overcurrent relays y

y y

AFW motor driven pump overcurrent y

y y

relays Startup transformer overcurrent relays y

y y

(Bus F, G, H)

ASW pump control transfer switch relay y

y y

CCW pump control transfer switch relays y

y y

4160 V potential transformers (Bus F, G, y

y y

H)

DG shutdown relays y

y y

DG overcurrent relays y

y y

DG oil pressure timer relays y

y y

DG overcrank timer relays y

y y

DG oil pressure relays y

y y

DG jacket water temperature trip relays y

y y

DG engine start relays y

y y

DG overcrank relays y

y y

DG excitation cubicle y

y y

DG control panel y

y y

Safeguard relay panel (Bus F, G, H) y y

y y

y 480 V breaker cabinets (load centers) y y

y y

y (SPF to SPH)

IPEEE SSEL (Y/N)

(Y/N) y y

y y

y N

y y

y N

y y

EPRI 1025286 Screen No. 3 (Five SF orCF)

RRC RCPC RCIC OHR CF Structure, System, or Component (Y/N)

(Y/N)

CCW FCV motor control contactors y

y y

CCW FCV control switches (FCV-430, y

y y

FCV-431) 480-V auxiliary relay panel y

y y

4160 V/480 V transformers (THF10 to y

y y

THH10)

Instrument breaker panels (PY11 to y

y y

PY16) 120 V inverters (IY11 to IY14) y y

y y

y 125 Vdc batteries (BAT11 to BAT13) y y

y y

y Vital battery racks y

y y

Vital battery chargers (BTC11, BTC12, y

y y

BTC121, BTC131, BTC132) 125 Vdc and 125 Vdc y

y y

switchgear/breaker panels (S011 to S013)

Nuclear auxiliary relay rack y

y y

SSPS y

N y

y y

Auxiliary safeguards cabinet y

N y

y y

Process control and protection system N

y y

N y

Process control and protection system N

y y

N y

instrument racks (P1A to P1 C)

Main control boards (1VB1 to 1VB5) and y

y y

control console (CC1 to CC3)

Hot shutdown panel y

y y

IPEEE (Y/N) y N

y y

y SSEL (Y/N) y y

N N

N y

y y

N N

PG&E Letter DCL-14-041 Attachment B Page 4 of 5 Remarks Safe shutdown equipment Added from SSEL.

Safe shutdown equipment Safe shutdown equipment Safe shutdown equipment Safe shutdown equipment Safe shutdown equipment Safe shutdown equipment Safe shutdown equipment Safe shutdown equipment Safe shutdown equipment Safe shutdown equipment Safe shutdown equipment Safe shutdown equipment Safe shutdown equipment Safe shutdown equipment Safe shutdown equipment

EPRI 1 025286 Screen No. 3 (Five SF or CF)

RRC RCPC RCIC DHR CF Structure, System, or Component (Y/N)

(Y/N)

Containment fan coolers N

N N

N y

Containment purge valves N

N N

N y

(RCV-11, RCV-12, FCV-660, FCV-661)

Auxiliary building supply fans (S-35, N

y y

S-36) 480 V switchgear room supply fans N

y y

(S-43, S-44)

Auxiliary building exhaust fans N

y y

(E-43, E-44)

Auxiliary building shutoff (discharge)

N y

y y

y dampers (FCV-5045, FCV-5046)

Auxiliary building backdraft dampers N

y y

(BDD-43, BDD-44)

ASW pump control switch relays y

y y

ASW pump control switch relays at hot y

y y

shutdown panel CCW pump control switch relays y

y y

CCW pump control switch relays at hot y

y y

shutdown panel Auxiliary transformer overcurrent relays y

y y

(Bus F, G, H)

IPEEE SSEL (Y/N)

(Y/N) y y

y y

PG&E Letter DCL-14-041 Attachment B Page 5 of 5 Remarks Safe shutdown equipment Safe shutdown equipment Safe shutdown equipment Safe shutdown equipment Safe shutdown equipment Safe shutdown equipment Safe shutdown equipment Safe shutdown equipment Safe shutdown equipment Safe shutdown equipment Safe shutdown equipment Safe shutdown equipment

Attachment C Unit 1: Seismic Walkdown Equipment List-1 List Safety Function System Equipment New or Risk Component No.

Class Environment Replacement RRC RCPC RCIC DHR CF Significance SSEL (Y/N)

(Y/N)

ASW crosstie valve FCV-601 17 8

SWIE N

N N

y y

N y

y Fire pump No. 1 18 5

MIE N

N N

N DFO transfer pump 0-2 21 5

DIE N

y y

y DFO transfer pump 0-2 filters 21 0

DIE N

y y

y N

N AFW lead 1 temperature element 3

19 MIE N

N N

N AFW pump 1 (turbine-driven) 3 5

MIE N

N N

N y

y AFW pump 2 (motor-driven) 3 5

MIE N

N N

N y

y TD AFW pump Discharge to SG 3

7 OE N

N N

y N

N LCV-110 AFW pump discharge to SG 3

7 MIE N

N N

y N

N LCV-115 TO AFW pump discharge to SG 3

8 OE N

N N

y N

N LCV-106 FCV-95 control switch contactor 4

1 MIE N

N N

N y

N N

N (supply to TO AFW pump)

Stop valve No. FCV-152 on supply to 4

0 MIE N

N N

N y

N N

y TDAFW pump 1 MS isolation valve FCV-41 4

7 OE N

N N

N y

N N

y MS PCV-20 (1 0% dump) 4 7

OE N

N N

N y

N N

y Isolation valves on supply to TO 4

8 OE N

N N

N y

N N

y AFW pump (FCV-37)

MSSV RV-13 4

7 MIE N

N N

N y

N N

N MSSVRV-3 4

7 OE N

N N

N y

N N

N MSSV RV-61 4

7 MIE N

N N

N y

N N

N IPEEE IPEEE Enhancement (Y/N)

(Y/N) y N

N y

y y

y N

N N

y N

N N

y N

N N

y N

Walkdown Package No.

DC-0-17 -P-VOM-SW-1-FCV-601 DC-0-18-M-PP-FP1 DC-0-21-M-P P-D FOTP2 DC-0'-21-P-FL-DFOTF2 DC-1-03-1-E-TE-117 DC-1-03-M-P P-AFWP 1 DC-1-03-M-PP-AFWP2 DC-1-03-P-VOH-FW-1-LCV-110 DC-1-03-P-VOH-FW-1-LCV-115 DC-1-03-P-VOM-FW-1-LCV-106 DC-1-04-LD30 DC-1-04-P-V-MS-1-FCV-152 DC-1-04-P-VOA-MS-1-FCV-41 DC-1-04-P-VOA-M S-1-PCV-20 DC-1-04-P-VOM-MS-1-FCV-37 DC-1-04-P-VR-MS-1-RV-13 DC-1-04-P-VR-MS-1-RV-3 DC-1-04-P-VR-MS-1-RV-61 PG&E Letter DCL-14-041 Attachment C Page 1 of6 Remarks Valve shared by both units.

Added due to association with L TSP/IPEEE modification. Pump common to both units.

Associated with L TSPIIPEE modifications. DFO transfer pumps common to both units.

DFO filters common to both units.

Added for variety of types of systems and variety of equipment types (19).

Added based on peer review.

Added for Equipment Type (1 ).

Added from SSEL. Special type of control valve for steam turbine.

Added from SSEL

Safety Function System Equipment New or Component No.

Class Environment Replacement RRC RCPC RCIC DHR (Y/N)

MSSV RV-8 4

7 OE N

N N

N y

Boric acid storage tank 1 level 8

18 MIE N

y N

transmitter L T -102 Seal water Hx 8

21 MIE N

y y

y N

CCP 1 (Emergency) 8 5

MIE N

y y

y N

CCP 3 (Normal) 8 5

MIE y

y y

y N

Boric acid blender inlet valve 8

7 MIE y

N N

FCV-110A Emergency borate valve to charging 8

8 MIE N

y y

y N

pump (8104)

Volume control tank outlet to CCP 8

8 MIE N

y y

y N

suction valve LCV-1128 Sl pump 1 9

5 MIE N

N N

Containment recirculation sump, sump strainer, trash rack, and vortex 9

0 ICE y

N N

y y

suppressor Sl accumulator 1 9

21 ICE N

N N

RWST to charging pump suction 9

8 MIE N

N N

valve 8805A Sl pump suction valves from RWST 9

8 MIE N

N N

(8923A)

RHR Hx 1 10 21 MIE N

N N

N y

RHR pump 2 10 6

MIE N

N N

N y

RHR pump suction valve 8700A 10 8

MIE N

N N

N y

RHR pump recirculation valve 10 8

MIE y

N N

N y

FCV-641A RHR pump recirculation valve 10 8

MIE y

N N

N y

FCV-6418 CCW header A flow FCV-430 14 8

MIE y

N N

CCW Hx output thermocouple TE-6 14 19 MIE N

N N

N y

Risk IPEEE CF Significance SSEL IPEEE Enhancement (Y/N)

(Y/N)

N N

N y

N N

N y

N N

y y

y N

N N

y y

N y

N N

y N

N y

y N

N y

y y

N N

N y

y N

N N

y N

N y

y N

N y

y y

N N

y N

N N

N y

N N

y N

N N

y y

y N

N y

N N

Walkdown Package No.

DC-1-04-P-VR-MS-1-RV-8 DC-1-08-1-T-LT-102 DC-1-08-M-HX-SWH E 1 DC-1-08-M-PP-CCP1 DC-1-08-M-PP-CCP3 DC-1-08-P-VOA-CVCS FCV-110A DC-1-08-P-VOM-CVCS 8104 DC-1-08-P-VOM-CVCS LCV-1128 DC-1-09-M-PP-SIP1 DC-1-09-M-STR-STR-RHR 1 DC-1-09-M-TK-AT1 DC-1-09-P-VOM-SI-1-8805A DC-1-09-P-VOM-SI-1-8923A DC-1-1 O-M-HX-RHE1 DC-1-10-M-PP-RHRP2 DC-1-1 0-P-VOM-RHR 8700A DC-1-1 0-P-VOM-RHR FCV-641A DC-1-1 0-P-VOM-RHR FCV-641B DC-1-14-E-P-VOM-CCW FCV-430 DC-1-14-1-E-TE-6 PG&E Letter DCL-14-041 Attachment C Page 2 of6 Remarks Added from SSEL and variety of systems. Mounted in local panel no.

XLT102.

Added based on recommendation from PRA Group. Variety of equipment types (21). Added for variety of systems Includes subcomponent: AP1 Originally a reciprocal charging pump, replacement dissimilar to CCP1. Major Modification.

Added based on modification.

Seismically supported valve.

Added from SSEL. Seismically supported.

Added due to association with L TSP/IPEEE modification.

Added as major modification.

Added for variety of environments.

Added due to association with L TSP/IPEEE modification.

Added based on peer review.

Associated with L TSPIIPEEE modification.

Added for variety of equipment (19).

Electrical location code XTE-006.

System Equipment New or Component No.

Class Environment Replacement RRC (Y/N)

CCW Hx 1 14 21 MIE N

N CCW pump 1 14 5

MIE N

N CCW surge tank 14 21 OE N

N CCW Hx FCV-365 14 7

MIE y

N ASW pump 1 17 6

SWIE N

N ASW FCV-602 17 7

MIE N

N DG No. 1 lube oil electric heater 21 0

DIE y

y DG No. 1 control panel 21 20 DIE N

y DG No. 1 excitation cubicle 21 20 DIE N

y DG No. 1 DC power supply transfer switches 21 14" DIE N

y DFO transfer pump 0-1 local 21 1

MIE N

y contactor panel DG No. 1 engine 21 17 DIE N

y DG No. 1 radiator A 21 0

DIE N

y DG No. 1 exhaust silencer 21 0

DIE N

y DG No. 1 inlet silencer 21 0

DIE N

y DG No. 1 air start receiver A 21 21 DIE N

y DG No. 1 inlet air filter 21 0

DIE N

y DG No. 1 fuel off shutoff valve 21 7

DIE N

y header B Post-LOCA sampling room 23 0

MIE N

N ventilation duct heater No. 29A Control room ventilation control 23 20 MIE N

N cabinet CCR 1 Safety Function Risk RCPC RCIC DHR CF Significance

_{Y/N_l N

y y

N y

y y

y N

y y

y N

N N

y y

N y

y N

N y

y y

y N

y y

N y

y y

y N

y y

N y

y y

y N

y y

N y

y y

y N

y y

N y

y y

y N

y y

N N

N IPEEE SSEL IPEEE Enhancement

_{_Y/N_l

_{_Y/N_l (Y/N) y y

N y

y N

y y

N y

N N

y y

N y

y N

N N

y N

N y

N N

y y

N N

y N

N y

N N

y N

N y

N N

y N

y y

N N

N y

N Walkdown Package No.

DC-1-14-M-HX-CCWH E 1 DC-1-14-M-PP-CCWP1 DC-1-14-M-TK-CCWST1 DC-1-14-P-VOA-CCW FCV-365 DC-1-17-M-PP-ASP1 DC-1-17-P-VOA-SW-1-FCV-602 DC-1-21-E-HT-LOH1 DC-1-21-E-PNL-GQD11 DC-1-21-E-PNL-SED11 DC-1-21-E-S-EQD-11 DC-1-21-LPH65 DC-1-21-M-EN-DEG 1 DC-1-21-M-HX -JWR 1 A DC-1-21-M-MISC-ES1 DC-1-21-M-MISC-IS1 DC-1-21-M-TK-AR 1 A DC-1-21-P-FL -CAF 1 DC-1-21-P-VOA-DEG-1-LCV-85 DC-1-23-E-HT -EH-29A DC-1-23-E-PNL-CRC1 PG&E Letter DCL-14-041 Attachment C Page 3 of6 Remarks Includes component No. CCWAP1 Added from SSEL New component Added for variety of types of equipment (14).

Added for equipment type (1 ).

Includes DFOTD1, JWP1, main lead terminal box 1, generator 1 Added per recommendation by PRA group. Added for variety of systems and for a variety of types of equipment (1 0).

Safety Function System Equipment New or Component No.

Class Environment Replacement RRC RCPC RCIC DHR (Y/N)

CFCU Sl system and auto bus 23 20 MIE y

y y

transfer relay cabinet, Bus F Control room ventilation air 23 12 DIE N

N N

conditioning compressor CP-35 Containment fan cooler No. 1 23 10 ICE N

N N

Auxiliary building ventilation exhaust 23 9

DIE N

N y

y y

fan E-1 ASW pump compartment exhaust fan E-103 23 9

SWIE N

y y

480 V switchgear ventilation exhaust 23 10 OE N

N y

y y

fan E-43 Auxiliary building ventilation supply 23 9

DIE N

N y

y y

fan S-31 Control room ventilation supply fan 23 10 DIE N

N y

y y

S-35 480 V switchgear ventilation supply 23 9

OE N

N y

y y

fan S-43 Control room ventilation air 23 10 DIE N

N N

conditioning condenser CR35 480 V switchgear ventilation shutoff 23 7

OE N

N y

y y

(discharge) damper FCV-5045 Control room ventilation supply fan 23 8

DIE N

N N

suction damper MOD-1 0 Control room ventilation supply fan 23 8

DIE N

N N

suction damper MOD-9 Control room ventilation filter unit 23 18 DIE N

N N

FU39 Containment purge valve FCV-660 23 7

ICE N

N N

Containment purge valve RCV-11 23 7

ICE N

N N

Hydrogen monitoring system supply 23 8

ICE N

N N

valve FCV-238 Post-LOCA sample system return 23 8

MIE N

N N

line to containment valve FCV-700 ASW FCV-602 backup air 25 21 MIE N

N N

y y

accumulator Risk CF Significance SSEL IPEEE (Y/N)

(Y/N)

(Y/N) y N

N N

N y

y N

N y

y N

N N

y N

y y

y N

N N

y y

N y

y N

y y

N N

N y

y N

N y

N N

y N

N y

y N

N y

y N

N N

y N

N N

IPEEE Enhancement (Y/N)

Walkdown Package No.

N DC-1-23-E-PNL-PCCFC1 N

DC-1-23-M-BC-CP-35 N

DC-1-23-M-BF-CFC1-1 N

DC-1-23-M-BF-E-1 N

DC-1-23-M-BF-E-1 03 N

DC-1-23-M-BF-E-43 N

DC-1-23-M-BF-S-31 N

DC-1-23-M-BF -S-35 N

DC-1-23-M-BF-S-43 N

DC-1-23-M-HX-CR35 N

DC-1-23-P-D-VAC-1-FCV-5045 N

DC-1-23-P-D-VAC-1-MOD N

DC-1-23-P-D-VAC-1-MOD-9 N

DC-1-23-P-FL-FU39 N

DC-1-23-P-VOA-VAC-1-FCV-660 N

DC-1-23-P-VOA-VAC-1-RCV-11 N

DC-1-23-P-VOS-VAC-1-FCV-238 N

DC-1-23-P-VOS-VAC-1-FCV-700 N

DC-1-25-M-TK-BUAS-602 PG&E Letter DCL-14-041 Attachment C Page 4 of6 Remarks Added for variety of environments.

Added for safety function Added from SSEL. Added for variety of environments.

Added for safety function Includes CR35 Added for variety of environments.

Variety of types of equipment (1 0)

Associated with IPEEE modification.

Added per recommendation from PRA group.

Added for variety of equipment types (8)

Added for variety of systems.

Safety Function System Equipment New or Component No.

Class Environment Replacement RRC RCPC RCIC DHR (Y/N)

Auxiliary relay rack No. RNARA 36 20 MIE N

N y

N N

Process control and protection 36 18 MIE N

N y

y N

system - process control rack No. 1 A SSPS - input relay cabinet No.

38 20 MIE N

y N

y y

RNSIA SSPS-logic cabinet No. RNSLA 38 20 MIE N

y N

y y

SSPS -output relay cabinet No.

38 20 MIE N

y N

y y

RNSOA SSPS-test cabinet No. RNSTA 38 20 MIE N

y N

y y

Reactor trip switchgear/control panel 41 20 MIE N

y N

N N

No. B1 Process control and protection system - computer input rack 43 18 MIE N

N y

y N

No. RNCI1 4160 V switchgear, Bus G 63 3

MIE y

y y

4160 V safeguard relay panels 63 20 MIE N

y y

4160 V potential transformer, Bus G 63 4

MIE N

y y

480 V breaker cabinets (load 64 2

MIE N

y y

centers), Bus ~

Auxiliary relay panel 64 20 MIE N

y y

4160 V/480 V transformer 64 4

MIE N

y y

No. THG 1 0ll=f~ ~ g 120 Vac instrument breaker panel 65 2

MIE N

y y

No. PY11 120 Vac inverter No. IY11 65 16 MIE y

y y

Regulating transformer No. TRY11 65 4

MIE y

y y

125 Vdc batteries and battery rack 67 15 MIE y

y y

No. BAT11 125 Vdc battery charger 67 16 MIE y

y y

No. BTC11 Risk IPEEE CF Significance SSEL IPEEE Enhancement (Y/N)

(Y/N)

N N

N y

N N

y y

N y

y N

y y

N y

y N

N N

N y

N N

y y

y N

y y

N y

N N

y N

N y

y N

N y

N N

y N

N y

y N

N N

N y

y N

y y

N Walkdown Package No.

DC-1-36-E-PNL-RNARA DC-1-36-1-PN L-RN01 A DC-1-38-1-PNL-RNSIA DC-1-38-1-PNL-RNSLA DC-1-38-1-PN L-RNSOA DC-1-38-1-PNL-RNSTA DC-1-41-E-PNL-PORTB1 DC-1-43-1-PN L-RNCI1 DC-1-63-E-LC-SHG DC-1-63-E-PNL-RHG DC-1-63-E-XF-SHG 12PT DC-1-64-E-LC-SPGF-DC-1-64-E-PN L-ARP DC-1-64-E-XF-TH G~ 10 DC-1-65-E-LC-PY11 DC-1-65-E-U PS-IY 11 DC-1-65-E-XF-TRY11 DC-1-67-E-BT-BAT11 DC-1-67-E-BTC-BTC11 PG&E Letter DCL-14-041 Attachment C Page 5 of 6 Remarks Associated with IPEEE modification.

Associated with IPEEE modification.

Associated with 480-V Motor Control Centers Added for variety of types of equipment (4) and as replacement equipment Batteries and racks replaced as part of major modification.

Safety Function System Equipment New or Component No.

Class Environment Replacement RRC RCPC RCIC DHR (Y/N) 125 Vdc distribution panel 67 14 MIE N

N N

No. PD25 125 Vdc switchgear/breaker panel 67 2

MIE N

y y

No. SD11 Control console No. CC1 96 20 MIE N

y y

Main control board No. VB 1 96 20 MIE N

y y

Hot shutdown panel 96 20 MIE N

y y

Mechanical panel PM-101 (CCW 96 20 MIE N

N N

N y

supply header instrumentation)

Mechanical panel PM-103 (SG No. 1 96 20 OE y

N N

instrumentation)

Mechanical panel PM-185 (condensate storage tank 96 20 MIE y

N N

instrumentation)

Mechanical panel PM-45 (SG level instrumentation) 96 20 ICE y

N N

Mechanical panel PM-79 (reactor level/wide range pressure 96 20 MIE N

N N

y y

instrumentation)

Mechanical panel PM-89 (RC Loop 2 96 20 ICE N

N N

y y

cold leg instrumentation)

Risk CF Significance SSEL IPEEE (Y/N)

(Y/N)

N N

y N

y y

y N

N y

y N

N y

y N

N y

N N

y N

N N

y N

N N

y N

N N

y N

N N

y N

N N

y N

IPEEE Enhancement (YIN)

Walkdown Package No.

N DC-1-67 -E-LC-PD25 N

DC-1-67 -E-LC-SD11 N

DC-1-96-E-PNL-1CC1 N

DC-1-96-E-PNL-1VB1 N

DC-1-96-E-PNL-HSP N

DC-1-96-M-PNL-PM-1 01 N

DC-1-96-M-P N L -P M-1 03 N

DC-1-96-M-PNL-PM-185 N

DC-1-96-M-P N L -PM-45 N

DC-1-96-M-PNL-PM-79 N

DC-1-96-M-P N L -PM-89 PG&E Letter DCL-14-041 Attachment C Page 6 of 6 Remarks No safety function, but seismically qualified. Added for a variety of types of equipment (14).

Contains transmitter No.:

- FT-65, FT-68, FT-69 Added from SSEL.

Contains transmitter No.:

- PT-514, Pl-518 Contains transmitter No.:

- LT-40 Contains transmitter No.:

- L T-529.

Contains transmitter No.:

- PT-403 Contains transmitter No.:

- PT-460

Attachment D PG&E Letter DCL-14-041 Attachment D Unit 1: Seismic Walkdown Equipment List -2 Base List 2 Component Quick opening transfer tube closure Spent fuel pool pumps Spentfuelpoolheatexchanger Makeup water transfer pump Indoor hose reel stations Spent fuel pool pump transfer switches Spent fuel pool cooling system temperature instrumentation Fuel handling building ventilation system supply fans Fuel handling building ventilation system fan flow control damper Fuel handling building ventilation system mode dampers Fuel handling building ventilation system backdraft dampers (fan shutoff dampers)

Fuel handling building ventilation system normal exhaust fan Fuel handling building ventilation system normal backdraft dampers (fan shutoff dampers)

Fuel handling building ventilation system normal fan flow control damper PG&E Letter DCL-14-041 Attachment E Attachment E Unit 1: Seismic Walkdown Equipment List-2 Rapid Drain-Down List Spent Fuel Pool Rapid Drain-Down Equipment List Component Comments QOTTC Verify condition of QOTTC SFP fill piping from hold-up tank recirculation Verify that pipe terminates above elevation 122ft pumps and check for anti-siphon hole Suction piping to SFP pumps Verify that the SFP wall penetration is above elevation 122 ft Return piping from SFPCS Hxs Verify that anti-siphon hole is present and unobstructed SFP skimmer suction piping Verify that suction point is above elevation 122ft SFP skimmer return piping Verify that termination point is above elevation 122ft Fuel transfer tube expansion joint Verify condition of expansion joint Return piping from makeup water transfer Verify that removable spool has been removed or that submerged termination of pipe is above pumps elevation 122 ft

Structure, System, or System Component No.

Makeup water transfer 16 pump No.1 Indoor hose reel station FW-120-A38-1 18 Fuel transfer tube 42 expansion joint QOTTC 42 SFP fill piping from hold-up tank recirculation 8

pumps SFP pump No. 1 13 SFP Hx 13 SFP pump transfer switch 13 No.2 Attachment F PG&E Letter DCL-14-041 Attachment F Page 1 of 2 Unit 1: Seismic Walkdown Equipment List-2 List Rapid New or Equipment.

S-Q Drain-Replacement Class Environment (Y/N) down (Y/N)

WID Package No.

Remarks 5

MIE y

N N

DC-0-16-M-PP-Primary source for refilling MUWTP1 SFP.

Added due to use for SFP DC-1-18-F-HR-FW-makeup per OP AP-22. The 0

MIE y

N N

120-A38-1 same hose reel station is used to refill the SFP in either unit.

0 MIE y

y N

DC-1-42-M-EJ-FTC-1-EJ2 0

ICE y

y N

DC-1-42-M-MISC-QOTTC DC-1-08-P-P-LI N E-Verify that pipe terminates 0

MIE N

y N

1119 above elevation 122 ft and check for anti-siphon hole.

5 MIE y

N N

DC-1-13-M-P P-SFPP1 21 MIE y

N N

DC-1-13-M-HX-SFPHE1 1

MIE y

N N

DC-1-13-SFPPTS1

Structure, System, or System Equipment.

S-Q Component No.

Class Environment (YIN)

Suction piping to SFP 13 0

MIE y

pumps Return piping from 13 21 MIE N

SFPCS Hx SFPC temperature 13 19 MIE y

instrumentation SFP skimmer suction 13 0

MIE N

piping Line-1 080 SFP skimmer suction 13 0

MIE N

piping Line-1118 SFP skimmer return 13 0

MIE N

piping Line-1121 SFP skimmer return 13 0

MIE N

piping Line-1122 SFP skimmer return 13 0

MIE N

piping Line-1123 Return piping from makeup water transfer 16 0

MIE N

pump (Line-2242)

FHBVS Normal exhaust 23 9

DIE y

Fan E-4 Rapid New or Drain-Replacement down (Y/N) y N

y N

N N

y N

N N

PG&E Letter DCL-14-041 Attachment F Page 2 of 2 WID Package No.

Remarks DC-1-13-P-P-LINE-Verify that the SFP wall penetration is above 154 elevation 122 ft.

DC-1-13-P-P-LI N E-Verify that anti-siphon hole is 159 present and unobstructed.

DC-1-13-1-1-Tl-653 Mounted on SFPCS Hx Outlet piping DC-1-13-P-P-LI N E-Verify that suction point is 1080 above elevation 122 ft.

DC-1-13-P-P-LINE-Verify that suction point is 1118 above elevation 122 ft.

DC-1-13-P-P-LI N E-Verify that termination point 1121 is above elevation 122 ft.

DC-1-13-P-P-LINE-Verify that termination point 1122 is above elevation 122 ft.

DC-1-13-P-P-LINE-Verify that termination point 1123 is above elevation 122 ft.

Verify that removable spool DC-1-16-P-P-LI N E-has been removed or that 2242 submerged termination of pipe is above elevation 122ft.

DC-1-23-M-BF-E-4

Attachment G PG&E Letter DCL-14-041 Attachment G Page 1 of 3 Unit 1: Potentially Adverse Seismic Conditions Entered into the Corrective Action Program Description Walkdown Checklist Finding CAP Status Potential seismic interaction Spatial between sprinkler and 1-AFWP1 Interaction -

Note Closed conduit Fire/Flood Light fixture near S-31 filters Spatial could swing into filter 1-BFS-31 Interaction - SISI Note Closed housing Seismically induced flooding potential found in piping Spatial close to service cooling 1-CCWHE Interaction -

Closed water piping in CCW Hx Fire/Flood room Improperly latched doors on 1-RNAR-A Configuration Closed Eagle racks Missing grating clips near 1-RV-13 Configuration Note Closed MSSV Missing grating clip near 1-RV-3 Configuration Note Closed 1-PCV-20 LD-30 anchor bolts installed DC-1-04-LD30 Configuration Note Closed undersized CCW Hx 1-1 support:

DC-1-14-M-HX-spalled concrete (edge of CCWHE1 Degraded-Other Note pedestal)

Hoist chain SISI issue with DC-1-14-M-PP-CCWP1 Spatial Note Closed CCW Pump 1-1 Interaction - SISI Light fixture in ASW pump 1-DC-1-17 -M-PP-ASP1 Spatial Note Closed 1 room Issue Interaction - SISI Hose reel A38 gaps at wall DC-1-18-F-HR-FW-120-Configuration Note Closed brackets A38-1 Feedwater hose reel A38 DC-1-18-F-HR-FW-120-Spatial Note Closed swings into valve A38-1 Interaction - SISI Screws missing from DFO DC-1-21-P-VOA-DEG-Configuration Note Closed grating (1-1) 1-LCV-85 Screws missing at DFO DC-1-21-P-VOA-DEG-grating (1-2); (EOC From 1-LCV EOC Configuration NoteC!osed DEG 1-1 inspection)

Screw missing from DFO DC-1-21-P-VOA-DEG-grating (1-3) (EOC from DEG 1-LCV-85-EOC Configuration Not.eC/osed 1-1 inspection)

Fan E-1 03 anchor bolt lacks DC-1-23-M-BF-E-1 03 Configuration Note Closed full thread engagement Weld size discrepancy for DC-1-23-M-BF-S-35 Configuration Note Closed Fan S-35 I

I I

I

Description Modification to damper (channel stiffeners) not shown on drawings.

Incorrect drawing for FU39 support anchor

Weak light fixture support connection UPS IY11 missing some mounting bolts for transformers Expansion anchor edge distance issue on Panel TRNM Potential clearance issue at MS-1-FCV-41 Modifications to Damper Nos. VAC-1-MOD12 and VAC-1-MOD-12A (channel stiffeners) were not shown on the drawings Severe corrosion was found on the cooling coil support frames associated with Containment Fan Cooler No. 1-1 The as-found mounting for VAC-1-FCV-238 used a steel strap to secure the valve body, while the drawing specifies the use of a U-bolt The threads in the tapped holes for two of the machine screws that secure the internal swinging panel for Relay Panel No. RHG in the closed position were stripped out and three others were missing.

One of the flat-head bolts used to secure the leveling plate to the embedded anchor rods for the Load Center No. SPG was found to be missing Walkdown Checklist DC-1-23-P-D-VAC MOD-10 DC-1-23-P-FL-FU39 DC-1-36-E-PNL-RNARA DC-1-65-E-UPS-IY11 DC-1-65-E-XF-TRY11 DC-1-04-P-VOA-MS FCV-41 1-CP-35 DC-1-23-M-BF-CFC1-1 DC-1-23-P-\\IOS-VAC-1-FCV-238 DC-1-63-E-PNL-RHG DC-2-64-E-LC-SPG PG&E Letter DCL-14-041 Attachment G Page 2 of 3 Finding CAP Status Configuration Note Closed Configuration Note Closed Spatial Note Closed Interaction - SISI Configuration Note Closed Configuration Note Closed Configuration Note Configuration Closed Degraded-Note Corrosion Configuration Note Configuration Closed Configuration Note I

I I

Description A light fixture located on the exterior of the Crane Wall directly above Panel No. PM-45 was found to be loose.

The configuration of the anchorage at the base of the panel is not consistent with the drawing.

Walkdown Checklist DC-1-96-M-PNL-PM-45 DC-1-96-M-PNL-PM-89 Finding Spatial PG&E Letter DCL-14-041 Attachment G Page 3 of 3 CAP Status Interaction - SIS/

Closed Configuration Note Note: In accordance with EPRI 1025286, these conditions have been entered into the CAP. These items are open and have been prioritized in accordance with CAP guidance.

I PG&E Letter DCL-14-041 Attachment H Page 1 of 2 Attachment H Unit 1: Inaccessible Component List Upon completion of the Unit 1 eighteenth refueling outage (1 R18), all inaccessible components identified in PG&E Letter DCL-12-118, "Response to Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50. 54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2. 3 Seismic Unit 1," dated November 27, 2012, were walked down. There are no further inaccessible components to be walked down in the scope of Recommendation 2.3 Seismic for Unit 1.

Preparation for the walkdowns during 1 R18 identified that five components that were previously identified as inaccessible had been adequately inspected and documented in existing area walkdown checklists (AWCs). The 480-V breaker cabinet (load center) for Bus G and the 4160-V/480-V transformer THG 10 were originally identified in PG&E Letter DCL-12-118 to be inspected as part of AWC 1-MCCBUSG. Further review determined that this area was adequately inspected in the scope of AWC 1-LD30, which was submitted in PG&E Letter DCL-12-118. Containment purge valves VAC-1-RCV-11 and VAC-1-FCV-660 were originally identified in PG&E Letter DCL-12-118 to be inspected as part of AWCs 1-PEN62 and 1-PEN61, respectively. Further review determined that these areas were adequately inspected in the scope of A WC 1-PM-45, and submitted in PG&E Letter DCL-12-118. SWC DC-1-67-E-LC-SD11 was inspected in the scope of AWC 1-BTC11, which was submitted in PG&E Letter DCL-12-118.

Area \\"Jalkdo'.':n Component Description Seismic 'Nalkdo*Nn Checklist Outage Checklist fPG ~

~ GeRtFel f)aRel QG ~ ~~ E PNb GQQ~~

~ QEG ~ ~

m-+8 fPG ~ ~ exGitatieR GY9iGie QG ~ ~~ E PNb SEQ~~

~ QEG ~ ~

m-+8 fPG ~ ~ Fa9iateF Ne. ~A QG ~ ~~ M ~X JlJ~JR~A

~ QEG ~ ~

m-+8 Llgg V. 9FeakeF Ga9iRet (lea9 GeRteF~ 13~:Js G QG ~ s4 E bG SPG

~ MGGI3bJSG m-+8 Ll ~ sQ V.i4 gg V tFaRSfeFmeF +~G~ Q QG ~ s4 EX~ +~G~Q

~ MGGBbJSG m-+8

~=Fip switGR(leaFIGeRIFel paRel Ne.

QG ~ 4 ~ E PNb POR+B~

~ POR+B~

m-+8

~~=~:::::M g9 (RG beef) ~ Gel9 QG ~ 9s M PNb PM g9

~PM 89 m-+8

~~ I aGGI:Jmi:JiateF ~ ~

QG ~ Q9 M +K A+~

~ SIA+~

m-+8

=*=*===~=SGF QG ~ Q9 M S+R S+R R~R~

~ S+R R~R~

m-+8 (R ~:JiGk Of)eRiA~ +FaRsfeF +~:Jee Gles~:JFe QG ~ 4~ M MISG QO++G

~ QO++G m-+8

~~~:;~:~FiR~ system SI:Jf)f)ly valve QG ~ ~3 P V.OS V.AG ~ ~GV. ~3g

~ ~GV ~38 m-+8

(~ai~~~;t"'ZFf!e valve

~.. -4

~

QG ~ ~3 P V.OAVAG ~ RGV ~~

~ PENs~

m-+8 (rc~~:;-11e *Jalve

~.... -4 :G -6 QG ~ ~3 P VOA VAG ~ ~GV 66Q

~ PENs~

m-+8

I Component Description

===IPM45 (SG level 4 entainment fan seeleF Ne. 1 1 LI16Q V-switsl:lgeaF Bus G LI16Q V-safeguaF9 Felay panel Bus G

~~~as SlNitGI:lgeartl;)FeakeF panel Ne.

~=;;~Atial traAsfeFmeF Ne.

PG&E Letter DCL-14-041 Attachment H Page 2 of 2 Area lJ'!alkdown Seismic '.'-Yalkdown Checklist Outage Checklist DC 1 96 M PNL PM 45 1 PM 45 R-+8 DC 1 23 M B~ C~C1 1 1 C~C1 R-+8 DC 1 63 E LC S~G 1 4KV-G R-+8 DC 1 63 E PNL R~G 1 4KV-G R-+8 DC 1 67 E LC SD11 1 B+C11 R-+8 DC 1 63 EX~ S~G12P+

1 4KV-G R-+8

Attachment I PG&E Letter DCL-14-041 Attachment I Page 1 of 4 Unit 1: Seismic Walkdown Checklists Number of SWC Number Number of SWC Number Checklist pages of LBEs LBE pages DC-0-16-M-P P-M UWTP 1 2

0 0

DC-0-17-P-VOM-SW-1-FCV-601 2

0 0

DC-0-18-M-PP-FP1 2

1 1

DC-0-21-M-PP-DFOTP2 2

1 1

DC-0-21-P-FL-DFOTF2 2

0 0

DC-1-03-1-E-TE-117 2

0 0

DC-1-03-M-P P-AFWP 1 2

0 0

DC-1-03-M-P P-AFWP2 2

0 0

DC-1-03-P-VOH-FW-1-LCV-11 0 2

1 1

DC-1-03-P-VOH-FW-1-LCV-115 2

0 0

DC-1-03-P-VOM-FW-1-LCV-1 06 2

1 1

DC-1-04-LD30 2

1 2

DC-1-04-P-V-MS-1-FCV-152 2

1 1

DC-1-04-P-VOA-MS-1-FCV-41 2

2 2

DC-1-04-P-VOA-MS-1-PCV-20 2

0 0

DC-1-04-P-VOM-MS-1-FCV-37 2

0 0

DC-1-04-P-VR-MS-1-RV-13 2

0 0

DC-1-04-P-VR-MS-1-RV-3 2

0 0

DC-1-04-P-VR-MS-1-RV-61 2

0 0

DC-1-04-P-VR-MS-1-RV-8 2

0 0

DC-1-08-1-T-L T-102 2

0 0

DC-1-08-M-HX-SWHE1 2

0 0

DC-1-08-M-PP-CCP1 2

0 0

DC-1-08-M-PP-CCP3 2

1 1

DC-1-08-P-P-LI N E-1119 2

0 0

DC-1-08-P-VOA-CVCS-1-F CV -11 OA 2

0 0

DC-1-08-P-VOM-CVCS-1-81 04 2

0 0

DC-1-08-P-VOM-CVCS-1-LCV-1128 2

0 0

DC-1-09-M-PP-SIP1 2

0 0

DC-1-09-M-STR-STR-RHR1 2

0 0

OC-1-09-M-TK-AT1 2

0 0

DC-1-09-P-VOM-SI-1-8805A 2

0 0

DC-1-09-P-VOM-SI-1-8923A 2

0 0

DC-1-1 O-M-HX-RHE1 2

0 0

DC-1-1 O-M-PP-RHRP2 2

0 0

Number of SWC SWC Number Checklist pages DC-1-1 O-P-VOM-RHR-1-8700A 2

DC-1-1 O-P-VOM-RHR-1-FCV-641A 2

DC-1-1 0-P-VOM-RHR-1-FCV-641 B 2

DC-1-13-1-1-Tl-653 2

DC-1-13-M-HX-SFPHE1 2

DC-1-13-M-PP-SFPP1 2

DC-1-13-P-P-LI N E-154 2

DC-1-13-P-P-LINE-159 2

DC-1-13-P-P-LINE-1 080 2

DC-1-13-P-P-LINE-1118 2

DC-1-13-P-P-LINE-1121 2

DC-1-13-P-P-LINE-1122 2

DC-1-13-P-P-LI N E-1123 2

DC-1-13-SFPPTS1 2

DC-1-14-E-P-VOM-CCW-1-FCV-430 2

DC-1-14-1-E-TE-6 2

DC-1-14-M-HX-CCWHE1 2

DC-1-14-M-P P-CCWP 1 2

OC-1-14-M-TK-CCWST1 2

DC-1-14-P-VOA-CCW-1-FCV-365 2

DC-1-16-P-P-LI N E-2242 2

DC-1-17-M-PP-ASP1 2

DC-1-17 -P-VOA-SW-1-FCV-602 2

DC-1-18-F-HR-FW-120-A38-1 2

DC-1-21-E-HT -LOH 1 2

DC-1-21-E-PNL-GQD11 2

DC-1-21-E-PNL-SED11 2

DC-1-21-E-S-EQD-11 2

DC-1-21-LPH65 2

DC-1-21-M-EN-DEG1 2

DC-1-21-M-HX-JWR1A 2

DC-1-21-M-M I SC-ES 1 2

DC-1-21-M-MISC-181 2

OC-1-21-M-TK-AR 1 A 2

DC-1-21-P-FL-CAF1 2

DC-1-21-P-VOA-DEG-1-LCV-85 2

DC-1-23-E-HT -EH-29A 2

DC-1-23-E-PNL-CRC1 2

PG&E Letter DCL-14-041 Attachment I Page 2 of 4 Number Number of of LBEs LBE pages 0

0 0

0 2

2 0

0 0

0 1

1 1

1 0

0 0

0 2

2 0

0 2

2 0

0 0

0 1

1 0

0 0

0 1

1 0

0 0

0

Number of SWC SWC Number Checklist pages DC-1-23-E-PNL-PCCFC1 2

DC-1-23-M-8C-CP-35 2

DC-1-23-M-BF-CFC 1-1 2

DC-1-23-M-8F-E-1 2

DC-1-23-M-8 F -E-4 2

DC-1-23-M-8F-E-1 03 2

DC-1-23-M-8F-E-43 2

DC-1-23-M-8F-S-31 2

DC-1-23-M-8F-S-35 2

DC-1-23-M-8 F -S-43 2

DC-1-23-M-HX-C R35 2

DC-1-23-P-D-VAC-1-FCV -5045 2

DC-1-23-P-D-VAC-1-MOD-1 0 2

DC-1-23-P-D-VAC-1-MOD-9 2

DC-1-23-P-FL-FU39 2

OC-1-23-P-VOA-VAC-1-FCV-660 2

OC-1-23-P-VOA-VAC-1-RCV-11 2

OC-1-23-P-VOS-VAC-1-FCV-238 2

DC-1-23-P-VOS-VAC-1-FCV-700 2

DC-1-25-M-TK-8 UAS-602 2

DC-1-36-E-PNL-RNARA 2

DC-1-38-1-PN L-RNSIA 2

DC-1-38-1-PNL-RNSLA 2

DC-1-38-1-PNL-RNSOA 2

DC-1-38-1-PN L-RNSTA 2

OC-1-41-E-PNL-PORTB1 2

DC-1-42-M-EJ-FTC-1-EJ2 2

OC-1-42-M-M/SC-QOTTC 2

DC-1-43-I-PNL-RNCI1 2

OC-1-63-E-LC-SHG 2

OC-1-63-E-PNL -RHG 2

OC-1-63-E-XF-SHG 12PT 2

DC-1-64-E-LC-SPG 2

DC-1-64-E-PNL-ARP 2

DC-1-64-E-XF-THG10 2

DC-1-65-E-LC-PY11 2

DC-1-65-E-UPS-IY11 2

DC-1-65-E-XF-TRY11 2

PG&E Letter DCL-14-041 Attachment I Page 3 of 4 Number Number of of LBEs LBE pages 0

0 0

0 1

1 0

0 0

0 1

1 1

1 0

0 2

4 1

1 0

0 1

1 1

18 0

0 1

1 0

0 0

0 1

1 0

0 0

0 1

1 0

0 0

0 1

1 0

0 0

0 1

1 0

0 1

1 0

0 0

0 1

3 1

1

Number of SWC SWC Number Checklist pages DC-1-67 -E-BT -BAT11 2

DC-1-67 -E-BTC-BTC 11 2

DC-1-67 -E-LC-PD15 2

DC-1-67-E-LC-SD11 2

DC-1-96-E-PNL-1 CC1 2

DC-1-96-E-PNL-1VB 1 2

DC-1-96-E-PNL-HSP 2

DC-1-96-M-PNL-PM-1 01 2

DC-1-96-M-PNL-PM-1 03 2

DC-1-96-M-PNL-PM-185 2

OC-1-96-M-PNL-PM-45 2

DC-1-96-M-PNL-PM-79 2

DC-1-96-M-PNL -PM-89 2

DC-1-99-I-PNL-RN01A 2

PG&E Letter DCL-14-041 Attachment I Page 4 of 4 Number Number of of LBEs LBE pages 0

0 0

0 1

1 0

0 2

2 0

0 1

1 0

0 Note: Pages include applicable portions of the checklists and LBE required by EPRI 1025286 guidelines.

Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

Equipment ID No.

DC-1-09-M-STR-STR-RHR1 Equipment Class 12

0. (Other)

Equipment

Description:

Containment Recirculation Sump, Sump Strainer, Trash Rack, and Vortex Suppressor Sheet 1 of9 Status: _Y_

Location: Bldg.

c Floor El.

.::;...9=-1 ' __ _

Room, Area

=1--=RHR=-==1 ______________ _

Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist may be used to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment on the SWEL. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgments and findings. Additional space is provided at the end of the checklist for documenting other comments.

Anchorage

1.

Is the anchorage configuration verification required (i.e., is the item one of the 50% of SWEL items requiring such verification)?

2.

Is the anchorage free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware?

3.

Is the anchorage* free of corrosion that is more than mild surface corrosion?

The anchor bolts and other anchorage is stainless steel and free of corrosion

4.

Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchorage?

Although the concrete surface is painted, no visual cracks were observed around the anchorage

5.

Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation? (Note: This question only applies if the item is one of the 50% for which anchorage configuration verification is required.)

6.

Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free of potentially adverse seismic conditions?

Shims of up toW' were observed at various anchorage locations of the RHR system. It is confirmed with the drawings that the shims are allowed as per the design of the RHR anchorage.

Interaction Effects

7.

Are soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment or structures?

Electrical panels, fire extinguishers, overhead conduits, ladders were observed in the vicinity and are adequately anchored. Therefore, no credible sources exist in the area.

8.

Are overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles and lighting, and masonry block walls not likely to collapse onto the equipment?

There is a significant amount of overhead conduit which runs over the recirculation sump which is adequately supported.

9.

Do attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage?

10.

Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations, is the equipment free of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects?

12 Enter the equipment class name from Appendix B: Classes of Equipment N

y y

y N/A y

y y

Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

Equipment ID No.

DC-1-09-M-STR-STR-RHRI Equipment Class12

0. (Other)

Equipment Desc1iption: Coittainment Recirculation Sumjl. Sump Strainer. Trash Rack. and Vortex Suppressor A temporary scaffold storage drum was located 11nanchored in the area. The drum is located fat*

enough fi*om the RHR. sump aild other components to not cause any adverse seismic interaction effects.

Other Adverse Conditions

11.

Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions that could adversely affect the safety ftmction of the plant equipment?

No other adverse conditions.

Comments (Additional pages' maybe added as necessaty)

Sheet2 of9 Status: J._

y Significant amounts of boric acid crystals was observed on the pipes and stmctural steelnmning over the RHR sump. The cause of the leak was 1.mder investigation at the time of the RHR. sump inspection.

Evaluated by:

KA Date:

JG 12Enter the equipment class name from Appendix B: Classes of Equipment

Seismic Walkdo\\Vn Checklist (SWC)

Status:

Y Equipment ID No DC-1-09-M-TK-AT1 Equipment Class:

21 Equipment

Description:

Sl Accumulator No. 1 Location:

Building: Containment Floor El. ru_

Room, Area:

1-SIAT1 Manufacturer, model, Etc.

Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist may be used to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment on the SWEL. Tl1e space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgements and findings. Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.

Anchorage

1. Is the anchorage configuration verification required (i.e, is the item one of the 50% of SWEL items requiring such verification)?

2. Is the anchorage free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware?

3. Is the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than mild surface oxidation?

Afl anchorage appears to be in good condition.

4. Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors?

5. Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation? (Note: This question only applies if the item is one of the 50% for which an anchorage configuration verification is required.)

Anchorage is consistent with drawing 663216 sheet 9.

6. Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free of potentially adverse seismic conditions?

Interaction Effects

7. Are soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment or structures?

8. Are overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles, and lighting, and masonry block walls not likely to collapse onto the equipment?

9. Do attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage?

Piping appears to have adequate flexibility.

10. Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations, is equipment free of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects?

Other Adverse Conditions y

y y

y

11. Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions that could adversely affect the safety function of the Y

equipment?

Page 1 of 9

Seismic Walkdo\\WI Checklist (SWC) status:

v Equipment ID No DC-1-09-M-TK-AT1 Equipment Class:

21 Equipment

Description:

Sf Accumulator No. 1 Comment:

The accumulator is a tall vertical tank cantilevered from the base. (24) 1" anchors embedded into concrete pedestal with a 5" edge distance. (8) stiffeners welded to the base of the skirt. The skirt is 7116" thick and 84" tall from the flange to the top of the skirt which is welded to the tank. Valving exiting near the bottom of the tank just above the skirt is supported off the tank. Similar valving exiting near the top of the tank appears to be supported off adjacent civil structure.

Evaluated by:

3/ JO/.:l0\\4

.sfre/#611¥ Page 2 of9

Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

Status:

y Equipment ID No DC-1-21-E-PNL-GQD11 Equipment Class:

Equipment

Description:

DG No. 1 Control Panel Location:

Building: Turbine Floor El.

85 Room, Area:

1-DEG-11 Manufacturer, model, Etc.

Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist may be used to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment on the SWEL. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgements and findings. Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.

Anchorage

1. Is the anchorage configuration verification required (i.e, is the item one of the 50% of SWEL items requiring such verification)?

2. Is the anchorage free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware?

No bent, broken or missing hardware

3. Is the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than mild surface oxidation?

Minor surface corrosion noted on the interior mounting machine bolts in the vertical panel

4. Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors?

No cracks observed near the anchors y

y y

y

5. Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation? (Note: This question only applies if the item is Y

one of the 50% for which an anchorage configuration verification is required.)

The vertical panel anchorage includes vibration isolators at the four corners. The angle frame is bolted to each isolator with a 518" machine bolt (1" flat to flat on the hex head) Each isolator is anchored with two 112" Kwik Bolts.

The east side of the low panel is anchored by a machine bolt connecting the frame to a steel base plate. The base plate is anchored with 3-518" anchors (Drawing 663082 Sheet 198).

The top of the vertical panel is braced in the front-to-back direction by a unistrut system that is welded to the building column. The welded connection of the unistrut to the column is covered with plaster (Drawing 505413 Sheet 1).

The internal devices mounted to the panel are adequately mounted. No missing hardware was noted.

6. Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free of potentially adverse seismic conditions?

Interaction Effects y

7. Are soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment or structures?

Y Possible soft targets are the annuciator and hand switches on the front of the vertical panel and gauges and meters on the top of the low side panel. However, there are no credible interaction sources.

8. Are overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles, and lighting, and masonry block walls not likely to y

collapse onto the equipment?

Overhead lighting, conduits, piping, emergency lighting, and warning light are well supported. No masonry walls

9. Do attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage?

All conduits entering the panel have flex connections

10. Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations, is equipment free of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects?

y y

Page 1 of 10

~ismic Wal_kdovun Checklist (SWC) status:

y Equipment ID No DC-1-21-E-PNL-GQD11 Equipment Class:

20 Equipment

Description:

DG No. 1 Control Panel Other Adversa Conditions

11. Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions that could adversely affect the safety function of the Y

equipment?

No other adverse conditions Comment:

Evaluated by:

KA-A~

DRC AJf!*

Page 2 oflO

Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

Status:

y Equipment ID No DC-1-21-E-PNL-SED11 Equipment Class:

Equipment

Description:

DG No. 1 Excitation Cubicle Location:

Building: Turbine Floor El.

85 Room, Area:

1-DEG-11 Manufacturer, model, Etc.

Basler Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist may be used to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment on the SWEL. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgements and findings. Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.

Anchorage

1. Is the anchorage configuration verification required (i.e, is the item one of the 50% of SWEL items requiring such verification)?

2. Is the anchorage free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware?

No bent, broken, or missing hardware

3. Is the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than mild surface oxidation?

4. Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors?

No cracks observed near the anchors N

y y

y

5. Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation? (Note: This question only applies if the item is N/A one of the 50% for which an anchorage configuration verification is required.)

6. Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free of potentially adverse seismic conditions?

y No adverse condition noted Interaction Effects

7. Are soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment or structures?

Potential soft targets on the front panel include hand switches, meters, indicator lights, and buttons. However, there are no credible interaction sources

8. Are overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles, and lighting, and masonry block walls not likely to collapse onto the equipment?

Overhead lighting, conduits, piping, monorail, emergency lighting, and warning light are well supported. No masonry walls.

9. Do attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage?

Conduits are rigidly supported to the adjacent wall and the top of the panel is braced. Therefore differential displacements are expected to be low and no significant loading is anticipated.

10. Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations, is equipment free of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects?

Other Adverse Conditions y

y y

y

11. Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions that could adversely affect the safety function of the Y

equipment?

No other adverse conditions noted.

Page 1 of 8

Seismic Walkdovun Checklist (SWC) status:

y

~ **-----*--********-*** --------------------

Equipment ID No DC-1-21-E-PNL-SED11 Equipment Class:

2Q Equipment

Description:

DG No. 1 Excitation Cubicle Comment:

The excitation cubicle Is supported on a C12 channel base frame. The panel is bolted to the base frame with 4 ea-1 inch bolts. The base frame is anchored to the concrete floor with 4 - 314 Inch studs that are welded to embedded steel plates.

The top of the panel Is braced in both the front-to-back and side-to-side directions by a unlstrut frame.

The unistrut frame is both anchored to the floor and to the building column. The welded connection of the unistrut to the column Is covered with plaster.

The internal devices are adequately mounted to the panel. No missing or loose hardware was noted.

Evaluated by:

KA ~Ill Date: I\\ 1 O"':f-J !.3 '

DRC ]DC u

lf/0"'1 /J3.

Page 2 of8

Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

Status:

y Equipment ID No DC-1-21-M-HX-JWR1A Equipment Class:

Equipment

Description:

DG No. 1 Radiator A Location:

Building: Turbine Floor El.

85 Room, Area:

1-DEG-11 Manufacturer, model, Etc.

Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist may be used to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment on the SWEL. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgements and findings. Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.

Anchorage

1. Is the anchorage configuration verification required (i.e, is the item one of the 50% of SWEL items requiring such N

verification)?

The Jacket Water Radiator is mounted on one end of the continuous Diesel Generator skid. The skid is extended on both sides to accommodate the width of the radiator and the extensions are stiffened with large gusset plates.

Y The Radiator is bolted to the skid by (4) 314" bolts on both sides. In addition, a series of smaller bolts on the sides assist in securing the coil assemblies within the fan enclosure.

2. Is the anchorage free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware?

3. Is the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than mild surface oxidation?

There is some minor corrosion on the baseplate of the lateral stop restraint located on the SW corner of the radiator. The back of the same stop has somewhat greater corrosion. For disposition see Attachment 1.

4. Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors?

y y

5. Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation? (Note: This question only applies if the item is N/A one of the 50% for which an anchorage configuration verification is required.)

6. Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free of potentially adverse seismic conditions?

y Interaction Effects

7. Are soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment or structures?

The enclosure for the radiator is not a soft target. Nearby HVAC ducting is rigidly supported and the large air straightener located on top of the fan enclosure is well supported. There is a flexible connection between the air straightener housing and the fan enclosure.

8. Are overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles, and lighting, and masonry block walls not likely to collapse onto the equipment?

9. Do attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage?

Cooler and DG engine are mounted on a common skid.

10. Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations, is equipment free of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects?

y y

Page 1 of 19

Checklisft: (5\\NC)

Status:

Y Equipment ID No DC-1-21-M-HX-JWR1A Equipment Class: f!

Equipment

Description:

DG No. 1 Radjatot A Other Adyerse Cc)ndltions

11. Have. you looked for and found no other seismic conditions that could adversely affect the safety function of the equipment?

Minor surface corrosion was noted on the metal floor of the radiator enclosure, the horizontal and vertical drive shafts for the fan, the fan hub, bolts on the *gear box, and the. top surface of the gear box-* this Is not a structur~l

!ntegiity Issue.

Shim packs were noted at each of the mounting boits ;JS{3ociated with the bearings for the horizontal drive shaft for the fan an{! the gea.r box, which are* used for alignment puiposes. Since the mounting bolls are torqued and. the shim packs provide adequate bearing between the* components and the supporting stru.cture, the use of shims does not impact the seismic qualification of the fan..

The water jacket piping (visible inside the radiator housing) is well supported and there are no signs of leakage from the mechanical couplings.

The po,oling coils are bolted to the skid. and framing by a series of smaller bolts on the sides which are in satisfactol}' condition.

The vertical drive shaft for the. fan Is well supported by the gear box at Its lower end and crossed rods at its upper end. Instrumentation (temperature sensor and. vibration sensor) are sect~rely mounted on the crossed rods.

Comment:*

The scope of this walkdown included the exteriorofthe radiafor(e.g., anchorage to the concrete floot, mounting skid, outside of framing, outside ()f the cooling coils, and potential S(1ismlc Interactions) and the Interior of the radilitors( e.g., drive shafts, gear box~ fan~ inside of framing, metal floor, inside of the cooling coils, and water jacket piping, including mechanical couplings). Note that the ext~nd l~terlor Inspections wete performed separately, dtJe to equfpmenf aCCeSS /imifat/OnS.

.,A~~

1 A~ t\\.

r;:;f 2. eJ !2.0 \\

!;valuated by:

TR_K*~.-07 2' -~

lJllm;

~I 3:.

~1!u12 ~

!i(z6l/z.&1.3 DRC, WR~

t.I

}J'J/2_~R~5/ZB/lJJI3 y

Page 2 of 19*

**--.. -- -~- -

Seismic Walkd.own Checklist (SWC)

Diablo Canyon Power Plant, Unit...1 Equipment No. DC-1-21-M-HX-JWR1A Licensing Basis Evaluation Issue:, Page 1 of 1 There is some minor corrosion on the baseplate of the lateral stop restraint located at the SW corner of the radiator.

Evaluation:

The anchorage for the radiator skid is shown on drawing no. 438309, Detail 5 and is safety related. This is considered to be surface corrosion. Based on the limited amount of corrosion, there is no impact on the structural adequacy of the anchorage.

Therefore, this condition does not impact the operation of DCPP.

Recommendations:

The baseplate should be cleaned and repainted.

Notification Required: Yes (50508583)

Potentially Adverse seis!V, Condition: No.II..

Evaluated by:

~ R... ~

Reviewed by:

--A.('~34 61..""

S}1-~ /1-z.

s ll~ /t:2-.

Seismic Walkdo\\1\\11 Checklist (S\\IVC)

Status:

N

-----~~*-*----*

Equipment ID No DC-1-23-M-BF-CFC1-1 Equipment Class:

10 Equipment

Description:

Containment Fan Coolers Location:

Building: Containment Floor El.

140 Room, Area:

1 MCFC1 Manufacturer, model, Etc.

Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist may be used to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment on the SWEL The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgements and findings. Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.

Anchorage

1. Is the anchorage configuration verification required (i.e, is the item one of the 50% of SWEL items requiring such verification)?

2. Is the anchorage free of bent. broken, missing or loose hardware?

3. Is the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than mild surface oxidation?

No corrosion of the anchorage was seen.

4. Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors?

5. Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation? (Note: This question only applies if the item is one of the 50% far which an anchorage configuration verification is required.)

Anchorage is consistent with drawing 513227 Sheet 1, Revision 1.

6. Based an the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free of potentially adverse seismic conditions?

Interaction Effects

7. Are soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment or structures?

8. Are overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles, and lighting, and masonry block walls not likely to collapse onto the equipment?

T/1e containment spray piping and overhead ligllting appear to be well supported.

9. Do attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage?

10. Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations. is equipment free of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects?

No adverse seismic interactions were identified.

Other Adverse Conditions y

y y

y

11. Have you looked far and found no other seismic conditions that could adversely affect the safety function of the N

equipment?

Corrosion was noted on the lower three support frames/baffles associated with the internal cooling coils which could potentially impact their structural integrity. See Attachment 1 for disposition. The tube fin cooling coils appear to be in good condition.

Page 1 of 19

Seismic Walkdown Checklist (S\\IVC)

Status:

N Equipment ID No DC-1-23-M-BF-CFC1-1 Equipment Class:

1 0 Equipment

Description:

Containment Fan Coolers Comment:

This review included the fan, gear box, and fan motor as well as the cooling unit. T/Je fan assembly is separated from the cooling unit by a flexible coupling.The anchorage is consistent with drawing 513227 Sheet 1, Revision 1. All other elements appear to be as designed. The fan coolers contain no soft targets and this area high in containment includes no noted falling sources.

Evaluated by:

KTM Date:

~* ~

5/l/d-Dil.f

~-£_~

-?//~/~

Page 2 of 19

Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

Diablo Canyon Power Plant~ Unit j_

Equipment No. DC-1-23-M-BF-CFC1-1 Licensing Basis Evaluation Corrosion was found on the cooling coil baffles.

Evaluation:

Attachment t Page 1 of 1 The corrosion of the cooling coils, including the baffles} was documented in Action Request No. A0672985 (converted to Notification No. 50034303) in 2006. The engineering evaluation documented in Action Evaluation Nos. 01 and 02, indicate that the cooling coifs can still perform their required functions in their corroded state, but should be replaced.

Therefore, this condition does not impact the operation of DCPP.

Recommendations:

Cooling coils to be replaced.

Notification Required: Yes {50034303-existing)

Evaluated by: _...!w!.!.r.!...!..h ___

--b-~~~---J~-1-....:.=..~~=:;;,__--=:.t....:.....:::::Jl....L_.l,_ _______

Reviewed by: -------=-~...s.;.~~::..:........:.~=+-.:...._:::._ ___ ___,_.::.::..=....t-:-...!.----------

Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

Status:

y Equipment ID No DC-1-23-P-VOA-VAC-1-FCV-660 Equipment Class: z Equipment

Description:

Containment Purge Valves Location:

Building: Containment Floor El. lli Room, Area:

1-PM-45 Manufacturer, model, Etc.

Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist may be used to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment on the SWEL. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgements and findings. Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.

Anchorage

1. Is the anchorage configuration verification required (i.e, is the item one of the 50% of SWEL items requiring such verification)?

2. Is the anchorage free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware?

3. Is the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than mild surface oxidation?

4. Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors?

5. Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation? (Note: This question only applies if the item is one of the 50% for which an anchorage configuration verification is required.)

6. Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free of potentially adverse seismic conditions?

No adverse conditions were identified in the valve anchorage.

Interaction Effects

7. Are soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment or structures?

No credible sources to impact soft targets.

8. Are overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles, and lighting, and masonry block walls not likely to collapse onto the equipment?

9. Do attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage?

Pneumatic and electrical lines have adequate flexibility.

10. Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations, is equipment free of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects?

Other Adverse Conditions N

y y

y N/A y

y y

11. Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions that could adversely affect the safety function of the Y

equipment?

Page 1 of 7

Seismic Walkdo\\1\\111 Checklist (SWC)

Status:

y Equipment 10 No DC-1-23-P-VOA-VAC-1-FCV-660 Equipment Class: I Equipment

Description:

Containment Purge Valves Comment:

48" cylinder operated buttetf/y valve mounted on flanges, cantilevered off containment wall.

63" operator height (45" above ypke). Pneumatic and electrical lines have adequate flexibility.

Evaluated by*

KTM Date:

~

3/to/::.l4>11-f

~--~

3/;~/VJI~

Page 2 of 7

Seismic Walkdovvn Cheddist (SVVC)

Status:

Y Equipment 10 No DC-1-23-P-VOA-VAC-1-RCV-11 Equipment Class: I Equipment

Description:

Containment Purge Valves Location:

Building: Containment Floor El.

115 Room, Area:

1-PM-45 Manufacturer, model, Etc.

Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist may be used to document the results of the Seismic Walk down of an item of equipment on the SWEL The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgements and findings. Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.

Anchorage

1. Is the anchorage configuration verification required (i.e, is the item one of the 50% of SWEL items requiring such verification)?

2. Is the anchorage free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware?

All anchorage was present and appeared to be in good condition.

3. Is the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than mild surface oxidation?

4. Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors?

5. Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation? (Note: This question only applies if the item is one of the 50% for which an anchorage configuration verification is required.)

6. Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free of potentially adverse seismic conditions?

No adverse seismic conditions were identified in tl1e valve anchorage.

Interaction Effects

7. Are soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment or structures?

No credible sources to impact soft targets.

8. Are overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles, and lighting, and masonry block walls not likely to collapse onto the equipment?

9. Do attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage?

All attached lines have adequate flexibility.

10. Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations, is equipment free of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects?

Other Adverse Conditions N

y y

y N/A y

y y

11. Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions that could adversely affect the safety function of the Y

equipment?

Page 1 of 10

Seismic Walkdo\\1\\111 Checklist (S\\IVC)

Status:

Equipment ID No DC-1-23-P-VOA-VAC-1-RCV-11 Equipment Class: Z Equipment

Description:

Containment Purge Valves Comment:

48" cylinder operated butterfly valve mounted on flanges, cantilevered off containment wall.

63" operator height

{45" above yoke). Pneumatic and electrical lines have adequate flexibility. Expansion joint between the valve and the HVAC dueling.

Evaluated by:

Date:

3/ to(;l!Z>)t+

.3/;o/~1-/

y Page 2 of 10

Seismic Walkdovun Checklist (SWC)

Status:

Y Equipment 10 No DC-1-23-P-VOS-VAC-1-FCV-238 Equipment Class:

_a Equipment

Description:

Hydrogen Monitoring System supply valves Location:

Building: Containment FloorEJ. 1Q1 Room, Area:

1-FCV-238 Manufacturer, model, Etc.

Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist may be used to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment on the SWEL. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgements and findings. Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.

~--~-~-*---------

Anchorage

1. Is the anchorage configuration verification required (i.e, is the item one of the 50% of SWEL items requiring such verification)?

2. Is the anchorage free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware?

3. Is the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than mild surface oxidation?

4. Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors?

5. Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation? (Note: This question only applies if the item is one of the 50% for which an anchorage configuration verification is required.)

Anchorage is consistent w;th drawing 049244 sheet 20, except the top restraint of the operator is a 2" wide metal strap, as opposed to a U-bolt connection. This difference is not significant to the anchorage of the valve. See for disposition.

6. Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free of potentially adverse seismic conditions?

Interaction Effects

7. Are soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment or structures?

No credible sources could impact soft targets.

8. Are overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles, and lighting, and masonry block walls not likely to collapse onto the equipment?

9. Do attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage?

10. Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations, is equipment free of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects?

Other Adverse Conditions y

y y

y

11. Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions that could adversely affect the safety function of the Y

equipment?

No adverse seismic conditions were identified.

Page 1 of 6

~---~--------

Seismic Walkdovvn Checklist (SliVC)

Status:

Y

***--*******~*-**-**

Equipment 10 No DC-1-23-P-VOS-VAC-1-FCV-238 Equipment Class:

~

Equipment

Description:

Hydrogen Monitoring System supply valves Comment:

Solenoid valve for a small tube line. The valve is bolted to a bracket which is in tum welded to the flanges of an /-

beam. A 2" wide metal strap captures the yoke just below the vertically oriented operator and is bolted to the support bracket. The connecting tubing is adequately supported, and the attached electrical connections use flexible conduit.

Evaluated by:

Date:

3//0/ d./JI 1-lc s/s/2.()/~

Page 2 of6

Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SVVC)

Diablo Canyon Power Plant, Unit _1_

Equipment No. DC-1-23-P-VOS-VAC-1-FCV-238, Page 1 of 1 Licensing Basis Evaluation Issue:

The as-found configuration of the support for Valve No. VAC-1-FCV-238 (Support No. 244-5R) does not match the configuration shown on the as-built drawing. A steel strap was used to attach the valve to the support instead of the U-bolt shown on the drawing.

Evaluation:

A review of the applicable design calculation (84173, rev. 0) indicates that the steel strap has adequate capacity to resist the applied loading. Therefore, this condition does not impact the operation of DCPP.

Recommendations:

Revise support drawing to show the as-found configuration.

Notification Reg uired: Yes (50609279)

Potentially Adverse Seismic Condition: Yes ~ _ )

Evaluated by:

wrh ~

~ ~""---

~ '21} /4-

.~eviewed by:

-A-~~~'~,,

'L /2.. b l I lf

1

Seismic Walkdovvn Checklist (S\\IVC)

Status:

y Equipment ID No DC-1-41-E-PNL-PORTB1 Equipment Class:

Equipment

Description:

Reactor Trip Switchgear/Control Panel Location:

Building: Auxiliary Floor El. lli Room, Area:

1-PORTB1 Manufacturer, model, Etc.

Westinghouse Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist may be used to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment on the SWEL. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgements and findings. Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.

Anchorage

1. Is the anchorage configuration verification required (i.e, is the item one of the 50% of SWEL items requiring such verification)?

2. Is the anchorage free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware?

No bent, broken, missing or loose hardware was seen.

3. Is the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than mild surface oxidation?

4. Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors?

No visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors.

N y

y y

5. Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation? (Note: This question only applies if the item is N/A one of the 50% for which an anchorage configuration verification is required.)

6. Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free of potentially adverse seismic conditions?

y Panel is one of the middle cabinets in a four cabinet assembly. (5) Fillet welds anchoring the cabinet to embed plates were visible on the front and (5) fillet welds were seen on the back of the cabinet. The panel assembly appears to be bolted together from the inside but the panel doors were not opened.

Interaction Effects

7. Are soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment or structures?

No credible sources to impact soft targets.

8. Are overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles, and lighting, and masonry block walls not likely to collapse onto the equipment?

9. Do attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage?

Conduit running through the top of the cabinet is well supported.

10. Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations, is equipment free of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects?

Other Adverse Conditions y

y y

y

11. Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions that could adversely affect the safety function of the Y

equipment?

Page 1 of 15

Seismic Walkdo\\Nil Checklist (SVVC)

Status:

y Equipment ID No DC-1-41-E-PNL-PORTB1 Equipment Class:

Equipment

Description:

Reactor Trip Switchgear/Control Panel Comment:

Evaluated by:

3/ l:l./ ~0 ll..t e~/ t;z,f "LI I.:t Page 2 of 15

Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

Equipment ID No.

DC-1-42-M-MISC-QOTTC Equipment Class 12 Equipment

Description:

Quick Opening Transfer Tube Closure Location: Bldg.

Cont.

Floor El.

..:::..10=0~'---

Room, Area Westinghouse Manufacturer, Model, Etc. (optional but recommended)

Instructions for Completing Checklist 1-QOTTC

42. (Other)

Sheet 1 of 4 Status: _y_

This checklist may be used to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment on the SWEL. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgments and findings. Additional space is provided at the end of the checklist for documenting other comments.

Anchorage

1.

Is the anchorage configuration verification required (i.e., is the item one of the 50% of SWEL items requiring such verification)?

2.

Is the anchorage free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware?

The QOTTC is attached to the flange at the end of the Fuel Transfer Tube with bolts. There is no direct anchorage to the Containment Structure

3.

Is the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than mild surface corrosion?

The mounting bolts are stainless steel and free of corrosion

4.

Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchorage?

QOTTC is not directly anchored to concrete.

5.

Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation? (Note: This question only applies if the item is one of the 50% for which anchorage configuration verification is required.)

6.

Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free of potentially adverse seismic conditions?

Interaction Effects N

y y

N/A N/A y

7.

Are soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment or structures?

N/ A The QOTTC is a machined stainless steel hatch-like assembly and does not have any soft targets attached to it.

8.

Are overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles and lighting, and masonry block walls not Y

likely to collapse onto the equipment?

The QOTTC is located in a recess in the side of the Reactor Cavity and by viliue of its location it is protected from the potential collapse of overhead items.

9.

Do attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage?

The QOTTC is a passive mechanical component, and does not have any attached lines.

10.

Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations, is the equipment free of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects?

12 Enter the equipment class name from Appendix B: Classes ofEquipment N/A y

Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

Equipment ID No.

Equipment Class 12

42. (Other)

Equipment

Description:

Quick Opetling Transfer Tube Closure Other Advel'se Conditions

11.

Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions that could adverse1y affect the safety function of the plant equipment?

No other adverse conditions.

Comments (Additional pages may be added as necessary)

The QOTTC is located in the refueling cana1J at the bottom of the Reactor Cavity.

WRH W~R.

Evaluated by:

JCG jl -4r;;c:

Date:

03/06/2014 03/06/2014 12 Enter the equipment class name from Appendix B: Classes of Equipment Sheet2 of4 Status: _:y___

y I

I i i I I I

Seismic WalkdolNI1 Chedclist (SVVC)

Status:

y Equipment ID No DC-1--63-E-LC-SHG Equipment Class:,a Equipment

Description:

4160V Switchgear Location:

Building: Turbine FloorEI. ill Room, Area: 1-4KV-G Manufacturer, model, Etc.

General Electric Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist may be used to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an Item of equipment on the SWEL. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgements and findings. Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.

Anchoraae

1. Is the anchorage configuration verification required (i.e, Is the Item one of the 50% of SWEL items requiring such verification)?

2. Is the anchorage free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware?

No broken bent. or missing hardware

3. Is the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than mild surface oxidation?

Only some mild surface oxidation at some weld locations y

y y

4. Is the. anchorage free of visible cracks In the concrete near the anchors?

Y No visible cracks

5. Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation? (Note: This question only applies If the Item Is Y

one of the 50% for which an anchorage configuration verification Is required.)

Anchorage Is consistent with plant documentation

6. Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free of potentially adverse seismic conditions?

Interaction Effects

7. Are soft targets free from Impact by nearby equipment or structures?

Overhead lighting is braced. Overhead bus is braced by angle braced frame. Emergency light has restraint cable

8. Are overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles, and lighting, and masonry block walls not likely to collapse onto the equipment?

Distribution systems are braced. Masonry walls are braced by steel columns. Overhead drain pfpels braced.

9. Do attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage?

Cabling comes up through floor

10. Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations, Is equipment free of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects~

Other Adyerse Conditions

11. Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions that could adversely affect the safety function of the equipment?

y y

Page 1of14

Seismic walkdo Cheddist (SWC)

Status:

Y Equipment ID No DC-1-63-E-LC-SHG Equipment Class:,a Equipment

Description:

4160V Switchgear Comment:

Evaluated by:

Page 2 of 14

Seismic walkdo1N11 Checklist (SVVC)

Status:

N Equipment ID No QC-1-63"E-PNL-RHG Equipment

Description:

4160V Safeguard Relay Panels location:

Building:~

Manufacturer, model, Etc.

Instructions for Completing Checklist Floor El. lli Equipment Class: 20 Room, Area:

1-4KV-G This checklist may be used to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an Item of equipment on the SWEL. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgements and findings. Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.

Anchorage

1. Is the anchorage configuration verification required (I.e, is the Item one of the 50% of SWEL items requiring such verification)?

2. Is the anchorage free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware?

Anchorage*consists of (5) plug welds located at the back and (5)1/8" fillet welds varying from 2" to 5. 75 In the front according to calculation EQP 205.1. Actual cabinet to embed plate anchorage Is not visible. Cabinet interior panel Is missing screws. See Attachment 1 for disposition.

3. Is the anchorage free of corrosion that Is more than mlfd surface oxidation?

4. Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors?

5. Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation? (Note: This question only applies if the item is one of the 50% for which an anchorage configuration verification Is required.)

6. Based on the above anchorage evaluations, Is the anchorage free of potentially adverse seismic conditions?

See question 2.

Interaction Effects

7. Are soft targets free from Impact by nearby equipment or structures?

Stand-alone panel. Overhead lighting poses only falling hazard but Is well restrained.

8. Are overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles, and lighting, and masonry block walls not likely to collapse onto the equipment?

Masonry_ walls are adequately restrained.

9. Do attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage?

Cables exit through floor.

10. Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations, Is equipment free of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects?

Other Adverse Conditions

11. Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions that could adversely affect the safety function of the equipment?

N N

y y

NfA N

y v

v v

y Page 1 of 21

Seismic walkdown Cheddist (SVVC)

Status:

2Q N

Equipment 10 No DC~1-63=E-PNL-RHG Equipment

Description:

4160V Safegyard Relay Panels Comment:

Pane/Is 24"x94x43" Evaluated by:

Equipment Class:

~

~-aS-dP'L\\

3fl7fzot+

Page 2 of21

Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

Equipment No. DC-1-63-E-PNL-RHG Licensing Basis Evaluation Issue:

Diablo Canyon Power Plant, Unit _..1_, Page 1 of 1 The threads in the tapped holes for two of the machine screws that secure the internal swinging panel in the closed position were stripped out and three other machine screws were missing.

Note: this issue was identified by Electrical Maintenance, but included in the SWC for completeness.

Evaluation:

As indicated in Notification No. 50611089, the Shift Foremai1 declared the Relay Panel inoperable. Note that the panel was out-of-service for maintenance during the refueling outage, so this did not impact plant operation.

Recommendations:

Repair stripped threads in tapped holes and replace missing machine screws.

Notification Required: Yes (50611 089)

Potentially Adverse Seismic Condition: Y~

es i:va~uated by:

wrh

~~

Eh___

Rev1ewed by:

~

Seismic Walkdovun Cheddist (S\\IVC)

Status:

Y Equipment 10 No DC-1-63-E-XF-SHG12PT Equipment Class:

~

Equipment

Description:

4160V Potential Transformers Location:

Building: Turbine Floor El. 11fl Room, Area:

1-4KV-G Manufacturer, model, Etc.

Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist may be used to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment on the SWEL. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgements and findings. Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.

Anchorage

1. Is the anchorage configuration verification required (i.e, is the item one of the 50% of SWEL items requiring such verification)?

2. Is the anchorage free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware?

(5) bolts are visible coming through the top of the 4kV load center along the perimeter of the potential transformer.

(2) of the bolts did not have a nut, but it was determined that the holes were tapped and threaded. Additional fasteners were also visible coming through the top of the 4kV load center.

3. Is the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than mild surface oxidation?

4. Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors?

6. Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation? (Note: This question only applies if the item is one of the 60% for which an anchorage configuration verification Is required.)

PT Is mounted to the top of the 4kV load center with (5) bolts.

6. Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free of potentially adverse seismic conditions?

Interaction Effects

7. Are soft targets free from Impact by nearby equipment or structures?

PT cabinet Is mounted to the top of a 4kV load center.

8. Are overhead equipment distribution systems, ceiling tiles, and lighting, and masonry block walls not likely to collapse onto the equipment?

Masonry walls are reinforced. Lights are rod hung with unistrut bracing to prevent swaying.

9. Do attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage?

10. Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations, is equipment free of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects?

Other Adverse Conditions

11. Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions that could adversely affect the safety function of the equipment?

y y

y Page 1 of 8

Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SVVC) status: v Equipment ID No DC-1-63-E-XE-SHG12PT Equipment Class:.4 Equipment

Description:

4160V P<<entiaf Transformers Comment:

Evaluated by:

K~~ ~

~

a/.:18/~1'-\\

-~~c.J>>a~.... _

3/l7llOI4-Page 2 ofB

Seismic Walkdown Cheddist (SWC)

Status:

N Equipment fD No DC-1-64"E-LC-SPG Equipment Class: 2 Equipment

Description:

480V Breaker Cabinets (load Centers)

Location; Building:~

Floor El. 1QQ Room. Area: 1-LD30 Manufacturer. model, Etc.

Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist may be used to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment on the SWEL. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgements and findings. Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.

Anchorage

1. Is the anchorage configuration verification required (I.e, is the item one of the 50% of SWEL Items requiring such verification)?

2. Js the anchorage free of bent, broken. missing or loose hardware?

Embed plate anchor bolt appears to be missing at the southwest corner of the load center. See Attachment 1 for disposition.

3. Js the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than mild surface oxidation?

No corrosion obseNed N

N y

4. Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors?

Y No visible cracks noted

5. Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation? (Note: This question only applies if the Item Is N/A one of the 50% for which an anchorage configuration verification Is required.)

6. Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free of potentially adverse seismic conditions?

N See question 2.

Interaction Effects

7. Are soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment or structures?

Overhead cable trays are well supported

8. Are overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles, and lighting, and masonry block walls not likely to collapse onto the equipment?

Adjacent masonry walls are strengthened with vertical steel plate straps. Lighting can swing but is not likely to fall.

It may Impact cable trays

9. Do attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage?

Cable trays are well braced. Top of the panel is braced by structural steel tied back to the concrete wall. Significant relative displacements are not expected

10. Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations, Is equipment free of potentially adverse seismic Interaction effects?

Other Adverse Conditions y

v y

y

11. Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions that could adversely affect the safety function of the Y

equipment?

No other concerns Page 1 of9

Seismic Walkdo1M1 Checklist (SliVC)

~!~t~~; *-*-* -~----

Equipment ID No DC-1-64-E-LC-SPG Equipment Class: 2 Equipment

Description:

. 480V Breaker Cabinets (Load Centers)

Comment:

Evafuated by:

~~~

11* 3J2-1J:lollf

~--tJ./'14/ 'Ldl4 Page 2 of9

Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

Diablo Canyon Power Plant, Unit j_

Equipment No. DC-1-64-E-LC-SPG, Page 1 of 1 Licensing Basis Evaluation Issue:

One of the flat-head bolts used to secure the leveling plate to the embedded anchor rods for Load Center No.

SPG was found to be missing.

Note: this issue was identified by Electrical Maintenance, but included in the SWC for completeness.

Evaluation:

An Engineering Evaluation is documented in Notification No. 50611037, Task No. 1. This evaluation concludes that the one missing bolt does not have an adverse impact on the seismic qualification of the load center. Therefore, this issue does not impact the ability of the load center to perform its required function.

Recommendations:

Replace missing bolt.

Notification Required: Yes (50611037)

Potentially Adverse Seismic Condition: Yes Evaluated by:

wrh tt ~A f/l_ tk--, ~

RevieWedby:

-A~~ql (kNA-i)

G}-z __ c;;J 1'-/

0'-/2-6) llf*

Seismic WalkdolNI1 Cheddist (SVVC) status: v Equipment ID No DC-1-64-E-XF-THG10 Equipment Class:

~

Equipment

Description:

4160-V/480.V Transfonners location:

Building:~

Floor El..100.

Room, Area:

1-LD30 Manufacturer, model, Etc.

Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist may be used to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an Item of equipment on the SWEL The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgementS and findings. Additional space Is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.

Anchorage

1. Is the anchorage configuration verification required {i.e$ is the item one of the 50% of SWEL items requiring such verification)?

2. Is the anchorage free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware?

No missing or loose hardware was seen.

3. Is the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than mild surface oxidation?

No corrosion was identified.

4. Is the anchorage free of visible cracks In the concrete near the anchors?

5. Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation? (Note: This question only applies If the item Is one of the 50% for which an anchorage configuration verification Is required.)

The three coil assemblies are not supported at the top. Each coil assembly Is bolted to the channel base by (4) bolts. At the four comers below the coils. the channel base Is bolted to mounting plates by (2) 3/8" bolts. The four mounting plates are In tum bolted to transverse structural engle members by single 112" bolts. These are In tum welded on the vertical face of the angle to the enclosure base plates that are 112" steel plates running the length of the transformer. On each side, (7) 118" fillet welds of about 1" are used to secure the enclosure base plate to embed plates.

6. Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free of potentially adverse seismic conditions?

Interaction Effects

7. Are soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment or structures?

8. Are overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles, and lighting, and masonry block walls not likely to collapse onto the equipment?

Masonry walls on the west end of the room have been reinforced.

9. Do attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage?

10. Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations. is equipment free of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects?

Other Adverse Conditions y

y y

y

11. Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions that could adversely affect the safety function of the Y

equipment?

Page 1 of 14

Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC) status:

v Equipment ID No DC-1-64-E-XF-THG10 Equipment Class:

~

Equipment

Description:

4160-V/480..V Transformers Comment:

Evaluated by*

KTM ~--~

~

d./clS/ ;to\\4 DRC p,()

_Jt

___..... ~. ~--------*----*""'

3{z7/l/JI4-Page 2of 14

Seismic Walkdo1Nil Cheddist (S\\IVC)

Status:

Y Equipment ID No DC~1-67-E-LC-SD11 Equipment

Description:

125V DC Switchgear/Breaker Panels Location:

Building: &OOli.a.ll!

Floor El. ill Manufacturer, model, Etc.

ITE Circuit Breakers Umited model 08-05Z98 Instructions for Completing Checklist Equipment Class:.z Room, Area:

1-BTG_11 This checklist may be used to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment on the SWEL. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgements and findings. Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.

Anchorage

1. Is the anchorage configuration verification required (i.e, is the item one of the 50% of SWEL items requiring such verification)?

2. Is the anchorage free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware?

Nothing missing, broken or bent

3. Is the anchorage free of corrosion that Is more than mild surface oxidation?

No corrosion observed y

y y

4. Is the anchorage free of visible cracks In the concrete near the anchors?

Y No cracks obseTVed

5. Is the anchorage configuratio~ consistent with plant documentation? (Note: This question only applies if the Item Is Y

one of the 60% for which an anchorage configuration verification Is required.)

Consistent with design drawing 050053 Sheet 118 Rev 1.

6. Based on the above anchorage evaluations. is the anchorage free of potentially adverse seismic conditions?

y fnteractlon Effects

7. Are soft targets free from Impact by nearby equipment or structures?

Relay mounted on the front panel. However no credible interaction sources

8. Are overhead equipment. distribution systems, ceiling tiles, and lighting, and masonry block walls not likely to collapse onto the equipment?

Conduit and cable trays are well supported. The adjacent masonry wall has been strengthened.

9. Do attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage?

Top conduits and cable trays are n'gidly supported and the top of the panel is restrained in the front to back direction.

10. Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations, is equipment free of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects?

1-1/2 11 gap between the panel and the adjacent masonry wall-this is an adequate gap.

Other Adverse Conditions y

y y

y

11. Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions that could adversely affect the safety function of the Y

equipment?

Page 1 of 12

Seismic walkdown Chedclist (SVVC)

Status:

y Equipment ID No DC-1-67 -E-LC-8011 Equipment Class: 2 Equipment

Description:

125V DC Switchgear/Breaker Panels Comment:

SD11 consists of three panels that are bolted together. The base sheet metal channel is welded in 12 places In front and 6 places In back to embedded steel plates In the concrete floor. The top of the pane/Is retrained in the front to back direction with two bent plate clips that are anchored with two 112" expansion anchors In the concrete wall behind the panel. Th.e Internal components are securely mounted to the panel.

Evaluated by:

KTM

~~--

Page 2 of 12

Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC) status:

N

**-* *------ -~*-*-***-*-* ---------- ------------*---.,.---------*-*~-----~----. -~--*------~--------~----~~------

~-----

Equipment ID No DC-1-96-M-PNL-PM-45 Equipment Class:

20 Equipment

Description:

Mechanical Panel No. PM-45(CCW HX Differential Pressure Instrumentation) location:

Building: Auxiliary Floor El.

127 Room, Area:

1-PM-45 Manufacturer, model, Etc.

Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist may be used to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment on the SWEL. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgements and findings. Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.

Anchorage

1. Is the anchorage configuration verification required (i.e, is the item one of the 50% of SWEL items requiring such verification)?

2. Is the anchorage free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware?

No bent, broken, missing or loose hardware.

3. Is the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than mild surface oxidation?

4. Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors?

5. Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation? (Note: This question only applies if the item is one of the 50% for which an anchorage configuration verification is required.)

Anchorage is consistent with drawing 101903 sheet 22.

6. Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free of potentially adverse seismic conditions?

Interaction Effects

7. Are soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment or structures?

See question 8.

8. Are overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles, and lighting, and masonry block walls not likely to collapse onto the equipment?

Overhead light is mounted to a junction box with (2) screws. The top screw does not appear to be properly engaged. The tubing at the top of the panel appears to be rugged enough to withstand an impact if the light were to fall. See Attachment 1 for disposition.

9. Do attached fines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage?

10. Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations, is equipment free of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects?

Other Adverse Conditions y

y y

N y

y

11. Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions that could adversely affect the safety function of the Y

equipment?

Pagel of 13

*------------~-.. *--------*--***-**----------

Seismic Walkdovvn Checklist (SWC) status:

N

~--~------------ ----. ----------------.-~-------- -----------

~------*----*-- ---

Equipment ID No DC-1-96-M-PNL-PM-45 Equipment Class:

20 Equipment

Description:

Mechanical Panel No. PM-45CCCW HX Differential Pressure Instrumentation)

~-----*-----------------------

Comment:

Mecl1anica/ panel is 48x1Bx48". (2) Panel tabs at the top are bolted to a unistrut member. Bottom of panel is supported by (2) stiffened T-bars. (6) bolts connect the bottom of the panel to each T-bar. (4) 518" bolts connect each T-bar to the crane wall. The internal components appear to be properly mounted to the panel. Some corrosion was seen on the through-bolts connecting the bottom of the panel to the T-bar support on the left side.

The corrosion does not appear to be s;gnificant. See Attachment 2 for disposition. The panel includes substantial inter;or stiffeners.

Evaluated by: ~~

KTM

~/h?.

---~--~-~*---~-~--.. - -~-~

511 I ;l.O I 1..\\-

Page 2 of 13

Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

Diablo Canyon Power Plant, Unit.1..

Equipment No. DC-1-96-M-PNL-PM-45 Licensing Basis Evaluation Issue:, Page 1 of 1 A light fixture located on the exterior of the Crane Wall, directly above Panel No. PM-45, was found to be loose.

Evaluation:

The potential exists for the light fixture to become dislodged during a seismic event and fall onto the instrument tubing located below the fixture (top of PM-45). However, the weight of the fixture is judged to be insufficient to cause damage to the tubing or the mechanical panel that would impair these items ability to perform their required safety functions.

Recommendations:

Properly secure the light fixture to the associated electrical box.

Notification Required: Yes (50609277)

Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

Diablo Canyon Power Plant, Unit _1_

Equipment No. DC-1-96-M-PNL-PM-45 Attachment ~, Page 1 of 1 Licensing Basis Evaluation Issue:

Corrosion was found on the interior surface of the bottom of the panel and the mounting bolts associated with the attachment of the panel to the lower mounting brackets.

Evaluation:

Since the corrosion is currently limited to surface effects, it does not impact the structural integrity of the panel or the mounting bolts. Therefore, there is no impact on the ability of the panel to perform its design functions.

Recommendations:

(a) Prepare and recoat panel shell (b) Replace corroded machine bolts Notification Required: Yes (50609278)

Potentially Adverse Seismic~tion: No }1-:

Evaluated by:

wrh uJt.k.,., (2. ~

Reviewed by:

-A ~~

(1..,..,-

'L jz..=r} I L(

2f2-8JI.i' I

r I

Status:

Y Equipment 10 No DC-1-96-M-PNL-PM-89 Equipment Class:

20 Equipment

Description:

Mechanical Panel No. PM-8£(Reactor Coolant Loop 2 Cold Leg lnstrumenation)

- - - --*----**- -~*----*~--**--~-*------**-*-** ------- -------

Location:

Building: Containment Floor El. 91 Room, Area:

1-PM-89 Manufacturer, model, Etc.

Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist may be used to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment on the SWEL The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgements and findings. Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.

Anchorage

1. Is the anchorage configuration verification required (i.e, is the item one of the 50% of SWEL items requiring such verification)?

2. Is the anchorage free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware?

3. Is the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than mild surface oxidation?

No significant corrosion was seen.

y y

y

4. Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors?

Y

5. Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation? (Note: This question only applies if the item is Y

one of the 50% for which an anchorage configuration verification is required.)

Nearly consistent with drawing 101903 sheet 14 & 17 except the back anchor bolt in the drawing is located near the front of the panel as opposed to the center of the panel. See Attachment 1 for disposition.

6. Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free of potentially adverse seismic conditions?

y Interaction Effects

7. Are soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment or structures?

No credible seismic sources were identified.

8. Are overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles, and lighting, and masonry block walls not likely to collapse onto the equipment?

9. Do attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage?

10. Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations, is equipment free of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects?

Other Adverse Conditions y

y y

y

11. Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions that could adversely affect the safety function of the Y

equipment?

Page 1 of 13

Seismic walkdown Cheddist (SVVC)

Status:

y

-------N~

- ---~-~*-***-****~------~-** --~*~-~-----*-~**-**

~--------

~

Equipment ID No DC-1-96~M-PNL-PM-89 Equipment Class:

20 Equipment

Description:

Mechanical Panel No. PM-89'Reactor Coolant Loop 2 Cold Leg lnstrumenation)

Comment:

48"x16"x60" panel. Top of the panel is supported by (2) tabs mounted to a horizontal Unistrut member with spring nuts at ends of panel. Unistrut is bolted to crane wall at the right end of the panel and near the center of the panel.

Base of cabinet is supported by structural steel channel sections and ar.e each bolted at (2) locations near the front of the panel to the concrete floor. The channel sections traverse a gap at the back of the panel and are supported by steel tabs at the bottom of the trough. The interior components are adequately supported to the panel. Attached conduit has adequate flexibility. The panel includes substantial interior stiffeners. Oil spill drain line overhead is adequately supported along with overhead fire water piping.

Evaluated by:

KTM

~Date:

~------***-*-----

S/ \\I ~\\4

~~s/j£D,I Page 2 of 13

Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

Diablo Canyon Power Plant, Unit _1_

Equipment No. DC-1-96-M-PNL-PM-89. Page 1 of 1 Licensing Basis Evaluation Issue:

The configuration of the anchorage at the base of the panel to the concrete floor is nearly consistent with configuration shown on Drawing No. 101903, sheets 14 & 17, except the back anchor bolt in the drawing is located near the front of the panel as opposed to the center of the panel.

Evaluation:

Since the drawing shows the locations of the expansion anchors pictorially, but does not provide any dimensions for the locations of the anchors, the design calculation applicable to this panel (Calculation No. IS-001. 08) was reviewed to determine the anchor bolt locations considered in the design. This review indicated that Calculation No. IS-001.08, which generically evaluated a group of similar mechanical panels, did not include a specific evaluation of the anchorage for Panel No. PM-89 (the anchorage configuration for the representative panel selected for the generic evaluation was not similar to the anchorage configuration for Panel No. PM-89). Therefore, the as-found anchorage configuration represents a potentially adverse seismic condition, since it does not match the design drawing and is not addressed in the calculation.

However, the calculation applicable to Unit 2 Panel No. PM-89 (Calculation No. /S-001. 17), evaluates the panel anchorage, which is very similar to the anchorage for the Unit 1 panel, and demonstrates that the as-found anchorage configuration is acceptable for the applied loading. Therefore, Unit 1 Panel No. PM-89 will be able to perform its intended function during a seismic event.

Recommendations:

Revise Calculation No. /S-001.08 to evaluate the as-found anchorage configuration for Unit 1 Panel No. PM-

89.

Notification Required: Yes (50612588}

Potentially Adverse Seismic wdition: Yes Evaluated by:

wrh

. ~Ur- ~~

Reviewed by:

~~~

Attachment J Unit 1: Area Walk-By Checklists AWC Number Number of AWC Number Checklist pages of LBEs 0-DFOVAULT 1

1 0-FCV-601 1

0 O-FP1 1

0 1-4KV-G 1

0 1-8700A 1

0 1-AFWP1 1

1 1-AFWP2 1

2 1-ASP1 1

0 1-BAT11 1

0 1-BFE-1 1

0 1-BFE4 1

0 1-BFS-31 2

2 1-BTC11 1

0 1-CCP1 1

0 1-CCP3 1

0 1-CCWHE 1

1 1-CCWP1 1

0 1-CCWST1 1

9 1-CFC1 1

0 1-CP-35 1

1 1-CR-35 1

0 1-DEG-11 1

1 1-DEG-ES-11 1

0 1-E43 1

3 1-EAGLE21 1

0 1-EJ2 2

0 1-FCV-238 1

0 1-FCV-365 1

0 1-FCV-37 1

0 1-FCV-41 1

0 1-FCV-641A 1

0 1-FCV700 1

0 1-FWHRA38 1

0 1-HT -EH-29A 1

1 PG&E Letter DCL-14-041 Attachment J Page 1 of 2 Number of LBE pages 1

0 0

1 2

0 0

2 0

0 0

2 0

9 0

1 0

3 0

0 0

1

AWC Number Number of AWC Checklist pages 1-LCV-110 1

1-LCV-1128 1

1-LCV115 1

1-LD30 1

1-LPH47 1

1-LPH65 1

1-L T-102 1

1-MUWTP1 1

1-PD15 1

1-PM-45 1

1-PM-79 1

1-PM-89 1

1-PM-101 1

1-PM-103 1

1-PM-185 1

1-PNL-ARP 1

1-PORTB1 1

1-QOTTC 2

1-RHE1 1

1-RHR1 2

1-RHRP2 1

1-RNAR-A 1

1-RNCI1 1

1-RV-3 1

1-RV-13 1

1-SFPHE1 1

1-SFPP1 1

1-SIAT1 1

1-SIP1 1

1-SSPS 1

1-SWHE1 1

1-TE117 1

1-TRY11 1

1-VB1 1

Number of LBEs 1

2 0

0 0

0 1

0 0

3 0

0 0

0 1

0 0

1 0

2 1

0 0

0 PG&E Letter DCL-14-041 Attachment J Page 2 of 2 Number of LBE pages 1

2 0

0 0

0 1

0 0

3 0

0 0

0 1

0 0

1 0

2 1

0 0

0 Note: Pages include applicable portions of the checklists and LBE required by EPRI 1025286 guidelines.

Area Walk-By Checklist (A'JVC)

Status Y

Location:

Building: Turbine Floor El. 119 Room, Area:

1-4KV-G Instructions for Completing Checklist This cnecklfst may be used to document the results of the area walk-by near one or more SWEL items. The space below each.of the following questions may be used to record the results pf judgements and findings, Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.

1. Does the anchorage of equipment in the area appear to be fr~e of potentially adverse seismic conditions (if visible Y

without necessarily opening cabinets)

Major equipment in the room Is* $afety related. No anchorage concerns 2.Does anchorage of equipment in the area appear to be free of significant degraded conditions?

y No qegraded conditions observed 3.Based on visual inspection from the floor, do the cable/conduit raceway!3 and HVAC ducting app~ar to be free of y

potentially adverse seismic conditions (e.g., condition of supports is adequat~ and fill conditions of cable trays appear to be inside acceptable limits)?

No cable trays or HVAC

4. Pees it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse seismic spatial interactions with other equipment In the y

area(e.g.* ceiling tiles and lighting)?

Lighting is lightweiqht and braced

5. Does It appear that -the area Is free of potentially adverse seismic interaetlons that COl!ld cause flooding or spray in lh$ area?

6. Does It appearthafthe area is free of potentially adverse seismic Interactions that could cause fire in the area?

7. Does it *appear that the area is free of potentially adverse seismic Interactions associated with housekeeping practices, storage of portable equipment, and temporary installations (e.g. scaffolding, lead shielding)?

Good housekeeping in the room

8. Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions that could adversely affect the safely functions of the equipment ih the area?

PA speaker, conduit, emerge.ncy light anc( masonry Walls are restrained Comments Includes DC-1ft63-E-LC-SHG, DCw1-63-E-PNL-RHG, and DC*1-63-E-XF-SHG12PT.

Evaluated by:

y y

Page 1-of6

Area Walk-By Checklist {A1NC)

Status Y

Location:

Building: Containment Floor El.

140 Room, Area:

Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist may be used to document the results of the area walk-by near one or more SWEL items. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgements and findings. Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.

1. Does the anchorage of equipment in the area appear to be free of potentially adverse seismic conditions (if visible Y

without necessarily opening cabinets)

Nearby equipment appears to /lave adequate anchorage.

2.Does anchorage of equipment in the area appear to be free of significant degraded conditions?

Y 3.Based on visual inspection from the floor, do the cable/conduit raceways and HVAC ducting appear to be free of y

potentially adverse seismic conditions (e.g., condition of supports is adequate and fill conditions of cable trays appear to be inside acceptable limits)?

Containment dome ventilation dueling is restrained every 8' up the containment wall. Overhead Containment Spray piping is well supported.

4. Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse seismic spatial interactions with other equipment in the y

area(e.g., ceiling tiles and lighting)?

5. Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse seismic interactions that could cause flooding or spray y

in the area?

6. Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse seismic interactions that could cause fire in the area?

y

7. Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse seismic interactions associated with housekeeping Y

practices, storage of portable equipment, and temporary installations (e.g. scaffolding, lead shielding)?

There is some temporary scaffolding barrels but they are outage related and are expected to be removed. There is some equipment on top of CFCU1-3 but it appears to be outage related as well.

8. Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions that could adversely affect the safety functions of the Y

equipment in the area?

No adverse conditions were identified.

Comments Includes DC-1-23-M-BF-CFC1-1.

Evaluated by:

Date:

3/tO/d.ol4 Page 1 of7

Area Walk-By Checklist {AWC)

Status Y

Location:

Building: Containment FloorEI. 1Q1 Room, Area:

1-FCV-238 Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist may be used to document the results of the area walk-by near one or more SWEL items. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgements and findings. Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.

1. Does the anchorage of equipment in the area appear to be free of potentially adverse seismic conditions (if visible Y

without necessarily opening cabinets)

Nearby components appear to have adequate anchorage.

2.Does anchorage of equipment in the area appear to be free of significant degraded conditions?

Y 3.Based on visual inspection from the floor, do the cable/conduit raceways and HVAC ducting appear to be free of y

potentially adverse seismic conditions (e.g., condition of supports is adequate and fill conditions of cable trays appear to be inside acceptable limits)?

4. Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse seismic spatial interactions with other equipment in the y

area( e.g., ceiling tiles and lighting)?

5. Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse ~eismic interactions that could cause flooding or spray y

in the area?

No credible sources that could cause flooding or spraying were identified.

6. Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse seismic interactions that could cause fire in the area?

7. Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse seismic interactions associated with housekeeping practices, storage of portable equipment, and temporary installations (e.g. scaffolding, lead shielding)?

Scaffolding members are stored on the floor., There is no axial restraint for the scaffolding poles but it appears to be a temporary storage space for the outage.

y y

8. Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions that could adversely affect the safety functions of the Y

equipment in the area?

Comments Includes DC-1-23-P-VOS-VAC-1-FCV-238.

Evaluated by:

Date:

3/to/~l!..\\

.s ;/.;

"UJ t-/

Page 1 of7

Area Walk-By Checklist {AliVC)

Status Y

Location:

Building: Auxiliary Floor El.

127 Room. Area:

1-PM-45 Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist may be used to document the results of the area walk-by near one or more SWEL items. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgements and findings. Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.

1. Does the anchorage of equipment in the area appear to be free of potentially adverse seismic conditions (if visible Y

without necessarily opening cabinets) 2.Does anchorage of equipment in the area appear to be free of significant degraded conditions?

Y No significant degradation wa:S Identified.

3.Based on visual inspection from the floor, do the cable/conduit raceways and HVAC ducting appear to be free of y

potentially adverse seismic conditions (e.g., condition of supports is adequate and fill conditions of cable trays appear to be inside acceptable limits)?

Large diameter pressurizer HVAC dueling has support saddles every 8 to 10 feet. Dampers are supported by rod hangers.

4. Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse seismic spatial interactions with other equipment in the y

area( e.g., ceiling tiles and lighting)?

~ All components appear to be properly mounted.

5. Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse seismic interactions that could cause flooding or spray y

in the area?

No credible sources to cause flooding.

6. Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse seismic interactions that could cause fire in the area?

Y

7. Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse seismic interactions associated with housekeeping Y

practices, storage of portable equipment, and temporary installations (e.g. scaffolding, lead shielding)?

8. Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions that could adversely affect the safety functions of-the Y

equipment in the area?

No issues were identified. Piping and conduit are adequately supported.

Comments Includes DC-1-96-M-PNL-PM-45, DC-1-23-P-VOA-VAC-1-RV-11, & DC-1-23-P-VOA-VAC-1-FCV-660.

Evaluated by:

Date:

'3/Jo/.:a.o* 1.\\

Page 1 of 8

Area walk-By Checklist (AV\\fC)

Status Y

Location:

Building: Containment Floor El. 91 Room, Area:

1-PM-89 Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist may be used to document the results of the area walk-by near one or more SWEL items. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgements and findings. Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.

1. Does the anchorage of equipment in the area appear to be free of potentially adverse seismic conditions (if visible Y

without necessarily opening cabinets)

Nearby components appear to have adequate anchorage.

2.Does anchorage of equipment in the area appear to be free of significant degraded conditions?

Y 3.Based on visual inspection from the floor, do the cable/conduit raceways and HVAC ducting appear to b.e free of y

potentially adverse seismic conditions (e.g., condition of supports is adequate and fill conditions of cable trays appear to be inside acceptable limits)?

4. Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse seismic spatial interactions with other equipment in the y

area(e.g., ceiling tiles and lighting)?

I

5. Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse seismic interactions that could cause flooding or spray y

in the area?

No credible sources that could cause flooding/spraying were identified.

6. Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse seismic interactions that could cause fire in the area?

7. Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse seismic interactions associated with housekeeping practices, storage of portable equipment, and temporary installations (e.g. scaffolding, lead shielding)?

Scaffolding members are stored on the floor. There is no axial restraint for the scaffolding poles but it appears to be a temporary storage space for the outage.

y y

8. Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions that could adversely affect the safety functions of the Y

equipment in the area?

Comments Includes DC-1-96-M-PNL-PM-89.

Evaluated by:

Date:

~/lO/~l'-t o/lo(wtf Page 1 of 5

Area Walk-By Checklist (A\\IVC)

Status Y

Location:

Building: Auxiliary Floor El. 115 Room, Area:

1-PORTB1 Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist may be used to document the results of the area walk-by near one or more SWEL items. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgements and findings. Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.

1. Does the anchorage of equipment in the area appear to be free of potentially adverse seismic conditions {if visible Y

without necessarily opening cabinets)

All nearby equipment appears to be adequately anchored.

2.Does anchorage of equipment in the area appear to be free of significant degraded conditions?

Y No corrosion is seen on nearby equipment.

3.Based on visual inspection from the floor, do the cable/conduit raceways and HVAC ducting appear to be free of y

potentially adverse seismic conditions (e.g., condition of supports is adequate and fill conditions ofcable trays appear to be inside acceptable limits)?

Cable tr:ays appear to be adequately anchored and braced.

4. Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse seismic spatial interactions with other equipment in the y

area(e.g., ceiling tiles and lighting)?

5. Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse seismic interactions that could cause flooding or spray y

in the area?

6. Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse seismic interactions that could cause fire in the area?

Y

7. Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse seismic interactions associated with housekeeping Y

practices, storage of portable equipment, and temporary installations {e.g. scaffolding, lead shielding)?

Maintenance cart is tied off with rope to prevent rolling. Ladders are properly stored in a ladder storage area.

8. Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions that could adversely affect the safety functions of the Y

equipment in the area?

Comments Includes DC-1-41-E-PNL-PORTB1.

Evaluated by:

KTM ~;J~

Date:

3/~/at>JA-\\-

~

Page 1 of9

Area Walk-By Checklist (AWC)

Sheet 1 of2 Status: _y_

Location: Bldg.

Cont.

Floor El.

=1 0=0"--'---

Room, Area 13

..::;_1_:-0:.:...0~T...!:T....:::C~--------------

Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist may be used to document the results of the Area Walk-by near one or more SWEL items. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgments and findings. Additional space is provided at the end of the checklist for documenting other comments.

1.

Does anchorage of equipment in the area appear to be free of potentially adverse seismic conditions (if Y

visible without necessarily opening cabinets)?

The mast of the manipulator crane, manipulator crane, polar crane, containment spray piping, light fixtures, Containment Upper Internals Laydown Supports, removable reactor cavity staircase, ladders were observed in the area and appear to be adequately supported and free of potentially adverse seismic conditions.

2.

Is anchorage of equipment in the area appear to be free of significant degraded conditions?

All equipment/components within the reactor cavity are anchored to the stainless steel cavity liner plate, with either welds or studs.

3.

Based on a visual inspection from the floor, do the cable/conduit raceways and HV AC ducting appear to be free of potentially adverse seismic conditions (e.g., condition of support s is adequate and fill conditions of cable trays appear to be inside acceptable limits)?

Conduits are present on the walls of the cavity, on the manipulator crane, the polar crane, and the underside of the Containment dome, there is no HV AC ducting located in or above this area.

4.

Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse seismic spatial interactions with other equipment in the area (e.g., ceiling tiles and lighting)?

The light fixtures attached to the polar crane and the underside of the Containment dome appear to be adequately supported.

y y

y

5.

Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse seismic interactions that could cause flooding Y

or spray in the area?

The area is flooded during refueling operations, but is free of potentially adverse seismic interactions that could cause flooding during the plant operation. Note that the Containment Spray system piping is located on the underside of the Containment dome, directly above this area, but its design function is to spray water inside Containment during an accident, so the equipment in the area is designed for exposure to water.

6.

Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse seismic interactions that could cause a fire in Y

the area?

There are no systems containing flammable liquids or gases in the area.

7.

Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse seismic interactions associated with housekeeping practices, storage ofequipment, and temporary installations (e.g., scaffolding, lead shielding)?

Many outage related equipment, including tool boxes, flashlights, etc. were observed in the area but will be removed at the end of the outage. Note that the Reactor Cavity is cordoned-off as a foreign materials exclusion area.

8.

Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions that could adversely affect the safety function of the equipment in the area?

13 If the room in which the SWEL item is located is very large (e.g., Turbine Hall), the area selected should be described. This selected area should be based on judgment, e.g., on the order of 35 feet from the SWEL item.

y y

Area Walk.. By Checklist (AWC)

Sl1eet2 of2 Status: _x__

Location: Bldg.

.:::C=on=t"-. __ Floor El.

.:..:I 0=0'-' __ Room) Area13

~1-...:.Qc;.:O:::..T::...:T~C:::.,_ ___________ _

Comments (Additional pages may be added as necessary)

Note; the Area Walk-by was performed during Refueling Outage no. IRIS, so many activities were in-progress in the vicinity of the Reactor Cavity, where the QOTTC is located.

Since the QOTTC is located in the refueling canal, at the bottom ofthe reactor. cavity (approx. elev. 100'), the area/room covered by this AWC is defined as the eastern half of the reactor cavity, between the location of the QOITC and the Reactor Vessel Closure Head (RVCH)/lntegrated Head Assembly (IHA). The area/room is horizontally lhnited by the walls of the reactor cavity (tlu*ec sides) and the RVCH/IHA (west side), and vertically extends upwards to the underside of the Containment dome.

Due to limitations associated with the bringing of cameras into the Containment structure (radio1ogica1 swface contamination area}, general area photographs were not taken.

General housekeeping activities will be performed as patt of the clean-up in preparation for Containment closure at the end of the outage.

Evaluated by:

WRH Date:

03/06/14 JCG 03/06/14 13 If the room in which the SWEL item is located is very large (e.g., Turbine Hall), the area selected should be descl'ibed. This selected area should be based on judgment, e.g., on the order of35 feet from the SWEL item.

Area Walk-By Checklist (AWC)

Sheet 1 of5 Status: _y_

Location: Bldg.

Cont Floor El.

=-9=-1 ' __ _

Room, Area13

-=-1--=RHR==-=1 _______________ _

Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist may be used to document the results of the Area Walk-by near one or more SWEL items. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgments and findings. Additional space is provided at the end of the checklist for documenting other comments.

1.

Does anchorage of equipment in the area appear to be free of potentially adverse seismic conditions (if Y

visible without necessarily opening cabinets)?

Electrical PM-122, PM-91, PM-86 and PM-69, Fire extinguishers and other equipment in the area are adequately anchored and the area is free of potentially adverse seismic conditions

2.

Is anchorage of equipment in the area appear to be free of significant degraded conditions?

Y There appears to be minor surface corrosion on the anchorage of the electrical panels in the area and does not impact the structural capacity of the anchorage.

3.

Based on a visual inspection from the floor, do the cable/conduit raceways and HV AC ducting appear to be free of potentially adverse seismic conditions (e.g., condition of support s is adequate and fill conditions of cable trays appear to be inside acceptable limits)?

All electrical conduit appear to be adequately anchored.

4.

Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse seismic spatial interactions with other equipment in the area (e.g., ceiling tiles and lighting)?

Containment evacuation strobe light, fire extinguisher, MOVs and other equipment in the area are adequately anchored.

y y

5.

Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse seismic interactions that could cause flooding Y

or spray in the area?

6.

Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse seismic interactions that could cause a fire in Y

the area?

7.

Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse seismic interactions associated with Y

housekeeping practices, storage of equipment, and temporary installations (e.g., scaffolding, lead shielding)?

Lead shield storage area is anchored to the ground using anchor bolts. Equipment for use during the outage is stored around the area and proper housekeeping practices are followed.

8.

Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions that could adversely affect the safety function of the equipment in the area?

Comments (Additional pages may be added as necessary) 13 If the room in which the SWEL item is located is very large (e.g., Turbine Hall), the area selected should be described. This selected area should be based on judgment, e.g., on the order of 35 feet from the SWEL item.

y

-*~

Area Walk-~y_Cimckllst (AWC)

Sheet2 of5 Status:

- L~~ation: Bldg.

~C~on;!.!:.t __ Floor El...t-.91=-'---

Room,.Area13

-=--1-~RH~R:::..el ____________ _

Evaluated by:

z/ze/14 13Jf the room in which the SWEL item is located is very large (e.g., Turbine Hall), the area selected should be described. This selected area should be based on judgment, e.g., on the order of35 feet from the SWEL item.

Area walk-By Checklist {AWC)

Status Y

Location:

Building: Containment Floor El. 91 Room, Area: --- ---------"--

Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist may be used to document the results of the area walk-by near one or more SWEL items. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgements and findings. Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.

1. Does the anchorage of equipment in the area appear to be free of potentially adverse seismic conditions (if visible Y

without necessarily opening cabinets)

Nearby components appear to have adequate anchorage.

2.Does anchorage of equipment in the area appear to be free of significant degraded conditions?

y 3.Based on visual inspection from the floor, do the cable/conduit raceways and HVAC ducting appear to be free of y

potentially adverse seismic conditions (e.g., condition of supports is adequate and fill conditions of cable trays appear to be inside acceptable limits)?

4. Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse seismic spatial interactions with other equipment in the y

area(e.g., ceiling tiles and lighting)?

No seismic spatial interaction issues were identified.

5. Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse seismic interactions that could cause flooding or spray y

in the area?

6. Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse seismic interactions that could cause fire in the area?

y No credible sources.

7. Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse seismic interactions associated with housekeeping practices, storage of portable equipment, and temporary installations (e.g. scaffolding, lead shielding)?

Nearby scaffolding has been properly tagged for use and has significant clearance with the accumulator tank.

y

8. Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions that could adversely affect the safety functions of the Y

equipment in the area?

Comments Includes DC-1-09-M-TK-A T1.

Evaluated by:

Date:

3/10/Joll...\\

~~:?Dtf Page 1 of6 PG&E Letter DCL-14-041 Attachment K Page 1 of 13 Attachment K Summary Findings of the Peer Reviews Peer Review: SWEL-1 and SWEL-2 The peer review of the SWEL-1 and SWEL-2 was performed during several meetings held while these lists were being developed and during the performance of the inspections. A summary of the issues identified during the peer review, and their resolution, is provided in Table 1.

Table 1: Peer review issues and resolutions for SWEL-1 and SWEL-Issue Resolution SWEL development does not consistently Updated to include reference to the Q-List identify SSCs by their Q-List Item No.

Item No. where applicable.

SWEL-1, Screen No. 2 allows exclusion of These valves were included to meet other valves associated *with containment criteria. Discussion of Screen No. 2 penetrations, but the final SWEL-1 included exclusions updated to indicate that this certain CIVs.

exclusion was not used in its entirety.

SWEL-1 should consider safe shutdown The safe shutdown equipment identified in equipment identified in UFSAR UFSAR Appendix 9.5G was added to SWEL Appendix 9.5G "Equipment required for safe development documentation to address these shutdown."

components and their inclusion as candidates for the selection of SWEL-1.

SWEL-1 should include AFW pump Valves LCV-111 through LCV-115 added to discharge to SG LCVs, since these are important to the AFW system operation.

list of candidates for the SWEL-1.

SWEL-1 should include RHR pump Valves FCV-641A and FCV-641 8 added to recirculation valves since these are list of candidates for the SWEL-1.

important to the RHR operation.

SWEL-1 should include flow control valves Valves FCV-106, FCV-107, FCV-108, and for the motor-driven AFW pumps since these FCV-109 added to list of candidate for the are important to the operation of the pumps.

SWEL-1.

SWEL-1 should include auxiliary building ventilation system supply and exhaust fans Fans E-1, E-2, S-31, S-32, S-33, and S-34 since these are important to the cooling of added to list of candidates for the SWEL-1.

the auxiliary building and are subjected to a corrosive environment.

SWEL-1 should include chemical and Valves 8145 and 8148 added to list of volume control system spray valves, since candidates for the SWEL-1.

these are important to system operation.

SWEL-1 should include valves in the RHR Valves 8701, 8702, 8809A, 88098, 8700A, system normal shutdown cooling flowpath.

87008, HCV-637, and HCV 638 added to list of candidates for the SWEL-1.

SWEL-1 should include valves in charging Valves 8107, 8108, and HCV-142 added to system flowpath to reactor.

list of candidates for the SWEL-1.

Issue SWEL-1 should include valves associated with boric acid storage tank and transfer pumps.

SWEL-1 should include the main annunciator.

SWEL-1 should include SG level and pressure instrumentation.

SWEL-1 should include wide range and source range neutron detectors.

SWEL-1 assignment of five safety functions (Screen No. 3) - certain seismically qualified SSCs do not perform any of these functions, so they will Screen-out, but still may ~e added back-in under Screen No.4 (d1vers1ty) or under SWEL-2 (SFP-related SSCs).

Risk significance is not well defined and must be addressed more clearly.

SWEL-2 development uses 10 feet above top of fuel assemblies as an absolute number, but EPRI 1025286 states "for SFP penetrations below about 1 0 feet above the top of the fuel assemblies... " This g.ives some latitude as to the exact elevat1on for drain-down.

Operating experience report I ER L3-12-63, "Anti-Siphon Devices in Spent Fuel Pool Missing" was recently received and should be addressed in the development of the SWEL-2.

Question was asked if EPRI guideline requires consideration of SFP drain-d?~n during various operating modes, spec1f1cally during refueling operations, when the SFP gate is open, transfer canal is flooded, etc.

PG&E Letter DCL-14-041 Attachment K Page 2 of 13 Resolution Valves 8104, FCV-110A, and FCV-111A added to list of candidates for the SWEL-1.

This is not seismically qualified, so it is excluded at Screen No. 1.

SG level transmitters (LT-516, LT-517, etc.)

and pressure transmitters (PT-538, etc.)

added to list of candidates for the SWEL-1.

These detectors are included in the list of candidates for the SWEL-1, but were not selected in the finalization of the SWEL-1.

This is addressed in SWEL development documentation.

Risk significance data was received from the seismic PRA group and incorporated into SWEL-1.

SWEL-2 development documentation revised to be consistent with EPRI 1 025286.

IER L3-12-63 added as an input reference for the SWEL-2 and verification of the presence of anti-siphon holes added as an inspection attribute for piping entering the SFP.

The NEI frequently asked questions clarified this issue and it is addressed in SWEL-1.

Issue During the 1980s, the blind flange on the Containment end of the fuel transfer tube was replaced with a QOTTC device. If the SFP gate (not seismically qualified) and the fuel transfer tube manual gate valve (not seismically qualified per component data) were to fail during an earthquake, the QOTTC would act as a part of the SFP pressure boundary. The concern is whether the QOTTC has been designed to resist the hydrostatic and hydrodynamic loads associated with this scenario.

The FLOC data for the SFP gate indicates that this sse is not seismically qualified, and that the air supply and back-up nitrogen supply for the inflatable gate seals is not seismically qualified. However, it appears that the gate is very robust and even wjth deflation of the seals, the rate of leakage through the SFP gate into the fuel transfer canal will not allow the SFP to drain-down within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.

Even though the SFP skimmers are anchored to the wall at the SFP water surface, we need to investigate possibility that they break loose (non-seismic support) and sink into the pool, allowing siphoning of the pool inventory.

Monitoring of the SFP level is a key issue, so the SFP level monitoring instrumentation should be added to the SWEL-2.

The SFP cooling water pump transfer switch (a local contactor) is key to the cooling of the SFP and should be added to the SWEL-2.

The various ways to provide pure water (to replace evaporation/boiling) or borated water (to replace leakage) to the SFP were discussed. OP AP-22 (Spent Fuel Pool Abnormalities), Appendix A (Addition of Water to the SFP) indicates that the condensate storage tank is the "only source of makeup water to the SFP with a flow path that is completely Design Class 1." This flow path should be included in the SWEL-2.

See OP B-7:11 for details of flow path PG&E Letter DCL-14-041 Attachment K Page 3 of 13 Resolution This concern was entered into the CAP.

Development documentation for SWEL-2 updated to show gate as being seismically qualified.

Review of the civil engineering calculation files located a seismic qualification calculation for the SFP gate. Therefore, gate can be credited to survive an earthquake.

Request to update the FLOC data was entered into CAP.

SWEL-2 updated to include check of the maximum depth based on hose/tubing length between wall penetration and skimmer to inspection attributes. This will address the maximum depth to which skimmers could sink.

The SFP level instrumentation was considered for inclusion in the SWEL-2, but it was determined that this instrumentation is not seismically qualified, so it lnitially screened-out at Screen No. 1.

SWEL-2 updated to include switch.

SWEL-2 development basis document enhanced to discuss this flow path.

Issue The FHBVS is required to cool various SFP-related equipment. Portions associated with the mitigation of a fuel handling accident do not need to be included (e.g., filters), but other equipment should be considered for inclusion.

SFP cooling system pressure instrumentation does not serve any post-earthquake function and can be exclude from the SWEL-2.

Screen No. 3 of the EPRI guidelines for the development of the SWEL-2 require the inclusion of a diversity of equipment classes (similar to Screen No.4 for the SWEL-1), but due to the limited scope of equipment associated with the SFP, it is not possible to include representatives of all 21 classes.

Difficulties associated with the verification of the elevation of the various underwater pipe penetrations through the walls of the SFP were discussed.

Fuel transfer tube expansion joint has been included in SWEL-2 (failure could drain SFP, if SFP gate is open during a refueling outage). Suggest reviewing DCM C-28 (Seismic and LOCA displacements) to determine differential displacements.

SWEL-2 includes various pipes which penetrate the SFP wall that are potential rapid drain-down paths. How do we document the walkdowns of these pipes?

Operating procedure AP-22 includes the use of a fire hose for emergency refilling of the SFP. The associated hose reel stations should be included in the SWEL-2.

PG&E Letter DCL-14-041 Attachment K Page 4 of 13 Resolution The SWEL-1 already includes the auxiliary building ventilation system, which has components that are similar to the FHB ventilation system. However, an FHB exhaust fan was added to the SWEL-2.

Pressure instrumentation deleted from the SWEL-2.

This is acceptable, since the SWEL-1 already includes a diverse selection of equipment classes. A discussion of this was added to the SWEL-2 development documentation.

The following methods were selected for the verification of elevations:

Underwater cameras, Verification of the elevation of the pipe where it exits the concrete on the outside of the SFP, and Approximate visual verification from the water surface.

Review of DCM C-28 indicates that the seismic differential displacements (containment structure vs. auxiliary building) are small at this location (less than 0.2 inches), but the LOCA differential displacement is large (approximately 1 inch).

The combination of seismic and LOCA displacements is enveloped by the vendor-allowed differential displacements for the expansion joint.

The EPRI guidelines do not address this.

Since these guidelines require the use of the SWC form, the walkdown will be documented on an SWC, with most of the inspection attributes marked as "N/A". The "comments" section will be used to describe any observations.

Hose reel station FW-120-A38-1 added to the SWEL-2.

Issue Document "Frequently Asked Questions on Seismic Walkdown Guidance" (August 10, 2012) was provided by the NEI, not the EPRI.

Discussion of seismic classification system relative to Regulatory Guide 1.29 is not clear.

EPRI definition of SFP rapid drain-down applies to the "top of fuel assemblies," and could result in exclusion of SFP gate from SWEL-2, while the "about 10 feet above fuel assemblies" applies to penetrations through walls of SFP.

Rationale for the exclusion of the fuel storage racks from the SWEL-2 is not adequate.

SWEL-1 did not adequately address risk significance.

PG&E Letter DCL-14-041 Attachment K Page 5 of 13 Resolution The SWEL development documentation was revised.

Clarified discussion in the SWEL development documentation.

Clarified discussion to distinguish between two applications in SWEL development documentation.

Expanded discussion to address criticality/spacing criteria, lack of anchorage, submersion in borated water, etc., in the SWEL development documentation.

Risk significance data was received from the seismic PRA group and incorporated into SWEL-1 Peer Review: Seismic Walkdown Checklists and Area Walk-by Checklists Introduction In accordance with the guidance provided in EPRI 1025286, the results of the seismic walkdowns and area walk-bys were peer reviewed. Daily debrief of the walkdown team and peer review of a sample of SWCs and AWCs were performed early in the process to check the initial quality of the checklists and to ensure that any the general comments are incorporated in the remaining checklists prepared at later stages. In addition to the early peer reviews, all the SWCs and AWCs were reviewed to verify that the SWEs followed the guidance provided in EPRI 1025286 for performing the walkdowns.

Peer Review Team The seismic walkdown and area walk-by results peer review team was led by the project team leader, with various individuals acting as team members.

Peer Review Process The results of the seismic walkdowns and area walk-bys were peer reviewed in two steps:

(1)

Each completed SWC or AWC was reviewed by a peer review team member.

This step included a review of the completed checklist and any attached PG&E Letter DCL-14-041 Attachment K Page 6 of 13 photographs and in some cases discussion with walkdown team members.

Depending on the complexity of the issue, this step included visiting the plant and visually inspecting the subject equipment or area. Any peer review questions or comments were discussed with the SWEs and after all the questions and comments had been resolved, the completed checklist was signed by both the SWEs.

(2)

All completed SWCs/AWCs were reviewed by peer review team leader for overall accuracy and consistency. Comments or questions from the team leader were discussed with the SWEs and resolved.

Summary of Peer Review Findings and Resolutions The peer review findings are divided into two categories: generic findings and specific findings. The following are the general comments:

(1)

Problem Identification: Provide a clear and concise description of the problem/issue. Do not provide extraneous details or opinions.

(2)

Redundant Problems: A specific problem should only be identified on one check list. If the problem is identified on the SWC for the specific SSC, do not describe the same problem on the AWC or assign a status of Nor U on the AWC. It is okay to cross-reference between the AWC and SWC for a problem.

(3)

Recommendations: The AWC/SWC should identify and characterize the potential issue. Do not include statements such as, "valve should be cleaned and painted," "means of anchoring should be improved," or "further evaluation is

recommended."

(4)

Disposition of Problems: The goal is to not have any remaining open problems on the checklists. Therefore, as part of the checklist finalization, each problem should be linked to its disposition. Create supplemental sheets to be added to the checklists as attachments for this purpose. The AWC/SWC should reference these attachments (e.g., "See Attachment No. xx for disposition."). The SAP notification number is to be referenced on the attachment, not the checklist.

(5)

Final Checklist Status: Once all of the issues and comments on a checklist have been dispositioned, the "U" statuses in the checklist should be changed to either "Y" (the condition is acceptable) or "N" (the condition is not acceptable, but will be addressed in the CAP). It is not necessary for the checklist to address any follow-up on CAP actions.

PG&E Letter DCL-14-041 Attachment K Page 7 of 13 (6)

Electronic AWC and SWC Templates: Some aspects of the electronic templates used to generate the hard copies of the completed checklists from the Access database do not match the format of the checklist forms included in EPRI 1025286, Appendix C. The templates should be reviewed against Appendix C and corrected as necessary.

(7)

Description of Room. Area for AWCs: The AWC form (EPRI 1025286, Appendix C), includes a field for "Room, Area." DCPP has used this field for the AWC number (typically the unit number, followed by an acronym for the piece of equipment in the room-e.g., "1-ASP1"). Since this entry does not actually define the room/area covered by the AWC (as required by Footnote 13 in EPRI 1 025286), it is recommended that a set of maps be developed to define the areas.

Table 2: Specific Findings for Unit 1 - AWCs No. AWC/SWC Title Issue Resolution The AWC identifies a leak which is The leak issue is deleted already identified in the component from the AWC comments 1

1-AFWP1 SWC. Since the issue is covered in section.

the SWC for the component, remove it from the AWC.

The status of the checklist and answer The checklist status and to question 4 is shown as "Y", although answer to question 4 is 2

1-BFS-31 a seismic interaction issue was changed to "N" and a LBE observed.

was performed.

The identified surface corrosion on the Addedinresponseto damper body was already identified in question 1 "The corrosion 3

1-E43 the component SWC.

on the backdraft dampers is already addressed in SWC DC-1-23-M-BF-E-43."

Change the response to question 1 Response was changed to from "N" to "Y", as the nonconforming "Y."

4 1-FWHRA38 anchorage issue was already identified in the component SWC The status of the checklist and Status of checklist and 5

1-MUWTP1 question 5 was shown as "U" although question 5 changed to "Y."

all the issues were resolved.

No. AWC/SWC Title Issue Response to question 1 identified the similarities and dissimilarities between the Unit 1 and Unit 2 areas. Since the walkdown reports are being 6

1-PD15 independently prepared for Unit 1 and Unit 2, no references to other units should be made.

Table 3: Specific Findings for Unit 1 - SWCs No.

AWC/SWC Title Issue The status for question 5 is shown as "N/A" although anchorage 1

DC-0-21-P-FL-DFOTF2 verification was required on this component and the anchorage is consistent with the design drawings.

DC-1-03-P-VOH-FW-1-LCV-These checklists answer 110 questions 2.: 5 as "N/A" DC-1-04-P-VOA-MS-1-FCV-irrespective of the 2

41 response to question 1.

DC-1-04-VOA-MS-1-PCV-20 DC-1-04-P-VR-MS-1-RV-3 DC-1-04-P-VR-MS-1-RV-8 The comments section mentions the CAP 3

DC-1-04-P-V-MS-1-FCV-152 number without any explanation of the resolution/action.

Equipment No. shown as 4

DC-1-04-P-VOA-MS-1-FCV-

"DC-1-04-V-MS-1-FCV-41 41" instead of "DC-1 P-VOA-MS-1-FCV-41 II Room, row/column DC-1-04-P-VOA-MS-1-PCV-Information still shown as 5

20 "1-PCV-20" although the area has been merged with "1-RV-3."

PG&E Letter DCL-14-041 Attachment K Page 8 of 13 Resolution Deleted the following statement from the response to question 1:

"The area is similar to area 2-PD25 except that the service air piping is more uniformly supported" and replaced it with "service air piping is uniformly supported."

Resolution Status for question 5 changed from "N/A" to "Y".

The anchorage characteristics on these components were re-verified and the checklists updated.

Reference to the CAP replaced with "See Attachment No. 1 for disposition."

Equipment No. changed to "DC-1-04-P-VOA-MS FCV-41" Room, row/column information changed to "1-RV-3."

No.

AWC/SWC Title Issue In response to question 7, suggestions about possible modifications are presented by the SWE.

The checklist should only 6

DC-1-14-M-PP-CCWP 1 identify the issue and not any suggested modifications. All suggested changes/modifications are identified in the LBE Status of questions 3, 5, and 6, and the checklist 7

DC-1-17 -M-PP-ASP1 status are shown as "U" although all the issues were resolved and LBEs were performed.

Status of question 7 of the checklist is shown as "Y" although the fire hose rack could swing and hit DC-1-18-F-HR-FW-120-A38-the valve body.

8 1

Also, the status of question 10 is shown as "N," although the LBE suggests that the interaction is unlikely to damage the valve.

Response to question 4 identified a minor hairline 9

DC-1-21-M-MISC-ES1 crack 2 feet from the center of fixed support and no further evaluation was presented.

Backdraft damper number DC-1-23-P-D-VAC BDD-43 was looked at during the walkdown and is not identified in the 10 DC-1-23-M-BF-E -43 SWC.

PG&E Letter DCL-14-041 Attachment K Page 9 of 13 Resolution In response to question 7, the suggestion was replaced with "See Attachment No.1 for disposition."

Status changed to "Y."

Status of question 7 changed to "N" and status of Question 1 0 changed to "Y."

Included "No impact on anchorage expected" in response to question 4 and changed the status from "N" to "Y."

Included the following in the comments section:

"Inspection includes backdraft damper number DC-1-23-P-D-VAC BDD-43" and "surface corrosion was noted on the backdraft damper (VAC-1-BDD-43). See Attachment No. 1 for disposition."

No.

AWC/SWC Title Issue The status of the checklist 11 DC-1-23-M-BF-S-43 is shown as "Y" although the status of question 4 is "N."

In the response to question 1, reference is made to the similarity between the walked down 12 DC-1-23-P-D-VAC-1-MOD-1 0 component and damper DC-1-23-P-D-VAC MOD-9. Each component should be evaluated independent of other components.

Room, row/column shown 13 DC-1-36-E-PNL-RNARA as "1-Eagle21" although the component belongs to area "1-RNARA."

Status of question 5 shown as "Y" although the 14 DC-1-96-E-PNL-1VB1 component is removed from the 50°/o anchorage.

check.

Room, Area shown as 15 DC-1-64-E-L C-SPG "1-MCCBUSG" although the component belongs in "1-LD30. II Room, Area shown as 16 DC-1-64-E-XF-THG10 "1-MCCBUSG" although the component belongs in "1-LD30. II Comment included statement that the "anchorage should be evaluated for concrete breakout in tension and 17 DC-1-09-M-TK-AT1 shear." However, this consideration is not in the scope of the Fukushima Recommendation 2. 3 Seismic Walkdown procedure.

Room, Area shown as 18 DC-1-23-VOA-VAC-1-RCV-

"1-PEN62" although the 11 component belongs in "1-PM-45. II PG&E Letter DCL-14-041 Attachment K Page 10 of 13 Resolution Status of the checklist changed to "N."

Reference to DC-1-23-P-D-VAC-1-MOD-9 deleted from response to question

1.

Room, row/column Information changed to "1-RNARA."

Status of question 5 changed to "N/A."

Room, Area information changed to "1-LD30."

Room, Area information changed to 111-LD30. II Deleted statement from Comment.

Room, Area information changed to "1-PM-45."

No.

AWC/SWC Title Issue Room, Area shown as 19 DC-1-23-VOA-VAC-1-FCV-

"1-PEN61" although the 660 component belongs in "1-PM-45."

Response to Question No. 8 included an 20 DC-1-63-E-LC-SHG incomplete sentence:

"Masonry walls are braced by."

Peer Review: Licensing Basis Evaluations Introduction PG&E Letter DCL-14-041 Attachment K Page 11 of 13 Resolution Room, Area information changed to "1-PM-45."

Sentence revised to describe the bracing provided for the masonry walls.

A LBE was performed for each potentially adverse seismic issue identified on the SWC and AWC. The LBEs, which are documented in attachments to the individual checklists, include a determination of the need for entry of the issue into the CAP.

Peer Review Team The LBE peer review team was led by the project team leader, with various individuals acting as team members.

Peer Review Process The LBE peer review was performed in two steps:

(1)

Each potentially adverse seismic condition was evaluated by a cognizant engineer and peer reviewed by a designated review team member. This step included a review of the completed checklist, review of the photograph (if applicable), discussions with the preparer of the LBE, review of the supporting documentation (e.g., drawings, design criteria memoranda, calculations) and, in some cases, discussions with the walkdown team members who performed the field inspections.

The completed LBE was signed by the preparer and the peer reviewer.

(2)

All completed LBEs were reviewed by the peer review team leader for overall accuracy and consistency. Comments or questions from the team leader were discussed with the preparer and reviewer, and resolved as necessary.

Summary of Peer Review Findings and Resolutions PG&E Letter DCL-14-041 Attachment K Page 12 of 13 The peer review findings are divided into two categories: (a) generic findings; and (b) specific findings. The following provides an overall summary of the two categories of findings, and their resolution.

Table 4: General Findings from the Licensing Basis Evaluation Peer Review Finding Resolution Each LBE should be self-contained within LBEs that were split between multiple the attachment and not reference other attachments were restructured to be attachments to the same checklist for input.

self-contained.

The seismic requirements for the SSC being LBEs were updated, as appropriate.

addressed should be clearly stated, using DCPP's classification as defined in the FLOC data (i.e., design classification and seismic qualification requirement).

A LBE for one unit should not reference the Cross-references between units were LBE for a similar issue in the other unit.

eliminated.

A LBE should provide specific reference to References added to LBE, as the source of information (e.g., calculation appropriate.

number, drawing number, etc.)

Table 5: Specific Findings from the Licensing Basis Evaluation Peer Review LBE No.

Finding Resolution 1-CP-35, This LBE referenced another LBE LBE enhanced to provide Attach. 1 (DC-1-23-P-D-VAC-1-MOD-10, detailed description of the Attach. 1 ), but did not provide details evaluation.

of the evaluation documented in the other LBE.

1-DEG-11, LBE used incorrect values for the LBE updated to reference Attach. 1 vertical and horizontal Hosgri DCM C-17 as source of earthquake accelerations for the accelerations and use the location of the fire extinguisher, and correct values.

did not provide a source reference.

LBE No.

Finding 1-LCV-1128, LBE addressed the postulated seismic Attach. 1 interaction qualitatively, but did not indicate whether the valve was a SISIP target.

1-PM-79, LBE did not clearly distinguish Attach. 1 between vulnerability of SISIP targets in the area and SISIP housekeeping issues.

OC-1-23-M-LBE indicated that the issue was not a BF-CFC1-1 PASC, although the as-found configuration was degraded and needed modifications. Therefore the condition should be classified as a PASC.

DC-1-96-M-LBE indicated that the issue was not a PNL-PM-45 PASC. The light fixture above the panel PM-45 was found to be in a degraded condition and needed modifications. Therefore the condition should be classified as a PASC.

Peer Review: Submittal Response PG&E Letter DCL-14-041 Attachment K Page 13 of 13 Resolution LBE updated to reference SISIP Manual and indicate that the valve is not a SISIP target, so this is not an adverse seismic condition.

LBE updated to indicate that the issues are limited to SISIP housekeeping only.

Changed the LBE to reflect the issue as a potentially adverse seismic condition."

To meet this requirement, David Miklush, Philippe Soenen, and Tom Baldwin performed independent peer reviews of this submittal. In addition, San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station personnel performed a review of the submittals. All comments were evaluated and resolved.

Comments included:

(1)

Clarify how unique DCPP seismic categories compare to SCI, (2)

Clarify independence of peer reviewers, (3)

Clarify where engineering evaluations of potentially seismically adverse conditions are included in the submittal, and (4)

Indicate status of the walkdown observations entered into CAP.

1R18 AC ACI AFW AISC ANSI ASW AWC CAP CCP ccw CF CFCU CIV CST de DCM DCPP DEG DFO DG DHR DIE EOC EPRI ESP FCV FHB FHBVS FLOC Ft HEPA Hx ICE IEEE IER IPEEE LBE LCV LOCA LTSP Attachment L List of Acronyms Unit 1 Refueling Outage 18 Alternating current American Concrete Institute Auxiliary feedwater American Institute of Steel Construction American National Standards Institute Auxiliary saltwater Area walk-by checklist Corrective Action Program Centrifugal charging pump Component cooling water Containment function Containment fan cooler unit Containment isolation valve Condensate storage tank Direct current Design criteria memorandum Diablo Canyon Power Plant Diesel emergency generator Diesel fuel oil Diesel generator Decay heat removal Damp indoor environment Extent of condition Electric Power Research Institute Equipment selection personnel Flow control valve Fuel handling building Fuel handling building ventilation system Functional location Feet High efficiency particulate air Heat exchanger Inside containment environment Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Industry Event Response Individual Plant Examination for External Events Licensing basis evaluation Level control valve Loss of coolant accident Long Term Seismic Program PG&E Letter DCL-14-041 Attachment L Page 1 of 3

MIE MS MSSV N

NEI No.

NRC NTTF OE Ops PCV PE PG&E Ph.D PRA Q-List QOTTC RC RCIC RCP RCPC RCS RCV RHR RRC RV RWST sc SG SFP SFPCS Sl SIS I SISIP SQUG sse SSEL SSER SSPS swc SWE SWEL SWIE TO Mild indoor environment Main steam Main steam safety valve No Nuclear Energy Institute Number Nuclear Regulatory Committee Near-term Task Force Outside environment Operations Pressure control valve Professional engineer Pacific Gas and Electric Company Doctor of Philosophy Probabilistic risk assessment Quality classification list Quick opening transfer tube closure Reactor coolant Reactor coolant inventory control Reactor coolant pump Reactor coolant pressure control Reactor coolant system Radiation control valve Residual heat removal Reactor reactivity control Reactor vessel Raw water storage tank Seismic category Steam generator Spent fuel pool Spent fuel pool cooling system Safety injection Seismically induced system interaction Seismically induced system interaction program Seismic Qualification Utilities Group Structures, systems, and components Safe shutdown equipment list Supplemental Safety Evaluation Report Solid state protection system Seismic walkdown checklist Seismic walkdown engineer Seismic walkdown equipment list Saltwater interior environment Turbine-driven PG&E Letter DCL-14-041 Attachment L Page 2 of 3

u UFSAR UPS y

Unknown Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Uninterruptable power supply Yes PG&E Letter DCL-14-041 Attachment L Page 3 of 3

DCL-14-041, Response Update to Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.3 Seismic

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