05000530/LER-2009-001, Regarding Manual Reactor Trip Due to a Loss of Instrument Air to the Containment Building
| ML100490747 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
| Issue date: | 02/01/2010 |
| From: | Mims D Arizona Public Service Co |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| 102-06128-DCM/RAB/TNW/DFH LER 09-001-00 | |
| Download: ML100490747 (7) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| Reporting criterion: | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications |
| 5302009001R00 - NRC Website | |
text
10 CFR 50.73 AL-A subsidiary of Pinnacle West Capital Corporation Dwight C. Mims Mail Station 7605 Palo Verde Nuclear Vice President Tel. 623-393-5403 P. O. Box 52034 Generating Station Regulatory Affairs and Plant Improvement Fax 623-393-6077 Phoenix, Arizona 851072-2034 ID#: 102-06128-DCM/RAB/TNW/DFH February 1, 2010 ATTN: Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001
Dear Sirs:
Subject:
Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS)
Unit 3 Docket No. STN 50-530 License No. NPF 74 Licensee Event Report 2009-001-00 Enclosed, please find Licensee Event Report (LER) 50-530/2009-001 -00 that has been prepared and submitted pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73. This LER reports a manual actuation of the reactor protection system (reactor trip) in response to a loss of instrument air to the containment building.
In accordance with 10 CFR 50.4, copies of this LER are being forwarded to the NRC Regional Office, NRC Region IV and the Senior Resident Inspector. If you have questions regarding this submittal, please contact Ray Buzard, Section Leader, Regulatory Affairs, at (623) 393-5317.
Arizona Public Service Company makes no commitments in this letter.
Sincerely, DCM/RAB/TNW/DFH/gat Enclosure cc:
E. E. Collins Jr.
NRC Region IV Regional Administrator J. R. Hall NRC NRR Project Manager - (send electronic and paper)
R. I. Treadway NRC Senior Resident Inspector for PVNGS A member of the STARS (Strategic Teaming and Resource Sharing) Alliance
- Callaway
- Comanche Peak a Diablo Canyon
- Palo Verde
- South Texas *Wolf Creek *San Onofre
F NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 08/31/2010 (9-2007)
, the NRC may digits/characters for each block) not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to. respond to, the dgsC rinformation collection.
- 3. PAGE Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS) Unit 3 05000530I 1 OF 6
- 4. TITLE Manual Reactor Trip Due to a Loss of Instrument Air to the Containment Building
- 5. EVENT DATE
- 6. LER NUMBER
- 7. REPORT DATE
- 8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR SEQUENTIAL REV MONTH DAY YEAR FACILITYNAME DOCKET5000NUMBER NUMBER NO.05 0
FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 12 03 2009 2009
- - 001 00 02 01 2010 05000
- 9. OPERATING MODE
- 11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR§: (Check all that apply)
El 20.2201(b)
El 20.2203(a)(3)(i)
El 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)
[3 50.73(a)(2)(vii)
E] 20.2201(d)
El 20.2203(a)(3)(ii)
El 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)
El 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)
El 20.2203(a)(1)
[I 20.2203(a)(4)
El 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)
El 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)
_ 20.2203(a)(2)(i)
El 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A)
El 50.73(a)(2)(iii)
[I 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)
- 10. POWER LEVEL
[] 20.2203(a)(2)(ii)
El 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A)
Z 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)
[E 50.73(a)(2)(x)
El 20.2203(a)(2)(iii)
El 50.36(c)(2)
El 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)
El 73.71(a)(4)
El 20.2203(a)(2)(iv)
El 50.46(a)(3)(ii)
El 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)
El 73.71(a)(5) 100 [1 20.2203(a)(2)(v)
[I 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)
[I 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)
[I OTHER [E 20.2203(a)(2)(vi)
El 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)
[E 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)
Specify in Abstract below or in (If more space is required, use additional copies of (If more space is required, use additional copies of (If more space is required, use additional copies of (If more space is required, use additional copies of (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) adequate guidance to control room operators to allow for an earlier diagnosis of a loss of instrument air to the containment building.
- 7.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
Immediately following the event, the coil in the failed solenoid valve was replaced. An extent of condition review was performed of solenoid valves that were from the same lot number as the failed solenoid valve. Three valves were found installed in the power plant with the same lot number; but, those valves are normally de-energized and closed and are, therefore, not subjected to conditions similar to the failed coil. The damaged coil was sent to an offsite laboratory for further evaluation.
The following additional corrective actions were or will be implemented for all three units:
0 Procedure 40AO-9ZZ06, Loss of Instrument Air, was revised providing instructions to plant operators on required actions when instrument air is lost to the containment building.
0 Procedure 40AL-9RK3A will be revised to provide the operator additional information to aid in diagnosis of a loss of instrument air to the containment building in a timely manner.
Licensed Operator Training and Simulator Training will revise lesson plans to provide additional training on a loss of instrument air to the containment building event.
- 8.
PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS
Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station reported a manual reactor trip of unit 2 in LER 529-2003-001-00 when a pressurizer spray valve positioner failed causing the maximum amount of air through the positioner. This resulted in a pressure drop in the instrument air system which affected components similar to this event. However, the cause of the previous event was not similar to this event. As such, the corrective actions for that event would not have prevented this event.
NRU FUOM 366A (-20UU()
t"i*iN I EU UN RC*,* T %.sLCU r"/*,FI::R