05000530/FIN-2014003-01
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to Follow Operator Challenges Procedure |
| Description | The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, for the failure of operations personnel to follow station procedures to ensure that appropriate contingency actions are entered in the operator challenge listing in the control room. Specifically, upon discovery that the pressurizer master level controller could not be placed into manual mode on February 20, 2014, the licensee did not prescribe appropriate contingency actions for operation of the pressurizer level control system. As a result, on March 15, 2014, Unit 3 exceeded the pressurizer maximum level mandated by Technical Specification 3.4.9. The licensee subsequently replaced the faulty controller and has entered this issue in their corrective action program as Palo Verde Action Request 4540981. The failure of operations personnel to follow station procedures for identifying, documenting, and tracking operator challenges was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor, and therefore a finding, because it adversely affected the configuration control attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the failure to document an operator work around in the pressurizer level control system allowed operators to place the system in a configuration that challenged the availability, reliability, and capability of the pressurizer to respond to reactor coolant system pressure transients. The inspectors evaluated the significance of the issue under the Significance Determination Process, as defined in Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, Initial Characterization of Findings, and Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings at-Power. The inspectors concluded the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because all questions in Exhibit 2 could be answered in the negative. The inspectors determined that the finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance because the licensee did not challenge the uncertain condition of the pressurizer level controller. Specifically, after identifying the unexpected failure of the pressurizer level controller, operations personnel did not fully evaluate and manage the risks associated with the degraded condition before proceeding. |
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000530/2014003 Section 4OA2 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2014 (2014Q2) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71152 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | B Parks D Reinert G George G Guerra J Drake M Baquera N Okonkwo T Brown T Skaggs Ryan W Sifre |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion V Technical Specification Technical Specification - Procedures |
| CCA | H.11, Challenge the Unknown |
| INPO aspect | QA.2 |
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Finding - Palo Verde - IR 05000530/2014003 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Palo Verde) @ 2014Q2
Self-Identified List (Palo Verde)
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