05000528/FIN-2013004-02
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to Include Inspection Requirements in Preventative Maintenance Basis |
| Description | The inspectors identified a Green finding for the failure of licensee personnel to follow Procedure 30DP-9MP08, Preventive Maintenance Program. Specifically, plant personnel did not ensure that requirements for performing inspection and replacement of degraded tie-wraps in electrical cubicles were contained in preventative maintenance basis documents. Consequently, degraded cable tie-wraps in Unit 1 load center L02, were not inspected prior to, and resulted in a catastrophic electrical fault on July 2, 2013. The licensee rebuilt the load center cubicle and has entered this issue into their corrective action program as Palo Verde Action Request 4454845. The failure to follow established procedures for updating preventive maintenance basis documents with requirements and recommendations from previous component failures was a performance deficiency. This performance deficiency is more than minor, and therefore is a finding, because it was associated with the procedure quality attribute of the Initiating Events Cornerstone and adversely affects the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. Specifically, by not including the requirements and recommendations from the history of previous failures in the preventive maintenance basis, the licensee did not consider pertinent operating experience when evaluating changes to the preventive maintenance program. Consequently, the licensee did not inspect degraded cable tie-wraps in Unit 1 load center L02, prior to experiencing a catastrophic electrical fault on July 2, 2013, that upset plant stability. The inspectors used the NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power, to determine the significance. The finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not contribute to both the likelihood of a reactor trip and the likelihood that mitigation equipment or functions would not be available. The issue had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with the operating experience component because the licensee did not implement and institutionalize operating experience through changes to the stations preventive maintenance program. |
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000528/2013004 Section 4OA3 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2013 (2013Q3) |
| Type: | Finding: Green |
| cornerstone | Initiating Events |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71153 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | D Reinert J Laughlin J Reynoso M Baquera R Lantz |
| CCA | P.5, Operating Experience |
| INPO aspect | CL.1 |
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Finding - Palo Verde - IR 05000528/2013004 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Palo Verde) @ 2013Q3
Self-Identified List (Palo Verde)
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