05000528/FIN-2014002-03
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Finding | |
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| Title | Failure to Establish Adequate Procedures for Performing Nitrogen Pre-Charge Checks |
| Description | The inspectors reviewed a self-revealing, non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, for the licensees failure to prescribe activities affecting quality by documented procedures of a type appropriate to the circumstances. Specifically, the licensee failed to establish appropriate procedures for performing nitrogen pre-charge checks of the main steam isolation valve (MSIV) accumulators. As a result of the licensees failure to establish appropriate procedures, the Unit 1, main steam isolation valve 170 hydraulic oil reservoir catastrophically failed on November 6, 2013, rendering the main steam isolation valve and both of its accumulators inoperable. The licensee entered this issue in the corrective action program as Condition Report Disposition Request 474316. The licensees failure to prescribe nitrogen precharge checks by documented procedures of a type appropriate to the circumstances was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency is more than minor and therefore is a finding, because it affected the procedure quality attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The inspectors performed the initial significance determination for the failed main steam isolation valve 170. For this evaluation, the valve was failed in the open position. The inspectors used the NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Attachment 0609.04, Initial Characterization of Findings. The inspectors used the NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions. The finding screened to a detailed risk evaluation because it involved a potential loss of one train of safety related equipment for longer than the technical specification allowed outage time. A Region IV senior reactor analyst performed the detailed risk evaluation, which determined that the finding was of very low safety significance. The inspectors determined this finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution, associated with the operating experience aspect, because the licensee did not effectively evaluate internal operating experience when establishing procedures for the main steam system [P.5]. |
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000528/2014002 Section 4OA3 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2014 (2014Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71153 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | B Parks D Reinert G Guerra J O'Donnell L Carson M Baquera T Brown |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion V Technical Specification Technical Specification - Procedures |
| CCA | P.5, Operating Experience |
| INPO aspect | CL.1 |
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Finding - Palo Verde - IR 05000528/2014002 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Palo Verde) @ 2014Q1
Self-Identified List (Palo Verde)
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