05000528/FIN-2014002-05
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Licensee-Identified Violation |
| Description | Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.2.1, Condition A, requires that if the Core Operating Limit Supervisory System (COLSS) calculated core power exceeds the Core Operating Limit Supervisory System calculated core power operating limit based on linear heat rate (LHR), actions must be taken to restore linear heat rate to within limits, within one hour. Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation 3.2.4, Condition A, requires that if Core Operating Limit Supervisory System calculated core power is not within limits, actions must be taken to restore the Departure from Nucleate Boiling Ratio to within limits, within one hour. If these actions are not completed, Technical Specifications Limiting Condition for Operation 3.2.1, Condition C, and Limiting Condition for Operation 3.2.4, Condition C, require that thermal power be reduced to less than 20 percent of rated thermal power within six hours. Contrary to the above, on December 3, 2013, Unit 3 operations personnel failed to reduce rated thermal power in accordance with the actions specified in Technical Specifications Limiting Condition for Operation 3.2.1, Condition C, and Limiting Condition for Operation 3.2.4, Condition C. Specifically, on December 3, 2013, while recovering from a dropped control element assembly, Unit 3 operators inappropriately exited Limiting Condition for Operation 3.2.1 and Limiting Condition for Operation 3.2.4, resulting in the licensee exceeding the allowed completion time of Condition C by 12 minutes. Licensee engineering personnel identified this condition during a post-event review of plant data on December 15, 2013. The licensees subsequent cause evaluation determined that the operating crew had inappropriately exited Limiting Condition for Operation 3.2.1 and Limiting Condition for Operation 3.2.4 prior to fully understanding and reconciling instrument and alarm discrepancies. Planned corrective actions will revise Procedure 40DP-9OP02, Conduct of Shift Operations, to add guidance and actions for operators prior to exiting a Limiting Condition for Operation. Procedure 40AO-9ZZ11, CEA Malfunctions, will also be revised to incorporate lessons learned from this event. The inspectors used the NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Attachment 0609.04, Initial Characterization of Findings, and concluded that the finding is of very low safety-significance (Green) because the finding did not affect a reactor protection system trip signal, did not involve control manipulations that unintentionally added positive reactivity, and did not result in a mismanagement of reactivity by operators. The issue has been entered into the licensees corrective action program as Action Request 4485144. |
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000528/2014002 Section 4OA7 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2014 (2014Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Licensee-identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | |
| Inspectors (proximate) | B Parks D Reinert G Guerra J O'Donnell L Carson M Baquera T Brown |
| Violation of: | Technical Specification - Procedures Technical Specification |
| INPO aspect | |
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Finding - Palo Verde - IR 05000528/2014002 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Palo Verde) @ 2014Q1
Self-Identified List (Palo Verde)
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