05000528/FIN-2011004-02
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Inadequate Operability Determination for Essential Chilled Water System Gas Voids |
| Description | The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, for the failure of operations and engineering personnel to follow station procedures and complete a prompt operability determination for the essential chilled water system commensurate with system safety significance. Specifically, after identifying gas voids in the essential chilled water system in Unit 2, and subsequently Units 1 and 3, plant personnel failed to meet timeliness and quality requirements for a prompt operability determination of the essential chilled water systems. The licensee developed an Operational Decision Making Issue Plan and has maintained gas volumes below established limits. The licensee entered the issue into the corrective action program as PVAR 3886168 and has not completed all corrective actions. The inspectors concluded that the failure of the operations and engineering personnel to adequately evaluate the operability of a safety-related structure, system, or component was a performance deficiency. The inspectors concluded the performance deficiency is more than minor because it affected the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The inspectors evaluated the significance of the issue under the Significance Determination Process, as defined in Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase I Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, and concluded the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding: (1) is not a design or qualification issue; (2) did not represent an actual loss of safety function of the system or train; (3) did not result in the loss of one or more trains of non-technical specification equipment; and (4) did not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. The inspectors determined this finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the component of decision making because the licensee failed to make safety-significant or risk-significant decisions using a - 4 - Enclosure systematic process, especially when faced with uncertain or unexpected plant conditions, to ensure safety is maintained H.1(a)(Section 1R15). |
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000528/2011004 Section 1R15 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2011 (2011Q3) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.15 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | G Warnick J Bashore M Baquera M Brown R Lantz |
| CCA | H.13, Consistent Process |
| INPO aspect | DM.1 |
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Finding - Palo Verde - IR 05000528/2011004 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Palo Verde) @ 2011Q3
Self-Identified List (Palo Verde)
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