05000528/FIN-2011002-05
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Inadequate Work Instructions for Condenser Coating |
| Description | The inspectors identified a self-revealing finding after Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station failed to adequately perform maintenance activities associated with main condenser tube sheet coatings in Unit 3. As a result, a degraded tube was not replugged following coating and failed on January 15, 2011, resulting in high sodium levels in the condensate system. Operators entered the abnormal operating procedures for condenser tube rupture and reduced power to 40 percent power to facilitate troubleshooting and repairs. The licensee concluded that Work Order 3384533 and Procedure 31MT-9ZZ19, Tube Plugging of Secondary Heat Transfer Components, did not provide adequate instructions for the removal, accountability, and reinstallation of permanent plugs during maintenance. The licensee also concluded that engineering verification inspection practices were inadequate and no procedural guidance existed for the verification. The licensee completed repairs to the main condenser and returned Unit 3 to full power. The licensee entered the performance deficiency into the corrective action program as Palo Verde Action Request 3580739 and implemented immediate corrective actions to revise the pre-job brief checklist and maintenance work instructions for condenser tube plugging. The licensee has not completed all corrective actions for this issue. The inspectors determined that the performance deficiency is more than minor because it affected the equipment reliability attribute of the Initiating Events Cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. Using NRC Manual Chapter 0609, Attachment 4, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, the inspectors concluded that the finding is of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not contribute to both the likelihood of a reactor trip and the likelihood that mitigation equipment or functions would not be available. This finding had a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the resources component because the licensee failed to provide complete, accurate and up-to-date procedures and work packages for tube sheet coating, replugging and verification H.2(c). |
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000528/2011002 Section 4OA3 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2011 (2011Q1) |
| Type: | Finding: Green |
| cornerstone | Initiating Events |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71153 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | R Lantz M Brown R Kopriva L Carson M Young J Bashore M Baquera D Graves B Rice N Greene |
| CCA | H.7, Documentation |
| INPO aspect | WP.3 |
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Finding - Palo Verde - IR 05000528/2011002 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Palo Verde) @ 2011Q1
Self-Identified List (Palo Verde)
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