05000461/FIN-2017012-01
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Finding | |
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Title | Failure to Perform a Corrective Action to Prevent Recurrence |
Description | The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance and an associated NCV of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Actions, for the licensees failure to take corrective action to preclude repetition (CAPR) of a significant condition adverse to quality. Specifically, CAPRs developed following a December 8, 2013, 480 Volt transformer failure were not completed on Division 2 equipment even though the licensee recognized the 2013 transformer failure as a significant condition adverse to quality. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program (CAP) as action request (AR) 04089480. As corrective actions, the licensee planned to perform the testing, which made up the corrective action to prevent recurrence, at the next available opportunity which will be the 2018 refueling outage. This performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because it adversely impacted the Equipment Reliability attribute and the Initiating Events Cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. Failure to perform the CAPR commensurate with safety reduced the effectiveness of the CAPR and increased the likelihood of a recurring event. This finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because the finding did not involve the complete or partial loss of a support system that contributes to the likelihood of, or cause, an initiating event and did not affect mitigation equipment. This finding affected the cross-cutting area of human performance, in the aspect of work management where the organization implements a process of planning, controlling, and executing work activities such that nuclear safety is the overriding priority. Delaying the performance of the testing because it extended the outage did not demonstrate that nuclear safety was the overriding priority. [H.5] |
Site: | Clinton |
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Report | IR 05000461/2017012 Section 4OA3 |
Date counted | Dec 31, 2017 (2017Q4) |
Type: | NCV: Green |
cornerstone | Initiating Events |
Identified by: | NRC identified |
Inspection Procedure: | IP 71153 |
Inspectors (proximate) | J Mcghee C Phillips |
Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion XVI |
CCA | H.5, Work Management |
INPO aspect | WP.1 |
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Finding - Clinton - IR 05000461/2017012 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Clinton) @ 2017Q4
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