05000461/FIN-2017001-01
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Finding | |
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| Title | Plant Barrier Control Program Failed to Compensate for an Impacted Flood Barrier ( |
| Description | Green. The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance and an associated non-cited violation of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, for the failure to implement the plant barrier control program for an impacted flood barrier. Specifically, the plant barrier impairment (PBI) permit, PBI201702003, for work on watertight door 1SD124, failed to identify the door as a flood barrier and that appropriate compensatory measures for 1SD124 being open for an extended period were identified or implemented in accordance with station procedure CCAA201, Plant Barrier Control Program, Revision 11. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as AR 03980495. The corrective actions in response to this violation were to identify appropriate compensatory measures for impairment of 1SD124 and incorporate them into the PBI log. The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because it impacted the Mitigating Systems cornerstone attribute of protection against external events and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. With the flood barrier nonfunctional and without compensatory actions in place the residual heat removal (RHR) B and RHR C pumps were inoperable. The finding was screened against the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and the inspectors determined that the finding involved the loss or degradation of equipment or function specifically designated to mitigate a seismic, flooding or severe weather initiating event. The inspectors determined that the loss of this equipment or function by itself during the external initiating event would degrade one or more trains of a system that supports a risk significant system or function and would require a detailed risk evaluation. The senior reactor analyst (SRA) performed the detailed risk evaluation and concluded the finding was of very low safety significance. The inspectors determined that this finding affected the cross-cutting area of human performance in the aspect of conservative bias, where individuals use decision making practices that emphasize prudent choices over those that are simply allowable. Proposed actions are determined to be safe in order to proceed, rather than unsafe in order to stop. Specifically, during preparation of the PBI permit, the station PBI log was reviewed and actions for previous work associated with the watertight door were deemed acceptable even though the work on the door in those instances was different than the work being performed this time. [H.14] |
| Site: | Clinton  |
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| Report | IR 05000461/2017001 Section 1R15 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2017 (2017Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.15 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | E Sanchez-Santiago G Edwards J Wojewoda K Stoedter S Mischke W Schaup |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion V |
| CCA | H.14, Conservative Bias |
| INPO aspect | DM.2 |
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Finding - Clinton - IR 05000461/2017001 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Clinton) @ 2017Q1
Self-Identified List (Clinton)
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