05000458/FIN-2015004-02

Finding

Title

Failure to Properly Implement Surveillance Testing of Penetration Valve Leakage Control System Leads to Inoperability in Excess of Technical Specification Allowed Outage Time

Description

The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of Technical Specification 3.6.1.9, Main Steam-Positive Leakage Control System, for the licensees failure to take required actions for an inoperable subsystem of the main steam positive leakage control system. Specifically, after rendering Division II of the main steam positive leakage control system inoperable for a period of time in excess of the 30-day allowed outage time, the licensee failed to place the unit in Mode 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as Condition Report CR-RBS-2015-03622. The licensee restored compliance by restoring Division II of main steam positive leakage control system to operable status. Corrective actions included modifying surveillance procedures for main steam positive leakage control system to ensure that they are carried out correctly. The performance deficiency was more than minor, and therefore a finding, because it was associated with the barrier performance attribute of the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. Specifically, the plant was operated at power for an extended period of time with one subsystem of a system designed to prevent radioactive leakage across the main steam isolation valves inoperable. The inspectors performed the initial significance determination using NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, Exhibit 3, Barrier Integrity Screening Questions. The inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because (1) the finding did not represent an actual open pathway in the physical integrity of reactor containment (valves, airlocks, etc.), containment isolation systems (logic and instrumentation), or heat removal components and (2) the finding did not involve an actual reduction in function of hydrogen igniters in the reactor containment. This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with change management because leaders failed to use a systematic process for evaluating and implementing change so that nuclear safety remains the overriding priority.

02
Site:	River Bend
Report	IR 05000458/2015004 Section 1R22
Date counted	Dec 31, 2015 (2015Q4)
Type:	NCV: Green
cornerstone	Barrier Integrity
Identified by:	NRC identified
Inspection Procedure:	IP 71111.22
Inspectors (proximate)	B Parks G Warnick J Sowa L Brandt L Carson M Hayes M Phalen M Stafford N Greene P Hernandez
Violation of:	Technical Specification - Procedures Technical Specification
CCA	H.3, Change Management
INPO aspect	LA.5
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Finding - River Bend - IR 05000458/2015004

1(3)2(2)3(2)4(7)5(0)6(0)7(3)8(4)9(6)10(5)301(0)401(0)402(0)403(2)405(1)406(3)409(0)501(0)

IR 05000458/2015004: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Finding List (River Bend) @ 2015Q4

CCA Matrix: 2015Q4

	Q	CCA	Title
05000458/FIN-2015001-01	2015Q1	H.11	Failure to Perform Adequate Operability Evaluations on Degraded High Pressure Core Spray System
05000458/FIN-2015001-03	2015Q1	H.4	Failure to Operate Condensate Demineralizer System Following Reactor Scram Results in Loss of All Feedwater
05000458/FIN-2015001-02	2015Q1	H.4	Inadequate Engineering Change and Work Instruction Review Results in Reactor Recirculation Pump Trip
05000458/FIN-2015009-01	2015Q2		Vendor and Industry Recommended Testing Adequacy on Safety-related and Safety-significant Circuit Breakers
05000458/FIN-2015009-05	2015Q2	P.2	Failure of the Plant-Referenced Simulator to Demonstrate Expected Plant Response
05000458/FIN-2015002-02	2015Q2		Failure to Maintain Design Control for 18 Upgraded Hydraulic Control Unit Accumulators
05000458/FIN-2015009-06	2015Q2	H.8	Failure to Identify and Classify Operator Workarounds that Impacted Scram Recovery Actions
05000458/FIN-2015009-04	2015Q2	H.12	Failure to Identify High Reactor Water Level as a Condition Adverse to Quality
05000458/FIN-2015009-03	2015Q2	P.2	Failure to Provide Adequate Procedures for Post-scram Recovery
05000458/FIN-2015406-01	2015Q2	H.9	Security
05000458/FIN-2015002-01	2015Q2		Inadequate Operating Margin for Reactor Protection System A Motor Generator Set for Overvoltage Protection Results in Loss of Shutdown Cooling
05000458/FIN-2015009-02	2015Q2	P.2	Failure to Establish Adequate Procedures to Perform Maintenance on Equipment that can Affect Safety-Related Equipment
05000458/FIN-2015406-02	2015Q2	H.14	Security
05000458/FIN-2015406-03	2015Q2	H.1	Security
05000458/FIN-2015008-01	2015Q3	H.1	Failure to Recognize Violations of Contamination Control Requirements as Adverse Conditions
05000458/FIN-2015008-02	2015Q3	H.9	Failure to Promptly Document Adverse Conditions in the Corrective Action Program
05000458/FIN-2015003-01	2015Q3	H.12	Failure to Operate the Unit 1 Feedwater System In Accordance With Procedures
05000458/FIN-2015405-01	2015Q3		Security
05000458/FIN-2015008-04	2015Q3	H.1	Failure to Identify an Adverse Trend in the Performance of Post Maintenance Testing on High Critical Components
05000458/FIN-2015008-03	2015Q3	H.2	Failure to Preclude Repetition of Consequential Gaps in Operator Performance
05000458/FIN-2015007-02	2015Q4		Failure to Obtain Prior NRC Approval for a Change in Reactor Core Isolation Cooling Injection Point
05000458/FIN-2015403-01	2015Q4		Security
05000458/FIN-2015004-01	2015Q4	H.8	Failure to Ensure Work Hours are Within Work Hour Limits
05000458/FIN-2015004-02	2015Q4	H.3	Failure to Properly Implement Surveillance Testing of Penetration Valve Leakage Control System Leads to Inoperability in Excess of Technical Specification Allowed Outage Time
05000458/FIN-2015004-03	2015Q4	H.5	Failure to Conduct Operations and Control Work Practices to Minimize Residual Radioactivity into the Site, including the Subsurface
05000458/FIN-2015004-05	2015Q4	H.12	Failure to Follow Procedure Results in Inadvertent Draindown of Reactor Pressure Vessel
05000458/FIN-2015004-06	2015Q4	H.8	Failure to Restore Main Steam Positive Leakage Control System to Operable Prior to Changing Modes
05000458/FIN-2015004-04	2015Q4		Failure to Make a Notification to NRC Operations Center Regarding a Radioactive Spill Reported to Another Government Agency
05000458/FIN-2015007-01	2015Q4	P.1	Failure to Establish Adequate Procedures for Severe Weather Operations

Self-Identified List (River Bend)

	Q	Title
05000458/FIN-2015003-02	2015Q3	Licensee-Identified Violation
05000458/FIN-2015007-03	2015Q4	Licensee-Identified Violation
05000458/FIN-2015004-07	2015Q4	Licensee-Identified Violation
05000458/FIN-2015403-02	2015Q4	Licensee-Identified Violation

[River Bend Findings full list]

05000458/FIN-2015004-02

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