05000458/FIN-2015009-06
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Finding | |
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| Title | Failure to Identify and Classify Operator Workarounds that Impacted Scram Recovery Actions |
| Description | The team identified a finding for the licensees failure to follow written procedures for classifying deficient plant conditions as operator workarounds and providing compensatory measures or training in accordance with fleet Procedure EN-OP-117, Operations Assessment Resources, Revision 8. A misclassification of these conditions resulted in the failure of the operations department to fully assess the impact these conditions had during a plant transient. The failure to identify operator workarounds contributed to complications experienced during reactor scram recovery on December 25, 2014. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as Condition Report CR-RBS-2015-00795. This performance deficiency is more than minor, and therefore a finding, because it had the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern if left uncorrected. Specifically, the performance deficiency contributed to complications experienced by the station when attempting to restore feedwater following a scram on December 25, 2014. The team performed an initial screening of the finding in accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, the team determined this finding is of very low safety significance (Green) because it: (1) was not a deficiency affecting the design or qualification of a mitigating structure, system, or component, and did not result in a loss of operability or functionality; (2) did not represent a loss of system and/or function; (3) did not represent an actual loss of function of at least a single train for longer than its technical specification allowed outage time, or two separate safety systems out-of-service for longer than their technical specification allowed outage time; and (4) did not represent an actual loss of function of one or more non-technical specification trains of equipment designated as high safety-significant in accordance with the licensees maintenance rule program. This finding has a consistent process cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance because the licensee failed to use a consistent, systematic approach to making decisions and failed to incorporate risk insights as appropriate. Specifically, no systematic approach was enacted in order to properly classify deficient conditions [H.8]. |
| Site: | River Bend  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000458/2015009 Section 4OA5 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2015 (2015Q2) |
| Type: | Finding: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 93812 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | D Bradley J Drake T Hartman T Pruett |
| CCA | H.8, Procedure Adherence |
| INPO aspect | WP.4 |
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Finding - River Bend - IR 05000458/2015009 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (River Bend) @ 2015Q2
Self-Identified List (River Bend)
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