05000458/FIN-2010006-03
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Finding | |
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Title | Failure to Implement and Maintain in Effect all Provisions of the Approved Fire Protection Program |
Description | The team identified a noncited violation of License Condition 2.C.(10), Fire Protection, for the failure to implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program. Specifically, the team identified, during a timed walkdown of the procedure that it took operators over 6 minutes to isolate feedwater, but the simulator showed that the steam lines could be flooded in 2 minutes. Overfilling the reactor pressure vessel and flooding the main steam lines could make reactor core isolation cooling unavailable. Reactor core isolation cooling was credited for decay heat removal and inventory control in the event of a fire. The failure to ensure that feedwater would be isolated prior to overfilling the reactor pressure vessel and flooding the main steam lines making reactor core isolation cooling unavailable is a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the protection against external events (fire) attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and it adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The team evaluated this finding using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix F, Fire Protection Significance Determination Process, because it affected fire protection defense-in-depth strategies involving post fire safe shutdown systems with plant- wide consequences. A senior reactor analyst performed a Phase 3 evaluation to determine the risk significance of this finding since it involved a control room fire that led to control room abandonment. The Phase 3 evaluation determined that the finding had very low safety significance because a fire in only one of 109 electrical cabinets in the control room could result in this overfill event. The finding was entered into the licensees corrective action program as CR-RBS-2010-01808. The finding did not have a crosscutting aspect since it was not indicative of current performance, in that the licensee had established the incorrect response time more than three years prior to this finding. (Section 1R05.05.b.2 |
Site: | River Bend ![]() |
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Report | IR 05000458/2010006 Section 1R05 |
Date counted | Jun 30, 2010 (2010Q2) |
Type: | NCV: Green |
cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
Identified by: | NRC identified |
Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.05 |
Inspectors (proximate) | B Correll N O'Keefe N Okonkwo S Alferink |
INPO aspect | |
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Finding - River Bend - IR 05000458/2010006 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (River Bend) @ 2010Q2
Self-Identified List (River Bend)
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