05000445/FIN-2010006-04
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Inadequate Evaluation of Hydrogen Generation for Safety-Related and NonSafety-Related Batteries |
| Description | The team identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control which states, in part, that measures shall be established to assure that applicable regulatory requirements and the design basis are correctly translated into specifications, drawings, procedures, and instructions. Specifically, as of June 18, 2010, the licensee failed to perform an adequate hydrogen evolution calculation, for the safety-related and nonsafety-related batteries, using the most limiting expected condition of forcing maximum current into a fully charged battery which led to a ventilation system design that did not limit hydrogen accumulation to less than two percent of the total volume of the battery areas during all conditions. This finding was entered into the licensees corrective action program as condition reports CR-2010-005941, CR-2010-005941, and CR-2010-006561. The team determined that the failure to adequately perform the hydrogen evolution calculation for the safety-related battery, using the most limiting condition, was a performance deficiency. This finding was more than minor because it was associated with the design control attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and affected the cornerstone attribute of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The team performed a Phase 1 screening in accordance with Manual Chapter 0609, Attachment 4, Phase 1 Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, and determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because it was a design or qualification issue confirmed not to result in a loss of operability or functionality, it did not result in the loss of a system safety function, it did not represent the loss of a single train for greater than technical specification allowed outage time, it did not represent a loss of one or more non-technical specification risk significant equipment for greater than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, and it did not screen as potentially risk significant due to seismic, flooding, or severe weather. This finding did not have a crosscutting aspect because the most significant contributor did not reflect current licensee performance. |
| Site: | Comanche Peak  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000445/2010006 Section 1R21 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2010 (2010Q2) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.21 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | B Rice J Leivo J Watkins K Clayton M Yeminy P Goldberg R Caniano W Sifre |
| INPO aspect | |
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Finding - Comanche Peak - IR 05000445/2010006 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Comanche Peak) @ 2010Q2
Self-Identified List (Comanche Peak)
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