05000440/FIN-2013002-01
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Finding | |
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| Title | Inadequate Procedure Resulted in Loss of High-Pressure Core Spray Function |
| Description | A self-revealed finding of very low safety significance and associated non-cited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a., Procedures, was identified for the licensees failure to establish and maintain a correct surveillance inspection procedure for high-pressure core spray (HPCS) emergency core cooling systems integrated testing. The surveillance procedure used for the HPCS, safety-related electrical bus, EH13, testing during refueling outage 14, directly resulted in an unplanned outage of the bus for nearly 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. The licensee entered the issue into the corrective action program as Condition Report 2013-03863. The inspectors determined that the failure to develop a correct surveillance procedure required by Technical Specification 5.4.1 a. was a performance deficiency and resulted in an unplanned loss of the EH13 safety-related electric bus and caused a loss of function for HPCS. The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor, and thus a finding, using IMC 0612, Appendix B, Issue Screening, dated September 7, 2012, because it was associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The finding was evaluated for significance using IMC 0609, Attachment 0609.04, dated June 19, 2012, and IMC 0609, Appendix A, Exhibit 2 Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, dated June 19, 2012. The inspectors answered yes to Question 2, Does the finding represent a loss of system and/or function? A detailed risk evaluation was conducted by the Region III Senior Reactor Analyst (SRA). The SRA performed an evaluation using the NRCs Standardized Plant Analysis Risk model for Perry. The SRA assumed that EH13 was unavailable for 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. The change in core damage frequency was estimated to be much less than 1E-6/yr, which represents a finding of very low safety significance (Green). The finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the work control component, in that, the licensee failed to appropriately coordinate work activities by incorporating actions to address the impact of changes to the work scope or activities which could affect the plant. Specifically, the development of a new surveillance procedure did not correctly predict the plant response for the safetyrelated system test lineup and resulted in an unplanned loss of the EH13 safety-related electric bus. |
| Site: | Perry  |
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| Report | IR 05000440/2013002 Section 1R13 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2013 (2013Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.13 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | M Marshfield D Jones M Kunowski J Nance |
| Violation of: | Technical Specification - Procedures Technical Specification |
| CCA | H.5, Work Management |
| INPO aspect | WP.1 |
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Finding - Perry - IR 05000440/2013002 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Perry) @ 2013Q1
Self-Identified List (Perry)
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