05000440/FIN-2012009-03
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to Appropriately Control Access to a Locked High Radiation Area |
| Description | The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance and an associated NCV of TS 5.7.2 for the failure to control and establish barriers that would prevent unauthorized entry to an area that was accessible to personnel with radiation levels, such that a major portion of the whole body could receive in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />, a dose greater than or equal to 1000 mRem. Specifically, the inspectors determined that the barriers used to control access to an identified Locked High Radiation Area (LHRA) around the work platform erected to support dry fuel storage cask loading and transport, did not provide reasonable assurance that the area was secure against unauthorized access and could not be circumvented. The licensee entered this issue into their CAP as CR-2012-14884. The licensee also took immediate corrective actions, which included posting an additional access control guard in the area, documenting Radiation Protection (RP) Manager standing orders for control of the area, controlling keys to operate the person-lift by the RP staff, and providing additional physical barriers to the lower areas of the scaffolding to prevent use of natural ladders of the scaffolding. The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor based on Example 6.g of IMC 0612, Appendix E, Examples of Minor Issues, because LHRA conditions were actually present. As a result, the inspectors determined that the performance deficiency was a finding of more than minor safety significance. The finding was not subject to traditional enforcement because it was not associated with a violation that impacted the regulatory process and did not contribute to actual safety consequences. The finding was assessed using IMC 0609, Appendix C, Occupational Radiation Safety SDP, and was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it was not related to ALARA, did not result in an overexposure or a substantial potential for overexposure, nor was the ability to assess dose compromised. This finding was associated with a cross-cutting aspect in the operating experience component of the problem identification and resolution cross-cutting area. Specifically, the licensee failed to implement and institutionalize operating experience through changes to station processes, procedures, equipment and training programs. |
| Site: | Perry  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000440/2012009 Section 4OA4 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2012 (2012Q4) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Or Safety |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 95002 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | A Garmoe B Dickson G Hansen J Cassidy J Ellegood M Keefe M Mitchell S Garry |
| Violation of: | Technical Specification |
| CCA | P.5, Operating Experience |
| INPO aspect | CL.1 |
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Finding - Perry - IR 05000440/2012009 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Perry) @ 2012Q4
Self-Identified List (Perry)
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