05000440/FIN-2013002-02
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Valve Mis-position Causes SDV Level Detector Inoperability |
| Description | A self-revealed finding of very low safety significance and associated non-cited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a., Procedures, was identified for the licensees failure to correctly implement a surveillance procedure for calibration of a scram discharge volume (SDV) level detector. Specifically, licensee technicians failed to open and lock open, with independent verification, the lower isolation valve to an SDV level detector. The licensee documented the issue in the corrective action program as Condition Report 2013-04452. The inspectors determined that the failure to correctly complete the procedure and lock open the lower isolation valve was a performance deficiency which resulted in a locked-in scram signal with a resulting inability to clear the signal and restore safetyrelated systems after the scram (to begin a refueling outage) for several days. The performance deficiency was evaluated under Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0612, Appendix B, Issue Screening, dated September 7, 2012, and determined to be more than minor, and thus a finding, because it was associated with the human performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and it adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). The finding was evaluated for significance using IMC 0609, Attachment 0609.04, dated June 19, 2012, and IMC 0609, Appendix A, Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, dated June 19, 2012. By answering no to C. Reactivity Control Systems, questions 1, 2, and 3, the inspectors determined this finding was of very low safety significance because the finding did not affect other diverse methods of reactor shutdown, it did not add positive reactivity, nor did it result in the mismanagement of reactivity by an operator. The finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the work practices component, in that the licensee communicates human error prevention techniques, that techniques are used commensurate with the risk of the assigned task, and personnel do not proceed in the face of uncertainty or unexpected circumstances. Specifically, the independent verifier found the valve in an unexpected condition with a locking device already installed, did not stop the process and question the valve position, but proceeded in the face of uncertainty. |
| Site: | Perry  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000440/2013002 Section 1R20 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2013 (2013Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.2 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | M Marshfield D Jones M Kunowski J Nance |
| Violation of: | Technical Specification - Procedures Technical Specification |
| CCA | H.12, Avoid Complacency |
| INPO aspect | QA.4 |
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Finding - Perry - IR 05000440/2013002 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Perry) @ 2013Q1
Self-Identified List (Perry)
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