05000440/FIN-2013002-03
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Finding | |
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| Title | Failure to Follow Procedures for Conducting a Standby Liquid Control System Surveillance |
| Description | A self-revealed finding of very low safety significance and associated non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, was identified when the licensee failed to correctly implement procedures for testing safety-related equipment. Specifically, the licensee failed to correctly implement prerequisite steps in a surveillance instruction, causing the standby liquid control (SLC) pump \'A\' plunger pot drain valves to be left open, contrary to procedure. The licensee entered the finding into the corrective action program as Condition Report 2013-00114 and took immediate action to close the valves when leakage was discovered from the drain valve tailpipes. The inspectors determined that the failure to correctly complete the prerequisite steps in surveillance instruction (SVI)-C41-T2001-A was a performance deficiency which resulted in a water spill in containment, an associated lockup of the rod control and information system (RCIS), and required the licensee to enter two off-normal instructions (ONIs). The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor, and thus a finding, using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0612, Appendix E, Examples of Minor Issues, dated August 11, 2009, because it is similar to Example 4.b and resulted in an unexpected, Inhibit Rod Motion RCIS OOS, alarm and caused the operating crew to enter ONI-C11-1, Inability to Move Control Rods. The finding was evaluated for significance using IMC 0609, Attachment 0609.04, dated June 19, 2012, and IMC 0609, Appendix A, Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, dated June 19, 2012. In answering no to C. Reactivity Control Systems, questions 1, 2, and 3, the inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance because the finding did not affect a reactor protection system trip signal, did not add positive reactivity, nor did it result in the mismanagement of reactivity by an operator. The finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the work practices component, in that licensee personnel failed to use human error prevention techniques, such as holding a pre-job briefing, self and peer checking, and proper documentation of activities. Specifically, the operation to position the plunger pot drain valves on the \'A\' and \'B\' SLC pumps was not coordinated by the field supervisor in accordance with the SVI and operations personnel proceeded in the face of uncertainty or unexpected circumstances. |
| Site: | Perry  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000440/2013002 Section 1R22 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2013 (2013Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.22 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | M Marshfield D Jones M Kunowski J Nance |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion V |
| CCA | H.12, Avoid Complacency |
| INPO aspect | QA.4 |
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Finding - Perry - IR 05000440/2013002 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Perry) @ 2013Q1
Self-Identified List (Perry)
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