05000412/LER-2021-004, Manual Reactor Trip
| ML22011A283 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Beaver Valley |
| Issue date: | 01/11/2022 |
| From: | Grabnar J Energy Harbor Nuclear Corp |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| L-21-292 LER 2021-004-00 | |
| Download: ML22011A283 (5) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| Reporting criterion: | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B)(1) |
| 4122021004R00 - NRC Website | |
text
energy harbor John J. Grabnar Site Vice President January 11, 2022 L-21-292 ATTN: Document Control Desk U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001
SUBJECT:
Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 2 Docket No. 50-412, License No. NPF-73 LER 2021-004-00 10 CFR 50.73 Beaver Valley Power Station P.O. Box 4 Shippingport, PA 15077 724-682-5234 Fax: 724-643-8069 Enclosed is Licensee Event Report (LER) 2021-004-00, "Unit 2 Manual Reactor Trip."
This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50. 73(a)(2)(iv)(A).
There are no regulatory commitments contained in this submittal. Any actions described in this document represent intended or planned actions and are described for information only.
If there are any questions or if additional information is required, please contact Mr. Steve Sawtschenko, Manager, Regulatory Compliance and Emergency Response, at 724-682-4284.
s/
John J. Grabnar Enclosure: Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit 2 LER 2021-004-00 cc:
Mr. D. C. Lew, NRC Region I Administrator NRC Senior Resident Inspector Ms. S. Goetz, NRC Project Manager INPO Records Center (via INPO Industry Reporting and Information System)
Mr. L. Winker (BRP/DEP)
Enclosure L-21-292 Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit 2 LER 2021-004-00
Abstract
Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit 2 412 3
- 4. Title Unit 2 Manual Reactor Trip 11 12 2021 2021 004 00 01 11 2022 1
17 Steve Sawtschenko, Manager, Regulatory Compliance and Emergency Response 724-682-4284 At 1007 EST on November 12, 2021, with Unit 2 in Mode 1 at approximately 17 percent power following a refueling outage, the reactor was manually tripped due to increasing steam generator water levels due to oscillating Main Feedwater Pump Recirculation Valves. The oscillation of the valves led to a steam generator water level transient that met predefined reactor trip criteria. The direct cause was the key lock switches for the recirculation valves were left in AUTO allowing the valves to modulate based on flow indication. The apparent cause was the unit supervisor did not properly read a procedure step from a startup procedure and the step was not performed.
This is reportable under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) as an event that resulted in a manual actuation of the Reactor Protection System per 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B)(1). Corrective actions are procedural clarifications and cautions. Page of 05000-
- 3. LER NUMBER YEAR SEQUENTIAL NUMBER REV NO.The apparent cause was during performance of the procedure, the unit supervisor did not properly read step 6 of 2OM-52.4.A to the control room operator and as a result the step was performed incorrectly. The procedure step stated, "verify failed open," however, the unit supervisor read the step as "verify full open." Additionally, the unit supervisor did not read two sub steps to take the key lock switch to OPEN. The procedure is also deficient in that these two sub steps do not contain an action verb to move or verify that the key lock switches are in OPEN.
ANALYSIS OF EVENT
This is reportable under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) as an event that resulted in a manual actuation of the Reactor Protection System per 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B)(1). A 4-hour report was made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)
(B) at 1352 on November 12, 2021 (event notification 55572).
The plant risk associated with the BVPS-2 reactor trip on November 12, 2021, is considered to be very low. This is based on the change in average core damage frequency derived using the conditional core damage probability and change in average large early release frequency derived using conditional large early release probability for the event. The safety significance of this event was very low.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
Completed Actions:
The key lock switches were placed in OPEN per 2OM-52.4.A.
An immediate stand down was conducted at the site and within Operations to refocus on the correct behaviors.
Planned Actions:
Procedure 2OM-52.4.A will be updated to add the action verb to step 6 and add a caution prior to the performance of the step that describes why it is being performed.
PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS
A recent mispositioning event due to personnel not properly following procedure use and adherence requirements includes Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 1 (BVPS-1) LER 2021-001-00, "Containment Isolation Valve Found Restrained Open Resulting in Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications." The cause and corrective actions from the BVPS-1 event were related to ensuring that the valves being out of position is logged correctly. This BVPS-2 event requires a corrective action to clarify a procedure step, and therefore the direct corrective actions for the BVPS-1 event would not be expected to prevent the BVPS-2 event.
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Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit 2 412 2021 004 00