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eu!!!!!!l!!!a wuci.., e..., oivi,Sn February 10,1998 L-98-030 Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 2 Docket No. 50-412 License No. NPF-73 IJiR 98-001-00 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 In accordance with Appendix A, Beaver Valley Tecimical Specifications, the following Licensee Event Repon is submitted:
LER 98-00100,10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)," Failure to Perfonn Surveillance iesting of Containment isolation Spring Loaded Check Valve as Required by Technical Specification 4.6.3.1.2.e."
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Mr.11. J. Miller, Regional Adininistrator United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region 1 475 Allendale Road King of Prussia, PA 19406 Mr. D. S. Brinkman BVPS Senior Project Manager United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 Mr. David M. Kern BVPS Senior Resident inspector United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mr J. A. Ilultz Ohio Edison Company 76 S. Main Street Akron, Oli 44308 Mr. Steven Dumek Centerior Energy Corporation 6670 Beta Drive Mayfield Valley, Oil 44143 INPO Records Center 700 Galleria Parkway Atlanta, GA 30339 5957 Mr. Michael P. Murphy Bureau of Radiation Protection Department of Environmental Protection RCSOB.13th Floor P.O. Box 8469 liarrisburg, PA 17105 8469 Manager, Nuclear Licensing and Operations Support Virginia Electric & Power Company 5000 Dominion Blvd.
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.a io i u>.m. i...n-.n..iy o..w. m.a nremi.n kn.o o.1 On January 12,1998 at 1330 hours0.0154 days <br />0.369 hours <br />0.0022 weeks <br />5.06065e-4 months <br />, with Unit 2 in Mode 5, an ongoing Technical Specification (TS) Surveillance Review identified that Containment isolation Spring Loaded Check Valve (CISLCV) 2CVS 93 was not being tested in accordance with the requirements of Unit 2 TS 4.6.3.1.2.c. This TS requires that each weight or spring loaded containment isolation valve be demonstrated operable during the cold shutdown or refueling mode at least once per 18 months by cycling each valve through one complete cycle of full travel and verifying that cach check valve remains closed when the differential pressure in the direction of flow is less than 1.2 psid and opens w hen the difTerential pressure in the direction of flow is greater than or equal to 1.2 psid but less than 6.0 psid. Contrary to this requirement, CISLCV 2CVS 93. Containment Radiation Monitor Discharge Check Valve, was not included in the Containment isolation Check Valve Test Program and consequently not tested. Failure to perform a Surveillance Requirement in the TS is a condition prohibited t)y TS and is thus reportable pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i). There were no automatically or manually initiated safety system responses as a result of this event.
The apparent cause of this event was the fact that CISLCV 2CVS 93 was not uniquely identified on controlled prints, the controlled Master Equipment List, or in the UFSAR. This appears to be the main reason that CISLCV 2CVS 93 was not included in Containment Isolation Valve Surveillance Test (ST) 2DYT 147.3. Additionally, the Unit 2 preoperational test procedures, upon which the development of ST 2DVT 1.47.3 was based, did not identify this valve as a spring loaded check valve.
As completed corrective actions: (1) CISLCV 2CVS 93 was successfully tested on 01/16/98 in accordance with TS 4 6.3.L2 c, (2) ST 2DVT I 47.3 was revised to include testing of CISLCY 2CVS 93 on 01/15/98; (3) penetrations listed in the respective unit Licensing Requirements Manual ' Containment Penetrations' Tables and UFSAR ' Containment Isolation Arrangements' Tables were reviewed to verify that all applicable Containment isolation Weight and Spring Loaded Check Valves are identified and tested per Surveillance Tests. This was completed on 01/19/98. As a future corrective action, controlled prints and the controlled Master ' uipment List will be changed. and a UFSAR change request will be prepared, to identify all Containment Isolation Checi
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The safety implications of this event are minimal. as CISLCV 2CVS 93 tested satisfactorily.
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CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE Unit 2: Mode $, 0 percent Reactor Power IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE Discovery Date: January 12,1998 Event Date: This event has existed since Unit 2 startup.
DESCRIPTION OF EVENT
On January 12,1998 at 1330 hours0.0154 days <br />0.369 hours <br />0.0022 weeks <br />5.06065e-4 months <br />, a Technical Specification (TS) Surveillance Review (SR) team composed of Management and System Engineering representatives identified that Containment Isolation Spring Loaded Check Valve (CISLCV) 2CVS 93 (JM/ISV) was not being tested in accordance with the requirements of Unit 2 TS 4.6.3.1.2.c. This TS requires that cach weight or spring loaded containment isolation valve be demonstrated operable during the cold shutdown or refueling mode at least once per 18 months by cycling cach valve through one complete cycle of full travel and verifying that cach check valve remains closed w hen the differential pressure in the direction of flow is less than 1.2 psid and opens when the differential pressure in the direction of flow is greater than or equal to 1.2 psid but less than 6.0 psid. Contrary to this requiicment, CISLCV 2CVS 93, Containment Radiation Monitor Discharge Check Valve, was not included in the Containment Isolation Check Valve Test Program and consequently not tested. Further review has revealed that this condition has existed since Unit 2 startup.
Upon discovery, Condition Report Number 980050 was initiated to document the event.
This has been determined to not be applicable to Unit 1.
There were no automatically a manually initiated safety system responses as a result of this event.
l REPORTABil ITY TS 4.6.3.1.2.c requires that cach weight or spring loaded containment isolation valve be demonstrated operable during the cold shutdown or refueling mode at least once per 18 months by cycling cach valve through one complete cycle of full travel and verifying that cach check valve remains closed when the differential pressure in the direction of flow is less than 1.2 psid and opent when the di!Terential pressure in the direction of flow is greater that or equal to 1.2 psid but less than 6.0 psid. Contrary to tk requirement, CISLCV 2CVS 93, Containment Radiation Monitor Discharge Check Valve, was not included in the Containment isolation Check Valve Test Program and consequently not tested. Failure to perform a Surveillance Requirement in the TS is a condition prohibited by TS and is thus reportable pursuant to the requircrnents of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i).
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CAUSF The apparent cause of this event was the fact that CISLCV 2CVS 93 was not uniquely identified on controlled prints, tl c controlled Master Equipment List, or in the UFSAR. This appears to be the main reason tiet CISLCV 2CVS 93 was not included in Containment Isolation Valve Surveillance Test 2DVr 1.47.3. There was only one spring loaded check valve on Unit 2, and this wasn't tested because Surveillance Test 2DVT 1.47.3 only tested weight loaded check valves. Additionally, the Unit 2 preoperational test procedures, upon which the development of Surveillance Test 2DVT 1.47.3 was based, did not identify this vah; as a spring loaded check valve.
CORRECTIVF ACTIONS COMPl.ETED:
- 1. CISLCV 2CVS 93 was successfully tested on January 16,1998 in accordance with the requirunents of TS 4.6.3.1.2.c.
- 2. Containment Isolation Check Valve Sury-illance Test 2DVT 1.47.3 was revised to include testing of CISLCV 2CVS 93 on January 15,1998.
- 3. Penetrations listed in the respective unit Licensing Requirements Manual ' Containment Penetrations' Tables and UFSAR
' Containment Isolation Arrangements' Tabics were reviewed to verify that all applicable Containment isolation Weight and Spring Loaded Check Valves are identified and tested per STs. This was completed on January 19,1998.
FUTURE:
- 4. Controlled prints and the controlled Master Equipment List will be changed, and a UFSAR change request will be prepared, to identify all Containment Isolation Check Valves as either ' weight loaded' or ' spring loaded'. This will be completed by March 20, 1998.
SAFETY IM Pl.ICATIONS The safety implications of this event are minimal, as CISLCV 2CVS 93 tested satisfactorily.
PREVIOUS SIMil.AR EVENTS A resiew of LERs for the past two years reviewed the following similar event:
- 1. LER 197-019-00," Containment Penetration Check Valves Not in Accordance with the Design Basis", dated August i1,1997.
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| 05000334/LER-1998-001-01, :on 980115,failure to Perform Required Valve Surveillance for CC & SW as Required by TSs Were Noted. Caused by Inadequate Application of Tss.Unit 1 Surveillance Procedures Will Be Revised |
- on 980115,failure to Perform Required Valve Surveillance for CC & SW as Required by TSs Were Noted. Caused by Inadequate Application of Tss.Unit 1 Surveillance Procedures Will Be Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) | | 05000412/LER-1998-001, :on 980112,failure to Perform Surveillance Testing of Ci Spring Loaded Check Valve Was Noted.Caused by Fact That Ci Spring Loaded Check Valve Was Not Uniquely identified.2CVS-93 Was Successfully Tested |
- on 980112,failure to Perform Surveillance Testing of Ci Spring Loaded Check Valve Was Noted.Caused by Fact That Ci Spring Loaded Check Valve Was Not Uniquely identified.2CVS-93 Was Successfully Tested
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) | | 05000412/LER-1998-002-01, :on 980206,inadequate Testing of Diesel Fuel Transfer Pumps as Required by Ts,Was Identified.Caused by Inadequate Application & Understanding of Ts.Surveillance Procedures 20ST-36.1 & 20ST-36.2 Were Revised |
- on 980206,inadequate Testing of Diesel Fuel Transfer Pumps as Required by Ts,Was Identified.Caused by Inadequate Application & Understanding of Ts.Surveillance Procedures 20ST-36.1 & 20ST-36.2 Were Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) | | 05000412/LER-1998-002, Forwards LER 98-002-00,re Inadequate Testing of Diesel Fuel Oil Transfer Pumps as Required by TS | Forwards LER 98-002-00,re Inadequate Testing of Diesel Fuel Oil Transfer Pumps as Required by TS | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) | | 05000334/LER-1998-003, :on 980128,failure to Perform Chemical Addition Sys Valve Cycling Surveillance as Required by TSs Occurred. Caused by Inadequate Application of Tss.Test Procedures 1OST-13.11 Was Revised |
- on 980128,failure to Perform Chemical Addition Sys Valve Cycling Surveillance as Required by TSs Occurred. Caused by Inadequate Application of Tss.Test Procedures 1OST-13.11 Was Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) | | 05000412/LER-1998-003-01, :on 980213,identified That PORV Limit Switch Position Indicators May Not Have Been Tested IAW Requirements of Unit 2 TS 4.3.3.8.4.Caused by Inadequate Application of Ts.Procedures Revised |
- on 980213,identified That PORV Limit Switch Position Indicators May Not Have Been Tested IAW Requirements of Unit 2 TS 4.3.3.8.4.Caused by Inadequate Application of Ts.Procedures Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) | | 05000412/LER-1998-004-01, :on 980311,determined That No Channel Specific Status Lights Existed for P-9 Permissive Interlock.Caused by Inadequate Design.Issued Plant Mod to Install P-9 Permissive Input Bistable Windows on Subject Interlock |
- on 980311,determined That No Channel Specific Status Lights Existed for P-9 Permissive Interlock.Caused by Inadequate Design.Issued Plant Mod to Install P-9 Permissive Input Bistable Windows on Subject Interlock
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) | | 05000334/LER-1998-004, :on 980128,failure to Perform Required Valve Surveillance for Boron Injection,Eccs & Quench Spray as Required by TSs Occurred.Caused by Inadequate Application of Ts.Procedures Revised |
- on 980128,failure to Perform Required Valve Surveillance for Boron Injection,Eccs & Quench Spray as Required by TSs Occurred.Caused by Inadequate Application of Ts.Procedures Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) | | 05000412/LER-1998-005-01, :on 980402,inadequate FP SS Analysis for Boric Acid to Boric Acid Blender valve,2CHS*FCV113A,was Noted. Caused by Oversight of Missing Support Cables.Control Circuit of 2CHS*FCV113A Will Be Modified |
- on 980402,inadequate FP SS Analysis for Boric Acid to Boric Acid Blender valve,2CHS*FCV113A,was Noted. Caused by Oversight of Missing Support Cables.Control Circuit of 2CHS*FCV113A Will Be Modified
| 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000334/LER-1998-005, :on 980204,failure to Comply W/Surveillance Requirement for Boron Injection Tank Surge Tank Boron Concentration Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Application of TS Surveillance Requirements.Bit Was Sampled |
- on 980204,failure to Comply W/Surveillance Requirement for Boron Injection Tank Surge Tank Boron Concentration Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Application of TS Surveillance Requirements.Bit Was Sampled
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) | | 05000412/LER-1998-006-01, :on 980411,reactor Protection Sys Actuation Bypass Breaker Trip During 2MSP-1.14A Occurred.Caused by Procedure Error in Msp.Revised Maint Surveillance Procedures 2MSP-1.14A & 2MSP-1.14B |
- on 980411,reactor Protection Sys Actuation Bypass Breaker Trip During 2MSP-1.14A Occurred.Caused by Procedure Error in Msp.Revised Maint Surveillance Procedures 2MSP-1.14A & 2MSP-1.14B
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000334/LER-1998-006, :on 980205,inadequate Routine Weekly Surveillance Testing of Onsite AC Power Distribution Sys Occurred.Caused by Inadequate Application of Tss.Unit 2 Surveillance procedure,2OST-36.8,was Revised |
- on 980205,inadequate Routine Weekly Surveillance Testing of Onsite AC Power Distribution Sys Occurred.Caused by Inadequate Application of Tss.Unit 2 Surveillance procedure,2OST-36.8,was Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) | | 05000412/LER-1998-007-01, :on 980409,inadequate Beaver Valley Power Station Procedures to Ensure Compliance W/Tech Specs Were Noted.Caused by Inadequate Training of Procedure Writers. Procedures Revised |
- on 980409,inadequate Beaver Valley Power Station Procedures to Ensure Compliance W/Tech Specs Were Noted.Caused by Inadequate Training of Procedure Writers. Procedures Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) | | 05000412/LER-1998-007-02, Forwards LER 98-007-02 Re Inadequate BVPS Unit 2 Procedures to Ensure Compliance W/Ts | Forwards LER 98-007-02 Re Inadequate BVPS Unit 2 Procedures to Ensure Compliance W/Ts | | | 05000412/LER-1998-007, :on 980409,inadequate BVPS Procedures Were Performed to Ensure Compliance W/Ts.Caused by Inadequate Training of Procedure Writers.Procedure Reviews & Revs Will Be Incorporated in TS Where Necessary |
- on 980409,inadequate BVPS Procedures Were Performed to Ensure Compliance W/Ts.Caused by Inadequate Training of Procedure Writers.Procedure Reviews & Revs Will Be Incorporated in TS Where Necessary
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) | | 05000412/LER-1998-008-01, :on 980515,discovered Inadequacies in GL 96-01 Specification Instrumentation Surveillance.Caused by Inadequate Application of Ts.Revised Procedures to Address Identified Concerns & Will Perform Testing |
- on 980515,discovered Inadequacies in GL 96-01 Specification Instrumentation Surveillance.Caused by Inadequate Application of Ts.Revised Procedures to Address Identified Concerns & Will Perform Testing
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) | | 05000412/LER-1998-008-03, Forwards LER 98-008-03 Re GL 96-01 TS Instrumentation Surveillance Inadequacies.Rept Is Submitted IAW 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i) | Forwards LER 98-008-03 Re GL 96-01 TS Instrumentation Surveillance Inadequacies.Rept Is Submitted IAW 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i) | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) | | 05000412/LER-1998-008-02, Revised LER 98-008-02:on 980609,GL 96-01 TS Instrumentation Surveillance Inadequacies Occurred.Caused by Inadequate Application of Tech Specs.Procedures Revised | Revised LER 98-008-02:on 980609,GL 96-01 TS Instrumentation Surveillance Inadequacies Occurred.Caused by Inadequate Application of Tech Specs.Procedures Revised | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) | | 05000334/LER-1998-008, :on 980207,failure to Test EDG IAW TSs Were Noted.Caused by Inadequate Application of TSs When Initial Surveillance Procedures Were Being Developed.Condition Rept on Potential Issue Was Written on 980207 |
- on 980207,failure to Test EDG IAW TSs Were Noted.Caused by Inadequate Application of TSs When Initial Surveillance Procedures Were Being Developed.Condition Rept on Potential Issue Was Written on 980207
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) | | 05000412/LER-1998-008, Forwards LER 98-008-00, Generic Letter 96-01 - TS Instrumentation Surveillance Inadequacies | Forwards LER 98-008-00, Generic Letter 96-01 - TS Instrumentation Surveillance Inadequacies | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) | | 05000334/LER-1998-009, :on 980123,failure to Perform Required Ventilation Filter Bank Testing as Required by TSs Occurred. Caused by Human Performance Lapse on Part of Safety & Licensing Personnel.Procedures Revised |
- on 980123,failure to Perform Required Ventilation Filter Bank Testing as Required by TSs Occurred. Caused by Human Performance Lapse on Part of Safety & Licensing Personnel.Procedures Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000412/LER-1998-009-01, :on 980420,inadequate Testing of PORV TS SR Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Application & Implementation of TS Sr.Revised M/S Procedures 2MSP-6.68-I & 2MSP-6.69-I |
- on 980420,inadequate Testing of PORV TS SR Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Application & Implementation of TS Sr.Revised M/S Procedures 2MSP-6.68-I & 2MSP-6.69-I
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) | | 05000334/LER-1998-010, :on 980218,inadequate Compliance to Action Statement During Instrument Testing Note Due to Inadequate Development of TS Change Request in 1994.Compliance Position Statement 98-006 Issued & Completed on 980225 |
- on 980218,inadequate Compliance to Action Statement During Instrument Testing Note Due to Inadequate Development of TS Change Request in 1994.Compliance Position Statement 98-006 Issued & Completed on 980225
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) | | 05000412/LER-1998-010-01, :on 980421,noted That non-safety Related Mechanical Seal Assembly Was Installed in Quench Spray Pump a 2QSS-P21A.Caused by Inadequate Knowledge & Training. Replacement Gland Seal Plates Were Procured |
- on 980421,noted That non-safety Related Mechanical Seal Assembly Was Installed in Quench Spray Pump a 2QSS-P21A.Caused by Inadequate Knowledge & Training. Replacement Gland Seal Plates Were Procured
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) | | 05000412/LER-1998-010, Forwards LER 98-010-00, Non-Safety Related Mechanical Seal Assembly Installed in Quench Spray Pump a 2QSS-P21A, Per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i) | Forwards LER 98-010-00, Non-Safety Related Mechanical Seal Assembly Installed in Quench Spray Pump a 2QSS-P21A, Per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i) | | | 05000334/LER-1998-011, :on 980206,identified That No Backup Nitrogen Supply for PORV PCV-456 Existed.Caused by Loss of Design Which Led to Inadequate Installation.Installed Nitrogen Backup Supply for PORV PCV-456 |
- on 980206,identified That No Backup Nitrogen Supply for PORV PCV-456 Existed.Caused by Loss of Design Which Led to Inadequate Installation.Installed Nitrogen Backup Supply for PORV PCV-456
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded | | 05000412/LER-1998-011, Forwards LER 98-011-00, Cross-Connect Piping Installed Between Suction Lines of Hydrogen Recombiners, IAW 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i) & (II) | Forwards LER 98-011-00, Cross-Connect Piping Installed Between Suction Lines of Hydrogen Recombiners, IAW 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i) & (II) | | | 05000412/LER-1998-011-01, :on 980612,confirmed That cross-connect Lines W/No Isolation Valves Connecting to Hydogen Recombiners, Fails to Comply W/Ts.Caused by Lack of Attention to Detail. Rev to UFSAR Will Be Made Re Hydrogen Recombiner Piping |
- on 980612,confirmed That cross-connect Lines W/No Isolation Valves Connecting to Hydogen Recombiners, Fails to Comply W/Ts.Caused by Lack of Attention to Detail. Rev to UFSAR Will Be Made Re Hydrogen Recombiner Piping
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000334/LER-1998-012, :on 980204,discovered That Capacitors Could Not Be Gauranteed to Withstand Consequences.Caused by Inadequate Implementation of Vendor Instructions.Filled Voids Between Capacitors & Circuit Boards W/Silicon Rubber |
- on 980204,discovered That Capacitors Could Not Be Gauranteed to Withstand Consequences.Caused by Inadequate Implementation of Vendor Instructions.Filled Voids Between Capacitors & Circuit Boards W/Silicon Rubber
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000412/LER-1998-012-01, :on 981101,identified That Train a Battery 2-1, Cell Number 3 Was Below TS Min Category B Allowable Float Voltage.Caused by Accumulation of Sedimentation at Bottom of Cell Jar.Cell Pairs Were Replaced.With |
- on 981101,identified That Train a Battery 2-1, Cell Number 3 Was Below TS Min Category B Allowable Float Voltage.Caused by Accumulation of Sedimentation at Bottom of Cell Jar.Cell Pairs Were Replaced.With
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000334/LER-1998-013, :on 980217,discovered That RCS Loop Stop Valves Limit Switch Interlocks Were Not Tested IAW Ts.Caused by Inadequate Application of TS Srs.Initiated Procedure Mods to Include Required Status Light Testing |
- on 980217,discovered That RCS Loop Stop Valves Limit Switch Interlocks Were Not Tested IAW Ts.Caused by Inadequate Application of TS Srs.Initiated Procedure Mods to Include Required Status Light Testing
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) | | 05000412/LER-1998-013-01, :on 981106,failure to Comply with TSs Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Operating Sp.Revised Procedure 2OST-36.7.With |
- on 981106,failure to Comply with TSs Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Operating Sp.Revised Procedure 2OST-36.7.With
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000334/LER-1998-014, :on 980309,failure to Comply W/Ts Surveillance Requirement 4.4.9.2.3,was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Application/Understanding Re TSs & Regulatory Compliance. Revised or Verified Procedures |
- on 980309,failure to Comply W/Ts Surveillance Requirement 4.4.9.2.3,was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Application/Understanding Re TSs & Regulatory Compliance. Revised or Verified Procedures
| | | 05000334/LER-1998-014-01, Forwards LER 98-014-01,re Failure to Comply W/Ts SR 4.4.9.2.3 on Both Units & Subsequent Identification of Two Prior Instances of Exceeded Unit 1 Max Allowed Pressurizer Spray Water Differential Temp,Per TS 3.4.9.2.c | Forwards LER 98-014-01,re Failure to Comply W/Ts SR 4.4.9.2.3 on Both Units & Subsequent Identification of Two Prior Instances of Exceeded Unit 1 Max Allowed Pressurizer Spray Water Differential Temp,Per TS 3.4.9.2.c | | | 05000412/LER-1998-014-01, :on 981112,inadequate Source Range High Voltage Setpoint Led to Failure to Comply with Tss.Caused by Human Error.High Voltage Setpoint for Source Range N32 Was Adjusted to 1600 Vdc IAW W Technical Info.With |
- on 981112,inadequate Source Range High Voltage Setpoint Led to Failure to Comply with Tss.Caused by Human Error.High Voltage Setpoint for Source Range N32 Was Adjusted to 1600 Vdc IAW W Technical Info.With
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) | | 05000334/LER-1998-015-01, Forwards LER 98-015-01, Inadequate Performance of Channel Functional Tests, Per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i).Restatement of Corrective Action Provided with Underlined Words to Clarify Intent | Forwards LER 98-015-01, Inadequate Performance of Channel Functional Tests, Per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i).Restatement of Corrective Action Provided with Underlined Words to Clarify Intent | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) | | 05000334/LER-1998-017, :on 980320,discovered Inadequate SR Testing of Accident & Remote Shutdown Monitoring Instrumentation.Caused by Misapplication of TS Surveillance Procedure Requirements. Revised Procedures for Clarification |
- on 980320,discovered Inadequate SR Testing of Accident & Remote Shutdown Monitoring Instrumentation.Caused by Misapplication of TS Surveillance Procedure Requirements. Revised Procedures for Clarification
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) | | 05000334/LER-1998-018, :on 980409,inadequate Beaver Valley Power Station Procedures to Ensure Compliance W/Tech Specs Were Noted.Caused by Inadequate Training of Procedure Writers.Revised Procedures |
- on 980409,inadequate Beaver Valley Power Station Procedures to Ensure Compliance W/Tech Specs Were Noted.Caused by Inadequate Training of Procedure Writers.Revised Procedures
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) | | 05000334/LER-1998-020, :on 980403,use of non-calibrated Computer Points for TS Surveillance Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Understanding & Application of TS Sr.Main Benchboard Instrumentation in CR Has Been Calibrated |
- on 980403,use of non-calibrated Computer Points for TS Surveillance Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Understanding & Application of TS Sr.Main Benchboard Instrumentation in CR Has Been Calibrated
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) | | 05000334/LER-1998-020-01, Forwards LER 98-020-01, Use of Non-Calibr Computer Points for TS Surveillances, IAW 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i) | Forwards LER 98-020-01, Use of Non-Calibr Computer Points for TS Surveillances, IAW 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i) | | | 05000334/LER-1998-021, :on 980324,discovered Gas Voids in Low Head Safety Injection Discharge Piping to Suction Piping of Charging/Head Safety Injection Pumps.Cause of Event Not Established.Procedures Will Be Revised |
- on 980324,discovered Gas Voids in Low Head Safety Injection Discharge Piping to Suction Piping of Charging/Head Safety Injection Pumps.Cause of Event Not Established.Procedures Will Be Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000334/LER-1998-022, :on 980427,common Mode Failure of Ci Check Valves Was Noted.Bvps Is Currently Investigating Root Cause & Appropriate Corrective Actions Will Be Identified |
- on 980427,common Mode Failure of Ci Check Valves Was Noted.Bvps Is Currently Investigating Root Cause & Appropriate Corrective Actions Will Be Identified
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) | | 05000334/LER-1998-023, :on 980429,RCP Bus UV & under-frequency Relay Channel Functional Testing Inadequacies Were Noted.Caused by Inadequate Application of Ts.Applicable Msps Were Revised or Developed & Implemented Prior to Mode 4 Entry |
- on 980429,RCP Bus UV & under-frequency Relay Channel Functional Testing Inadequacies Were Noted.Caused by Inadequate Application of Ts.Applicable Msps Were Revised or Developed & Implemented Prior to Mode 4 Entry
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000334/LER-1998-024, :on 980604,discovered Internal Flooding Discrepancy in Intake Structure Pump Cubicles.Caused by Inadequate Consideration of Effects Re Postulated Internal Flooding.Closed Flood Doors of Pump Cubicles |
- on 980604,discovered Internal Flooding Discrepancy in Intake Structure Pump Cubicles.Caused by Inadequate Consideration of Effects Re Postulated Internal Flooding.Closed Flood Doors of Pump Cubicles
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000334/LER-1998-025, :on 980611,condition Prohibited by Tech Specs Occurred.Caused by Inadequate Definition Applied for Channel Calibr W/Respect to RTDs & Tcs.Training Provided to Designated Site Personnel |
- on 980611,condition Prohibited by Tech Specs Occurred.Caused by Inadequate Definition Applied for Channel Calibr W/Respect to RTDs & Tcs.Training Provided to Designated Site Personnel
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) | | 05000334/LER-1998-026, :on 980623,noted Failure to Perform IST of RHR & CCR Valves,Per Ts.Caused by Failure of IST Program to Properly Identify Required Testing of Subject Valves.Will Review & Revise IST Program & Procedures |
- on 980623,noted Failure to Perform IST of RHR & CCR Valves,Per Ts.Caused by Failure of IST Program to Properly Identify Required Testing of Subject Valves.Will Review & Revise IST Program & Procedures
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) | | 05000334/LER-1998-027, Informs That Dl Intends to Issue Special Rept Providing Overview of TS Compliance Issues & Corrective Actions Taken. Based on Dl Intent to Provide Special Rept,Supplemental Rept to LER 98-027-00 Will Not Be Issued | Informs That Dl Intends to Issue Special Rept Providing Overview of TS Compliance Issues & Corrective Actions Taken. Based on Dl Intent to Provide Special Rept,Supplemental Rept to LER 98-027-00 Will Not Be Issued | | | 05000334/LER-1998-028, :on 980811,reactor Trip Occurred.Caused by Cognitive Error by Involved Licensed & non-licensed Shift Operating personnel.F-MS-475 Repaired & Returned to Svc. with |
- on 980811,reactor Trip Occurred.Caused by Cognitive Error by Involved Licensed & non-licensed Shift Operating personnel.F-MS-475 Repaired & Returned to Svc. with
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000334/LER-1998-029, :on 981218,inadequate Meterological Instrumentation Calibr Led to Failure to Comply with Tss.Caused by Human Error.Current Wind Direction Sensor Was Replaced.With |
- on 981218,inadequate Meterological Instrumentation Calibr Led to Failure to Comply with Tss.Caused by Human Error.Current Wind Direction Sensor Was Replaced.With
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) |
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