05000412/LER-2011-001, For Beaver Valley, Unit 2, Regarding Defective Fuel Injection Pump Supply Lines Provided by the Diesel Engine Manufacturer Results in an Emergency Diesel Generator Being Inoperable
| ML11145A171 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Beaver Valley |
| Issue date: | 05/19/2011 |
| From: | Harden P FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Co |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| LER 11-001-00 | |
| Download: ML11145A171 (7) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| Reporting criterion: | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown |
| 4122011001R00 - NRC Website | |
text
FENOC FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company Beaver Valley Power Station P.O. Box 4 Shippingport, PA 15077 Paul A. Harden Site Vice President 724-682-5234 Fax: 724-643-8069 May 19, 2011 L-1 1-178 10 CFR 50.73 ATTN: Document Control Desk U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001
SUBJECT:
Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 2 Docket No. 50-412, License No. NPF-73 LER 2011-001-00 Enclosed is Licensee Event Report (LER) 2011-001-00, "Defective Fuel Injection Pump Supply Lines Provided by the Diesel Engine Manufacturer Results in an Emergency Diesel Generator Being Inoperable." This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D) and 10 CFR 21.2(c).
There are no regulatory commitments contained in this submittal. Any actions discussed in this document that represent intended or planned actions are described for the NRC's information, and are not regulatory commitments.
If there are any questions or if additional information is required, please contact Mr. Brian T. Tuite, Manager, Regulatory Compliance at 724-682-4284.
Attachment c:
Mr. W. M. Dean, NRC Region I Administrator Mr. D. L. Werkheiser, NRC Senior Resident Inspector Ms. N. S. Morgan, NRR Project Manager INPO Records Center (via electronic image)
Mr. L. E. Ryan (BRP/DEP)
(4
NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 10/31/2013 (10-2010)
, the NRC may digits/characters fnot conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.
- 3. PAGE Beaver Valley Power Station Unit Number 2 05000412 1 of 6
- 4. TITLE Defective Fuel Injection Pump Supply Lines Provided by the Diesel Engine Manufacturer Results in an Emergency Diesel Generator Being Inoperable
- 5. EVENT DATE
- 6. LER NUMBER
}
- 7. REPORT DATE
- 8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED SEUNIL REV jFACILITY NAME IDOCKET NUMBER MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR NUMBER NO MONTH DAY YEAR None 2011
- - 001
- - 00 05 19 2011 FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER
- 9. OPERATING MODE
- 11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check a/l that apply)
[I 20.2201(b)
E] 20.2203(a)(3)(i)
El 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)
[1 50.73(a)(2)(vii) 6 E] 20.2201(d)
[] 20.2203(a)(3)(ii)
El 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)
[] 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)
E] 20.2203(a)(1)
El 20.2203(a)(4)
El 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)
E] 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)
_E 20.2203(a)(2)(i)
E] 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A)
El 50.73(a)(2)(iii)
El 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)
- 10. POWER LEVEL E] 20.2203(a)(2)(ii)
El 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A)
El 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)
E] 50.73(a)(2)(x)
El 20.2203(a)(2)(iii)
El 50.36(c)(2)
E] 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)
El 73.71(a)(4) 0%
El 20.2203(a)(2)(iv)
El 50.46(a)(3)(ii)
El 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)
El 73.71(a)(5)
El 20.2203(a)(2)(v)
E] 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)
El 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)
Z OTHER (Part 21)
Specify in Abstract below
_ _ 20.2203(a)(2)(vi)
Z 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)
Z 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D) or in for the fuel line compression fittings. The Train A EDG was considered available to function if needed.
Required Action "B" of BVPS-2 Technical Specification 3.8.2 was applied due to not having at least one EDG operable. The required actions included immediately initiating actions to restore one EDG to operable status, suspending all core alterations, and suspending positive reactivity additions. Considering risk insights, site management determined that one EDG would be maintained available at all times during the restoration activities to restore a required EDG to operable status. Maintenance activities that were in progress on the Train B EDG were stopped. The Train B EDG was then returned to available status prior to placing the Train A EDG on clearance to reinstall the fuel injection pump supply lines removed during 2R15. No unnecessary work that could challenge shutdown safety was permitted and the Technical Specification 3.8.2 required offsite circuit remained operable to supply required electrical loads during the period of time that both EDGs were inoperable. Following restoration and successful surveillance and post maintenance testing, the BVPS-2 Train A EDG was declared operable at 0058 hours6.712963e-4 days <br />0.0161 hours <br />9.589947e-5 weeks <br />2.2069e-5 months <br /> on March 27, 2011.
CAUSE OF EVENT
The direct cause is the ferrules were incorrectly swaged onto the fuel injection pump supply lines as supplied by the vendor, Fairbanks Morse Engine. Fairbanks Morse documentation indicates that the Parker Hannifin CPI ferrule that was installed was not suitable for use on the 0.75 inch x 0.120 inch wall tubing of which the fuel injection pump supply lines were manufactured.
The root cause is the vendor (Fairbanks Morse Engine) design change control process was inadequate in that the design change made to the fuel injection pump supply lines incorporated use of an unsuitable ferrule. In addition, this error was not detected by the vendor. Parker Hannifin catalog information (4230/4233) does not endorse the use of its CPI ferrule with 0.75 inch x 0.120 inch wall thickness tubing. Interviews indicated that even though the wall thickness of the fuel injection pump supply lines was increased (0.095 inches to 0.120 inches), the vendor did not identify this modification to the fuel injection pump supply lines to BVPS-2 as required by the purchase order. The vendor also did not identify this modification by changing the part number of these components.
ANALYSIS OF EVENT
From approximately 0305 hours0.00353 days <br />0.0847 hours <br />5.042989e-4 weeks <br />1.160525e-4 months <br /> on March 25, 2011, until 0058 hours6.712963e-4 days <br />0.0161 hours <br />9.589947e-5 weeks <br />2.2069e-5 months <br /> on March 27, 2011, both of the BVPS-2 EDGs were inoperable, although one EDG was available to function if needed during this period. In Mode 6, a minimum of one EDG is required to be operable per Technical Specification 3.8.2. Therefore, BVPS-2 operated in a plant Mode that requires a minimum of one EDG to be operable per the plant's Technical Specifications with both EDGs inoperable. This event represents two 10 CFR Part 50.73 reportable conditions. The first reportable event is an inadvertent operation/condition prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications which is reportable per 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) and occurred when the Train A EDG was declared operable on March 25, 2011 at 0305 hours0.00353 days <br />0.0847 hours <br />5.042989e-4 weeks <br />1.160525e-4 months <br /> when this EDG was actually inoperable due to the inadequately swaged fuel injection pump supply lines procured from the EDG engine manufacturer. This condition was unknown until later in the day on March 25, 2011 when BVPS-2 was informed of the manufacturer's recommendation to remove the affected lines. Following discovery, the Technical Specification 3.8.2 Condition B actions were initiated promptly and one EDG was maintained available at all times during the restoration activities to restore a required EDG to operable status.
This event is also reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D) as a loss of safety function for systems needed for accident mitigation.
With no EDGs operable in Mode 6 from approximately 0305 hours0.00353 days <br />0.0847 hours <br />5.042989e-4 weeks <br />1.160525e-4 months <br /> on March 25, 2011, until 0058 hours6.712963e-4 days <br />0.0161 hours <br />9.589947e-5 weeks <br />2.2069e-5 months <br /> on March 27, 2011, this condition could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function for systems needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident as the safety functions needed for accident mitigation could have been impaired in the event of a loss of off-site power. This event was previously reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) at 2135 hours0.0247 days <br />0.593 hours <br />0.00353 weeks <br />8.123675e-4 months <br /> on March 25, 2011 (Event Notification 46700).
Pursuant to 10 CFR 21.2(c), this report satisfies the reporting requirements of 10 CFR 21.
See the additional information section, below, for information regarding the manufacturer, part number, nature of defect and potential safety hazard.
The safety significance associated with this event is considered to be very low. An Engineering evaluation concluded that there was reasonable assurance that Train A EDG would be available to perform its safety function for a 24-hour period, following any plant transient or non-seismic external event. A risk assessment was performed assuming a postulated seismic event during the time that the EDG was degraded, which resulted in a very low Incremental Core Damage Probability (ICDP). One EDG was maintained available at all times to function, if needed, during the restoration activities and the required offsite circuit remained operable to supply required electrical loads during the period of time that both EDGs were inoperable.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
- 1. All of the defective replacement fuel injection pump supply lines were removed from the Train A EDG and the fuel injection pump supply lines previously removed during 2R1 5 were reinstalled. Following successful surveillance and post maintenance testing, the Train A EDG was declared operable at 0058 hours6.712963e-4 days <br />0.0161 hours <br />9.589947e-5 weeks <br />2.2069e-5 months <br /> on March 27, 2011.
- 2. FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company (FENOC) has inactivated the stock codes for the defective replacement fuel injector pump supply lines to prevent future procurement activities.
- 3. A plant operating experience report has been issued on this event (OE 33402).
- 4. FENOC will update the Nuclear Procurement Issues Committee (NUPIC) Industry Issues database, to ensure that the nuclear industry is informed of the issues regarding the Fairbanks Morse Engine design change process.
Completion of the above and other corrective actions are being tracked through the BVPS corrective action program.
PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS
There were no prior Licensee Event Reports at BVPS Unit 1 and BVPS Unit 2 for the past five years related to a BVPS EDG being declared inoperable.
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
Basic component supplier:
Fairbanks Morse Engine 701 White Ave.
Beloit, WI 53511 (608) 364-8494 Basic component which contains a defect:
Replacement fuel injection pump supply lines (Fairbanks Morse Part Numbers P12611001 and P12611002) on the 12 cylinder model PC2.2 and model PC2.3 Fairbanks Morse Engines.
Nature of the defect:
Improperly seated ferrules on the replacement fuel injection pump supply lines.
Safety hazard which could be created by such a defect:
In the event that a tube was to back out of the fitting entirely, a substantial amount of fuel would be flowing out of the header onto the engine and around the engine room. If the tube was to back out of the fitting, fuel would no longer be supplied to that cylinder and the total EDG power output would be reduced. This type of failure could have an adverse effect on the EDG's ability to start within the required timeframe and accept the required load assumed in plant's safety analysis for a design basis accident.
Information on extent of condition:
Fairbanks Morse Engine has provided information to BVPS that indicates affected replacement fuel injection pump supply lines (Part numbers P12611001 and P12611002) were only supplied to BVPS since the CPI ferrule was first implemented in 2004. BVPS-1 does not utilize Fairbanks Morse Engines on either of the two EDGs and therefore was not affected.
CR 11-91738