05000400/LER-2010-004, Unit 1 Valid Actuation of B Emergency Diesel Generator Due to Loss of B-SB 6.9kV Safety Bus

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Unit 1 Valid Actuation of B Emergency Diesel Generator Due to Loss of B-SB 6.9kV Safety Bus
ML110110166
Person / Time
Site: Harris 
Issue date: 01/04/2011
From: Henderson K
Progress Energy Carolinas
To:
Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
HNP-10-133 LER 10-004-00
Download: ML110110166 (4)


LER-2010-004, Unit 1 Valid Actuation of B Emergency Diesel Generator Due to Loss of B-SB 6.9kV Safety Bus
Event date:
Report date:
Reporting criterion: 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii)

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x)

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications
4002010004R00 - NRC Website

text

Serial: HNP-10-133 10 CFR 50.73 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, UNIT 1 DOCKET NO. 50-400/RENEWED LICENSE NO. NPF-63 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 2010-004-00 Ladies and Gentlemen:

The enclosed Licensee Event Report (LER) 2010-004-00 is submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73, paragraph (a)(2)(iv)(A) as an event that resulted in the automatic actuation of an emergency ac electrical power system. This report describes an event in which the loss of the 'B-SB' 6.9kV safety bus resulted in the valid actuation of the 'B' emergency diesel generator (EDG). In accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a) requirements, this LER is submitted within 60 days following discovery of the event.

This document contains no Regulatory Commitments.

Please refer any questions regarding this submittal to Mr. John Caves, Supervisor -

Licensing/Regulatory Programs, at (919) 362-3137.

Sincerely, Kelvin Henderson Plant General Manager Harris Nuclear Plant KH/jmd Enclosure cc:

Mr. J. D. Austin, NRC Senior Resident Inspector, HNP Mrs. B. L. Mozafari, NRC Project Manager, HNP Mr. L. A. Reyes, NRC Regional Administrator, Region II Progress Energy Carolinas, Inc.

Harris Nuclear Plant P. 0. Box 165 New Hill, NC 27562

NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 10/31/2013 (10-2010)

, the NRC may sfor each block) not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the digits/characters finformation collection.

/3. PAGE Harris Nuclear Plant-Unit 1 05000 0400 1

OF 3

4. TITLE Valid Actuation of B Emergency Diesel Generator Due to Loss of 'B-SB' 6.9kV Safety Bus
5. EVENT DATE
6. LER NUMBER
7. REPORT DATE
8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR SEQUENTIAL REV MONTH DAY YEAR FAIIYN/A MEDCENM NUMBER NO.

N/A 05000 FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 11 05 2010 2010 004 -

00 1

4 2011 N/A 05000

9. OPERATING MODE
11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check all that apply)

El 20.2201(b)

[J 20.2203(a)(3)(i)

E] 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)

E] 50.73(a)(2)(vii) 5l 20.2201(d)

[

20.2203(a)(3)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)

[

50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)

E] 20.2203(a)(1) fl 20.2203(a)(4) 50,73(a)(2)(ii)(B)

El 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)

[] 20.2203(a)(2)(i) fl 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(iii)

Li 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)

10. POWER LEVEL f] 20.2203(a)(2)(ii)

El 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)

El 50.73(a)(2)(x) 5 20.2203(a)(2)(iii) 5 50.36(c)(2)

F] 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A) 5 73.71 (a)(4) 5 20.2203(a)(2)(iv) 5 50.46(a)(3)(ii)

E] 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B) 5 73.71 (a)(5) 0 %

5 20.2203(a)(2)(v)

El 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A) 0 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C) 5 OTHER EJ 20.2203(a)(2)(vi)

E] 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) 5 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)

Specify in Abstract below or in

IV. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

Immediate Corrective Actions The plant entered AOP-025, Loss of One Emergency AC Bus (6.9KV) or One Emergency DC Bus (125V). After approximately three minutes the B Residual Heat Removal pump was started per AOP-025 step 13. The Emergency Action Level (EAL) network for loss of the 1 B-SB 6.9kV Bus was reviewed, no classification was required.

Corrective Actions to prevent recurrence Revise plant procedure PLP-400 to establish guidance for PMT development when replacing complex relays such as 86 UV or 86 lock out relays.

Planned Actions

1. Review this event with applicable personnel.
2. Implement the use of improved electrical test leads at HNP.

V.

PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS

Crystal River Unit 3 - Reactor Trip Caused by Group 7 Rods Dropping into the Core The cause of the dropped rods event in August, 2009 was the failure of the programmer. The cause of that failure is a gross over-current of the output driver during implementation of PM-126. The over-current condition was triggered by inadvertent contact of an inadequately protected (fused) test jumper to an incorrect/unintended point. The jumper made inadvertent contact with a positive voltage/current source. Although not a Harris Nuclear Plant event, this occurred in the Progress Energy fleet and actions were in place to apply the lessons learned regarding use of specialized test leads to all fleet nuclear plants. This action did not prevent the Harris event because the actions to procure and use standard leads were planned but not yet implemented.PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPERPRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER