05000400/FIN-2011011-02
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Noncompliance for Providing Inadequate Procedural Guidance for Post-Fire Safe Shutdown |
| Description | Shearon Harris License Condition 2.F, Fire Protection Program states, in part, that Carolina Power & Light Company shall implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program as described in the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) for the facility as amended. Section 9.5.1, Fire Protection System, of the FSAR incorporates, by reference, Fire Protection Evaluation and Comparison to NUREG-0800, BTP CMEB 9.5-1, Revision 3, dated May 7, 1986. o Section C.5.b (2) of Fire Protection Evaluation and Comparison to NUREG- 0800, BTP CMEB 9.5-1 requires one train of systems necessary to achieve and maintain hot standby conditions from either the control room or emergency control station(s) be free of fire damage by providing one of the means described in Section C.5.b (2) (i.e., use of spatial separation, passive fire barriers, and fire detection and an automatic fire suppression system). o Section C.5.b (3), of Fire Protection Evaluation and Comparison to NUREG- 0800, BTP CMEB 9.5-1 requires that alternative or dedicated shutdown capability be provided where the guidelines of Section C.5.b (1) and C.5.b (2) cannot be met. Section 9.5.1.5.4, Quality Assurance Program, of the FSAR states that the fire protection quality assurance program elements are included in Section 17.3 of the FSAR. Section 17.3.1.1, Methodology, of the FSAR states, in part, that the HNP quality assurance program prescribes measures for the control and accomplishment of activities for the operation of safety related and fire protection SSCs. Section 17.3.1.1 also commits to the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B. 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, which states, in part, that activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented procedures of a type appropriate to the circumstances. Contrary to the above, the licensee failed to meet the requirements of its documented fire protection program, in that: The licensee failed to protect redundant systems necessary to achieve and/or maintain hot shutdown conditions from the MCR or emergency control station(s) from fire damage by one of the means described in Section C.5.b(2) of Fire Protection Evaluation and Comparison to NUREG-0800, BTP CMEB 9.5-1. The licensee failed to ensure alternative shutdown capability was available for two fire areas where the guidelines for ensuring one redundant train for safe shutdown remain free of fire damage, detailed in Section C.5.b (1) and C.5.b (2) of Fire Protection Evaluation and Comparison to NUREG-0800, BTP CMEB 9.5- 1 could not be met. The licensee failed to provide adequate procedural guidance, in that the licensees fire safe shutdown procedure failed to incorporate instructions to alert operators concerning time constraints for restoring cooling to the RCP seals. Additionally, the licensees fire safe shutdown procedure included steps that were not appropriate to the circumstances in that a required procedural step may not have been feasible due to the presence of postulated smoke, under certain conditions. Because this issue relates to fire protection, and the associated noncompliances were resolved by compliance with 10 CFR 50.48(c), the NRC is exercising enforcement and reactor oversight process discretion for this issue in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy, Section 9.1, Enforcement Discretion for Certain Fire Protection Issues (10 CFR 50.48) and Inspection Manual Chapter 0305. Specifically, the licensee entered the noncompliances into their corrective action program and implemented appropriate compensatory measures. The noncompliances were not associated with a finding of high safety significance (Red), the noncompliances were not willful, and the licensee submitted a letter of intent stating its intention to transition to 10 CFR 50.48(c) by December 31, 2005. LER 05000400/2002-004-09, Unanalyzed Condition Due to Inadequate Separation of Associated Circuits; LER 05000400/2004-004-00, Unanalyzed Condition Due to Inadequate Separation of Associated Circuits; and URI 05000400/2005007-01, Fire Response Procedures May Not Be Adequate To Prevent RCP Seal Failure and Subsequent Seal Loss of Coolant Accident For a Fire in Certain Fire Areas, are closed. |
| Site: | Harris  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000400/2011011 Section 4OA5 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2011 (2011Q3) |
| Type: | Violation: Severity level Enforcement Discretion |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | |
| Inspectors (proximate) | N Merriweather R Rodriguez M Thomas D Orr G Macdonald G Wiseman B Correll R Nease J Montgomery P Braxton H Barrett |
| INPO aspect | |
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Finding - Harris - IR 05000400/2011011 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Harris) @ 2011Q3
Self-Identified List (Harris)
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