05000397/LER-2003-011, Vulnerability in Safeguards System That Could Allow Unauthorized or Undetected Access to Protected Area
| ML040020355 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Columbia  (NPF-021) |
| Issue date: | 12/22/2003 |
| From: | Coleman D Energy Northwest |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| Event #40273, GO2-03-188 LER 03-011-00 | |
| Download: ML040020355 (5) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| Reporting criterion: | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) |
| 3972003011R00 - NRC Website | |
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ENERGY NORTH WEST PO. Box 968 Richland, Washington 99352-0968 December 22, 2003 G02-03-188 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555
Subject:
COLUMBIA GENERATING STATION, DOCKET NO. 50-397 60-DAY FOLLOW-UP REPORT REGARDING EVENT NOTIFICATION #40273
Dear Sir or Madam:
Transmitted herewith is the 60-day follow-up report for the subject event notification pursuant to 10 CFR 73.71(b)(2) in accordance with paragraph (a)(4) of that section.
Should you have any questions or desire additional information regarding this matter, please call Ms. CL Perino at (509) 377-2075.
Respectfully, DW Coleman Manager Regulatory Programs Mail Drop PE20 Attachment cc:
BS Mallet - NRC - RIV TC Poindexter - Winston & Strawn NRC Sr. Resident Inspector - 988C (2)
BJ Benney - NRC - NRR RN Sherman - BPA/1399 INPO Records Center WB Jones - NRC RIV/fax Director, Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards Director, Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response
NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 6-30-2001 (1-2001)
COMMISSION
, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person Is not required to respond to, the information collection.
FACILITY NAME (1)
DOCKET NUMBER (2)
PAGE (3)
Columbia Generating Station 00050397 1 OF4 TITLE (4)
Vulnerability in a Safeguards System that Could Allow Unauthorized or Undetected Access to a Protected Area EVENT DATE (5)
LER NUMBER 6 REPORT DATE (7)
OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)
MO DAY YEAR YEAR SEQUENTIAL REV MO DAY YEAR FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER NUMBER NO 10 23 2003 2003 -
011 -
00 12 22 2003 FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER OPERATING I
THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 5: (Check all that apply) (ME)1 MODE (9) l 20.2201(b)
T 20.2203(a)(3)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B) 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)
POWER 100%
r 20.2201(d)
T 20.2203(a)(4) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 50.73(a)(2)(x)
LEVEL (10) 20.2203Aa)(1) 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) x 73.71 a)4)
=
20.2203(a)(2)(i) 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A)
=
50.73(a)(2)(v)(A) 73.71 (a)(5) 20.2203(a)(2)(ii) 50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)
Other 20.2203(a)(2)(iii) 50.46(a)(3)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)
Specify hI Abstract below or 20.2203(a)(2)(iv) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D) hI NRC Form 366A 20.2203(a)(2)(v) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) 50.73(a)(2)(vii) 20.2203(a)(2)(vi) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 20.2203(a)(3)(i)
_W (ii (A 0.73(a(2)(viii)(B)
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER 12)
NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)
RE Brownlee (509) 377-2085 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)
CAUSE
l SYSTEM COMPONENT MANU_
REPORTABLE
CAUSE
SYSTEM COMPONENTl MANU_
REPORTABLE I
I
~~~~~~~~~FACTURER TO EPIX
[.....
JFACTUR TO EPIX SUBMISSION
=
~~SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)
I EXPECTED IMONTH IDAY YEAR YES ( yescomplete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).
NO DATE (15)
ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)
On October 23, 2003, with Columbia Generating Station (Columbia) operating at 100% power, a vulnerability in a safeguards system was discovered that could have allowed unauthorized or undetected access to Columbia's protected or vital areas (ref: Event Notification 40273).
The vulnerability existed due to a safeguards information (SGI) container being unlocked and unattended for approximately six days. The unlocked SGI container could have allowed access to site-specific technical details regarding the physical security system that could facilitate access to Columbia's protected or vital areas.
Subsequent to discovery of the vulnerability, the SGI container contents were reviewed and did not appear to be changed or altered. The SGI container is located in a records vault for which access is controlled with a combination lock. There was no evidence of forced entry into the records vault or the SGI container. In addition, the vulnerable condition did not result in an unauthorized or undetected entry into Columbia's protected or vital areas.
(If more space Is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)
DESCRIPTION OF EVENT
On October 23, 2003, with Columbia Generating Station (Columbia) operating at 100% power, a vulnerability in a safeguards system was discovered that could have allowed unauthorized or undetected access to Columbia's protected or vital areas. The vulnerability existed due to a safeguards information (SGI) container being unlocked and unattended for a period of approximately six days. The unlocked container could have allowed unauthorized or undetected access to site-specific technical details regarding the physical security system that could facilitate access to the protected and vital areas.
Subsequent to discovery of the vulnerability, the contents of the SGI container were reviewed and did not appear to be changed or altered. The SGI container is located in a records vault for which access is controlled with a combination lock. The vault entrance is in full view of records management specialists throughout the workday. The vault is open only when records management specialists are in the direct vicinity to view the vault. There was no evidence of forced entry into the records vault or the SGI container. In addition, the vulnerable condition did not result in an unauthorized or undetected entry into Columbia's protected or vital areas.
This 60-day follow-up written report is submitted pursuant to 10 CFR 73.71(b)(2) and 10 CFR 73.71(a)(4). Regulatory Guide 5.62, Revision 1, Section 3.2, instructs licensees to use NRC Licensee Event Report form 366, and describes the report content that is sufficient for NRC analysis and evaluation. Because this event did not involve a security system failure or a threat related incident, only items 1 through 14 in section 3.2 of Regulatory Guide 5.62, Revision 1, are addressed below:
Date and Time of Event The SGI container was left unlocked from approximately 1215 hours0.0141 days <br />0.338 hours <br />0.00201 weeks <br />4.623075e-4 months <br /> on Friday, October 17, 2003, to approximately 1415 hours0.0164 days <br />0.393 hours <br />0.00234 weeks <br />5.384075e-4 months <br /> on October 23, 2003, PDT.
Location of Actual or Threatened Event The open SGI container is located in a plant records storage vault. The vault is in the records processing area of a building adjacent to Columbia's protected area and within the owner controlled area. The vault entrance is in full view of records management specialists throughout the workday. The vault is open only when records management specialists are in the direct vicinity to view the vault.U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (1-2001)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
FACILITY NAME g1)
DOCKET (2)
LER NUMBER (6)
PAGE (3)
YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION Columbia Generating Station 00050397 NUMBER NUMBER 3 OF 4 2003-011-00 Plant Operating Phase At the time of event discovery, Columbia Generating Station was in Mode 1 and operating at 100% reactor power.
Safety Systems Threatened, Directly or Indirectly Because the vulnerability did not result in an unauthorized entry into a protected or vital area, no safety systems were threatened.
Type of Security Force Onsite Columbia Generating Station maintains a proprietary security force.
Number and Type of Personnel Involved Two bargaining employees and a document designer were involved in this event. All three were safeguards approved for the container that was left unlocked.
Method of Discovery of Vulnerability On October 23, 2003, a records management specialist was showing a document designer the location of the SGI container located inside the records vault. When the two employees approached the container, the records management specialist observed the combination lock lying on top of the container. The document designer informed an administrative services supervisor who confirmed the container was not locked, secured the container, and informed the Security Department.
Procedural Errors Involved On October 17, 2003, a records management specialist left the SGI container unlocked and unattended. Leaving an unlocked SGI container unattended was a violation of security procedure SWP-SEC-02, "Protection of Safeguards Information."
Immediate Actions Taken in Response to the Vulnerability Upon discovery of the combination lock lying on top of the SGI container, an administrative services supervisor secured the container and informed the Security Department. Security personnel inspected the container and determined that the contents of the container did not 1
appear to be changed or altered.U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (1-2001)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
FACILITY NAME I DOCKET 2 LER NUMBER 6 PAGE (3)
YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION Columbia Generating Station 00050397 NUM8ER NUMBER 4 OF 4 2003-011-00 Corrective Actions Taken or Planned The employee responsible for leaving the SGI container unlocked is no longer approved to access SGI, and the combination to the SGI container has been changed. In addition, a time-out was conducted with administrative services personnel to stress the seriousness of this event, and the need to preclude the recurrence of a similar event. A two-person rule has been implemented which requires two people to verify that an SGI container has been opened or closed. Visible signs will also be placed on an SGI container to indicate when it is open or closed. Lastly, as a result of industry bench-marking, inventories will be maintained for SGI containers, and a log will be maintained when items are removed or restored to an SGI container.
Local, State, or Federal Law Enforcement Agencies Contacted No local, state, or federal law enforcement agencies were contacted regarding this condition.
Description of Media Interest or Press Release A press release was not issued regarding this condition and there has been no media interest.
Indication of Previous Similar Events A similar event occurred at Columbia on May 15, 2003, as reported to the NRC by a 30-day follow-up report dated June 13, 2003.
Knowledgeable Contact For questions or additional information the point of contact is Mr. Robert Brownlee at the Columbia Generating Station, who may be reached by telephone at (509)-377-2085.
26158 RI