05000382/FIN-2011004-03
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Finding | |
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Title | Failure to Provide Adequate Testing for a Shutdown Cooling Heat Exchanger Outlet Stop Check Valve |
Description | The inspectors documented a self-revealing non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.55a, Codes and Standards, because the licensee did not establish and maintain an adequate testing program for a shutdown cooling heat exchanger outlet stop check valve (CS-117A) in accordance with Mandatory Appendix II, Check Valve Condition Monitoring Program, of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers Operation and Maintenance Code 2001 through 2003. Specifically, the licensee did not provide adequate inservice testing to detect degradation of seat leakage on the stop check valve CS-117A. As a result, the operating train of shutdown cooling experienced a flow diversion when the licensee opened the upstream containment spray isolation header valve to fill the containment spray riser. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program for resolution as CR-WF3-2011-3350 and CR-WF3-2011-5841. The immediate corrective action included the closure of the upstream isolation valve and the initiation of a work order to address seat leakage on the stop check valve CS-117. The planned corrective action includes the development of an augmented test to determine appropriate seat leakage criteria for the stop check valve. The finding is more than minor because it is associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Initiating Events cornerstone and affects the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. The inspectors performed the initial significance determination using NRC Inspection Manual 0609, Attachment 0609.04, Phase 1 Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings. The initial screening directed the inspectors to use Attachment 1 of Appendix G, Shutdown Operations Significance Determination Process, since the degraded stop check valve upsets plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown conditions. The inspectors evaluated the significance of the finding and determined that it did not require a quantitative assessment because adequate mitigating equipment remained available and the finding did not constitute a loss of control, as defined in Appendix G. Therefore, the inspectors determined that the finding is of very low safety significance (Green). This finding did not have a cross-cutting aspect associated with it because the licensee established the check valve condition monitoring program prior to the past three years. Therefore it is not reflective of current plant performance. |
Site: | Waterford |
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Report | IR 05000382/2011004 Section 1R20 |
Date counted | Sep 30, 2011 (2011Q3) |
Type: | NCV: Green |
cornerstone | Initiating Events |
Identified by: | Self-revealing |
Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.2 |
Inspectors (proximate) | M Davis S Garchow J Melfi R Azua D Overland E Uribe |
INPO aspect | |
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Finding - Waterford - IR 05000382/2011004 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Waterford) @ 2011Q3
Self-Identified List (Waterford)
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