LER-2013-009, Regarding Automatic Actuation of the Reactor Protection System Due to a Main Turbine Trip |
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| Report date: |
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| Reporting criterion: |
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications |
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| 3542013009R00 - NRC Website |
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PSEG Nuclear LLC P.O. Box 236, Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038-0236 JAN 2 8 2014 LR-N14-011 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-001 Hope Creek Generating Station Unit 1 PSfG Nuclear LLC 10CFR50.73 Renewed Facility Operating License No. NPF-57 Docket No. 50-354
Subject:
Licensee Event Report 2013-009-00 In accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), PSEG Nuclear LLC is submitting the enclosed Licensee Event Report (LER) Number 2013-009-00, "Automatic Actuation of the Reactor Protection System due to a Main Turbine Trip."
If you have any questions or require additional information, please contact Mr. Philip Duca at (856) 339-1640.
There are no regulatory commitments contained in this letter.
Eric S. Carr Plant Manager Hope Creek Generating Station Attachment: Licensee Event Report 2013-009-00
LR-N14-011 Page 2 of 2 cc:
W. Dean, Regional Administrator-Region I, NRC J. Hughey, Project Manager - US NRC NRC Senior Resident Inspector-Hope Creek (X24)
P. Mulligan, Manager, NJBNE LER uploaded to ICES Hope Creek Commitment Tracking Coordinator (H02)
L. Marabella-Corporate Commitment Tracking Coordinator (N21) 10CFR50.73
NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 10/31/2013 (10-2010)
, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the Information collection.
- 13. PAGE Hope Creek Generating Station 05000354 1 of 3
- 4. TITLE Automatic Actuation of the Reactor Protection System Due To A Main Turbine Trip
- 5. EVENT DATE
- 6. LER NUMBER
- 7. REPORT DATE
- 8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED SEQUENTIAL REV FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR NUMBER NO.
MONTH DAY YEAR N/A N/A DOCKET NUMBER 12 05 2013 2013 009 -
00 01 28 2014
- 9. OPERATING MODE
- 11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR§: (Check all that apply)
D 20.2201(b)
D 20.2203(a)(3)(i)
D 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)
D 50.73(a)(2)(vii) 1 D 20.22o1(d)
D 20.2203(a)(3)(ii)
D 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)
D 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)
D 20.2203(a)(1)
D 20.2203(a)(4)
D 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)
D 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)
D 20.2203(a)(2)(i)
D 50.36(c)(1 )(i)(A)
D 50.73(a)(2)(iii)
D 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)
- 10. POWER LEVEL D 20.2203(a)(2)(ii)
D 50.36(c)(1 )(ii)(A)
50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)
D 50.73(a)(2)(x)
D 20.2203(a)(2)(iii)
D 50.36(c)(2)
D 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)
D 73.71(a)(4) 75 D 20.2203(a)(2)(iv)
D 50.46(a)(3)(ii)
D 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)
D 73.71(a)(5)
D 20.2203(a)(2)(v)
D 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)
D 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C) 0 OTHER D 20.2203(a)(2)(vi)
D 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)
D 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)
Specify in Abstract below or in
CAUSE OF EVENT
A causal evaluation is in progress to determine the cause of the MS dump valve failure. The results of the evaluation will be published in a supplement to this LER.
The second actuation of the reactor protection system was caused by mis-operation of the DEHC system.
SAFETY CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS
There were no safety consequences associated with this event. The high moisture level in the 'A' MS resulted in a main turbine trip and subsequent automatic reactor scram. All control rods inserted. All reactor protection systems functioned as designed. All systems responded as expected. There were no consequences from the second RPS actuation since the reactor was already in hot shutdown (OPCON 3). No ECCS or RCIC initiation setpoints were reached in either the first scram or the second RPS actuation. The plant was stabilized in hot shutdown after the reactor was depressurized to allow the start of a reactor recirculation pump.
SAFETY SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL FAILURE A review of this event determined that a Safety System Functional Failure (SSFF) did not occur as defined in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 99-02, "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline." This event did not prevent the ability of a system to fulfill its safety function to either shutdown the reactor, remove residual heat, control the release of radioactive material, or mitigate the consequences of an accident.
PREVIOUS EVENTS A review of events for the past three years at Hope Creek was performed to determine if a similar event had occurred. A similar event occurred on December 1, 2013, and is documented in LER 2013-008-00.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
- 1. A design change was implemented modifying control of the MS dump valve from a modulating function to a full open function on high level.
COMMITMENTS
This LER contains no commitments.
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| 05000354/LER-2013-001, Regarding High Pressure Coolant Injection System Inoperable Due to Control Relay Failure | Regarding High Pressure Coolant Injection System Inoperable Due to Control Relay Failure | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000354/LER-2013-002, Regarding Reactor Scram Due to Degrading Condenser Vacuum | Regarding Reactor Scram Due to Degrading Condenser Vacuum | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000354/LER-2013-003, Through-wall Flaw Discovered on RHR Shutdown Cooling Return Vent Line | Through-wall Flaw Discovered on RHR Shutdown Cooling Return Vent Line | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000354/LER-2013-004, Regarding Operations with a Potential to Drain the Reactor Vessel (OPDRV) Without Secondary Containment | Regarding Operations with a Potential to Drain the Reactor Vessel (OPDRV) Without Secondary Containment | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000354/LER-2013-005, Regarding Low-Low Set Safety/Relief Valve Pilot Solenoid Operated Valve Failed As-Found Testing | Regarding Low-Low Set Safety/Relief Valve Pilot Solenoid Operated Valve Failed As-Found Testing | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000354/LER-2013-006, Regarding Operations with a Potential to Drain the Reactor Vessel (OPDRV) Without Secondary Containment Operable | Regarding Operations with a Potential to Drain the Reactor Vessel (OPDRV) Without Secondary Containment Operable | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000354/LER-2013-007, Regarding As-Found Values for Safety Relief Valve Lift Set Points Exceed Technical Specification Allowable Limit | Regarding As-Found Values for Safety Relief Valve Lift Set Points Exceed Technical Specification Allowable Limit | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000354/LER-2013-008, Regarding Automatic Actuation of the Reactor Protection System Due to a Main Turbine Trip | Regarding Automatic Actuation of the Reactor Protection System Due to a Main Turbine Trip | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000354/LER-2013-009, Regarding Automatic Actuation of the Reactor Protection System Due to a Main Turbine Trip | Regarding Automatic Actuation of the Reactor Protection System Due to a Main Turbine Trip | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000354/LER-2013-010, Regarding Loss of Both Control Room Chillers | Regarding Loss of Both Control Room Chillers | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(8) | | 05000354/LER-2013-011, Regarding Filtration, Recirculation, and Ventilation System Exceeded Technical Specification Allowed Outage Time | Regarding Filtration, Recirculation, and Ventilation System Exceeded Technical Specification Allowed Outage Time | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications |
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