05000354/LER-2008-003, HPCI Inoperability Due to Instrument Failure Initiated Turbine Trip
| ML083500369 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hope Creek  |
| Issue date: | 12/04/2008 |
| From: | Jamila Perry Public Service Enterprise Group |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| LR-N08-267 LER 08-003-00 | |
| Download: ML083500369 (6) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| Reporting criterion: | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications |
| 3542008003R00 - NRC Website | |
text
PSEG Nuclear LLC P.O. Box 236, Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038-0236 O PSEG Nuclear LLC 10CFR50.73 DEC 0 4 2008 LR-N08-267 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-001 Hope Creek Generating Station Unit 1 Facility Operating License No. NPF-57 Docket No. 50-354
Subject:
Licensee Event Report 2008-003 In accordance with 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D) and 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) PSEG Nuclear LLC, is submitting Licensee Event Report Number 2008-003.
Should you have any questions concerning this letter, please contact Mr. Philip J. Duca at (856) 339-1640.
No Regulatory commitments are contained in the LER.
Sincerely, John F. Perry Plant Manager Hope Creek Generating Station
Attachment:
Licensee Event Report 2008-003 95-2168 REV. 7/99
Document Control Desk LR-N08-267 Page 2 cc:
Mr. S. Collins, Administrator - Region 1 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 475 Allendale Road King of Prussia, PA 19406 Mr. R. Ennis, Licensing Project Manager - Hope Creek U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mail Stop 08B3 Washington, DC 20555-0001 USNRC Resident Inspector office - Hope Creek (X24)
Mr. P. Mulligan, Manager IV Bureau of Nuclear Engineering PO Box 415 Trenton, New Jersey 08625 Tim Devik - Hope Creek Commitment Coordinator (H02)
Lee Marabella - Corporate Commitment Coordinator (N21)
NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 8/31/2010 (9-2007)
, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the digits/characters for each block) information collection.
- 3. PAGE Hope Creek Generating Station 05000354 1 OF 4
- 4. TITLE HPCI Inoperability due to Instrument Failure Initiated Turbine Trip
- 5. EVENT DATE
- 6. LER NUMBER
- 7. REPORT DATE
- 8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER MONTH DAY [Y YEAR NUMBER NO.
MONTH DAY YEAR N/A FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 10 05 2008 2008 - 003 - 0001 12 04 2008 N/A
- 9. OPERATING MODE
- 11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR§: (Check all that apply)
[I 20.2201(b)
El 20.2203(a)(3)(i) 0l 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)
El 50.73(a)(2)(vii) 0] 20.2201(d)
El 20.2203(a)(3)(ii)
El 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)
[3 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)
El 20.2203(a)(1)
[I 20.2203(a)(4)
[E 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)
E: 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)
EO 20.2203(a)(2)(i)
El 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A)
[I 50.73(a)(2)(iii)
[1 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)
- 10. POWER LEVEL El 20.2203(a)(2)(ii)
[I 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A) 0 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)
El 50.73(a)(2)(x)
El 20.2203(a)(2)(iii)
[I 50.36(c)(2)
[] 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)
El 73.71(a)(4)
El 20.2203(a)(2)(iv)
[1 50.46(a)(3)(ii)
El 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)
El 73.71(a)(5) 100 El 20.2203(a)(2)(v)
El 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)
El 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)
El OTHER 0l 20.2203(a)(2)(vi)
El 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)
ED 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)
Specify in Abstract below or in the unexpected trip. The approach used in the troubleshooter was to down power the drawer, replace the display card, inspect the drawer, and if no further indication of damage was present, re-power the drawer and restore the isolation instrument to normal. After card replacement a visual inspection did not note any other damage. The next step was to return the drawer to service. When the drawer was re-powered the display and keypad functioned properly, however a HPCI Turbine Trip occurred.
When the drawer was re-powered the NORMAL/BYPASS switch was in NORMAL, which allowed the isolation and turbine trip signals to be passed from the NUMAC drawer. The breaker for the isolation valve (F002) had been opened, so the valve did not change position. No actions had been taken to prevent the HPCI Turbine Trip from occurring.
SAFETY CONSEQUENCES
The safety consequences of this event were minimal. This event resulted in no nuclear, radiological, or industrial safety consequences. HPCI was inoperable for a short period of time well within the14-day allowable Technical Specification Limiting Condition of Operation (LCO) time.
A review of this event determined that a Safety System Functional Failure (SSFF) occurred as defined in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 99-02.
CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE The apparent cause of the event was a human error in that a mindset resulted in the failure to consider the potential that the troubleshooting could also cause a turbine trip. The technicians and supervisor involved were experienced in performing this procedure and were knowledgeable of all protective functions provided by this drawer. The technicians and supervisor preparing the troubleshooting log believed they had adequate protection in place to prevent the isolation. Their mind set was that with the breaker open, replacing the display card would not result in an isolation. They did not discuss or consider that the troubleshooting actions would cause a turbine trip. They were focused on the isolation and not the turbine trip, therefore they did not address the additional function the drawer provided.
A contributing cause was the planning of the troubleshooting. A troubleshooting log was prepared and approved. One step of the troubleshooting log "Limits or Boundaries" only listed: "Isolation valve actuation from the NUMAC drawer will be prevented by opening the breaker for the inboard isolation valve, HV-F002."
It did not list a step (place the NORMAL/BYPASS switch in BYPASS) to prevent a turbine trip actuation.
Contributing to the lack of a step to prevent HPCI turbine trip actuation was that the troubleshooting log used the test and calibration procedure Operations Information Sheet from the surveillance as the reference of possible alarms and functions for this evolution. The Operations Information Sheet does not list a HPCI Turbine Trip actuation as one of the functions. Since only the valve (F002) actuation was listed, it was the only actuation considered.
PREVIOUS OCCURRENCES
A review of failure history associated with NUMAC equipment back to 1991 did not identify any events caused by improper troubleshooting.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
- 1. Roll-out communications are being provided to all supervisors.regarding adequate rigor and questioning attitude in preparing simple troubleshooting:
- 2. The HPCI Turbine Trip is being added to the test and calibration procedure Operations Information Sheet and the other leak detection channel test and calibration procedures.
- 3.
A sampling of Instrumentation and Control procedures' Operations Information Sheets are being reviewed to assess the need to add information to the sheet regarding protective functions.
- 4. A needs analysis is being presented to the Licensed Operator Requalification Curriculum Review Committee for knowledge of protective functions of GE type switches.
COMMITMENTS
This LER contains no commitments.PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPERPRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER