05000354/LER-2005-007, Re B Control Room Emergency Filtration (CREF) Train Inoperable Greater than Allowed by Technical Specifications
| ML052370337 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hope Creek  (NPF-057) |
| Issue date: | 08/18/2005 |
| From: | Massaro M Public Service Enterprise Group |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| LR-N05-0434 LER 05-007-00 | |
| Download: ML052370337 (4) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| Reporting criterion: | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function |
| 3542005007R00 - NRC Website | |
text
PSEG Nuclear LLC P.O. Box 236, Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038-0236 0 PSEG ANitclear LLIC LR-N05-0434 AUG 1 8 2005 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 LER 354105-007-00 HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-57 DOCKET NO. 50-354 This Licensee Event Report entitled, " 'B' Control Room Emergency Filtration (CREF)
Train Inoperable Greater Than Allowed By Technical Specifications," is being submitted pursuant to the requirement of 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B).
Sincerely, Plant Manager ope Creek Attachment BJT C
Distribution LER File 3.7 5tCQ 95-2168 REV. 7/99
NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIO APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 08/30/2007 6-2004)
, the NRC may digits/characters for each block) sponsor, and a person Is not required to respond to, te
- 3. PAGE Hope Creek Generating Station 05000354 1 OF 3
- 4. TITLE
'B' Control Room Emergency Filtration (CREF) Train Inoperable Greater Than Allowed By Technical Specifications
- 5. EVENT DATE
- 6. LER NUMBER
- 7. REPORT
- 8. OTHER FACILMES INVOLVED l
FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR S
EQUEL RNEO MONTH DAY YEAR
+/-
FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 06 19 2005 2005 - 007-00 08 18 2005
- 9. OPERATING MODE
- 11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANTTO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR§: (Check all that apply) o 20.2201(b) a 20.2203(a)(3)(i) 0 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)
El 50.73(a)(2)(vii) 1 0 20.2201(d)
E 20.2203(a)(3)(ii)
El 50.73(a)(2)i(i)(A) 0 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) o 20.2203(a)(1) 0l 20.2203(a)(4) 0 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)
El 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) o 20.2203(a)(2)(i) 0 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A) 0 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 0 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)
- 10. POWER LEVEL 0 20.2203(a)(2)(ii) 0 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A) 0 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) 0 50.73(a)(2)(x) o 20.2203(a)(2)(iii) 0 50.36(c)(2) 0 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A) 0 73.71(a)(4)
El 20.2203(a)(2)(iv) 0 50.46(a)(3)(ii)
El 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B) 0 73.71(a)(5) 99 0 20.2203(a)(2)(v) 0 50.73(a)(2)(i) (A) a] 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)
E OTHER 0 20.2203(a)(2)(vi)
E 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)
El 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)
Specify In Abstract below tr in NRC. Fnrmv.RRA
- 12. UCENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER FACILITY NME Brian Thomas, Licensing Engineer TELEPHONE NUMBER (kSkte Area Code) 856-339-2022 D YES (Ifyes, complete 15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)
ABSTRACT (Umit to 1400 spaces, le., approximately 15 single-spaced typewdrtten lines)
On June 19, 2005, maintenance personnel identified that the fan flow controller for the 'B' control room emergency filtration (CREF) train was found with a reset setting different than required by the instrument calibration data (lCD) record. The reset was found at 1.0 X 10 rep/min when it should have been set at 10 X 10 rep/min. Upon identification of the incorrect controller setting, the 'B' CREF train was declared inoperable on June 19, 2005 at 1747 hours0.0202 days <br />0.485 hours <br />0.00289 weeks <br />6.647335e-4 months <br /> until the controller was adjusted to the proper settings on June 20, 2005 at 1505 hours0.0174 days <br />0.418 hours <br />0.00249 weeks <br />5.726525e-4 months <br />. The CREF train is required to run following a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) or a LOCA in conjunction with a loss of offsite power (LOP). Testing determined that with the June 19, 2005 as-found settings, the 'B' CREF train was not capable of clearing the low fan flow trip setting in the event of a LOP)LOCA. Based on a review of work history for the 'B' CREF train fan controller, the controller switch was most likely mis-positioned by the maintenance technician following testing of the 'B' CREF train in January 2005. Therefore, the 'B' CREF train was inoperable for longer than the 7-day allowed outage time for a single CREF train inoperable as required by Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.2. During the period of time the 'B' CREF train was assumed to be inoperable, the 'A' CREF train had experienced periods of inoperability. With both trains of CREF inoperable for greater than one hour the requirement of TS 3.0.3 was also exceeded.
The cause of the incorrect 'B' CREF train fan controller setting was due to human error. The 'B' CREF controller was restored to the proper settings and returned to operable on June 20, 2005.
This event is being reported in accordance with IOCFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), as "a condition which was prohibited by technical specifications."
NRC FORM 366 (6-2004)U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (1-2001)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
FACILITY NAME (1)
DOCKET (2)
LER NUMBER (6) l PAGE (3)
SEQUENTIAL REVSION YEAR NUMBER NUMBER Hope Creek Generating Station 05000354 ll2 OF 3 l _
2005 007 00 l
TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)
PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION
General Electric-Boiling Water Reactor (BWRI4)
Control Room Emergency Filtration {VI)*
- Energy Industry Identification System {EIIS) codes and component function identifier codes appear as {SS/CCC}
IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE Event Date: January 2005 Discovery Date: June 19, 2005 CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE Hope Creek was in operational condition 1 with reactor power at approximately 99% on June 19, 2005. During the period of time the 'B' CREF train was assumed to be inoperable, the 'A' CREF train had experienced periods of inoperability period.
DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE On June 19, 2005, maintenance personnel identified that the fan flow controller for the 'B' control room emergency filtration (CREF) {VI) train was found with a reset setting different than required by the instrument calibration data (ICD) record.
The reset was found at 1.0 X 10 rep/min when it should have been set at 10 X 10 rep/min. Upon identification of the incorrect controller setting, the 'B' CREF train was declared inoperable on June 19, 2005 at 1747 hours0.0202 days <br />0.485 hours <br />0.00289 weeks <br />6.647335e-4 months <br /> until the controller was adjusted to the proper settings on June 20, 2005 at 1505 hours0.0174 days <br />0.418 hours <br />0.00249 weeks <br />5.726525e-4 months <br />. The CREF train is required to run following a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) or a LOCA in conjunction with a loss of offsite power (LOP). Testing determined that with the June 19, 2005 as-found settings, the 'B' CREF train was not capable of clearing the low fan flow trip setting in the event of a LOPILOCA.
Based on a review of work history for the 'B' CREF train fan controller, the controller switch was most likely mis-positioned by the maintenance technician following testing of the 'B' CREF train in January 2005. Therefore, the 'B' CREF train was inoperable for longer than the 7-day allowed outage time for a single CREF train inoperable as required by Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.2. During the period of time the 'B' CREF train was assumed to be inoperable, the
'A' CREF train had experienced periods of inoperability. With both trains of CREF inoperable for greater than one hour the requirement of TS 3.0.3 was also exceeded.
This event is being reported in accordance with I OCFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), as 'a condition which was prohibited by technical specifications.
CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE The cause of the incorrect 'B' CREF train fan controller setting was due to human error. Based on a review of work history for the 'B' CREF train fan controller, the controller switch was most likely mis-positioned by the maintenance technician following testing of the 'B' CREF train in January 2005.
... I.U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (1.2001)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
FACILITY NAME (1)
DOCKET (2)
LER NUMBER (6)
PAGE (3)
SEQUENTAL REVISION I
eYEAR NUMBER lNUMBER Hope Creek Generating Station 05000354 30F3 l
2005 007 00
__l___
PREVIOUS OCCURRENCES
A review of LERs at Hope Creek for the previous two years was performed. This review identified the following LERs associated with CREF train inoperability: 354/03-002-00, 354/04-002-00, 354/04-003-01, 354/04-005-00 and 354/05-004-00. Although these LERs were against the CREF system, the reportable occurrences were not associated with improper controller settings. Corrective actions for these LERs were specific to the events and would not have prevented the current event from occurring.
SAFETY CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS
During the period of time the 'B' CREF train was assumed to be inoperable, the 'A' CREF train had experienced periods of inoperability. No plant events occurred during the period of time that the 'B' CREF was assumed inoperable that required the actuation of the CREF system. Although the 'B' CREF train would not have been capable of clearing the low fan flow trip during a LOP/LOCA, the train was capable of being started manually.
In accordance with the design basis dose analysis for a LOCA event, control room operator radiological doses as evaluated in the analysis would not be exceeded if the control room envelope (CRE) is initially isolated and a CREF train is started within the first 30 minutes of the LOCA to pressurize the CRE. With the as-found fan controller settings, the 'B' CREF train would have isolated the control room envelope, the fan would have tripped on low flow, but the operators were capable of re-starting the CREF train within 30 minutes from the control room.
A review of this event determined that a Safety System Functional Failure (SSFF) has not occurred as defined in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 99-02. Since the 'B' CREF train was capable of mitigating the consequences of a design basis accident in accordance with the design basis dose analysis, this event did not impact the ability to mitigate the consequences of an accident.
CORRECTIVE ACTION
- 1. The 'B' CREF controller was restored to the proper settings and returned to operable on June 20, 2005.
- 2. A departmental communication of the mis-positioning event was conducted with appropriate maintenance personnel in June following the identification of the incorrect as-found switch setting. An additional communication briefing for this event will be conducted with appropriate maintenance personnel to discuss the follow-up testing of the 'B' CREF train and the impact on operability of the system. This action is being tracked in PSEG's corrective action program.
COMMITMENTS
This LER contains no commitments.