05000338/FIN-2010004-03
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to Conduct Adequate Review of Calculation Results in Main Turbine/Reactor Trip |
| Description | A self-revealing finding was identified for the licensees failure to conduct an adequate review of calculations for the operation of the Unit 2 main generator automatic voltage regulator (AVR), as required by licensee procedure CM-AA-CLC-301, Engineering Calculations, Rev. 3, which resulted in the actuation of a main generator protective lockout relay and subsequent main turbine/reactor trip. The licensee entered this problem into their corrective action program as condition report 378800. The inspectors determined that the failure to conduct an adequate owners review of calculation EE-0826, as required by licensee procedure CM-AA-CLC-301, Engineering Calculations, Rev. 3, was a performance deficiency (PD). The inspectors reviewed IMC 0612, Appendix E and determined the PD was more than minor, because it was similar to example 4.b in that the procedural error resulted in a reactor trip or other transient. In addition, the inspectors determined that it adversely impacted the Initiating Events cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations, specifically the attribute of Design Control in that the AVR design change was not properly controlled and Human Performance in that licensee personnel conducting the owners review failed to follow the requirements of CM-AA-CLC-301 and conduct an owners review of calculation EE-0826. The inspectors reviewed IMC 0609 Attachment 4 and determined that the finding was of very low safety significance, or Green, because it did not contribute to both the likelihood of a reactor trip and the likelihood that mitigation equipment or functions will not be available. The cause of this finding involved the cross-cutting area of human performance, the component of decision making, and the aspect of conservative assumptions and safe actions, H.1(b), because the licensee failed to use conservative assumptions and demonstrate that the proposed action was safe in making the decision that the incorrect inputs for the five-point curve would not be used by the MEL tuning software. (Section 4OA3.1.1) |
| Site: | North Anna  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000338/2010004 Section 4OA3 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2010 (2010Q3) |
| Type: | Finding: Green |
| cornerstone | Initiating Events |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71153 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | J Reece P Fillion J Dodson G Mccoy R Clagg M Coursey |
| CCA | H.14, Conservative Bias |
| INPO aspect | DM.2 |
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Finding - North Anna - IR 05000338/2010004 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (North Anna) @ 2010Q3
Self-Identified List (North Anna)
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