05000338/FIN-2010003-02
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to Promptly Correct a Condition Adverse to Quality For 2-RH-MOV-2700 Breaker |
| Description | A self-revealing non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, \"Corrective Action,\" was identified for the failure to promptly identify and correct a condition adverse to quality for the breaker associated with 2-RH-MOV-2700, Loop A Hot Leg to RH Pump Isolation Valve. The licensee entered this problem into their corrective action program as condition report 372940
The inspectors determined that the licensees failure to promptly correct a known condition adverse to quality, as required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, was a performance deficiency. The inspectors reviewed IMC 0612, Appendix E and determined the finding was more than minor because it was similar to examples 4d and 4f. The phase 1 screening resulted in a need to perform phase 2 and phase 3 evaluations due to the finding resulting in the loss of mitigating function, specifically the ability to perform decay heat removal. A phase 3 analysis was performed by a regional senior risk analyst in accordance with the guidance of NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609 Appendix A. The significance determination process phase 3 risk evaluation resulted in a risk increase for the finding <1E-6 for core damage frequency (CDF) and <1E-7 for large early release frequency (LERF). The dominant sequence involved a steam generator tube rupture, followed by failure of the RHR system, and failure of the operators to refill the emergency condensate storage tank to continue secondary side cooling. The analysis assumed the operators, given the additional time while cooling the core using the secondary side, would be able to manually open 2-RH-MOV-2700. The finding was characterized as of very low safety significance (Green). The cause of this finding involved the cross-cutting area of problem identification and resolution, the component of corrective action program, and the aspect of implementation of corrective action (P.1(d)) because the licensee failed to correct the safety issue that existed with 2-RH-MOV-2700 in a timely manner, commensurate with its safety significance and complexity. |
| Site: | North Anna  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000338/2010003 Section 4OA2 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2010 (2010Q2) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71152 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | J Rivera-Ortiz J Reece R Carrion G Mccoy R Clagg R Williams |
| CCA | P.3, Resolution |
| INPO aspect | PI.3 |
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Finding - North Anna - IR 05000338/2010003 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (North Anna) @ 2010Q2
Self-Identified List (North Anna)
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