05000338/FIN-2010002-04
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Finding | |
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| Title | Failure to Follow Procedures Results in Loss of Offsite Power to 1H and 2J emergency Buses |
| Description | A Green, self-revealing finding was identified for the licensees failure to follow or adhere to licensee procedures for switchyard relay maintenance, human performance and management oversight, which resulted in the loss of the Technical Specifications (TS) required offsite circuit for the 1H and 2J emergency buses and the consequent auto-start of the respective emergency diesel generators (EDGs).The licensee entered this problem into their corrective action program as condition report 361280.The inspectors determined that the failure to follow procedures to successfully accomplish nuclear switchyard relay maintenance was a performance deficiency(PD). The PD had a credible impact on safety due to the loss of a TS required offsite power supply and the start of the respective EDGs to restore power to the affected emergency buses. The inspectors determined the PD was more than minor because it impacted the initiating events cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations, and the related attribute of human performance due to human error in the implementation of a non-safety nuclear switchyard related procedures. In accordance with NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Significant Determination Process, the inspectors performed a Phase 1 risk analysis and determined the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did contribute to a reactor trip but did not contribute to the likelihood that mitigation equipment or functions would not be available. This finding involved the cross-cutting area of human performance, the component of the work practices, and the aspect of personnel use human error prevention techniques commensurate with risk for the assigned task, H.4(a), because a licensee technicians failure to use proper human error prevention techniques resulted in a partial loss of offsite power on both units. |
| Site: | North Anna  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000338/2010002 Section 4OA3 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2010 (2010Q1) |
| Type: | Finding: Green |
| cornerstone | Initiating Events |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71153 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | R Clagg M Meeks G Laska J Reece |
| CCA | H.12, Avoid Complacency |
| INPO aspect | QA.4 |
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Finding - North Anna - IR 05000338/2010002 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (North Anna) @ 2010Q1
Self-Identified List (North Anna)
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