Letter Sequence Request |
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Initiation
- Request, Request, Request, Request, Request, Request, Request, Request, Request, Request
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MONTHYEARLR-N13-0205, Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding the Seismic Aspects of Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident-Base Case Velocity.2013-09-10010 September 2013 Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding the Seismic Aspects of Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident-Base Case Velocity. Project stage: Response to RAI 0CAN091301, Response to NRC Request for Information (RFI) Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding the Seismic Aspects of Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force (NTTF) Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi2013-09-12012 September 2013 Response to NRC Request for Information (RFI) Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding the Seismic Aspects of Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force (NTTF) Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Project stage: Response to RAI LR-N14-0042, SL-012270, Revision 0, Salem Generating Station Flood Hazard Reevaluation, Page 2-35 Through Page 2-552014-03-12012 March 2014 SL-012270, Revision 0, Salem Generating Station Flood Hazard Reevaluation, Page 2-35 Through Page 2-55 Project stage: Request 05000285/LER-2014-002, Regarding Reactor Manual Trip Due to Control Rod Misalignment2014-03-12012 March 2014 Regarding Reactor Manual Trip Due to Control Rod Misalignment Project stage: Request ML14079A4232014-03-12012 March 2014 Enclosure 1, Byron Nuclear Generating Station, Flood Hazard Reevaluation Report, Revision 0 Project stage: Request LR-N14-0051, PSEG Nuclear LLCs Seismic Hazard and Screening Report (CEUS Sites) Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima2014-03-28028 March 2014 PSEG Nuclear LLCs Seismic Hazard and Screening Report (CEUS Sites) Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Project stage: Response to RAI 0CAN031404, ANO, Units 1 & 2 - Seismic Hazard and Screening Report (CEUS Sites), Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force (Nttf)Review of Insights from the Fukushima2014-03-28028 March 2014 ANO, Units 1 & 2 - Seismic Hazard and Screening Report (CEUS Sites), Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force (Nttf)Review of Insights from the Fukushima Da Project stage: Response to RAI ML14092A4172014-03-31031 March 2014 Response to March 12, 2012 Information Request Seismic Hazard and Screening Report (CEUS Sites) for Recommendation 2.1 Project stage: Request 05000336/LER-2014-001, Regarding Completion of Plant Shutdown Required by Technical Specifications2014-03-31031 March 2014 Regarding Completion of Plant Shutdown Required by Technical Specifications Project stage: Request RS-14-065, Seismic Hazard and Screening Report (Central and Eastern United States (CEUS) Sites), Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the2014-03-31031 March 2014 Seismic Hazard and Screening Report (Central and Eastern United States (CEUS) Sites), Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Project stage: Response to RAI LIC-14-0047, Omaha Public Power District - Seismic Hazard and Screening Report (CEUS Sites), Response NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushi2014-03-31031 March 2014 Omaha Public Power District - Seismic Hazard and Screening Report (CEUS Sites), Response NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Project stage: Request 05000336/LER-2014-005, Regarding Train a Containment Spray Inoperable Due to Gas Voids2014-07-16016 July 2014 Regarding Train a Containment Spray Inoperable Due to Gas Voids Project stage: Request ML14204A6202014-07-21021 July 2014 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Seismic Hazard and Screening Report for Seismic Recommendation 2.1 Project stage: Response to RAI NL-14-099, Request for Review of Entergy Seismic Hazard and Screening Report (CEUS Sites), Response NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights.2014-08-18018 August 2014 Request for Review of Entergy Seismic Hazard and Screening Report (CEUS Sites), Response NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights. Project stage: Request 0CAN081401, Response to Request for Additional Information (RAI) Associated with Near-Term Task Force (NTTF) Recommendation 2.1, Seismic Hazard and Screening Report2014-08-21021 August 2014 Response to Request for Additional Information (RAI) Associated with Near-Term Task Force (NTTF) Recommendation 2.1, Seismic Hazard and Screening Report Project stage: Response to RAI PLA-7224, Response to March 12, 2012 Information Request - Supplemental Information Related to the Seismic Hazard and Screening Report for Recommendation 2.1 - PLA-72242014-08-28028 August 2014 Response to March 12, 2012 Information Request - Supplemental Information Related to the Seismic Hazard and Screening Report for Recommendation 2.1 - PLA-7224 Project stage: Request RS-14-206, Third Six-Month Status Report in Response to March 12, 2012 Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events (Order Number EA-12-049)2014-08-28028 August 2014 Third Six-Month Status Report in Response to March 12, 2012 Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events (Order Number EA-12-049) Project stage: Other RS-14-230, Supplemental Information Related to the Seismic Hazard and Screening Report in Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2, 1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review Of.2014-08-29029 August 2014 Supplemental Information Related to the Seismic Hazard and Screening Report in Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2, 1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review Of. Project stage: Supplement LIC-14-0124, Supplemental Information Related to Seismic Hazard and Screening Report in Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from The.2014-10-22022 October 2014 Supplemental Information Related to Seismic Hazard and Screening Report in Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from The. Project stage: Supplement 0CAN111401, Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding the Seismic Aspects of Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident2014-11-0404 November 2014 Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding the Seismic Aspects of Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident Project stage: Other NL-14-139, Additional Information Regarding the Request for Review of Entergy Seismic Hazard and Screening Report (CEUS Sites), Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident2014-11-0505 November 2014 Additional Information Regarding the Request for Review of Entergy Seismic Hazard and Screening Report (CEUS Sites), Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident Project stage: Request ML14310A0222014-11-13013 November 2014 Report Regarding Individual Plant Examination of External Events Supporting Information for Seismic Screening Project stage: Other ML14246A4282014-11-21021 November 2014 Screening and Prioritization Results Regarding Seismic Hazard Reevaluations for Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-Ichi Accident Based on Individual Plant Examination of External Events Project stage: Approval ML14310A0332014-12-15015 December 2014 NRC Response to Licensees Notification of Revised Regulatory Commitments Associated with Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Revie Project stage: RAI ML15096A3402015-05-0707 May 2015 Staff Assessment of Information Provided Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations for Recommendation 2.1, Seismic, of the NTTF Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-Ichi Accident Project stage: Approval ML15328A2682015-12-15015 December 2015 Staff Assessment of Information Provided Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations Part 50, Section 50.54(f) Seismic Hazard Reevaluations for Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review Project stage: Other ML15344A1092015-12-15015 December 2015 Staff Assessment of Information Provided Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations Part 50, Section 50.54(f) Seismic Hazard Reevaluations for Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Project stage: Other ML17123A3782016-04-27027 April 2016 Reevaluated Seismic Hazard Mitigating Strategies Assessment Report Project stage: Other ML16365A0322016-12-21021 December 2016 Response to March 12, 2012 Information Request, Spent Fuel Pool Seismic Evaluation for Recommendation 2.1 Project stage: Other 0CAN121602, Mitigating Strategies Assessment (MSA) Report for the New Seismic Hazard Information Per Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 12-06, Appendix H, Revision 2, H.4.3 Path 32016-12-30030 December 2016 Mitigating Strategies Assessment (MSA) Report for the New Seismic Hazard Information Per Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 12-06, Appendix H, Revision 2, H.4.3 Path 3 Project stage: Other 2014-03-31
[Table View] |
LER-2014-005, Regarding Train a Containment Spray Inoperable Due to Gas Voids |
| Event date: |
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| Report date: |
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| Reporting criterion: |
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function |
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| 3362014005R00 - NRC Website |
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text
'Dominion Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc.
Rope Ferry Rd., Warerford, CT 06385
'Mailing Address: VO. Box 128
\\Vaterford, CT 06385 dora.com JUL 1 6 2014 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 Serial No.
MPS Lic/LES Docket No.
License No.14-331 RO 50-336 DPR-65 DOMINION NUCLEAR CONNECTICUT, INC.
MILLSTONE POWER STATION UNIT 2 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 2014-005-00 TRAIN A CONTAINMENT SPRAY INOPERABLE DUE TO GAS VOIDS This letter forwards Licensee Event Report (LER) 2014-005-00 documenting a condition discovered at Millstone Power Station Unit 2 on May 17, 2014. This LER is being submitted pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) as any operation or condition which was prohibited by the plant's technical specifications.
If you have any questions or require additional information, please contact Mr. William D. Bartron at (860) 444-4301.
Sincerely, Matt Adams Plant Manager - Millstone Attachments: 1 Commitments made in this letter: None AJ
Serial No.14-331 Docket No. 50-336 Licensee Event Report 2014-005-00 Page 2 of 2 cc:
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region I 2100 Renaissance Blvd, Suite 100 King of Prussia, PA 19406-2713 M. C Thadani Sr. Project Manager - Millstone Power Station U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission One White Flint North 11555 Rockville Pike Mail Stop 08 B1 Rockville, MD 20852-2738 NRC Senior Resident Inspector Millstone Power Station
Serial No.14-331 Docket No. 50-336 Licensee Event Report 2014-005-00 ATTACHMENT LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 2014-005-00 TRAIN A CONTAINMENT SPRAY INOPERABLE DUE TO GAS VOIDS MILLSTONE POWER STATION UNIT 2 DOMINION NUCLEAR CONNECTICUT, INC.
NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 01/31/2017 (02-2014)
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Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours9.259259e-4 days <br />0.0222 hours <br />1.322751e-4 weeks <br />3.044e-5 months <br />.
Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry.
cci )
,Send comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA, Privacy and Information Collections
.. IE EV NT RBranch (T-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by LICENSEE EVENTi REPORT (LER internet e-mail to Infocollects.Resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and (See Page 2 for required number of Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC sfor each block) 20503. It a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB digits/characters fcontrol number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.
- 3. PAGE Millstone Power Station-Unit 2 05000336 1 OF 3
- 4. TITLE Train "A" Containment Spray Inoperable Due to Gas Voids
- 5. EVENT DATE
- 6. LER NUMBER
- 7. REPORT DATE
- 8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED MNH DY YA YER SQETA RE MOT DA YER FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER YEAR NUMBER NO.
DAY YEAR 05000 FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER
- - 2014 005 00 07 16 2014 05000
- 9. OPERATING MODE
- 11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check all that apply)
[1 20.2201(b)
LI 20.2203(a)(3)(i)
LI 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)
LI 50.73(a)(2)(vii) 3 F 20.2201(d)
E] 20.2203(a)(3)(ii)
LI 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)
LI 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 3 El 20.2203(a)(1)
LI 20.2203(a)(4)
LI 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)
LI 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)
[]
20.2203(a)(2)(i)
LI 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A)
[1 50.73(a)(2)(iii)
LI 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)
- 10. POWER LEVEL LI 20.2203(a)(2)(ii)
[1 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A)
LI 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)
L] 50.73(a)(2)(x)
LI 20.2203(a)(2)(iii)
LI 50.36(c)(2)
LI 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)
LI 73.71(a)(4)
LI 20.2203(a)(2)(iv)
LI 50.46(a)(3)(ii)
[1 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)
LI 73.71(a)(5) 000 00 20.2203(a)(2)(v)
L] 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)
LI 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)
LI OTHER LI 20.2203(a)(2)(vi)
[
50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)
[]
50.73(a)(2)(v)(D) specifyin Abstrmct heloworin
_____________________________________________________________________________NRC___FoNRCForm66A
- 12. LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER LICENSEE CONTACT TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)
William D. Bartron, Supervisor Nuclear Station Licensing 1 860-444-4301CSYTM CMOET MANU-REPORTABLE CAS SYTE MA EPRAL CPE FACTURER TO EPIX
CAUSE
SY COMPONENT FACTURER TO EPIX
- 14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED
- 15. EXPECTED MONTH DAY I
YEAR SUBMISSION LI YES (If yes, complete 15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)
Z NO DATE ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines)
At 1933 on May 16, 2014 while in MODE 3, Millstone Power Station Unit 2 (MPS2) exceeded the Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) of plant Technical Specification (TS) 3.6.2.1 'Containment Spray System' Action a.1 for an inoperable containment spray pump. The 'A' containment spray (CS) pump was declared inoperable at 0018 on May 17, 2014, the date of discovery, following completion of surveillance testing to determine the presence of gas voids.
However, the gas was introduced earlier during the refueling outage and the TS LCO went into effect upon first entry into MODE 3 greater than 1750 psia on May 13, 2014, at 1933. TS 3.6.2.1 Action a.1 requires that the pump be restored to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and reduce pressurizer pressure to less than 1750 psia within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />. MPS2 had been in a MODE where the CS system was required to be OPERABLE for 70.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> prior to completion of the testing. The gases were successfully removed by venting and the system was restored to OPERABLE status at 1221 on May 17, 2014.
This condition is being reported as any operation or condition which was prohibited by the plant's technical specifications in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(i)(B). The condition was caused by not adequately venting the CS system and delays in communicating the surveillance results, combined with a need to schedule performance of the surveillance testing earlier in a refueling outage. Corrective actions planned will improve scheduling of the testing and will result in more timely communications of the results from completed testing.
NRC FORM 366 (02-2014)
1. EVENT DESCRIPTION
At 1933 on May 16, 2014 while in MODE 3, Millstone Power Station Unit 2 (MPS2) exceeded the Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) of plant Technical Specification (TS) 3.6.2.1 "Containment Spray System" Action a.1 for an inoperable containment spray pump. The 'A' containment spray (CS) pump was declared inoperable at 0018 on May 17, 2014, the date of discovery, following completion of surveillance testing to determine the presence of gas voids. However, the gas found was introduced earlier during the refueling outage. The TS LCO went into effect upon entry into MODE 3 greater than 1750 psia on May 13, 2014, at 1933. TS 3.6.2.1 Action a.1 requires that the pump be restored to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and reduce pressurizer pressure to less than 1750 psia within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
MPS2 had been in a MODE where the CS system was required to be OPERABLE for approximately 70.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> prior to completion of the testing. The gases were successfully removed by venting and the system was restored to OPERABLE status at 1221 on May 17, 2014, 88 hours0.00102 days <br />0.0244 hours <br />1.455026e-4 weeks <br />3.3484e-5 months <br /> after entering an applicable MODE for TS 3.6.2.1.
This condition is being reported as any operation or condition which was prohibited by the plant's technical specifications in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(i)(B).
- 2.
CAUSE
Exceeding the LCO time limit while removing gases was due to not adequately venting the CS system following maintenance performed during the outage and delays in communicating the surveillance results to Operations, combined with a need to schedule performance of the surveillance testing earlier in a refueling outage.
- 3.
ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY CONSEQUENCES
The containment spray (CS) system is composed of two redundant independent trains. The CS system in conjunction with the containment air recirculation and cooling system provides sufficient heat removal capability to limit the post-accident containment pressure and structural temperature below the design values.
The safety consequences of this condition was determined to be low. The "A" Train of the CS system was considered to be unavailable because the amount of gas found during the ultrasonic testing exceeded engineering guidance for system operability. The "B" Train of the CS system was confirmed to be free of voids, and remained available to perform the safety function, if needed. In addition, both trains of containment air recirculation and cooling systems were available during the period to perform the safety function, if necessary. The period of unavailability of the "A" Train of the containment spray system was of short duration, approximately 88 hours0.00102 days <br />0.0244 hours <br />1.455026e-4 weeks <br />3.3484e-5 months <br />, and occurred during MODE 3, while the plant was shutdown.
- 4.
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Corrective actions planned will improve scheduling of system testing for gas voids after outages, and will result in more timely communications of the results from completed testing to Operations.
- 4.
CORRECTIVE ACTION (Continued)
Additional corrective actions are being taken in accordance with the station's corrective action program.
- 5.
PREVIOUS OCCURRENCES
There have been no previous occurrences.
- 6. Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes Containment Spray System - BE Pump-P
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| | | Reporting criterion |
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| 05000336/LER-2014-001, Regarding Completion of Plant Shutdown Required by Technical Specifications | Regarding Completion of Plant Shutdown Required by Technical Specifications | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) | | 05000423/LER-2014-001, Limiting Condition for Operation Exceeded Upon Approval of Enforcement Discretion | Limiting Condition for Operation Exceeded Upon Approval of Enforcement Discretion | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000423/LER-2014-002, Regarding DC Circuit Hot Shorts | Regarding DC Circuit Hot Shorts | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000336/LER-2014-002, 2 Regarding DC Circuit Hot Shorts | 2 Regarding DC Circuit Hot Shorts | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000423/LER-2014-003, Regarding Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Operability Impacted by Incorrect Bearing | Regarding Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Operability Impacted by Incorrect Bearing | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000336/LER-2014-003, Regarding Loss of Safety Function Due to Inoperable Enclosure Building | Regarding Loss of Safety Function Due to Inoperable Enclosure Building | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000423/LER-2014-004, Regarding Unlatched Dual Train HELB Door Results in Potential Loss of Safety Function | Regarding Unlatched Dual Train HELB Door Results in Potential Loss of Safety Function | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000336/LER-2014-004, Regarding Foreign Material Found in a Motor Lead Rendered a Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Inoperable | Regarding Foreign Material Found in a Motor Lead Rendered a Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Inoperable | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000336/LER-2014-005, Regarding Train a Containment Spray Inoperable Due to Gas Voids | Regarding Train a Containment Spray Inoperable Due to Gas Voids | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000336/LER-2014-006, Regarding Millstone Power Station Dual Unit Reactor Trip on Loss of Offsite Power | Regarding Millstone Power Station Dual Unit Reactor Trip on Loss of Offsite Power | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B)(1) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000336/LER-2014-007, Regarding Completion of Plant Shutdown Required by Technical Specifications | Regarding Completion of Plant Shutdown Required by Technical Specifications | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) |
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