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MONTHYEARLR-N13-0205, Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding the Seismic Aspects of Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident-Base Case Velocity.2013-09-10010 September 2013 Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding the Seismic Aspects of Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident-Base Case Velocity. Project stage: Response to RAI 0CAN091301, Response to NRC Request for Information (RFI) Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding the Seismic Aspects of Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force (NTTF) Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi2013-09-12012 September 2013 Response to NRC Request for Information (RFI) Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding the Seismic Aspects of Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force (NTTF) Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Project stage: Response to RAI LR-N14-0042, SL-012270, Revision 0, Salem Generating Station Flood Hazard Reevaluation, Page 2-35 Through Page 2-552014-03-12012 March 2014 SL-012270, Revision 0, Salem Generating Station Flood Hazard Reevaluation, Page 2-35 Through Page 2-55 Project stage: Request 05000285/LER-2014-002, Regarding Reactor Manual Trip Due to Control Rod Misalignment2014-03-12012 March 2014 Regarding Reactor Manual Trip Due to Control Rod Misalignment Project stage: Request ML14079A4232014-03-12012 March 2014 Enclosure 1, Byron Nuclear Generating Station, Flood Hazard Reevaluation Report, Revision 0 Project stage: Request LR-N14-0051, PSEG Nuclear LLCs Seismic Hazard and Screening Report (CEUS Sites) Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima2014-03-28028 March 2014 PSEG Nuclear LLCs Seismic Hazard and Screening Report (CEUS Sites) Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Project stage: Response to RAI 0CAN031404, ANO, Units 1 & 2 - Seismic Hazard and Screening Report (CEUS Sites), Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force (Nttf)Review of Insights from the Fukushima2014-03-28028 March 2014 ANO, Units 1 & 2 - Seismic Hazard and Screening Report (CEUS Sites), Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force (Nttf)Review of Insights from the Fukushima Da Project stage: Response to RAI ML14092A4172014-03-31031 March 2014 Response to March 12, 2012 Information Request Seismic Hazard and Screening Report (CEUS Sites) for Recommendation 2.1 Project stage: Request 05000336/LER-2014-001, Regarding Completion of Plant Shutdown Required by Technical Specifications2014-03-31031 March 2014 Regarding Completion of Plant Shutdown Required by Technical Specifications Project stage: Request RS-14-065, Seismic Hazard and Screening Report (Central and Eastern United States (CEUS) Sites), Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the2014-03-31031 March 2014 Seismic Hazard and Screening Report (Central and Eastern United States (CEUS) Sites), Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Project stage: Response to RAI LIC-14-0047, Omaha Public Power District - Seismic Hazard and Screening Report (CEUS Sites), Response NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushi2014-03-31031 March 2014 Omaha Public Power District - Seismic Hazard and Screening Report (CEUS Sites), Response NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Project stage: Request 05000336/LER-2014-005, Regarding Train a Containment Spray Inoperable Due to Gas Voids2014-07-16016 July 2014 Regarding Train a Containment Spray Inoperable Due to Gas Voids Project stage: Request ML14204A6202014-07-21021 July 2014 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Seismic Hazard and Screening Report for Seismic Recommendation 2.1 Project stage: Response to RAI NL-14-099, Request for Review of Entergy Seismic Hazard and Screening Report (CEUS Sites), Response NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights.2014-08-18018 August 2014 Request for Review of Entergy Seismic Hazard and Screening Report (CEUS Sites), Response NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights. Project stage: Request 0CAN081401, Response to Request for Additional Information (RAI) Associated with Near-Term Task Force (NTTF) Recommendation 2.1, Seismic Hazard and Screening Report2014-08-21021 August 2014 Response to Request for Additional Information (RAI) Associated with Near-Term Task Force (NTTF) Recommendation 2.1, Seismic Hazard and Screening Report Project stage: Response to RAI PLA-7224, Response to March 12, 2012 Information Request - Supplemental Information Related to the Seismic Hazard and Screening Report for Recommendation 2.1 - PLA-72242014-08-28028 August 2014 Response to March 12, 2012 Information Request - Supplemental Information Related to the Seismic Hazard and Screening Report for Recommendation 2.1 - PLA-7224 Project stage: Request RS-14-206, Third Six-Month Status Report in Response to March 12, 2012 Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events (Order Number EA-12-049)2014-08-28028 August 2014 Third Six-Month Status Report in Response to March 12, 2012 Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events (Order Number EA-12-049) Project stage: Other RS-14-230, Supplemental Information Related to the Seismic Hazard and Screening Report in Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2, 1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review Of.2014-08-29029 August 2014 Supplemental Information Related to the Seismic Hazard and Screening Report in Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2, 1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review Of. Project stage: Supplement LIC-14-0124, Supplemental Information Related to Seismic Hazard and Screening Report in Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from The.2014-10-22022 October 2014 Supplemental Information Related to Seismic Hazard and Screening Report in Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from The. Project stage: Supplement 0CAN111401, Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding the Seismic Aspects of Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident2014-11-0404 November 2014 Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding the Seismic Aspects of Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident Project stage: Other NL-14-139, Additional Information Regarding the Request for Review of Entergy Seismic Hazard and Screening Report (CEUS Sites), Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident2014-11-0505 November 2014 Additional Information Regarding the Request for Review of Entergy Seismic Hazard and Screening Report (CEUS Sites), Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident Project stage: Request ML14310A0222014-11-13013 November 2014 Report Regarding Individual Plant Examination of External Events Supporting Information for Seismic Screening Project stage: Other ML14246A4282014-11-21021 November 2014 Screening and Prioritization Results Regarding Seismic Hazard Reevaluations for Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-Ichi Accident Based on Individual Plant Examination of External Events Project stage: Approval ML14310A0332014-12-15015 December 2014 NRC Response to Licensees Notification of Revised Regulatory Commitments Associated with Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Revie Project stage: RAI ML15328A2682015-12-15015 December 2015 Staff Assessment of Information Provided Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations Part 50, Section 50.54(f) Seismic Hazard Reevaluations for Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review Project stage: Other ML17123A3782016-04-27027 April 2016 Reevaluated Seismic Hazard Mitigating Strategies Assessment Report Project stage: Other ML16365A0322016-12-21021 December 2016 Response to March 12, 2012 Information Request, Spent Fuel Pool Seismic Evaluation for Recommendation 2.1 Project stage: Other 2014-03-28
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4Domi nioni Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc.
Rope Ferry Rd., Waterford, CT 06385 Mailing Address: P.O. Box 128 Waterford, CT 06385 dora.corn MAR 3 12014 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 Serial No.
MPS Lic/GJC Docket No.
License No.14-143 RO 50-336 DPR-65 DOMINION NUCLEAR CONNECTICUT. INC.
MILLSTONE POWER STATION UNIT 2 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 2014-001-00 COMPLETION OF PLANT SHUTDOWN REQUIRED BY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS This letter forwards Licensee Event Report (LER) 2014-001-00 documenting an event at Millstone Power Station Unit 2 on January 31, 2014. This LER is being submitted pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A).
If you have any questions or require additional information, please contact Mr. William D. Bartron at (860) 444-4301.
Sincerely,
/Steph 4 E. Scac~e Site Vice President - Millstone Attachments: 1 Commitments made in this letter: None
Serial No.14-143 Docket No. 50-336 Licensee Event Report 2014-001 -00 Page 2 of 2 cc:
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region I 2100 Renaissance Blvd, Suite 100 King of Prussia, PA 19406-2713 M. C. Thadani NRC Project Manager Millstone Units 2 and 3 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission One White Flint North Mail Stop 08 B-1 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852-2738 NRC Senior Resident Inspector Millstone Power Station
Serial No.14-143 Docket No. 50-336 Licensee Event Report 2014-001 -00 ATTACHMENT LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 2014-001-00 COMPLETION OF PLANT SHUTDOWN REQUIRED BY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS MILLSTONE POWER STATION UNIT 2 DOMINION NUCLEAR CONNECTICUT, INC.
NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 01/31/2017 102-20141
,,02'2014 Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours9.259259e-4 days <br />0.0222 hours <br />1.322751e-4 weeks <br />3.044e-5 months <br />.
Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry.
Send comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA, Privacy and Information Collections Branch (T-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by intemet e-mail to Infocollects.Resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and (See Page 2 for required number of Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB digits/characters for each block) control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.
- 3. PAGE Millstone Power Station Unit 2 05000336 1 OF 3
- 4. TITLE Completion of Plant Shutdown Required By Technical Specifications
- 5. EVENT DATE
- 6. LER NUMBER
- 7. REPORT DATE
- 8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR SEQUENTIAL REV MONTH DAY YEAR 05000 NUMBER NO.
FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 01 31 2014 2014-001 00 03 31 2014 05000
- 9. OPERATING MODE
- 11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check all that apply)
E 20.2201(b)
El 20.2203(a)(3)(i)
Z 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)
E 50.73(a)(2)(vii) 3 20.2201(d)
E 20.2203(a)(3)(ii)
L 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)
E 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)
[] 20.2203(a)(1)
[]
20.2203(a)(4)
[]
50.73(a)(2)(ii)(g)
[]
50.73(a)(2)(viii)(a)
D 20.2203(a)(2)(i)
LI 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A)
LI 50.73(a)(2)(iii)
E 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)
- 10. POWER LEVEL
[
20.2203(a)(2)(ii)
LI 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A)
El 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)
LI 50.73(a)(2)(x)
LI 20.2203(a)(2)(iii)
LI 50.36(c)(2)
LI 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)
El 73.71(a)(4) 00 20.2203(a)(2)(iv)
LI 50.46(a)(3)(ii)
E 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)
LI 73.71(a)(5) 0L 20.2203(a)(2)(v)
[
50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)
LI 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)
OTHER El 20.2203(a)(2)(vi)
LI 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)
LI 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)
Specify in Abstract below or in
1. EVENT DESCRIPTION
On January 30, 2014 at 2313, with Millstone Power Station Unit 2 (MPS2) in MODE 1 and at 100%
reactor power, the circuit breaker for the group 1 pressurizer proportional heaters tripped. With the
'B' emergency diesel generator (EDG) out of service for its maintenance outage and therefore inoperable, Technical Specification Action Statement (TSAS) 3.4.4 action b was entered. TSAS 3.4.4 action b requires MPS2 be in at least HOT STANDBY (MODE 3) with the reactor trip breakers open within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in HOT SHUTDOWN (MODE 4) within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, unless one group of proportional heaters is restored to operable status. MPS2 completed the shutdown to MODE 3 at 0457 and restored the group 1 proportional heaters to operable status at 0747 on January 31, 2014. The initiation of the shutdown was reported to the NRC (event number 49779) pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i) - The initiation of any nuclear plant shutdown required by the plant's technical specifications.
This condition is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A) - The completion of any nuclear plant shutdown required by the plant's technical specifications.
Background Information
The pressurizer heaters are single unit, direct immersion heaters which protrude vertically into the pressurizer through sleeves welded in the lower head. Each heater is internally restrained from high amplitude vibrations and can be individually removed for maintenance during plant shutdown.
Approximately 20 percent of the heaters are connected to proportional controllers which adjust the heat input as required to account for steady state losses and to maintain the desired steam pressure in the pressurizer. These heaters are separated into two banks (approximately 160 kW each) and are provided with diverse vital power.
The pressurizer TS limiting condition for operation 3.4.4 states:
The pressurizer shall be OPERABLE with:
a. Pressurizer water level < 70%, and b. At least two groups of pressurizer heaters each having a capacity of at least 130 kW, APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2 and 3.
ACTION:
a. With only one group of pressurizer heaters OPERABLE, restore at least two groups to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
b. With the pressurizer otherwise inoperable, be in at least HOT STANDBY with the reactor trip breakers open within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
2. CAUSE
The direct cause of the need to shutdown the unit was the failure of the group 1 proportional pressurizer heaters concurrent with the 'B' EDG being out of service for planned maintenance.
3. ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY CONSEQUENCES
Reactor Coolant system (RCS) pressure control is maintained by pressurizer heaters and the pressurizer spray system. Although the 'B' EDG was out service for planned maintenance, MPS2 was in a normal electrical configuration, therefore one bank of proportional pressurizer heaters was functional (i.e., powered from the offsite power system). Additionally, the pressurizer spray system was not affected, therefore RCS pressure control was always functional. There was no indication of any primary to secondary leakage. There was no release of radioactive material. All safety related systems performed as designed.
4. CORRECTIVE ACTION
Troubleshooting activities determined one of the group 1 proportional heaters (P1-B1) had failed.
The P1 -B1 heater leads were subsequently lifted to remove the failed heater from service.
Following this maintenance activity, a pressurizer heater capacity test was performed and verified the group 1 proportional heaters had a capacity of at least 130KW as required by TS 3.4.4 b. The group 1 proportional heaters and the pressurizer were declared operable and MPS2 was subsequently returned to service. Additional corrective actions are being taken in accordance with the station's corrective action program.
5. PREVIOUS OCCURRENCES
None
- 6. Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes Electric Resistance Heater - EHTR Pressurizer - PZR Reactor Coolant System - AB Emergency Diesel Generator - DG Door-DR
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| 05000336/LER-2014-001, Regarding Completion of Plant Shutdown Required by Technical Specifications | Regarding Completion of Plant Shutdown Required by Technical Specifications | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) | | 05000423/LER-2014-001, Limiting Condition for Operation Exceeded Upon Approval of Enforcement Discretion | Limiting Condition for Operation Exceeded Upon Approval of Enforcement Discretion | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000423/LER-2014-002, Regarding DC Circuit Hot Shorts | Regarding DC Circuit Hot Shorts | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000336/LER-2014-002, 2 Regarding DC Circuit Hot Shorts | 2 Regarding DC Circuit Hot Shorts | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000423/LER-2014-003, Regarding Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Operability Impacted by Incorrect Bearing | Regarding Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Operability Impacted by Incorrect Bearing | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000336/LER-2014-003, Regarding Loss of Safety Function Due to Inoperable Enclosure Building | Regarding Loss of Safety Function Due to Inoperable Enclosure Building | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000423/LER-2014-004, Regarding Unlatched Dual Train HELB Door Results in Potential Loss of Safety Function | Regarding Unlatched Dual Train HELB Door Results in Potential Loss of Safety Function | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000336/LER-2014-004, Regarding Foreign Material Found in a Motor Lead Rendered a Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Inoperable | Regarding Foreign Material Found in a Motor Lead Rendered a Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Inoperable | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000336/LER-2014-005, Regarding Train a Containment Spray Inoperable Due to Gas Voids | Regarding Train a Containment Spray Inoperable Due to Gas Voids | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000336/LER-2014-006, Regarding Millstone Power Station Dual Unit Reactor Trip on Loss of Offsite Power | Regarding Millstone Power Station Dual Unit Reactor Trip on Loss of Offsite Power | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B)(1) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000336/LER-2014-007, Regarding Completion of Plant Shutdown Required by Technical Specifications | Regarding Completion of Plant Shutdown Required by Technical Specifications | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) |
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