Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Licensee-Identified Violation |
| Description | On July 5, 2011, a licensee-identified violation of Unit 2 TS 3.4.3 was discovered. TS section 3.4.3 requires 10 of 11 safety relief valves (SRVs) to be operable during Mode 1, 2, and 3. Contrary to this requirement it was identified during bench testing that eight safety relief valves failed to lift at the required technical specification setpoint, and therefore where inoperable when Unit 2 was in Mode 1, 2, and 3. The cause for the SRVs failing to lift within the required setpoint was due to corrosion induced bonding between the pilot disc and seating surface. This condition was documented in CR 334250. Analysis showed that with the SRVs lifting at the as-found bench test setpoints the SRVs still would have maintained reactor coolant system pressure below the TS safety limit requirements. Therefore, this finding was determined to be of very low safety significance |
| Site: | Hatch  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000321/2011005 Section 4OA7 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2011 (2011Q4) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Licensee-identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | |
| Inspectors (proximate) | L Dymek M Bates R Carrion D Hardage E Morris J Hickey J Montgomery |
| INPO aspect | |
| ' | |
Finding - Hatch - IR 05000321/2011005 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Finding List (Hatch) @ 2011Q4
Self-Identified List (Hatch)
| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||