05000313/FIN-2012003-03
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Finding | |
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| Title | Licensee-Identified Violation |
| Description | Unit 2 Technical Specification 3.4.4 limited condition for operation action b states With the pressurizer inoperable due to an inoperable emergency power supply to the pressurizer heaters, either restore the inoperable emergency power supply as required by Technical Specification 3.8.1.1 action b.3 or be in at least hot shutdown (Mode 4) within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. Contrary to the above on August 23, 2010 after not being able to restore emergency diesel generator 2 to an operable status, Unit 2 was not in hot shutdown within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. Specifically, the licensee had completed a shutdown of Unit 2 based upon compliance with Technical Specification 3.8.1.1 action b.3 requiring the unit to be in hot standby within six hours (Mode 3) and be in cold shutdown (Mode 5) within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br /> after not being able to restore emergency diesel generator 2 to an operable status but failed to recognize the need to be in hot shutdown (Mode 4) within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> as required by Technical Specification 3.4.4 action b. The unit was in hot shutdown (Mode 4) in 18 hours2.083333e-4 days <br />0.005 hours <br />2.97619e-5 weeks <br />6.849e-6 months <br /> and 18 minutes. The performance deficiency of not complying with the limited condition for operation was more than minor because it was associated with the equipment performance attribute and adversely affected the Mitigating System Cornerstone objective to ensure availability, reliability, and capability to respond to initiating events to prevent adverse consequences. Using Manual Chapter 0609, Attachment 0609.04, Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, the finding required additional analysis because with emergency diesel generator 2 inoperable the associated pressurizer heaters were unavailable representing an actual loss of safety function of a single train for greater than its technical specification allowed outage time. The resident inspectors received support from the regional senior reactor analyst who performed a phase 3 analysis that determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green). The issue was placed into the corrective action program as Condition Report CR-ANO-2-2010-1830. |
| Site: | Arkansas Nuclear  |
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| Report | IR 05000313/2012003 Section 4OA7 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2012 (2012Q2) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Licensee-identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | |
| Inspectors (proximate) | A Sanchez D Allen G Guerra J Josey J Rotton P Elkmann R Kumana W Schaup |
| INPO aspect | |
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Finding - Arkansas Nuclear - IR 05000313/2012003 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Arkansas Nuclear) @ 2012Q2
Self-Identified List (Arkansas Nuclear)
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