05000313/FIN-2011005-05
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Finding | |
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| Title | Failure to Take Adequate Corrective Actions for Known Fuel Transfer System Deficiencies |
| Description | The inspectors documented a self-revealing finding for the failure to take adequate corrective actions for known deficiencies associated with the Unit 1 fuel transfer system. Specifically, the licensee failed to investigate and correct issues that had been identified by site and vendor personnel from 1996 through 2010. This led to repeated fuel transfer system failures and significant core offload and reload delays during the 1R23 refueling outage, which placed the plant in an unplanned configuration for an extended period of time. After the failure of the fuel transfer equipment, multiple corrective actions were performed which included the installation of a temporary modification which allowed fuel movement to continue to support core reloading. The issue was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Condition Report CR-ANO-1-2011-2558. The failure of the licensee to take effective corrective action for known deficiencies related to the Unit 1 fuel transfer system is determined to be a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency is determined to be more than minor because, if left uncorrected, the performance deficiency could become a more safety significant issue. Specifically, the continued failure of the licensee to correct known deficiencies in the fuel transfer system could lead to damage to a fuel bundle. Using Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix G, Attachment 1, Checklist 4, PWR Refueling Operation: RCS Level >23, the finding was determined to have very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not adversely affect: 1) core heat removal, 2) inventory control, 3) electrical power, 4) containment control, or 5) reactivity control. The finding was determined to have a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance, associated with decision making component in that the licensee failed to use conservative assumptions and adopt a requirement to demonstrate that the proposed action is safe in order to proceed rather than a requirement to demonstrate that it is unsafe in order to disapprove the action. Specifically, the decision making efforts affecting the fuel transfer system did not reflect a safety minded culture as past experience and vendor recommendations were disregarded H.1(b) |
| Site: | Arkansas Nuclear  |
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| Report | IR 05000313/2011005 Section 1R20 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2011 (2011Q4) |
| Type: | Finding: Green |
| cornerstone | Barrier Integrity |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.2 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | A Sanchez D Allen G Guerra J Rotton M Williams R Kopriva W Schaup |
| CCA | H.14, Conservative Bias |
| INPO aspect | DM.2 |
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Finding - Arkansas Nuclear - IR 05000313/2011005 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Arkansas Nuclear) @ 2011Q4
Self-Identified List (Arkansas Nuclear)
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