05000313/FIN-2011005-06
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Finding | |
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| Title | Failure to Adequately Implement the Configuration Control Program |
| Description | The inspectors documented a self-revealing, non-cited violation of Unit 1 Technical Specification 5.4.1.a for the failure to implement station procedure OP-1015.049 Configuration Control Program, Revision 1. Specifically, on multiple occasions, station personnel failed to maintain configuration control through the use of valve line-ups and station procedures to ensure reactor plant components were in required positions. In each specific example the licensee took action to place the applicable system in a safe configuration. The licensee is implementing long term programmatic corrective actions. The licensee has placed that issue into their corrective action program as Condition Report CR-ANO-C-2011-2942. The failure of station personnel to maintain configuration control through the use of valve line-ups and governing station procedures is a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency is more than minor because it is associated with the configuration control attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affects the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences and is therefore a finding. Using Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, the examples included an actual loss of safety function of a non-technical specification train of equipment designated as risk-significant per 10CFR50.65, for greater than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. A Phase 3 significance determination analysis was performed by a Region IV senior reactor analyst. The dominant core damage sequences for Unit 1 were station blackouts with battery depletion and transients with loss of feedwater and feed and bleed capability. The dominant core damage sequences for Unit 2 were station blackout with loss of emergency feedwater and once-through-cooling, loss of 4160 volt vital bus 2A4 with loss of feedwater and once-through-cooling, and station blackout with an 8-hour battery depletion. Based on both units having the capability to operate a steam driven emergency feedwater pump during the dominate core damage sequences the finding was determined to have very low safety significance (Green). The finding was determined to have a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance, associated with the work practices component in that the licensee failed to define and effectively communicate expectations regarding procedural guidance and personnel follow procedures when performing component positioning H.4(b) |
| Site: | Arkansas Nuclear  |
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| Report | IR 05000313/2011005 Section 4OA2 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2011 (2011Q4) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71152 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | A Sanchez D Allen G Guerra J Rotton M Williams R Kopriva W Schaup |
| CCA | H.8, Procedure Adherence |
| INPO aspect | WP.4 |
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Finding - Arkansas Nuclear - IR 05000313/2011005 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Arkansas Nuclear) @ 2011Q4
Self-Identified List (Arkansas Nuclear)
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