05000313/FIN-2012003-01
From kanterella
Jump to navigation
Jump to search
Finding | |
---|---|
Title | Failure to Correct a Known Condition Adverse to Quality Associated with Inadequately Secured Splined Adaptors for Service Water Discharge Cross-Connect Valves |
Description | The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI for failure to take timely corrective action to correct a condition adverse to quality. Specifically, the licensee implemented a compensatory measure for four service water valves in early 2009 to ensure operability, but has not taken permanent corrective actions to correct the condition adverse to quality for two service water cross-connect valves. The licensee has currently scheduled corrective maintenance for the service water valves in September 2012 and the valves are currently operable. The licensee has placed the issue into their corrective action program as Condition Report CR-ANO-2-2012-1126. The inspectors determined that the failure to take timely corrective action to correct a condition adverse to quality is a performance deficiency. Specifically, the licensee failed to resolve the degraded condition associated with the splined adaptor for two service water cross-connect valves in the Unit 2 service water intake structure. The performance deficiency is more than minor because it is associated with the Mitigating System Cornerstone attribute of design control and adversely affects the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences and is therefore a finding. Using Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding: 1) is not a design or qualification deficiency confirmed not to result in an actual loss of operability or functionality, and did not: 2) represent a loss of system safety function, 3) represent an actual loss of safety function of a single train for greater than its technical specification allowed outage time, 4) represent an actual loss of safety function of one or more non-technical specification trains of equipment designated as risk-significant for greater than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, and 5) screen as potentially risk significant due to an external event. The finding was determined to have a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance, associated with work control component, in that the licensee failed to plan and coordinate work activities consistent with nuclear safety. Specifically, the licensee failed to adequately coordinate work activities to support long-term equipment reliability by limiting temporary modifications in that these temporary modifications have been installed for longer than three years (over two outages). |
Site: | Arkansas Nuclear ![]() |
---|---|
Report | IR 05000313/2012003 Section 1R15 |
Date counted | Jun 30, 2012 (2012Q2) |
Type: | NCV: Green |
cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
Identified by: | NRC identified |
Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.15 |
Inspectors (proximate) | A Sanchez D Allen G Guerra J Josey J Rotton P Elkmann R Kumana W Schaup |
CCA | H.5, Work Management |
INPO aspect | WP.1 |
' | |
Finding - Arkansas Nuclear - IR 05000313/2012003 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Finding List (Arkansas Nuclear) @ 2012Q2
Self-Identified List (Arkansas Nuclear)
| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||