05000311/FIN-2016002-04
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Licensee-Identified Violation |
| Description | TS LCO 3.3.2.1 requires the ESFAS instrumentation channels and interlocks shown in Table 3.3-3 shall be operable. Table 3.3-3, Function 8, requires two channels of AFW automatic actuation logic to be operable in Modes 1, 2, and 3. With the number of operable channels one less than the required number of channels, TS LCO 3.3.2.1 requires the inoperable channel to be restored to operable status within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> or, be in at least Hot Standby within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in at least Hot Shutdown within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />. Contrary to TS LCO 3.3.2.1, one less than the required number of channels of AFW automatic actuation logic were operable from April 20, 2015, until Unit 2 entered Mode 4 for a scheduled refueling outage on October 23, 2015. This was due to the 21 AFW pump loop time response being greater than the allowed TS value because the isolation valve for the pressure override defeat pressure transmitter was in the closed position. PSEG entered this issue into the CAP as NOTFs 20709417, 20716352, 20710947, and 20711796. This performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the human performance attribute of the Mitigating System cornerstone, and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the reliability and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The inspectors evaluated this finding using IMC 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process for Findings At-Power, Exhibit 2. The inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not represent an actual loss of function of at least a single train for greater than its TS allowed outage time. |
| Site: | Salem  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000311/2016002 Section 4OA7 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2016 (2016Q2) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Licensee-identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | |
| Inspectors (proximate) | A Ziedonis D Orr E Burket F Bower G Dipaolo J Kulp M Draxton M Modes P Finney R Nimitz R Vadella T O'Hara |
| Violation of: | Technical Specification |
| INPO aspect | |
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Finding - Salem - IR 05000311/2016002 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Salem) @ 2016Q2
Self-Identified List (Salem)
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