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- AUGUS1A, MAINE 04330 e (207) 0?2 4B68 January 28, 1993 MN-93-11 JRH-93-19 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Attention: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555
Reference:
(a)
License No. DPR-36 (Docket No. 50-309)
Subject: Maine ' Yankee Licensee Event Report 93-001, Inoperable Emergency Core Cooling Subsystems During Pump Recirculation Valve Stroke Testing-Gentlemen:
Please find enclosed Maine Yankee Licensee Event Report 93-001-00. This report-is submitted in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i).
Please contact us should you have questions regarding this matter.
Very truly yours, c
James R. Hebert, Manager-Licensing & Engineering Support Department JVW/ jag Enclosure c:-
Mr. Thomas T. Martin Mr. Charles S. Marschall L
Mr. E. H. Trottier Mr. Patrick J. Dostie 9302020255 930i21' [o
PDR ADOCK 05000309
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e NRC Form 306 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission (9 81)
Approved OMB No. 3150-0104 llc [NS(( [ VENT R[ PORT (LER)
Empirest 8/31/85 facility Name(l)
Docket Number (2)
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Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company
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WNnP LAJLF EMfRGf NCY CODE C00tlNG St*$YSTEMS DURING PLMP 9fCIDrVL ATION VALY[ STROKE Tf$ TING fvent Datef5) ifR NrterfM Report Date(7)
Other Facilitien involvedf 6)
Month Day Year Year Sequential Revision Month Day Year facility Names Docket NumberLs)
Number Number IIIIIi 11 2 31 1 9
7 91 3 01 01 1 01 0 01 1 Pl 1 91 3 iili11I lhis Report is Submitted Pursuant to the Requirements of 10 C6R 6
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Operating
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Mode 9) 7 20.402(b)
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50.73(a)(2)(ty) 13.11(b)
Power 20.405(a)(1)(1) 50.36(c)(1) 50.73(a)(2)(v) 73.?!(c)
Level 20.405(a)(1)(ti) 50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a)(2)(vil)
Other (Specify in (10) 1 0
0 20.405(a)(1)(111) & $0.73(a)(2)(1) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A), Abstract below 20.405(a)(1)(Iv) 50.73(a)(2)(11) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(8)
.and in Text, NRC P0 40$falfilfv) 50.73felf?)ftill 50.73f alf 21fx)
Form 306A) tlCf N$tt CONI AC1 FOR TH $ tfR (12' hAML Teleobone Number J[RRY MABEN NUCL[AR SAFETY [NGIN((R Area Code 21017 8
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[xpected Month Day Year sunclemental Report f voected ila Submission i
(if yes, complete Expected Date(15)
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Maine Yankee's Operating Experience Program requires that the industry operating plant experience reports be screened for applicability to Maine Yankee. On November 16, 1992 the review of a report concerning the temporary disabling of [mergency Core Cooling System ([CCS) subsystems during valve stroke testing resulted in the determination that the report was-potentially appliceble to Maine Yankee and it was forwarded to the Operations Department for formal evaluation. On December 2,1992 the Operations Department concluded that for a brief period of time, during the stroke testing of either of the nonnally open [CCS pump minimum-flow recirculation valves SIA-M-53 or SI A-M-54, both trains of the [CCS Low Pressure Safety injection and Containment Spray subsystems must be considered inoperable.
The minimum flow recirculation valves have historically been tested on a monthly basis in conjunction with the [CCS valve tests.
The root cause of this event is considered to be the failure of the original Technical Spectitcation Itcense submittal to allow for surveillance testing of the minimum-flow recirculation valves.
The surveillance is required by M,iine Yankee Techntwal Specifications. There are no exceptions in the LCO for [CCS that specifically allow this testing and recent interpretations concluded that this condition is reportable under 10CFR50.73, in order to minimite the period of time during which the minimum-flow recirculation line is -
isolated yet tested frequently enough to provide assurance of the valve's operability, Maine Yankee has changed the frequency of the valve stroke test from a monthly basis to a quarterly basis. Maine Yankee is also evaluating the possibility of submitting a proposed Technical Specification change which would grant an exception to the [CCS operability requirements -
for the stroke testing of SIA-M-53 and SIA-M-54 l'
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NRC form. MEA U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Connission (9 83)
Approved OMB No. 3150-0104
[ spires: 8/31/05 LICLhS(( fvENT RtPORY (LER) 1[X1 CONilNUAi!ON factitty hame(l)
Docket Number (2) llR NJmber (M Pace (3)
Year
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IEX1 (if more space is requiret' Kaine Yankee's Operating Experience Program reluttes that the industry operating plant expertence reports be screened for applicability to Maine Yankee, On November 16, 1992 the review of a report concerning the temporary disabling of tmergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) subsystems during valve stroke testing resulted in the determination that the report was potentially applicable to Maine Yankee ard it was forwarded to the Operations Department for f ormal evaluation. On December 2,1992 thu Operations. Department concluded that for a brief period of time, during the stroke testing c' either of the normally open (CCS pump minimum-flow recirculation valves $1 A-M-$3 or $1A-N-$4, both trains of tre ECC$ tow Pressure Safety injection (BP) and Containment Spray (BE.1 subsystems must be considered inoperable.
Maine Yankee's [CCS includes High Pressure Safety injection (HPSI)(BM, Low Pressure Safety injection (LPSI) and Containment Spray (CS) subsystems. All of the operable [CC$ pumps auto-start on receipt of a Safety injection Actuation Signal ($1AS) to prevent core damage. The LPSI and CS subsystems each have redundant pump trains and an additional pump can serve as a replacement for either one of the LPSI or CS pumps. All five of the LPSI/C5 pumps are served by a comon minimum-flow recirculation line to the plant's Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST).
This comon header has two normally open motor ope *sted isolation valves SI A-M 53 and SI A-M-54 which shut on receipt of a Recirculation Actuation signal (RAS) to prevent fission product transport to the RVST. The isolation valves are arranged in settes. Operation of either the LPSI or CS pumps at shutef f head without a minimum flow path would result in rapid pump degradation and the loss of both trains of LPSI ano C5.
The minimum flow recirculation valves have historically been tasted on a monthly basis in conjunction with the [CCS valve tests. $1nce the valve stroke time acceptance criteria is 35 seconds, the total tims the LPSI and C$ pumps could be cor sidered to be inoperable during the surveillance testing of both valves is approximately two a,d car half minutes per month. During a small break LOCA the Reactor Coolant System (RC$) pressure m'/ not f all below the shut-of f head of the LPS!/CS pumps for some time into the accident. The coincident occurrenes of this condition in conjunction with the short duration surveillance test is not considered to te a credible event.
Maine Yankee's technical specification 3.0. A.? requires that a reactor shut down be initiated within one hour when the plant is not in conformance with a technical specification limiting condition for operation. Prior to July 13, 1992 Maine Yankee did not report conditions which required brief entry into the one hour remedial action allowance of technical specification 3 0. A.2 if the condition was corrected before the one hour time limit was exceeded, On Juiy 13, 1992 Maine Yankee's reporting policy was revised to require that any operational event which requires entry into Technical Specification 3.0. A.2 be reported. Since both trains of ECCS cannot be considered to be operabir* wher. 'he mintmum flow recirculation path is isolated, the requirements of the (CCS teeMc41 W itcation are not satisfied and entry into 3.0.A.2 is required. Since the new reporting poitcy was instituted, stroke testing of the minimum-flow recirculation valves has occurred on the following dates: 8/04/92, 9/01/92, 10/01/92, 10/27/92, 11/24/92; and most recently on !?/31/92.
The root cause of this event is considered to be the failure of the original technical specification license submittal to allow f or surveillancu testing of the minime-flow recirculation valves.
The surveillance is required by Hair.e Yankee Technical Specifications. There are no exceptions in the LCO for ECCS that specifically allow this testing and recent interpretations concluded that this condition is reportable under 10CFR50.73.
In order to minimite the period of time during which the minimum-flow recirculation line is isolated yet tested frequently enough to provide assuonce of the valve's operability, Maine Yankee has changed the f requency of the valve stroke test f rom a monthly basis to a quarterly basis. Matne Yankee is also evaluating the possibility of suteltting a proposed Technical Specification change wMch would grant an exception to the ICCS operability requirements for the stroke testing of 5! A-M-53 and 51A-M-54.
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| 05000309/LER-1993-001, :on 921202,determined That,For Brief Period of Time,Both Trains of ECCS LPSI & Containment Spray Subsystems Inoperable.Caused by Erroneous Original TS License Submittal.Valve Stroke Test Frequency Changed |
- on 921202,determined That,For Brief Period of Time,Both Trains of ECCS LPSI & Containment Spray Subsystems Inoperable.Caused by Erroneous Original TS License Submittal.Valve Stroke Test Frequency Changed
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(8) | | 05000309/LER-1993-002, :on 930121,control Room Ventilation Trains Declared Inoperable Due to Preventive Maint.Consequences of Event Which Will Occurred Quarterly,Minimal Since Loss of Trains Short Duration (Less than 1 H) |
- on 930121,control Room Ventilation Trains Declared Inoperable Due to Preventive Maint.Consequences of Event Which Will Occurred Quarterly,Minimal Since Loss of Trains Short Duration (Less than 1 H)
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000309/LER-1993-003, :on 930211,two Dc Solenoid Pilot Valves Exceeded Environ Qualification Svc Life & Declared Inoperable.Caused by Misidentification of Solenoids.Valves Replaced & EQ Program Updated |
- on 930211,two Dc Solenoid Pilot Valves Exceeded Environ Qualification Svc Life & Declared Inoperable.Caused by Misidentification of Solenoids.Valves Replaced & EQ Program Updated
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000309/LER-1993-004, :on 930308,upper Level Spray Pump Bldg Fire Door Became Inoperable Due to Personnel Error.Heating Ventilation Unit HV-7 Returned to Svc.Precautions Will Be Placed in Ventilation Procedures |
- on 930308,upper Level Spray Pump Bldg Fire Door Became Inoperable Due to Personnel Error.Heating Ventilation Unit HV-7 Returned to Svc.Precautions Will Be Placed in Ventilation Procedures
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000309/LER-1993-005, :on 930308,NRC Inspector Notified CR That Five Manual Valves Necessary to Assure Emergency & Auxiliary Feedwater Flow to Sgs.Caused by Procedural Deficiency.Valves Locked & Controlling Procedure Revised |
- on 930308,NRC Inspector Notified CR That Five Manual Valves Necessary to Assure Emergency & Auxiliary Feedwater Flow to Sgs.Caused by Procedural Deficiency.Valves Locked & Controlling Procedure Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000309/LER-1993-006, :on 930222,defective Cutoff Switch Actuator (Paddle) Detected on Reactor Trip Circuit Breaker 10.Faulty Switch on Breaker Replaced & Trip Breaker Tested Successfully |
- on 930222,defective Cutoff Switch Actuator (Paddle) Detected on Reactor Trip Circuit Breaker 10.Faulty Switch on Breaker Replaced & Trip Breaker Tested Successfully
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000309/LER-1993-007, :on 930315,determined That Automatic Diverse Scram Sys Had Been Inoperable Since 930314.Caused by Transient within Innsdacs.Inputs Were re-enabled & Diverse Scram Sys Returned to Operable Status |
- on 930315,determined That Automatic Diverse Scram Sys Had Been Inoperable Since 930314.Caused by Transient within Innsdacs.Inputs Were re-enabled & Diverse Scram Sys Returned to Operable Status
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000309/LER-1993-008, :on 930415,ECCS Valves Found Unlocked.Caused by Oversight in Procedure Controls Due to Misunderstanding of Lube Water Supply Requirements for Svc Water Pump Operability.Controlling Procedures Revised |
- on 930415,ECCS Valves Found Unlocked.Caused by Oversight in Procedure Controls Due to Misunderstanding of Lube Water Supply Requirements for Svc Water Pump Operability.Controlling Procedures Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000309/LER-1993-009, :on 921116,review of Rept Determined That ECCS Temporarily Disabled During Valve Stroke Testing.On 921202, Determined That Valves SIA-M-53 & SIA-M-54 Inoperable.Valve Stroke Testing Frequency Changed to Quarterly |
- on 921116,review of Rept Determined That ECCS Temporarily Disabled During Valve Stroke Testing.On 921202, Determined That Valves SIA-M-53 & SIA-M-54 Inoperable.Valve Stroke Testing Frequency Changed to Quarterly
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000309/LER-1993-010, :on 930408,determined That Surveillance Testing of ECCS Subcomponents Causes Inoperable ECCS Subsys.Caused by Failure of Original TS License Submittal to Recognize Impact of Testing ECCS Subcomponents |
- on 930408,determined That Surveillance Testing of ECCS Subcomponents Causes Inoperable ECCS Subsys.Caused by Failure of Original TS License Submittal to Recognize Impact of Testing ECCS Subcomponents
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000309/LER-1993-011, :on 930525,integrity of Inner Door of Containment Hatch Compromised.On 930526,hatch Outer Door Opened for Maint on Inner Door & TS 3.0.A.2 Entered.Caused by Failure of O-ring to Seal Uniformly & Lubricant Buildup |
- on 930525,integrity of Inner Door of Containment Hatch Compromised.On 930526,hatch Outer Door Opened for Maint on Inner Door & TS 3.0.A.2 Entered.Caused by Failure of O-ring to Seal Uniformly & Lubricant Buildup
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000309/LER-1993-012, :on 930527,both Trains of CR Ventilation Declared Inoperable as Result of Preventative Maint.Event Occurs Quarterly & Consequence Minimal Since Loss of Both Trains Short Duration (Less than 1 H) |
- on 930527,both Trains of CR Ventilation Declared Inoperable as Result of Preventative Maint.Event Occurs Quarterly & Consequence Minimal Since Loss of Both Trains Short Duration (Less than 1 H)
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000309/LER-1993-013, :on 930618,incorrect Compensatory Action Taken for Inoperable Fire Hose Station.Caused by Personnel Error. Fire Hose Rerouted to Operable Station |
- on 930618,incorrect Compensatory Action Taken for Inoperable Fire Hose Station.Caused by Personnel Error. Fire Hose Rerouted to Operable Station
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000309/LER-1993-014, :on 930701,inoperable ECCS During Pump Recirculation Valve Stroke Test Due to Failure of Original TS License Submittal & Current Regulatory Positions. Changed Frequency of Valve Test |
- on 930701,inoperable ECCS During Pump Recirculation Valve Stroke Test Due to Failure of Original TS License Submittal & Current Regulatory Positions. Changed Frequency of Valve Test
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000309/LER-1993-015, :on 930716,ECCS Valves Found Unlocked.Caused by Result of Design Final Phase of Comprehensive Review Detailing ECCS Design Requirements for Proper Alignment. Valves Locked & Controlling Procedures Revised |
- on 930716,ECCS Valves Found Unlocked.Caused by Result of Design Final Phase of Comprehensive Review Detailing ECCS Design Requirements for Proper Alignment. Valves Locked & Controlling Procedures Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000309/LER-1993-016, :on 930804,multiple 480 Volt Breaker Trips Occurred Due to RMS-9 Device Not Being Actuated.Installed RMS-9 Devices in All AK-25 Breakers |
- on 930804,multiple 480 Volt Breaker Trips Occurred Due to RMS-9 Device Not Being Actuated.Installed RMS-9 Devices in All AK-25 Breakers
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) | | 05000309/LER-1993-017, :on 930815,discovered EDG Sensing Relay Wiring Discrepancy Due to Plants Original Design.Implemented Mod to Design |
- on 930815,discovered EDG Sensing Relay Wiring Discrepancy Due to Plants Original Design.Implemented Mod to Design
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000309/LER-1993-018, :on 930903,discovered Seven Defective Tubes in Number 3 Sg.Caused by General Corrosion Due to Contaminants & Stresses.All Defective Tubes Plugged During 1993 Refueling Outage |
- on 930903,discovered Seven Defective Tubes in Number 3 Sg.Caused by General Corrosion Due to Contaminants & Stresses.All Defective Tubes Plugged During 1993 Refueling Outage
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000309/LER-1993-019, :on 930928,determined That One of Four Available Swps Did Not Deliver Sufficient Flow Capacity to Meet Design Basis.Cause of Pump Degradation Will Be Determined from Overhauled Results |
- on 930928,determined That One of Four Available Swps Did Not Deliver Sufficient Flow Capacity to Meet Design Basis.Cause of Pump Degradation Will Be Determined from Overhauled Results
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000309/LER-1993-020, :on 931012,deviation from TS Requirements for Entry Into Power Operation Condition 7 Noted.Caused by Failure to Recognize Plant Procedure as Stated.Procedures Revised |
- on 931012,deviation from TS Requirements for Entry Into Power Operation Condition 7 Noted.Caused by Failure to Recognize Plant Procedure as Stated.Procedures Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) | | 05000309/LER-1993-021, :on 931104,CEA Position Deviation Alarms Disabled.Rod Position Sensing Sys Cards Removed for Troubleshooting During Refueling Outage on 931001.Cards Reinserted & Alarm Functions Restored |
- on 931104,CEA Position Deviation Alarms Disabled.Rod Position Sensing Sys Cards Removed for Troubleshooting During Refueling Outage on 931001.Cards Reinserted & Alarm Functions Restored
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000309/LER-1993-022, :on 931110,both Trains of Control Room Ventilation Declared Inoperable Due to Preventative Maint. Consequences of Event,Which Occurs Semiannually,Is Minimal Since Loss of Trains Less than 1 H |
- on 931110,both Trains of Control Room Ventilation Declared Inoperable Due to Preventative Maint. Consequences of Event,Which Occurs Semiannually,Is Minimal Since Loss of Trains Less than 1 H
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000309/LER-1993-023, :on 931202,found Pcc/Scc Outside Design Basis Due to Continuous Venting Through Nns Piping.No Corrective Actions Listed at This Time |
- on 931202,found Pcc/Scc Outside Design Basis Due to Continuous Venting Through Nns Piping.No Corrective Actions Listed at This Time
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) |
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