05000298/FIN-2017009-01
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Finding | |
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Title | Exceeding the Technical Specification A llowed Out of Service Time of the Division I RHR System |
Description | Green . The team reviewed a self -revealed, non -cited violation of Technical Specific ation 3.5.1, Emergency Core Cooling Systems Operating, for the licensees failure to restore the Division I residual heat removal system (RHR) during clearance restoration, which resulted in exceeding the applicable technical specification action compl etion time . Specifically, from October 7, 2016, to February 5, 2017, the licensee failed to restore Division I RHR minimum flow isolation valves for RHR pumps A and C to the open position prior to reinstalling the valve sealing devices following maintenan ce perform ed during Refueling Outage 29. The licensees immediate corrective action was to restore the Division I RHR subsystem to operable status by sealing open the minimum flow isolation valves for RHR pumps A and C. The licensee entered this issue in to their corrective action program as C ondition Report CR- CNS -2017- 0055 3. The licensees failure to properly restore the Division I RHR system during clearance restoration resulted in exceeding the applicable technical specification action completion time , in violation of Technical Specification 3.5.1, whi ch was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor, and therefore a finding, because it was associated with the human performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems C ornerst one and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to pr event undesirable consequences. Specifically, the failure to follow technical specification requirements t o ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of the Division I RHR sub system directly affe cted the cornerstone objective. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At -Power, dat ed June 19, 2012, the inspectors determined that the finding required a detail ed risk evaluation because it involved an actual loss of function of at least a single train for greater than its technical spec ification allowed outage time. A detai led risk ev aluation (Attachment 2) calculated an increase in core damage frequency of 4.7E -7 for the 89 days, 12 hours, and 49 minutes exposure period. Therefore, this violation was of very low safety significance (Green). The team determined the finding had a cros s- cutting aspect within the human performance area, challenge the unknown, because individuals fail ed to perform adequate job -site reviews to identify and resolve unexpected conditions. Specifically, operations personnel restoring the Division I RHR subsy stem did 3 not ensure that the minimum flow isolation valves were repositioned to the correct position of sealed open [H.11]. |
Site: | Cooper ![]() |
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Report | IR 05000298/2017009 Section 4OA3 |
Date counted | Jun 30, 2017 (2017Q2) |
Type: | NCV: Green |
cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
Identified by: | Self-revealing |
Inspection Procedure: | IP 71153 |
Inspectors (proximate) | N Hernandez |
Violation of: | Technical Specification |
CCA | H.11, Challenge the Unknown |
INPO aspect | QA.2 |
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Finding - Cooper - IR 05000298/2017009 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Cooper) @ 2017Q2
Self-Identified List (Cooper)
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