05000282/FIN-2012003-06
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Finding | |
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| Title | Licensee-Identified Violation |
| Description | Procedure SWI NE-8, Generation of Fuel Transfer Log, requires fuel assemblies removed from the reactor to be distributed into the final pattern no later than 60 days after reactor sub criticality in accordance with NRC commitment 01024151-01. Contrary to the above, during the Unit 2 refueling outage (2R27), the licensee failed to properly pre-plan and perform the distribution of fuel assemblies removed from the Unit 2 reactor within the time specified by written procedures. The licensee identified this issue on April 28, 2012, and generated CAP 1335689 to document the issue. Immediate corrective actions included moving the spent fuel into the designated final pattern and incorporating the embedded NRC commitment into another procedure which provided specific instructions to the outage management and work management department personnel. The inspectors determined that the failure to identify, evaluate, and implement requirements of SWI NE-8 regarding distribution of fuel assemblies removed from the reactor no later than 60 days after reactor sub-criticality was a performance deficiency. The inspectors determined the issue was more than minor because it impacted the design control attribute of the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers (fuel cladding, reactor coolant system, and containment) protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. Since this issue related to distribution of spent fuel during shut-down operations, the inspectors concluded the IMC 0609 Appendices associated with typical SDP evaluations did not apply. As a result, the inspectors contacted a regional Senior Reactor Analyst (SRA) for assistance in determining the risk significance of this finding since the SDP for shutdown conditions did not address concerns regarding movement of fuel assemblies in the spent fuel pool. The SRA concluded that the use of IMC 0609, Appendix M, Significance Determination Process Using Qualitative Criteria, was the appropriate method for determining the significance. In accordance with IMC 0609, Appendix M, management review of this issue determined that this finding was of very low safety significance since no fuel assemblies were dropped, no unexpected reactivity conditions occurred, or no unanalyzed conditions existed. |
| Site: | Prairie Island  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000282/2012003 Section 4OA7 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2012 (2012Q2) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Barrier Integrity |
| Identified by: | Licensee-identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | |
| Inspectors (proximate) | C Moore C Zoia D Betancourt K Riemer K Stoedter P Cardona Morales P Voss P Zurawski S Shah |
| INPO aspect | |
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Finding - Prairie Island - IR 05000282/2012003 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Prairie Island) @ 2012Q2
Self-Identified List (Prairie Island)
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